

THE
RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE.

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THE
RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

WITH A
COMMENTARY

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
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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

B.

ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ. Δῆλον δρα δτι δ Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ δις ἀλλος σπουδῆ τέχνην
ρητορικὴν διδῷ, πρῶτον πάσῃ ἀκριβείᾳ γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἐν
καὶ δμοιον πέφυκεν ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές. τοῦτο γάρ φαμεν φύσιν εἶναι
δεικνύναι. **ΦΑΙΔΡΟΣ.** Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. **ΣΩ.** Δεύτερον δὲ γε, δτω τι ποιεῖν
ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν. **ΦΑΙ.** Τι μήν; **ΣΩ.** Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ
λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα, δίεισι τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων
ἔκαστον ἔκαστη, καὶ διδάσκων οὐαὶ οὖσα ὥφ' οὖλων λόγων δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ μὲν
πειθεῖται, ἡ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ. **ΦΑΙ.** Καλλιστα γοῦν διν, ὡς ἔοικ', ἔχοι οὔτως. **ΣΩ.** Οὕτοι
μὲν οὖν, ὡς φίλε, ἀλλως ἐνδεικνύμενον ἢ λεγόμενον τέχνην ποτὲ λεχθήσεται ἢ γραφή-
σεται οὕτε τι ἄλλο οὕτε τοῦτο.—PLATO, *Phaedrus*, p. 271.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Β.

I Ἐκ τίνων μὲν οὖν δεῖ καὶ προτρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέ-
πειν καὶ ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν καὶ ἀπο-
λογεῖσθαι, καὶ ποῖαι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις χρήσιμοι

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CHAP. I.

In the following chapter we have a very brief account of the second kind of rhetorical proof, viz. the ethical, the *ἥθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι*. The treatment of it is cursory; and we are referred *backwards* to the analysis of virtue moral and intellectual in Book I c. 9¹, for further details of the topics from which are to be derived the enthymemes whereby the speech and the speaker may be made to assume the required character of *φρόνησις*, *ἀρετὴ* and *εὐνοία*; and *forwards* to the chapter on *φιλίᾳ* and *μῖσος* (II 4), in the treatise on the *πάθη*, where the indications of these affections are enumerated, which will enable the speaker to convey (always by *his speech*) the good intentions and friendly feeling by which he is affected towards his audience. As supplementary and auxiliary to the direct logical arguments this indirect ethical mode of persuasion is indispensable to the success of the speech. People are hardly likely to be convinced by a speaker who sets them against him.

On the order of the subjects of the work in general, and the connexion of the contents of this Chapter, I refer as before to the Introduction [p. 245].

§ I. ἐκ τίνων...ταῦτ' ἔστιν] This is a confusion of two constructions: the grammar requires either *ἐκ τίνων εἰρηται* (or something similar), or else *ἐξ ὧν ταῦτ' ἔστι*. The *ποῖαι* in the second clause shews that the first of the two was the one predominant in the writer's mind, which is carelessly varied at the end.

δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις] These two are in fact the same. The current popular opinions are converted by the artist into premisses of rhetorical enthymemes. They are united again, c. 18 § 2, comp. Topic. A 10, 104 a 12, *εἰσὶ δὲ προτάσεις διαλεκτικαὶ καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐνδόξοις ὅμοια...καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσὶ τὰς εὐρημένας*. And c. 14, init. *τὰς μὲν προτάσεις ἐκλεκτέουν...καὶ ὅσαι δόξαι κατὰ τέχνας εἰσίν*.

'Now the sources from which we must derive our arguments in

¹ The connexion of this chapter with the subject of the Rhetorical *ἥθος* is marked at the opening of the chapter itself: *συμβήσεται γὰρ ἄμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κάκενα δῆλον ἐξ ὧν ποιοι τινες ὑποληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἥθος, ἥπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλοι ἀξιόπιστον δινησόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν.*

πρὸς τὰς τούτων πίστεις, ταῦτ' ἔστιν· περὶ γὰρ τούτων καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰ ἐνθυμήματα, ὡς περὶ ἔκαστον εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔνεκα κρίσεώς ἔστιν ἡ ρῆτορική (καὶ γὰρ τὰς συμβουλὰς κρίνουσι καὶ ἡ δίκη κρίσις ἔστιν), ἀνάγκη μὴ μόνον πρὸς τὸν λόγον ὄραν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικὸς ἔσται καὶ πιστός, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα καὶ τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευά-

exhorting and dissuading, in panegyric and censure, in accusation and defence, and the sort of opinions and premisses that are serviceable for (rhetorical) proof in them, are these: for these are the materials and sources of our enthymemes, specially, so to say, in each kind of speeches'; i. e. using a special treatment according to the kind of speech on which we are engaged. If the text is right here, ὡς περὶ ἔκαστον εἰπεῖν ἰδίᾳ τὸ γένος τῶν λόγων—Bekker retains it unaltered, and Spengel¹ accepts it in his last edition, though he formerly proposed εἴπομεν—this must be the translation of it. ὡς εἰπεῖν ‘so to speak’, (ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ὡς τῷ ποδὶ τεκμήρασθαι, Plat. Phaedr. 230 B, et sim.).

§ 2. The commencement of this section is repeated and dwelt upon at the beginning of c. 18, where, after the parenthetical account of the πάθη and the six special ηθοί, a break occurs, the subsequent contents of the work are enumerated in their order, and the logical part of Rhetoric resumed.

On the extension of the signification of *κρίνειν*, *κρίσις*, *κριτής*, to include decisions or *judgments* of all kinds, moral, political, (as in deciding upon a course of policy to be pursued), literary, (criticism, in matters of taste, works of art, written compositions, and such like), as well as the ordinary application of it to the judicial decisions of the judges in a court of law, compare I I. 7, p. 10, and Introd. p. 137, note 1.

ἀποδεικτικός] ‘demonstrative’, improperly applied to *rhetorical* proof. See note on I I. II, p. 19.

τὸν κριτὴν κατασκευάζειν] (or the audience in general) Quint. v 12. 9, *probationes quas παθητικά vocant, ductas ex affectibus*. There is a sort of ζεύγμα in the application of κατασκευάζειν to αὐτὸν ποιόν τινα, and again to τὸν κριτήν. In both cases it means ‘to establish’ or ‘constitute’, but is applied in two slightly different senses; in the first it is to make himself out to be, to establish a certain character in and by the speech, and in the other to establish a certain feeling or disposition in the minds of the judges.

¹ In his treatise on the Rhetoric in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 39, note, he translates the passage thus: *wie man jedes genus der reden für sich behandeln soll*: understanding ὡς εἰπεῖν, if I do not mistake him, in the sense of ὡς δεῖ εἰπεῖν (?) ‘according as we have to speak’, which seems to me to be hardly allowable. ὡς εἰπεῖν can, I think, in conformity with ordinary Greek usage, have no other sense than that which I have attributed to it. See, for illustrations of ὡς thus used with an infinitive, Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 545.

3 Σειν· πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν, μάλιστα μὲν ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς, εἴτα καὶ ἐν ταῖς δίκαις, τὸ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ τὸ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἔχειν πως αὐτόν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐὰν καὶ 4 αὐτοὶ διακείμενοί πως τυγχάνωσιν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα χρησιμώτερον εἰς τὰς συμβουλάς ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαι πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας· οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ

§ 3. πολὺ γὰρ διαφέρει πρὸς πίστιν κ.τ.λ.] Comp. I 2. 4, 5. Quint. IV 5. 6, *interim refugienda non modo distinctio quaestionum est, sed omnino tractatio: affectibus perturbandus et ab intentione auferendus auditor. Non enim solum oratoris est docere, sed plus eloquentia circa movendum valet.* This goes beyond Aristotle: Quintilian however is speaking rather of the *πάθος*, of the *τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα κατασκευάζειν*, than of the *ἡθος*. He sets the *πάθος* above the *ἡθος* in point of its importance and value to the orator as a means of persuasion; Aristotle, admitting this in forensic speaking, takes the opposite view in the deliberative kind; § 4¹. But compare I 2. 4, where a decided preference for the *ἡθος* is expressed.

'For the assumption of a certain character by the speaker himself, and the supposition (of the audience) that he is disposed in a particular way (has certain feelings towards themselves), makes a great difference in respect of the persuasive effect of the speech, first and foremost in counselling or deliberation, and next in legal proceedings (*ἡθος*); and besides this, whether they (the audience) are *themselves* in some particular disposition (feeling, frame of mind) (towards him) (*πάθος*)?'

ἐν ταῖς συμβουλαῖς] 'consultations'. Plat. Gorg. 455 A, *ὅταν στρατηγῶν ἄιρέσεως πέρι...συμβουλὴ*.

§ 4. τὸ δὲ διακεῖσθαι πως τὸν ἀκροατὴν εἰς τὰς δίκας] Comp. I 2. 4, διὰ δὲ τὸν ἀκροατῶν...οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χάιροντες...πρὸς ὅ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαι φαμεν πραγματεύεσθαι τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογοῦντας, who wrote only for the use of pleaders in the courts of justice, I I. 9, 10.

οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα φαίνεται φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, κ.τ.λ.] Cic. de Orat. II 42. 178, *nihil est enim in dicendo maius quam ut faveat oratori is qui audiet, utique t'pse sic moveatur ut impetu quodam animi et perturbatione magis quam iudicio aut consilio regatur. Plura enim multo homines iudicant odio aut amore aut cupiditate aut iracundia aut dolore aut laetitia aut spe*

¹ The reason of this is, that when a man has to recommend or dissuade a certain course of action, his character and the opinion entertained of it must give great weight to his advice: and it is not in the law-court, but in public life, in quelling the seditious riot, that Virgil's *vir pietate gravis ac meritiss* (in the famous simile, Aen. I. 149) exhibits his 'authority': whereas in a court of justice, where facts are in question, the speaker's assumed character has either no weight at all, or in a far less degree.

μισοῦσιν, οὐδ' ὀργιζομένοις καὶ πράως ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἡ p. 1378.
τὸ παράπαν ἔτερα ἢ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος ἔτερα· τῷ μὲν
γὰρ φιλοῦντι, περὶ οὗ ποιεῖται τὴν κρίσιν, ἢ οὐκ ἀδι-
κεῖν ἢ μικρὰ δοκεῖ ἀδικεῖν, τῷ δὲ μισοῦντι τούναντίον· p. 55.
καὶ τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ εὐέλπιδι ὄντι, ἐὰν ἢ τὸ

aut timore aut errore aut aliqua per motione mentis quam veritate aut praescripto aut iuris norma aliqua aut iudicii formula aut legibus. And on this importance of *εὔνοια*, that is, the conciliation of it in the audience by making your own good will apparent in the speech, compare Demosth. de Cor. § 277, p. 318, κάκείνο δ' εὐδολός, ὅτι τὴν ἐμὴν δεινότητα—ἕστω γάρ· καίτοι ἔγωγ' ὥρῳ τῆς τῶν λεγόντων δυνάμεως τοὺς ἀκούοντας τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος κυρίους ὄντας· ὡς γὰρ ἀν ὑμεῖς ἀποδέξησθε καὶ πρὸς ἔκαστον ἔχητ' εὔνοιας, οὕτως δὲ λέγων ἔδοξε φρονεῖν κ.τ.λ.

τὸ παράπαν ἔτερα...τὸ μέγεθος ἔτερα] ('either altogether different', different in *kind*; 'or in magnitude and amount', different in *degree*.) This clause (to *τούναντίον*) is explanatory of the effect of the *πάθη* upon the audience, (not of the *ἡθος*,) as appears from the example chosen, *φιλία* and *μῆτρα* being *πάθη*, II 4: and it belongs especially, though not exclusively—for in such cases as the *public* speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines it might be usefully, and in fact was, employed—to *forensic* practice; the result being in this case either complete acquittal from a charge (*οὐκ ἀδικεῖν*) or a lenient construction of it, and a mitigation of the penalty (*ἢ μικρὰ ἀδικεῖν*). The next (after *τούναντίον*) refers principally to the *deliberative* branch of Rhetoric, as is shewn by the future *time*—the *time* of the deliberative speaker is the *future*, I 3. 2—τὸ ἐσόμενον, καὶ ἐσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐσεσθαι; and accordingly for the use of speakers in this branch the emotions appealed to must be different and adapted to a different purpose. The two which will be most serviceable to the public speaker are desire (*ἐπιθυμία*) and hope (*ἐλπίς*): those who are under the excitement of such feelings will be more likely to assent to the course of policy proposed, and so ensure the success of the speaker who recommends. It is singular however that neither of these is found in the list of *πάθη* which follows: *ἐπιθυμία* occurs amongst them in Eth. Nic. II 4; and hope may possibly be included under *θάρρος*, as the opposite of *φόβος*, in the analysis of τὸ θαρράλεον and θάρρος, Rhet. II 5. 16, to the end. This is partially confirmed by II 5. 16; after telling us that *confidence* is the opposite of *fear*, he adds ὡστε μετὰ φαντασίας ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἔγγὺς ὄντων, as if 'the hope of near approaching safety' were convertible with, or the ground of, confidence, and therefore a *πάθος* opposed to *φόβος*. In the same way *εὔνοια*, in the three 'ethical' virtues to be exhibited in the speech, is included in *φιλία*.

'And to one who feels a desire for anything, or is in a sanguine frame of mind, the future result (announced by the speaker), if it be pleasant, appears to be both certain and good; whilst to any one who has no (such) feeling, or is in a bad humour, the contrary (is true, is the case)'.

ἐσόμενον ἡδύ, καὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἔσεσθαι φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἀπαθεῖ καὶ δυσχεραίνοντι τούναντίον.

5 τοῦ μὲν οὖν αὐτοὺς εἶναι πιστοὺς τοὺς λέγοντας τρία ἔστι τὰ αἴτια· τοσαῦτα γάρ ἔστι δι' ἀ πιστεύομεν ἔξω τῶν ἀποδείξεων. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια· διαψεύδονται γάρ περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν ἢ συμβουλεύοντιν ἢ διὰ πάντα ταῦτα ἢ διὰ τούτων τι· ἢ γάρ δι' ἀφροσύνην οὐκ ὄρθως δοξάζουσιν, ἢ δοξάζοντες ὄρθως διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δο-

§ 5. *ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα φρόνησις καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ εὔνοια*] On Whately's comparison (*Rhetoric*, c. 2) of these three qualities as constituting the ethical character of the speech, with the character of Pericles, as drawn by himself, in Thuc. II 60, see Introd. p. 246, note 1. The explanation of them, and the reason of their selection, are there given. *φρόνησις* is the *intellectual* virtue of 'practical wisdom', essential above all to a statesman; *ἀρετὴ* is *moral virtue*, of character and conduct; *εὔνοια* is required in the speaker himself (or rather in his *speech*) as part of the *ἡθος*, and in the audience as a *πάθος*. In the *Politics* VIII (v) 9, init. the correspondence is exact, and the three same qualities or virtues are selected as the special qualifications of the statesman: *τρία δέ τινα χρή ἔχειν τοὺς μέλλοντας ἄρχειν τὰς κυρίας ἀρχάς, πρώτον μὲν φύλαν πρὸς τὴν καθεστώσαν πολιτείαν* (this is something rather different from the *εὔνοια* of the *Rhetic*; but the *purpose* of *Rhetic* and of *Politics* is different), *ἔπειτα δύναμιν μεγίστην τῶν ἔργων τῆς ἀρχῆς* (this is 'ability', corresponding to *φρόνησις* in *Rhet.* and the combination of knowledge and eloquence in Thucyd.), *τρίτον δὲ ἀρετὴν καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἐν ἔκαστῃ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν*. It seems not unlikely that Arist. may have borrowed this from Thuc., altering however and perhaps improving the classification and the expression, and adapting it to his immediate purpose in the *Politics* and the *Rhetic*.

διαψεύδονται] '(the speakers) make mistakes, or false statements', whether intentionally or unintentionally; *ψεύδεσθαι* can bear either sense. In the *Nic. Eth.* where it occurs several times, VI 3, 1139 b 18, ib. c. 6, 1140 b 4, c. 13, 1144 a 35; IX 3, 1165 b 8, and in the ordinary usage of other authors, it appears to be always 'to be deceived', implying an unintentional error, accordingly here also the mistakes and false statements must be represented as unintentional, so far as the word is concerned; though the alternative *διὰ μοχθηρίαν*—the second case, when *ἀρετὴ* is lacking—shews that it is also possible to make them intentionally and with intent to deceive. The fact is that here again is a sort of *ζεῦγμα*, and *διαψεύδεσθαι* (as interpreted by the ordinary usage of it) will only apply properly to the first of the three cases; in the other two it requires some modification. The concluding observation, *διόπερ ἐνδέχεται...γιγνώσκοντας*, 'it is possible to do this with one's eyes open', looks as if it was meant to supply this.

κοῦντα λέγουσιν, ἡ φρόνιμοι μὲν καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς εἰσὶν ἀλλ’ οὐκ εὖνοι, διόπερ ἐνδέχεται μὴ τὰ βέλτιστα συμβουλεύειν γιγνώσκοντας. καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸν ἀπαντα δοκοῦντα ταῦτ’ ἔχειν εἶναι 7 τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις πιστόν. ὅθεν μὲν τοίνυν φρόνιμοι καὶ σπουδαῖοι φανεῖν ἄν, ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διηρημένων ληπτέον· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γάρ κανέντες ταῦτα κανέντες τοιοῦτον κατασκευάσειε τοιοῦτον· περὶ δὲ εὔνοίας 8 καὶ φιλίας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη λεκτέον νῦν. ἔστι δὲ τὰ πάθη δι’ ὅσα μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρουσι πρὸς

§ 6. διὰ μοχθηρίαν οὐ τὰ δοκοῦντα λέγουσιν] i. e. from corrupt motives do not state their real opinions. Whately's parallel from Thucydides, above referred to, though not precisely corresponding to the three virtues of the speech here described, is yet sufficiently close to serve as a commentary on this passage of Aristotle; and as pourtraying, in terse and vigorous language, the character of an upright and independent statesman, such as were rare at Athens, it is sufficiently striking in itself, to deserve quotation on its own account. καίτοι ἐμὸι τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὅργιζεσθε, says Pericles, ὃς οὐδενὸς οἴομαι ἥσσων εἶναι γνῶναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταῦτα φιλοπόλις (Aristotle's *εὖνοια*) τε καὶ χρημάτων κρίσισσων. (This illustrates the *μοχθηρία*, the *malus animus*, of the other, which consists in suppressing your convictions or making false statements from corrupt or interested motives.) ὁ τε γάρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἵστρῳ καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐνεθυμήθη ὁ τ' ἔχων ἀμφότερα, τῇ δὲ πόλει δύστονος, οὐκ ἄν ὁμοίως τι οἰκείως φράσαι· πρόστοντος δὲ καὶ τοῦδε, χρήμασι δὲ νικωμένου, τὰ ξύμπαντα τούτου ἐνὸς ἄν πωλοῦτο, Thuc. II 60.

§ 7. ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς διηρημένων] ‘from the analysis of the virtues’, in I 9. περὶ εὔνοίας καὶ φιλίας, in II 4.

ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γάρ κ.τ.λ.] κατασκευάζειν here again has the same double sense and application as before, § 2. It is to make *oneself* out, make to appear, in the speech; and to put others in such and such a frame of mind. Both of these can be done, he says, by the use of the same topics, namely those of I 9. The topics there applied to panegyric under the epideictic branch, can be here transferred to the representation of the speaker's own character in and by his speech.

§ 8. τὰ πάθη] Of the various senses and applications of *πάθος*, and also of its special signification in Aristotle's ethical system, an account is given in the Introduction, p. 133 seq.; together with a comparison of the two lists here and in the Nic. Ethics. These two it will be seen differ materially. I have further referred (p. 246, note 1, on the summary of this chapter) to Mr Bain's work *On the Emotions and the Will* for a complete and scientific explanation of the actual facts of those which are also included in Aristotle's lists, either here or in the Nic. Eth., viz. anger, resentment, righteous indignation, terror and confidence or courage, love and hatred.

τὰς κρίσεις, οἷς ἔπεται λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, οἷον ὄργὴ
ἔλεος φόβος καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ τούτοις
9 ἐναντία. δεῖ δὲ διαιρεῖν τὰ περὶ ἔκαστον εἰς τρία.
λέγω δὲ οἷον περὶ ὄργῆς, πῶς τε διακείμενοι ὄργίλοι
εἰσί, καὶ τίσιν εἰώθασιν ὄργίζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις· εἰ
γάρ τὸ μὲν ἐν ἥ τὰ δύο ἔχοιμεν τούτων, ἀπαντα δὲ
μή, ἀδύνατον ἀν εἴη τὴν ὄργὴν ἐμποιεῖν· ὁμοίως δὲ

What is here said of them, that they are characterised, as parts of our moral nature, by being always attended by pleasure and pain—one or both, as anger—is found likewise in Eth. N. II 4, sub init. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμιαὶ ὄργὴν φόβον θράσος (so written here; more correctly θάρσος, II 5. 16,) φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μίσος πόθον ζῆλον ζλεον, ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἥ λύπη. In Eth. Eudem. II 2, 1220 b 12, it is said of them, λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβων αἰδὼ ἐπιθυμιαὶ, (this is of course not intended for a complete list: αἰδὼς and ἐπιθυμία come from the Nic. Eth., the former from the end of Book IV., where it appears with νέμεσις as an appendage to the list of virtues; it is found likewise in the Rhet. II 6, under the name αἰσχύνη. ἐπιθυμία is absent in the Rhetoric), ὅλως οἷς ἔπεται ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ (this is a modification of Aristotle's statement) ἡ αἰσθητικὴ (this also is an addition) ἡδονὴ ἥ λύπη καθ αὐτά. In Magn. Mor. A 7, 8, there is a summary account, borrowed directly from Aristotle, of the three elementary divisions of man's moral nature, πάθη δυνάμεις ξέεις. Of the first we find, πάθη μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὄργὴ φόβος μίσος πόθος ζῆλος ζλεος, τὰ τοιαῦτα, οἷς εἴωθε παρακολουθεῖν λύπη καὶ ἡδονή, 1186 a 12, which is afterwards thus modified, c. 8, 1186 a 34, τὰ δὲ πάθη ἤτοι λύπαι εἰσιν ἥ ἡδοναι, ἥ οὐκ ἀνεν λύπης ἥ ἡδονῆς. These πάθη proper are therefore distinguished from other πάθη, feelings or affections of like nature, such as the appetites, hunger and thirst (which are also attended by pleasure and pain), not by pleasure and pain in general, as seems to be implied in the above statements, but by the particular kinds of pleasures and pains that severally accompany them; bodily in the one case, mental and moral in the other. So that the appetites belong to the body or material, the 'emotions', as they are now called, to the mind and the moral, immaterial, part of man; and feeling (the general term) and emotion (the special term) are thus distinguished: all emotions are feelings, all feelings are not emotions.

μεταβάλλοντες διαφέρονται (differ by change) 'are brought over to a different state of mind or feeling'. πρὸς τὰς κρίσεις 'in respect of their decisions', of *all* kinds; but especially judicial decisions and those of national assemblies on questions of policy or expediency.

§ 9. For rhetorical purposes we must divide the examination of each πάθος into three parts; the nature of them, what the disposition is in one who feels the emotion; the ordinary objects, against whom the emotion is directed (as the ordinary objects of anger); and the ordinary conditions, the occasions and circumstances which give rise to them. Without the knowledge of all three in each case, it is impossible to excite in the mind of anyone the feeling or emotion required.

καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν προειρημένων διεγράψαμεν τὰς προτάσεις, οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων ποιήσωμεν καὶ διέλωμεν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον.

I ἔστω δὴ ὁργὴ ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινο- CHAP. II.

διαγράφειν, *de-scribere, de-lineare*, to *describe*, lit. draw in detail, with all the divisions (*διά*) marked: comp. *διάγραμμα*, of a mathematical *diagram*: applied to a descriptive analysis of a subject.

On this part of Aristotle's Rhetoric, the treatise on the *πάθη*, Bacon has the following remarks, *de Augm. Scient.* VII 3, Vol. I. p. 736, ed. Ellis et Spedding: 'Et hic rursus subiit nova admiratio, Aristotelem, qui tot libros de Ethicis conscripsit, Affectus ut membrum Ethicae principale in illis non tractasse; in Rheticis autem ubi tractandi interveniunt secundario (quatenus scilicet oratione cieri aut commoveri possint) locum illis reperisse; (in quo tamen loco, de iis, quantum tam paucis fieri potuit, acute et bene disseruit)'. I quote this with the more pleasure, as one of the few fair statements of Aristotle's merits to be found in Bacon's writings.

CHAP. II.

§ 1. [ἔστω δὴ] said of a *provisional* definition, suitable for rhetorical purposes, but without scientific exactness. Comp. I 5. 3, and note, 6. 2, 7. 2, 10. 3. On rhetorical definitions, see Introd. p. 13.

[ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης—μὴ προσήκοντος] This definition of anger occurs likewise in the Topics, Θ 156 α 30, ή ὁργὴ ὄρεξις εἶναι τιμωρίας διὰ φαινούμενην δλεγωρίαν, as an average specimen of a *dialectical* definition; whence no doubt it was imported into the Rhetoric. Another definition similar to this is again spoken of as popular and dialectical, and opposed to a true 'physical' definition, *de Anima* I, 403 α 29, διαφερόντως δ ἀν ὄρισαντο φυσικές τε καὶ διαλεκτικὸς ἔκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὁργὴ τί ἔστιν ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως η τι τοιοῦτον, ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἴματος καὶ θερμοῦ; the latter is the 'appropriate' form of definition. And Plutarch, *de Virt. Mor.* p. 442 B, speaks of ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως in terms which seem to imply that Aristotle had himself employed as his own definition. This, says Seneca, *de Ira*, I 3. 3, very nearly corresponded with his own, (*cupiditas iniuriae ulciscendae* I 2. 4,) *ait enim* (Arist.) iram esse cupiditatem doloris reponendi; which appears to be a translation of ὄρεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως. A passage of the Eth. Nic. VII 7, 1149 α 30, will illustrate some points of the definition of the Rhetoric. ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερπότητα καὶ ταχυτῆτα... ὅρμῃ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος η η φαντασία ὅτι ὑβρίς η δλεγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ο δ ὡσπερ συλλογισμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς η δ ἐπιθυμία, ἐὰν μόνον εἴπη ὅτι ηδὲ ὁ λόγος η η αἰσθησις, ὅρμῃ πρὸς τὴν ἀπόλανσιν. Here two elements of anger are distinguished. And the pain lies in the struggle which the θυμός undergoes, whilst the pleasure is caused by the satisfaction of the ἐπιθυμία, the *appetite* or *desire* of satisfaction or compensation for the injury inflicted, which is the object of the τιμωρία. Victorius quotes the Stoic definition of anger, τιμωρίας ἐπεθυμία τοῦ δοκούντος ηδικηκέναι οὐ προσήκοντως, which is derived probably from this of Aristotle.

μένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν

ὤρεξις as a general term denotes a class of *ὤρεξις*, instinctive and impulsive faculties of the soul or immaterial part, intellectual as well as moral, the ultimate origin of all action in the human subject. Sir W. Hamilton, *Lect. on Metaph.* I p. 185, laments the want of any corresponding word in modern psychology, and proposes to supply it by the term 'conative' faculties. The *ὤρεξις*, so far as it is described at all, is noticed in de Anima II 3, sub init., and afterwards more at length in III 9 and 10; compare also Eth. N. VI 2. The first of these passages enumerates the ascending stages or forms of life which characterise and distinguish the ascending orders of plants and animals. The first, *τὸ θρηπτικόν*, the life or principle of growth and nutrition, is the lowest form, and is characteristic of plants, which have no other. The second stage in the development of life is *τὸ αἰσθητικόν*, with which *τὸ ὀρεκτικόν*, the ultimate origin of motion in the living animal, is inseparably connected; (sensation implies impulse) both of them being instinctive and both together constituting animal as distinguished from plant. But the lowest animals have no power of motion; consequently the next stage in the upward course is *τὸ κινητικόν*, local motion, or locomotion in space, *κατὰ τόπον*. The last, which is peculiar to humanity, is *τὸ διανοητικόν*, the intellectual element, divided into *νοῦς* and *δέαντα*. The *ὀρεκτικόν* is here divided, 414 b 2, into three classes of faculties, *ἐπιθυμίᾳ* (the appetites, or sensual desires)¹, *θυμός* (the passions, anger, love, hatred, and all the more violent and impetuous emotions, the angry passions especially—the word is as old as Homer, a relic of antiquity, and as a psychological term very vague and indistinct), and lastly *βούλησις*, which seems here to include 'will' as well as 'wish'. The will is more directly implied, though never disengaged and distinctly expressed, in the *προαιρεσίᾳ*, the moral faculty of deliberate purpose: this consists of an intellectual, and also of an impulsive element, the spontaneous origin of moral action which it is the office of the intellectual part to direct aright; the *προαιρεσίᾳ* accordingly is *ὤρεξις βουλευτική*, Eth. N. VI 2, 1139 a 24, or again, *ὀρεκτικός νοῦς ἢ ὡρεξις διανοητική*, ib. b 4. These two elements in combination, (the *προαιρεσίᾳ*), are the *ἀρχὴ πράξεως*, ib. a 32, of which the *ὤρεξις* (and so de Anima III 9. 2, 3, ἐν δὴ τὸ κινοῦν, *τὸ ὀρεκτικόν*), is the

¹ This reference of *ἐπιθυμίᾳ* to the class of *ὤρεξις* indicates, as Plutarch, de Virt. Mor. c. 3 (ap. Heitz, *Verlor. Schrift. Arist.* p. 171), has pointed out, a change in the Aristotelian psychology, from the Platonic tripartite division of the human nature, intellectual and moral, which he originally held—*ὡς δῆλον ἔστιν ἐξ ὅν* *Ἐγραψεν*, i.e. in the lost dialogue *περὶ δικαιοσύνης*, according to Heitz: the *θυμοειδές* and *ἐπιθυμητικόν* are actually distinguished, Topic. B 7, 113 a 36—b 3, and Δ 5, 126 a 8—13, where we have the three, *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*, *τὸ θυμοειδές*, *τὸ λογιστικόν* (in both passages *τὸ θυμοειδές* is assigned as the seat of *δργή*); and the division is certainly implied in Polit. IV (VII) 7, 1327 b 36, seq., where the author is criticising the Republic to the views expressed in the de Anima, in which the Platonic division is criticised, condemned, and rejected. Plutarch, I. c., p. 442 B, after the statement above quoted, continues, *ἔστερον δὲ τὸ μὲν θυμοειδές τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ προσένεμεν, ὡς ἐπιθυμίαν τινὰ τὸν θυμόν ὄντα καὶ ὥρεξιν ἀντιλυπῆσεως.*

original moving agent; and this, though not expressly so called, is in fact the will. In de Anima III cc. 9, 10, are repeated the statements of II 3, with the addition of further details. Of the three component elements of ὄρεξις, the second, θυμός, is omitted: and the five stages of life of the former passage still remaining five, the intellectual is now divided into two, τὸ νοητικόν, and τὸ βούλευτικόν (the speculative and practical reason), and the κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον has disappeared. How this division of the ψυχή, soul or life, is to be reconciled with that of the Ethics II 4, into πάθη δυνάμεις ἔξεις, Aristotle has not told us, and no one I believe has yet discovered. Of the three sets of ὄρεξις above mentioned ὄργη must belong to the θυμός.

μετὰ λύπης] all the πάθη being attended by pleasure or pain; or sometimes both, as ὄργη. Note on c. 1. 8.

φαινομένης and φαινομένην] are both emphatic; not merely ‘apparent’ and unreal, but ‘manifest, conspicuous, evident’. φαινομένη τιμωρία, ‘a punishment of which the effect can be perceived’, (comp. II 3. 16, and note; II 4. 31, αἰσθεσθαι γὰρ κ.τ.λ.) and διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγωρίαν, ‘due to a manifest slight’; a slight which is so manifest that it cannot escape observation; and therefore because it *has* been noticed by everybody, requires the more exemplary punishment in the way of compensation. It is because anger is an impulse towards this punishment or vengeance *that can be seen*, and accompanied with pain until this impulse is quieted by satisfaction, that we are told in I 11. 9, ‘that no one is angry with one who appears to be beyond the reach of his vengeance, or with those who are very far superior to him in power’.

With φαινομένης, for φαινερᾶς, comp. I 7. 31 (note), 8. 6; 9. 32; II 10. 1; II. I; III 2. 9, διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι, compared with II 23. 30, where the same phrase occurs with φαινερὰ εἶναι for φαίνεσθαι. Topic. H 3, 153 a 31, ὅποιον ἀν μάλιστα φαῖη ὁ ἐναντίος ὄρισμός. Eth. Nic. III 7, 1113 b 19, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα φαίνεται, καὶ μὴ ἔχομεν κ.τ.λ. Parv. Nat. de Long. Vit. c. 5, sub init. φαίνεται γὰρ οὕτως. Compare also, alike for the sense and the expression, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 b 28, ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ γὰρ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὄργη ἔστιν: and Top. B 2, 109 b 36, the parallel case of envy, εἰ γὰρ ὁ φθόνος ἔστι λύπη ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ εὐπραγίᾳ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν τινός. Plato Phaedo 84 C, ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡς ιδεῖν ἐφαίνετο, (as *plainly* appeared in his face and gesture). Eth. Eudem. III 1, 1229 b 12 (quoted in note on II 5. 1), is a good instance.

ὅλιγωρίαν] ‘slight esteem or regard’, ‘slight’. The cause of anger is stated so nearly in the same terms in Rhet. ad Alex. 34 (35). II, ὄργὴν δέ (ἐμποιήσομεν), ἐάν ἐπιδεικνύωμεν παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον ὠλιγωρημένους ἢ ἡδικημένους, ἢ τῶν φίλων ἐκείνων, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὡν κηδόμενοι τυγχάνουσιν αὐτοῖς, that one might almost suppose that the two explanations are derived from some common source, perhaps a definition of anger current in the earlier treatises on Rhetoric, Thrasymachus’ ἔλεοι (Rhet. III 1. 7, Plat. Phaedr. 267 C), and the like.

A valuable commentary on this explanation of the cause of anger, the coincidence between the two being manifestly accidental, is to be found in Prof. Bain’s work on *The Emotions and the Will*, p. 166, ch. ix. § 3, on the ‘irascible emotion’. “These two facts both pertain,” he says, “to the nature of true anger, the discomposure of mind from the circumstance of

τὸν ὀλιγωρεῦν μὴ προσήκοντος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ'

another man's intention in working evil against us, and the cure of this discomposure by the submission or suffering of the agent." I will only add one remark upon this interesting subject ; that when Aristotle assigns ὀλιγωρία, the contempt and indifference to our feelings and sense of personal dignity implied in the notion of 'slight', as the main cause of the emotion of anger, he is thinking only of the angry passion as excited against a fellow man. Yet we are angry with a dog that bites, or a cat that scratches us¹, and here there cannot in all cases be any sense of undeserved contempt or indifference to provoke the angry feeling ; though perhaps sometimes it may be increased by such an act of aggression, if the animal happen to be a pet or favourite, in which case we may extend (by analogy) human feelings to the brute, comparing him unconsciously with a friend who has injured us, and forgetting the intellectual and moral differences of the two, which aggravate the offence in the *human* subject. Seneca denies the capacity of anger to all but man: de Ira, I 3. 4, *dicendum est feras ira carere et omnia praeter hominem.*

τῶν εἰς αὐτὸν ('him' i. e. αὐτόν, 'himself') ή *τῶν αὐτοῦ*] This phrase, which is unusually elliptical—even for Aristotle—must it seems be thus filled up and explained. *τῶν εἰς αὐτόν* means *τῶν ἀδικηθέντων* or simply *πραχθέντων εἰς αὐτόν*, 'offences or acts committed against oneself', and *ὀλιγωρίαν τῶν* is, 'slight or contemptuous indifference of', i.e. shewn in, evidenced by, offences &c.: in supplying the ellipse in the other part of the phrase, ή *τῶν αὐτοῦ*, we are guided by a similar expression, c. 8 § 7, *συμβεβήκότα ή αὐτῷ* (so the MSS here) ή *τῶν αὐτοῦ*, ή *ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι ή αὐτῷ ή τῶν αὐτοῦ*; in both of them the indef. pronoun is omitted, ή *τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ* in c. 2. 1, and *tui* in the two other places.

τὸν ὀλιγωρεῦν μὴ προσήκοντος², the last term of the definition, adds to

1 On the manner in which anger vents itself upon all sorts of objects indiscriminately, see Plut. de cohibenda ira, p. 455 D, θυμῷ δ' ἀθικτον οὐδὲν οὐδὲ ἀνεπιχειρητον ἀλλ' ὀργιζόμεθα καὶ πολεμοις καὶ φίλοις καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γονεῦσι, καὶ θεοῖς νηὶ Δίᾳ, καὶ θηρίοις, καὶ ἀψύχοις σκεύεσι, which is further illustrated by some examples.

2 This appears likewise in the Stoic definition quoted above. I believe it has not hitherto been noticed that the four terms usually employed in Greek to express the notion of duty or obligation may be distinguished as implying four different sources of obligation, and represent appeals to four different principles by which our actions are guided. The four are *προσήκει*, δεῖ, χρή, πρέπει. The first, τὸ *προσήκον*, expresses a natural connexion or relationship, and hence a law of *nature*, the prescriptions of φύσις; as *οἱ προσήκοντες* are our *natural relations*. This, therefore, is the form of obligation that nature imposes upon us, or natural propriety. The second, δεῖ, is of course connected with δεῖν, 'to bind', and δεσμός, and denotes the 'binding nature of an ob-ligation', which is equally suggested by the Lat. *obligatio*. τὸ δέον is therefore the *moral bond*, the *binding engagement*, by which we are bound to do what is right. The third, χρή, τὸ χρεών, appeals to the principle of utility or expediency, χρῆσθαι, χρέα, by which human conduct is directed as a principle of action, and accordingly expresses the obligation of a man's duty to himself, and the necessary regard for his own interest which the law of self-preservation requires. Besides these, we have πρέπει, τὸ πρέπον; *decorum, quod deceat*, Cic. de Off. I. 27, *quod aptum est in omni vita*; the befitting,

ἐστὶν ἡ ὄργη, ἀνάγκη τὸν ὄργιζόμενον ὄργιζεσθαι ἀεὶ

the offence at the slight which provokes anger the consciousness or feeling that the slight is something which is not our *due*: by a slight the sense of personal dignity is offended: we know that we do not deserve it, and are the more enraged. This is a necessary qualification—a *συμβεβηκὸς καθ' αὐτό*, and therefore added to the *definition*—because there may be cases in which an insult or injury arouses no angry feeling, when the person insulted is very far inferior in rank and condition to the offender or of a very abject and submissive temper, or if the power of the aggressor is so great and imposing, that the injured person is terrified and daunted instead of angry, II 3. 10. So at least Aristotle: but I am more inclined to agree with Seneca on this point, who to a supposed objection to his definition, *cupiditas ulciscendi*, replies thus, de Ira, I 3. 2, *Primum diximus cupiditatem esse poenas exigendae, non facultatem: concupiscent autem homines et quae non possunt. Deinde nemo tam humilis est, qui poenam vel summi hominis sperare non possit: ad nocendum potentes sumus.* And anger is apt to be blind and unreasonable. This is an answer to I 11. 9, already referred to.

The definition therefore of anger in full, is as follows: ‘an impulsive desire, accompanied by pain (and also pleasure, as is afterwards added), of vengeance (punishment of, and compensation for, an offence) visible or evident (in its result), due to a manifest (and unmistakeable) slight (consisting, or shewn) in (insults, indignities, wrongs) directed against ourselves, or (any) of our friends, when (we feel that) the slight is undeserved’; or literally, ‘is not naturally and properly belonging to us’, not our *due*, in consideration of our rank and importance or of our personal merits and qualifications.

Bacon’s *Essay, Of Anger*, has one point at least in common with Aristotle’s delineation of it. “The causes and motives of anger are chiefly three. First to be too sensible of *hurt*; for no man is angry that feels not himself hurt... The next is, the apprehension and construction of the injury offered to be, in the circumstances thereof, full of *contempt*: for contempt is that which putteth an edge upon anger, as much or more than the hurt itself.” “For raising and appeasing anger in another; it is done chiefly by choosing of times, when men are forwardest and worst disposed, to incense them. Again, by gathering all that you can find out to aggravate the contempt.”

§ 2. Anger is directed against the individual, not the *genus* or *species* (comp. c. 3. 16): that is, it is excited by a definite, concrete, single individual, and by a distinct provocation, not by a mere mental abstraction, or a whole class of objects. This is one of the characteristics which distinguish it from *μῖσος* or *έχθρα*; *infra* c. 4, καὶ ἡ μὲν ὄργη δεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ'

the becoming; which represents the general notion of *fitness* or *propriety*: that principle of *ἀρμονία* or *κοσμιότης* (and the *κόσμος*), of harmony and adaptation, which Dr Clarke selected as the basis of all morality, and styled ‘the fitness of things’. Our English words *ought* and *duty*, expressive of moral obligation in general, are both of them borrowed from the notion of ‘a debt,’ which is ‘owed’ in the one case, and ‘due’ from us in the other, to our neighbour; comp. *δψεῖλειν, ὥφελων*. “Owe no man any thing, but to love one another.”

τῶν καθ' ἔκαστον τινι, οἷον Κλέωνι ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνθρώπῳ,
καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸν ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά τι πεποίηκεν ἡ ἥμελ- P. 1378 b.
λεν, καὶ πάσῃ ὄργῃ ἐπεσθαὶ τινα ἥδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς
ἔλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι ἥδον μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἴεσθαι
τεύξεσθαι ὡν ἐφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν φαινομένων ἀδυ-
νάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, οἱ δὲ ὄργιζόμενος ἐφίεται δυνατῶν
αὐτῷ. διὸ καλῶς εἴρηται περὶ θυμοῦ

ὅς τε πολὺ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο
ἀνδρῶν ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀέξεται·

ἔκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἡ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην
μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἄπας. [For Κλέωνι, see III 5. 2.] Add to these,
national antipathies, family feuds, class prejudices, religious and political
enmities, the *odium theologicum*, &c. On the ordinary objects of anger,
Prof. Bain says, *Emotions and Will*, p. 163, “The objects of irascible
feeling are chiefly persons; but inanimate things may occasionally cause
an imperfect form of it to arise.” Aristotle omits this. Mr Bain, more
correctly than Aristotle, includes under the same head, ‘the irascible emotion’,
hatred, revenge, antipathy and resentment, or righteous indignation
(νέμεσις) with anger, as mere varieties of the same *páthos* or emotion.

Again, it is provoked by any injury (or insult) committed or intended,
ἢ πεποίκη τις ἡ ἥμελλεν, either against ourselves, or any of our relations,
friends, dependants, anyone in whose welfare we are interested.

‘Thirdly, (as we gather from the terms of the definition, ὅρεξις τιμωρίας,) every angry emotion is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, that, namely (τὴν Bekk. τῆς Α'), which arises from the hope of vengeance upon, or of punishing (both are included in *τιμωρία*), (the person who has offended us). First of all revenge is in itself pleasant: καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἥδον· οὐ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν λυπηρὸν τὸ τυγχάνειν ἥδον· οἱ δὲ ὄργιζόμενοι λυποῦνται ἀνιπερβλήτως μὴ τιμωρούμενοι, ἐλπίζοντες δὲ χαίρουσιν. Comp. Eth. Nic. IV 11, 1126 a 2, ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία πάνει τῆς ὄργῆς, ἥδονὴν ἀτὶ τῆς λύπης ἐμπο-
οῦσα. τούτου δὲ μὴ γενομένου τὸ βάρος ἔχουσιν. ‘For it is pleasant to
think that we shall attain to the object of our desire’, (the pleasure
of hope or anticipation, I II. 6, 7,) ‘and no one ever aims at what is
evidently impossible for himself (to attain), and the angry man’s desire
always aims at what he (believes to be) possible for *himself*’. He always
supposes that he *shall* obtain the object of his desire, the punishment of
the offender, and *therefore* even in his anger he feels pleasure in the pro-
spective satisfaction. The first of the two following lines of Homer, Il. Σ
109, has been already quoted in illustration of the same topic, the plea-
sure of anger in the prospect of revenge, I II. 9. In the passage quoted
above from Seneca, de Ira, I 3. 2, what is here said, οὐδεὶς τῶν φαινομένων
ἀδυνάτων ἐφίεται αὐτῷ, may seem at first sight to be contradicted. The
two statements are however different: Seneca says that a man may *wish*
for what is quite beyond his reach; Aristotle says that he never *aims at it*, never uses any exertion to attain to that which he knows to be

ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ καὶ ηδονή τις διά τε τοῦτο καὶ διότι διατρίβουσιν ἐν τῷ τιμωρεῖσθαι τῇ διανοίᾳ· η οὖν τότε γινομένη φαντασία ηδονὴν ἐμποιεῖ, ὥσπερ η τῶν 3 ἐνυπνίων. ἐπεὶ δὲ η ὀλιγωρία ἔστιν ἐνέργεια δόξης

unattainable: which is equally true. No one ever deliberates about things which are not under his own control. (For a list of such things see Eth. Nic. III 5, sub init.)

But this anticipation of the *future* is not the only source of the pleasure which we feel in an angry mood: ‘it is accompanied by yet another pleasure, the *present* pleasure of dwelling in the mind on the prospective vengeance: it is the fancy that then arises (presents itself) that produces the pleasure in us, just like that of dreams’. On the pleasures of the *phantasia*, and the *phantasia* itself, see again I 11. 6, 7, and the notes there.

Schrader refers to an excellent illustration of this pleasure of dwelling on the prospect of vengeance, in Terent. Adelph. III 2. 12, seq. beginning, *me miserum, vix sum compos animi, ita ardeo iracundia*¹.

§ 3. [ἐπεὶ δέ] has either no apodosis at all—which is highly probable in itself, and seems to be Bekker’s view, who retains the full stop at ντραμβάνομεν: or else we may suppose with Vater that the apodosis is τρία δέ ἔστιν...; in which case δέ may be added to the examples of the apodotic δέ in note on I 1. 11, or omitted with MSS Q, Y^b, Z^b. According to Vater’s view the connexion will be, that whereas ὀλιγωρία is an expression of contempt for somebody or something supposed to be worthless, whether it be so or not in reality, there are accordingly three kinds of ὀλιγωρία each expressing contempt, but in three different forms, or modes of manifestation. To the three kinds of ὀλιγωρία here distinguished ἀνα-

¹ See also ‘on the pleasure of irascible emotion,’ Bain, *Emotions and Will*, c. ix. § 4. Mr Bain acknowledges, though he regards it as anomalous, the painful fact that pleasure at the sight of suffering inflicted, especially under circumstances of violent excitement when the passions are already inflamed, as at the sack of a captured town, is in reality a phenomenon of human nature. Other examples of this are the notoriously cruel habits of children in their treatment of animals, and in their ordinary sports; the pleasure found in gladiatorial combats, bull fights, bear baiting, cock and quail fights, and all the other cruel exhibitions which have amused the most civilized as well as barbarous spectators. He traces this to three sources, of which the principal is the love of power. I will venture to add three more possible elements of the emotion, which may contribute, without superseding the others, to the production of it. First, the sense of contrast between the suffering which we are witnessing in another and our own present immunity: this is the principle implied in Lucretius’ *Suave mari magno*, and is illustrated in I 11. 8, of this work. Secondly, it may be partly traced to curiosity—the pleasure of learning, as Aristotle calls it—and the stimulus of surprise or wonder which we feel at any exciting spectacle; another source of pleasure mentioned by Aristotle in the same chapter. And thirdly, *perhaps*, a distorted and perverted sympathy (this is an ordinary source of pleasure), which gives us an *independent interest* in the sufferings of any creature whose feelings, and consequent liability to suffering, we share—that is, of all *animated* beings; with inanimate objects there can be no sympathy.

περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον· καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τάγαθὰ ἄξια οἰόμεθα σπουδῆς εἶναι, καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα πρὸς αὐτά· ὅσα δὲ μηδέν τι ἡ μικρόν, οὐδενὸς ἄξια ὑπολαμβάνομεν. τρία δὲ ἔστιν εἶδη ὀλιγωρίας, 4 καταφρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπηρεασμός καὶ ὕβρις· ὁ τε γὰρ καταφρονῶν ὀλιγωρεῖ (ὅσα γὰρ οἴονται μηδενὸς ἄξια, τούτων καταφρονοῦσιν, τῶν δὲ καταφρονου-

σχυτία is added in c. 6 § 2. In Dem. de F. L. § 228 it follows ἀναθεία as its ordinary companion (compare Shilleto's note).

ἐνέργεια δόξης] represents the opinion, hitherto dormant or latent, as roused into active exercise as a realised capacity, a *dύναμις* become an *ἐνέργεια*. The mere opinion of the worthlessness of so and so, has now become developed into *δλιγωρία*, and assumed the form of an active or *actual* expression of the contempt by the outward token of 'slight regard'.

δλιγωρία therefore shews 'indifference', as to something that we do not care for at all, or regard as something so contemptible, so devoid of all positive character, that it is not worth forming an opinion about: what is positively good or bad is always worthy of 'earnest attention', or 'serious anxiety.' On *σπουδή* 'earnest', as opposed to *παιδά* 'sport' (Plat. Phaedr. 276 D, compared with E, Rep. x 602 B, alibi), and on *σπουδαῖος* 'serious', 'earnest', 'of solid worth or value', opposed to *φαῦλος* 'light', 'trifling', 'frivolous', 'unsubstantial', 'worthless', and hence *morally* 'good' and 'bad', see note on I 5. 8.

καὶ τὰ συντείνοντα] 'as well as everything that has that tendency'; viz. to good and bad. 'There are three kinds of slight, or contemptuous indifference, contempt, spite and wanton outrage'. First, 'contempt involves δλιγωρία; because people *despise* men and things that they regard as *worthless*, and δλιγωρία, slight esteem, contemptuous indifference, is directed to the same objects', whence it appears that they have a common element, and that *καταφρόνησις* is δλιγωρία τις, a *kind* of slight.

§ 4. A second kind of δλιγωρία is ἐπηρεασμός, spiteful opposition to, wanton interference with, the plans and wishes (*ταῖς βούλησεσι*) of others, in order to thwart them, where you gain no advantage to yourself by doing so; where the motive is the mere malicious pleasure of disconcerting some one, and thereby shewing your power over them: which is the root of the wanton love of mischief inherent in human nature: comp. § 6. 'This is an inclination to *thwart* or interfere with the wishes of another, not for any advantage that you expect to derive from it yourself, but merely for the mischievous satisfaction of depriving him of it. The slight regard therefore is shewn in the wantonness of the offence; for it is plain that there is no intention (*lit. supposition*) of injury in a slight—that would imply fear, not merely indifference—nor of doing him any service, none at least worth speaking of' (δλιγωρία excludes the notion of good as well as bad, it is mere indifference; § 3, καὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τάγαθὰ ἄξια οἰόμεθα σπουδῆς εἶναι κ.τ.λ.); 'for this (doing him service) would imply care for him, solicitude for his welfare, and that again

μένων ὀλιγωροῦσιν) καὶ ὁ ἐπηρεάζων [φαίνεται καταφρονεῖν]. ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ἐπηρεασμὸς ἐμποδισμὸς ταῖς

friendship,' lit. 'for (in that case) he would have shewn that he cared for him, and therefore (so that *ὅτε*, it would follow) that he was his friend'. The argument of *ἐπεὶ οὖν—φίλος εἶναι* is this. The *wantonness* of the mischief which is the effect of *ἐπηρεασμός*, (spiteful interference with your neighbour's inclinations,) shews that *δλιγωρία* enters into it in this, that it must proceed from a contemptuous indifference as to the person and character of the victim; for the very wantonness of the act, that it is done for mere amusement, and without any prospect of advantage, shews the slight regard that the perpetrator has for the sufferer; that he neither fears him as he must have done if he wished to hurt or injure him by thwarting his schemes, nor esteems and respects him as a friend, as would necessarily be the case if he intended to interfere with and oppose his plans and inclinations for the other's benefit: and therefore the indifference that he does manifest must be indicative of contempt.

ἐπηρεασμός] appears to be almost a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*; only two examples are given in Steph. Lex., one from Diodorus and the other from Pollux—no great authorities. [It is also found *infra* c. 4 § 30.] The usual form of it in the ordinary language is *ἐπήρεια*, which occurs in much the same sense, as also *ἐπηρεάζειν* frequently in Demosthenes, and less frequently elsewhere, as in Xenophon and the Comic Poets. Thucyd. I 26 is a good instance as a commentary upon Aristotle's text, and illustrative of his interpretation: of the Corcyreans, during their war with the Corinthians, it is said that after the surrender of their colony Epidamnus to the Corinthians, they took this to heart, and despatched a force of 25 ships, to demand amongst other things the restitution of the Epidamnian exiles; and this they did *κατ' ἐπήρειαν*, 'they bade them *out of mere spite and wantonness*' without any prospect of benefit to themselves, merely for the purpose of annoying the others. Comp. *ἐπηρεάζειν*, Dem. c. Mid. p. 519, of Midias' vexatious annoyance, *ἐπήρεια* ib. p. 522 ult. where it is distinguished from *ὕβρις*, the wanton outrage on the sacred *person* of the choragus. See also de Cor. p. 229, lines 8, 14 in both of which it is applied to spiteful, wantonly offensive *language*; whereas in Aristotle it is *ἐμποδισμὸς ταῖς βουλήσεσιν*, and in Plut. Reip. Ger. Praec. p. 816 C, it is applied to *acts* of this character, *ἡ πράξειν ἔχοντας φιλοτιμίαν ἐπηρεάζων*; as in Ar. Pol. III 16, 1287 a 38, *πολλὰ πρὸς ἐπήρειαν καὶ χάρων εἰώθασι πράττειν*; which also marks the 'wantonness' characteristic of it by the addition of *πρὸς χάρων*. In Plut. Coriol. 334 D, *οὐκ ἐπὶ κέρδεσιν ἀλλὰ δι' ὕβριν καὶ περιφρόνησιν τοῖς πένησιν ἐπηρεάζων*, which marks the wanton character of the acts of oppression. These passages from Plutarch with some others from the same author are to be found in Wyttensbach's note on Plutarch, p. 135 D. He renders it *vexantes, infestantes, per invidiam et contumeliam*. The only other instance that I will refer to, occurs in Herod. vi 9, where the word seems at first sight to bear a different meaning, 'threatening': *τάδε σφι λέγετε ἐπηρεάζοντες τά περ σφέας κατέξει*, (and so Schweighäuser's Lexicon '*minitari*'). But by comparing the word as here used with its use and explanation in other authors, we see that the sense of the *threat* is only

Βουλήσεσιν οὐχ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ ἀλλ' ἵνα μὴ ἐκείνῳ. ἐπεὶ
οὖν οὐχ ἵνα αὐτῷ τι, δλιγωρεῖ· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὔτε
βλάψειν ὑπολαμβάνει, ἐφοβεῖτο γὰρ ἀν καὶ οὐκ ὠλι-
γώρει, οὕτ' ὡφελῆσαι ἀν οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου, ἐφρόντιζε
5 γὰρ ἀν ὥστε φίλος εἶναι. καὶ ὁ ὑβρίζων δὲ δλιγω-
ρεῖ· ἔστι γὰρ ὑβρις τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφ' οἷς
αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ
ἀλλο ἢ ὅτι ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ὅπως ησθῇ· οἱ γὰρ ἀντιποι-
implied, and that the prominent and characteristic signification is, as elsewhere, ‘insult or spite them by telling them the fate that will overtake them’.

ώστε φίλος εἶναι] is an instance of a not unfrequent attraction of a substantive or adjective, ordinarily in the accusative, within a grammatical bracket, as it were, to the subject of the verb without it—here ἐφρόντιζε—and hence expressed in the nominative. Plat. Euthyd. 273 A, ὑβριστῆς διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι. Arist. de part. Anim. IV 8. 2, χρήσιμαι πρὸς τὸ λαθοῦσαι προσφέρεσθαι τὴν τροφήν. Plat. Phaedo 83 D, ὥστε...καὶ ὕσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

§ 5. *ὑβρις*] which corresponds with the preceding in some points, while it differs in others, is ‘an injury or annoyance inflicted, involving disgrace to the sufferer; for no *benefit* that is expected to accrue to the aggressor except the mere fact of its having been done, in other words the *pleasure* of doing it: for *retaliation* is not wanton outrage but vengeance or punishment’. This is the *locus classicus* for the explanation of *ὑβρις*, so important in the Orators and the Athenian law. See note on I 12. 26, where it is examined from this point of view. The outraged personal dignity, the wounded honour, which gives its special sting to an act of *ὑβρις*, and distinguishes it from a mere assault, *aikia*, is noted in the text by the phrase ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνη ἔστι τῷ πάσχοντι, and the rest of the definition describes the ‘wantonness’ of the aggression, which *ὑβρις* has in common with *ἐπηρεασμός*, and in which the δλιγωρία is shewn. Compare I 13. 10, where the two same characteristics of *ὑβρις* reappear; οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξε πάντως ὑβρισεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκείνον ἢ αὐτὸς ησθῆναι. *ὑβρις* therefore is wanton outrage, an insult or injury which disgraces and humiliates its victim, and is prompted by no motive but the mere momentary gratification of humiliating another and therein indulging the love and the sense of power. Some illustrations of acts of *ὑβρις* are to be found in Polit. VIII (v), 10, 1311 a 33. Personal outrage, ἐπὶ τὸ σῶμα, is one of the causes of conspiracy and revolution. τῆς δὲ ὑβρεως οὕσης πολυμεροῦς, ἔκαστον αὐτῶν αἴτιον γίνεται τῆς ὁργῆς· τῶν δὲ ὁργιζομένων σχεδὸν οἱ πλεῖστοι τιμωρίας χάριν ἐπιτίθενται, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑπεροχῆς, οἷον κ.τ.λ. and then follows a number of examples. It is plain however from a comparison of this with what immediately follows in the Rhet. § 6, where *ὑβρις* is traced to the love of *ὑπεροχή*, that the *ὑβρις* here spoken of is confined to insults or outrages of a particular kind, offered to the *person*, *εἰς τὸ σῶμα*.

6 οῦντες οὐχ ὑβρίζουσιν ἀλλὰ τιμωροῦνται. αἴτιον δὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς τοῖς ὑβρίζουσιν, ὅτι οἴονται κακῶς δρῶντες αὐτοὺς ὑπερέχειν μᾶλλον. διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι

§ 6. ‘The cause or source of the pleasure which men feel in wanton outrages is that they think that by the illtreatment of (by doing mischief to) others they are shewing in an unusual degree their superiority over them’. μᾶλλον ‘more than they otherwise would’. Superiority, or excess in merit and good qualities, is a mark of virtue, I 9. 39, ἡ δὲ ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν. ...ἡ ὑπεροχὴ δοκεῖ μηνύειν ἀρετήν; and a source of pleasure, I 11. 14, τὸ νικᾶν ἡδὺ...φαντασία γάρ ὑπεροχῆς γίγνεται, οὐ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἡ ἥρεμα ἡ μᾶλλον, and the corollaries of this, § 15. τὸ ἄρχειν ἡδιστον, ib. § 27. On the ‘emotion of power’ and its ramifications, the various modes in which it exhibits itself, see Mr Bain’s excellent chapter (VIII), *Emotions and Will*, p. 145 seq. and the quotation from Dugald Stewart in the note at the commencement [chap. x. p. 192, ed. 1875].

διὸ οἱ νέοι ὑβρισταῖ] Comp. II 12. 15, καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὑβριν καὶ οὐ κακουργίαν. This character and tendency of youth is also expressed in one of the two opposite senses of the derivatives *νεανίας*, *νεανιεύεσθαι*, *νεανικός*. The two last convey, in different contexts, the two sides of the youthful character, and the good and bad qualities by which it is specially distinguished. On the one hand, they represent the gallant, spirited, vigorous, impetuous, nature of youth (*εὐ καὶ γενναῖος*, *ἄτε νέος ὁ*, Plat. Soph. 239 B), on the other the petulancy, wantonness, insolence, which sometimes characterises it—*protervus*, *ferox*, *superbus*, Ast, *Lex*, Plat. s. v. *νεανικός*. Both senses are abundantly illustrated in Plato. I will only quote Soph. 239 D, τί τις τῷ νεανίᾳ (this audacious, impertinent, youngster) πρὸς τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρινέται. See Heindorf ad loc. who refers to Eur. Suppl. 580, Arist. Vespr. 1333, and interprets the word ‘de homine feroci insolentique’; and *νεανιεύεσθαι*, as exemplified in Lysis’ speech (Phaedr. 235 A), which ‘ran riot’, ‘passed all bounds of moderation’ in the endeavour to shew, &c.; and (according to Callicles, Gorg. 482 C) in that of Socrates, who had been talking like a mob-orator, ‘running riot, luxuriating in language full of exaggeration, extravagance.’ So that ‘to play the youth, act like a young man’, sometimes means rash and arrogant, wanton, insolent, overbearing, extravagant, licentious conduct. The examples of both these words in Demosthenes display a leaning towards the more favourable view of the youthful character.—Plat. Euthyd. 273 A, *ὑβριστής* δὲ διὰ τὸ νέος εἶναι (Gaisford).

οἱ πλούσιοι] II 16. 1, τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ἡ ἐπεται ἥθη ἐπιπολῆς ἐστὶν ἵδειν ἀπασιν' ὑβρισταῖ γὰρ καὶ ὑπερήφανοι, and the reason of this. And again § 4, like the νέοι, ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν οὐ κακουργικὰ ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὑβριστικὰ τὰ δὲ ἀκρατευτικά. In applying the doctrine of the ‘mean’ to the various orders of population, with the view of determining the best form of government, Aristotle makes the following remark, Polit. VI (IV) 11, 1295 δ 6, all excess and defect is injurious; ὑπέρκαλον δὲ ἡ ὑπερίσχυρον ἡ ὑπερευγενῆ ἡ ὑπερπλούσιον, ἡ τάνατία τούτοις, ὑπέρπτωχον ἡ ὑπερασθενῆ καὶ σφόδρα ἄτιμον, χαλεπὸν τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθεῖν. γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταῖ καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπόνηροι λίαν δὲ ἀδικημά-

ὑβρισταί· ὑπερέχειν γάρ εἴονται ὑβρίζοντες. ὑβρεως δὲ ἀτιμία, ὁ δὲ ἀτιμάζων ὀλιγωρεῖ· τὸ γὰρ μηδενὸς ἄξιον οὐδεμίαν ἔχει τιμήν, οὐτ' ἀγαθοῦ οὔτε κακοῦ. διὸ λέγει ὁργιζόμενος ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς

ἡτίμησεν· ἐλῶν γὰρ ἔχει γέρας αὐτὸς ἀπούρας p. 57.
καὶ

ὡς εἰ τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην,
ἢ ως διὰ ταῦτα ὁργιζόμενος. προσήκειν δὲ οἴονται πο-

των τὰ μὲν γίγνεται δὲ ὑβριν τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν: where we have again the same distinction of crimes as in the two passages of the Rhetoric already quoted, II 12. 15, and 16. 4; and a third time 13. 14, where the opposite —*εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὑβριν*—is said of old men. Crimes are hereby divided into two classes, crimes on a great and on a petty scale; high-minded crimes of violence and audacity, outrages which imply a sense of power and superiority in those who commit them; and sneaking, underhand crimes, of fraud and low villainy, which are the crimes which the poor and mean are especially inclined to.

ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἴονται ὑβρίζοντες] This, as we have already seen, is a general tendency of human nature: but besides this general inclination, there is in the case of the young a special desire and a special inclination to assert their superiority to others, which is shewn in the love of *victory*, or getting the better of an opponent in the mimic combats and contests of their *games*; and also in their love of honour or spirit of ambition; *ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ή νεότης, η δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχή τις*, II 12. 6.

'Again, *ὑβρις* is a mark of disrespect, inflicts disgrace or indignity, and this again is a mark of slight esteem; and this feeling of disrespect, and the disgrace and dishonour to the sufferer that accompany it, shew that the object of them is considered of no worth or value, because he has no *honour* (but the contrary), which is as much as to say that he is of no *value* (*τιμή* having the double sense), worth nothing either for good or for evil', and *therefore* is the object of the contemptuous *indifference* which is the sting of *ὀλιγωρία*.

This disgrace and indignity is then illustrated by two lines of Homer Il. A 356, repeated in I (IX) 367, and I (IX) 648 (644), in which the angry Achilles expresses his indignation at the *slight* put upon him by Agamemnon, 'who had taken and kept for himself (αὐτὸς ἔχει) the present (gift of honour, one of the *μέρη τιμῆς*; see note on *γέρα*, I 5. 9, p. 85) of which he had deprived him'; and had treated him 'like some despised alien or vagabond'. *μετανάστης*, comp. II. II (xvi) 59, where the line is repeated, properly a 'settler in a foreign land', like the *μέτοικοι* at Athens, a despised class without civil rights, and therefore *ἀτίμητοι*; Ar. Pol. III 5, 1278 a 36, *ώσπερ καὶ Ομηρος ἐποίησεν "ώσει τιν' ἀτίμητον μετανάστην"*. *ώσπερ μέτοικος γάρ ἔστιν ὁ τῶν τιμῶν μὴ μετέχων*. And Herod. VII 161, where the Athenians boast that they are *μοῦνοι οὐ μετανάσται Ἑλλήνων*.

§ 7. 'Now men think they have a natural claim' (*προσήκειν*, note on II I p. 11, *μὴ προσήκοντας*).^{to especial respect and consideration (πολυωρίσθαι)}

λυωρεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ήττόνων κατὰ γένος, κατὰ δύναμιν, κατ' ἀρετὴν, καὶ ὅλως ἐν ὦ ἀν ταῦτῷ ὑπερέχῃ P. 1379.
πολύ, οἷον ἐν χρήμασιν ὁ πλούσιος πένητος καὶ ἐν τῷ λέγειν ῥῆτορικὸς ἀδυνάτου εἰπεῖν καὶ ἄρχων ἀρχομένου καὶ ἄρχειν ἄξιος οἰόμενος τοῦ ἄρχεσθαι ἄξιον.
διὸ εἴρηται

θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἔστι διοτρεφέων βασιλήων
καὶ

ἀλλά γε καὶ μετόπισθεν ἔχει κότον·

8 ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν. ἔτι ὑφ' ὧν τις
οἴεται εὖ πάσχειν δεῖν· οὗτοι δὲ εἰσὶν οὓς εὖ πεποίηκεν

(and therefore are all the more angry, the slight is felt more deeply, when they fail to receive it) from their inferiors in birth, power, virtue (i.e. merit), and generally in anything in which they far surpass (him who slights them) when it is of the same kind (falls under the same *γένος* or class) (as that in which they themselves excel); as in money the rich man (claims respect) from the poor, the accomplished orator from one that has no faculty for speaking, the governor from the governed, or one who thinks he has the right to bear rule from one who only deserves to obey'.

πολυωρεῖν, a rare word, found once in Aeschin. c. Timarch. § 50, in a copy of evidence, 'to pay attention to', but chiefly in later writers, (*πολυωρία* a Stoic term). It is opposed to, and formed upon the analogy of *ὅλιγωρεῖν*, and therefore appropriate here.

ῥῆτορικός] *'vocantur ῥῆτορικοὶ diserti et eloquentes homines.* Isocr. Nicocl. § 8, καὶ ῥῆτορικοὺς μὲν καλοῦμεν τοὺς ἐν τῷ πλήθει δυναμένους λέγειν.' Victorius.

This is illustrated by two more lines of Homer, Il. B 196, 'great is the wrath of divine-bred kings' ('in Homeri Il. B 196, singulare Διοτρεφέος βασιλῆος legitur. Sed cum haec sententia in proverbium abiisset, universe pronuntiandum erat plurali numero.' Vater); and, Il. A 82, 'Yet it may be that even hereafter he keeps a grudge'—here the endurance of the wrath indicates its original violence and the magnitude of the slight that provoked it (ἀλλά γε καὶ, the vulg., is retained by Bekker. MSS A^c, Y^b, Z^b have τε, as also Mr Paley's text).—ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ κ.τ.λ. 'For the lasting vexation (this is in explanation of the *μετόπισθεν κότον* of the last quotation) is owing to their superiority'.

§ 8. 'Another aggravation of anger and the sense of slight arises, when the insult or injury proceeds from those from whom, as he conceives, kind and courteous treatment is due; such are those who are indebted to him for benefits past or present, bestowed either by himself or on his account (such as are due to him) or by one of his friends, or those to whom he wishes well (wishes to benefit) or ever did (wish well)'. For the antecedent to *ὑφ' ὥν*, and the supplement of the context, we may

ἢ ποιεῖ, ἢ αὐτὸς ἢ δὶ' αὐτόν τις ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τις, ἢ
βούλεται ἢ ἐβουλήθη.

9 φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ἥδη πῶς τ' ἔχοντες ὄργι-
ζονται αὐτοὶ καὶ τίσι καὶ διὰ ποια. αὐτοὶ μὲν γάρ,
ὅταν λυπῶνται ἐφίεται γάρ τινος ὁ λυπούμενος· ἔάν
τε οὖν κατ' εὐθυνωρίαν ὅτιοῦν ἀντικρούσῃ τις, οἷον τῷ
understand (as I have done) ὄργζονται μᾶλλον from what has preceded, or
possibly ἀγανακτοῦσιν from the immediately preceding clause: otherwise
repeat οἴονται πολυνωρεῖσθαι from the beginning of § 7.

§ 9. ‘From what has been said it is by this time clear (we may now infer
from the preceding statements) what the angry disposition or state of
mind is, what sort of persons it is directed against or provoked by,
and (what sort of things it is due to) what sort of offences or acts
provoke it’.

‘As to the first, we are angry when we are vexed or annoyed; be-
cause one who is vexed is always aiming at, eagerly bent on, something;
if then he be *directly* crossed or thwarted (*ἐὰν ἀντικρούσῃ τις*) in anything
whatsoever,—a thirsty man, for example, in his effort to drink,—or not (i.e.
if he be crossed, not directly, but *indirectly*), the act in either case appears
to be just the same (the act *in its effect* or *in the intention* is the same;
the act itself is not the same); or again if any one offers any opposition,
or refuses to help, or troubles, bothers, throws obstacles in the way of,
a man in this state of mind (i.e. in a state of eager desire, and ‘aiming
at something’, *ἔφιέμενόν τινος*), with all these he is angry’.

κατ' εὐθυνωρίαν] is ‘in a straight line’, -ωρεῖν, -ωρος (this must be a
mere termination in this word, as in *θεωρός*, *τιμωρός*, *σινάμωρος*, and the
Latin -orus and -osus, *plagorous*, *generous*, *animosus*, *bellicosus*; ὥρα, as
in *Πιλωρός*, can form no part of the derivation). The phrase, which is
equivalent to ἔξ εὐθείας οτ κατ' εὐθείαν (*γραμμήν*), occurs elsewhere, in
Plat. Rep. IV 436 E, τὴν εὐθυνωρίαν (in a straight line, or straight) is
opposed to ἀποκλίνειν, and κατὰ τὸ περιφερές κύκλῳ. Ar. Metaph. A 2, init.
'in a straight line', (see Bonitz ad loc.), de part. Anim. II 8. 7, τὴν δὲ
σχίσιν ἔχει τῆς σαρκὸς οὐ κατ' εὐθυνωρίαν ἀλλὰ κατὰ κύκλους διαιρετήν (Vict.).
Ib. c. 10. 16, ἀκούει γάρ οὐ μόνον κατ' εὐθυνωρίαν ἀλλὰ παντόθεν, ή δ' ὅψις εἰς
τὸ ἔμπροσθεν, ὥρᾳ γάρ κατ' εὐθυνωρίαν (directly forwards, in a straight line)
(Gaisford), Probl. XI 58, εὐθυνωρέιν, Eth. Eudem. VII 10, 1243 b 15, τοῖς
μὴ κατ' εὐθυνωρίαν (*φίλοις*), of *indirect* friendships, where the two friends
are not of the same kind, but associated from different motives; Fritzsche,
note ad loc. (who refers also to Tim. Locr. p. 94 B, τῷ μήπω κατ' εὐθυνωρίαν
νοεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, and to this passage of the Rhetoric). Add
Arist. de part. Anim. IV 9. 6, ἡ εὐθυνωρία τῶν ἐντοσθιδίων, and de Anima a 3,
406 b 31, τὴν εὐθυνωρίαν εἰς κύκλον κατέκαμψεν. περὶ Ἐνυπνίων c. 2. 5, κατ'
εὐθυνωρίαν ἢ συμβαίνει τὴν ὅψιν ὥρᾳ.

ἀντικρόνειν, ‘to strike or knock against’, ‘to come into collision with’,
hence metaphorically, to interfere with, interpose an obstacle, to hinder or
thwart a man’s designs or efforts. The word is not common: it occurs in
Dem. de Cor. § 198, and ἀντικρούσις (a check, sudden stoppage), Rhet. III

διψῶντι πρὸς τὸ πιεῖν, ἐαν τε μὴ, ὁμοίως ταῦτὸ φαίνεται ποιεῖν· καὶ ἐάν τε ἀντιπράττῃ τις ἐάν τε μὴ συμπράττῃ ἐάν τε ἄλλο τι ἐνοχλῆι οὕτως ἔχοντα, ιο τοῖς πᾶσιν ὄργιζεται. διὸ κάμνοντες, πενόμενοι, *(πολεμοῦντες)*, ἐρῶντες, διψῶντες, ὅλως ἐπιθυμοῦντες καὶ μὴ κατορθοῦντες ὄργιλοι εἰσὶ καὶ εὐπαρόρμητοι, μάλιστα μὲν πρὸς τοὺς τοῦ παρόντος ολιγωροῦντας, οἷον κάμνων μὲν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν νόσον, πενόμενος δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὴν πενίαν, πολεμῶν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον, ἐρῶν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς τὸν ἔρωτα· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προωδοποίηται γὰρ ἔκαστος πρὸς τὴν

9. 6. In the neuter sense in which it is here employed it follows the analogy of *συγκρούειν*, *προσκρούειν*, and hundreds of other transitive verbs which by the suppression of the reflexive pronoun pass from active to neuter—a process common, I should suppose, to most languages, and certainly found in our own.

ἐνοχλεῖν, ‘to mob’ (*ὕχλος*), only once in Plato: but frequent in Demost., Xenoph., Aristoph.; applied to troublesome and vexatious annoyances and to vexatious conduct in general; ‘to trouble, annoy, bother’.

§ 10. ‘And therefore in sickness, in poverty (and distress), in love, thirst, or any appetite and desire in general, which is unsatisfied’ (in the satisfaction of which they are unsuccessful *μὴ κατορθοῦντες* ἐν τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ), ‘men are irascible and easily excited to passion (provoked) especially against those who shew a contemptuous indifference to their *present* condition (who wantonly obstruct them in the efforts they are making to obtain the immediate object of their wishes, or in the gratification of this particular appetite or desire of which they are under the influence at the moment) as a sick man against those who slight and thwart him in his efforts to cure his disease’, *οἷον κάμνων ὄργιλος ἔστι τοῖς* (*ολιγωροῦντιν αὐτοῦ*) *πρὸς τὴν νόσον*—(*πρὸς*, ‘in respect of’, ‘those who *direct* their obstruction and annoyance to’ his disease, i.e. to interference with the progress of his cure: and the same explanation may be applied to the remaining cases):—‘a poor man when his poverty (and efforts to relieve it) is at stake, and a man in a battle against those who interfere with his fighting (or if a *general*, with his manœuvres and warlike operations), or if in love, with the affairs of his love, and so on for all the rest: for in each case the way is ready prepared beforehand for the anger of the individual by the existing affection (passion, or state of feeling)?

ὄργιλος, ‘irascible’. *ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ ὄργην ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης...τῶν δὲ ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὄργιλος ἔστω, ή δὲ κακία ὄργιλότης*, Eth. N. II 7, 1108 a 40, IV 11, 1125 b 29, and 1126 a 13, οἱ μὲν οὖν ὄργιλοι *ταχέως* μὲν ὄργιζονται καὶ οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ μᾶλλον ηδεῖ, παύονται δὲ *ταχέως* ὁ καὶ βέλτιστον ἔχουσιν κ.τ.λ.

προωδοποίηται] See note on *όδοποιεῖν*, I 1. 2. *προκόπτειν*, Eur. Hippol.

II ἔκάστου ὄργὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος πάθους. ἔτι δὲ ἐὰν τάνατία τύχῃ προσδεχόμενος· λυπεῖ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τέρπει τὸ πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν, ἐὰν γένηται ὁ βούλεται. διὸ καὶ ὥραι καὶ χρόνοι καὶ διαθέσεις καὶ ἡλικίαι ἐκ τούτων φανεραί, ποῖαι εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὄργὴν καὶ ποῦ καὶ πότε, p. 58.

23 (and elsewhere), ‘to advance’ by clearing away (*κόπτειν*), before an advancing army, wood and other obstacles to its progress, presents the same metaphor in a somewhat different form.

§ II. Disappointed expectation is also provocative of anger: ‘if a man happen to have expected the contrary (to that which does actually occur); for the pain of disappointment is increased in proportion to its unexpectedness, just as the joy in the opposite case is increased by an unexpected success. And so, by applying these principles to the different seasons, times, dispositions, and ages (in which anger chiefly manifests itself), it will be easy to see what sorts of them (the two last named) are easily moved to anger, and in what places and at what times, and also that the more they are under these circumstances (in these conditions) the more easily they are moved’. That is, the nearer they are to the critical moment in the times and seasons and to the central point or acme in the age of life, and the more they are under the influence of the particular dispositions which prompt the angry feeling—the higher the *degree* in each case—the greater will be the proneness to anger.

Schrader supplies a very apt illustration of the *ὥραι* from Theocr. Id. I 15: ‘ut cibi et somni horae; caprarius ap. Theocr. Οὐ θέμις, ὁ ποιμάν, τὸ μεσαμβρινόν, οὐ θέμις ἄμμιν Συρίσθεν' τὸν Πάνα δεδοίκαμες· ή γὰρ ἀπὸ ἄγρας Ταΐκα κεκμακάς ἀμπάνεται· ἔντι δὲ πικρός, Καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ δριψεῖα χολὴ ποτὶ ρών κάθηται.’ Of the three *ἡλικίαι*, II 12. 2, Seneca, on the contrary, de Ira I 13, ult., *iracundissimi infantes senesque et aegri sunt, et invalidum omne naturae querulum est* (Schrader). *νεότης* is the one which is most liable to anger, Ib. § 5, com. 9. As regards times and seasons, one man might be more inclined to be angry in hot, and another in cold, weather—though perhaps this should rather be referred to the *διαθέσεις* or bodily temperaments; constitution, or habit of body or mind, comes under the denomination of *διαθέσεις*—the *διάθεσις* or ‘passing temporary disposition’ being apparently not here distinguished (as it ought to be, Categ. 8, p. 8 b 27, comp. II a 22) from the confirmed, settled, permanent, *ἔξις* or ‘state’. On the *διαθέσεις* Schrader notes, ‘Affectiones animi corporisve: ut morbus, maeror, pudor, metus. Sen. de Ira II 19, *vinum incendit iram, quia auget calorem.* III 10, *vetus dictum est, a lasso rixam quaeri* (fatigue). *Aequem autem et ab esuriente et a siccitate, et ab omni homine quem aliqua res urit: nam uti ulcera ad levem tactum, deinde etiam ad suspicionem tactus, condolescunt* (this describes a state of irritation or inflammation); *ita animus affectus minimis offenditur. Adeo ut quosdam salutatio, epistola, oratio, et interrogatio in litim evocent*’. Every situation or condition of pain, discomfort, malaise, constraint, &c. makes a man *irritable*.

καὶ ὅτι ὅτε μᾶλλον ἐν τούτοις εἰσί, μᾶλλον καὶ εὐκίνητοι.

12 αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἔχοντες εὐκίνητοι πρὸς ὄργήν, ὄργίζονται δὲ τοῖς τε καταγελῶσι καὶ χλευάζουσι καὶ σκώπτουσιν· ὑβρίζουσι γάρ. καὶ τοῖς τὰ τοιαῦτα

§ 12. So far of the *subjects* of anger; next of its *objects*.

First, anger is provoked by ridicule (contempt expressed in laughter), mockery, jeering; all of which imply *ὑβρίς*, a wanton unprovoked attack upon a man's feelings and personal dignity.

χλευάζειν, probably connected with *χεῖλος* or *χέλος* (*χελύνη*) 'the lip' (so Valck.), 'to shoot out the lips' in mockery and derision. Compare the analogous *ἐρεσχελεῖν* which may possibly be ~~ἐρεσσετε~~ *χέλος* expressing the same action. *χλευάζειν*, *χλευασμός* and *χλευασία*, appear frequently in Demosth. and occasionally in other authors: in Rhet. II 3. 9 we find *χλευαστής*. In Top. Z 6, 144 a 5, we have *καθάπερ οἱ τὸν προπλακισμὸν ὑβριν μετὰ χλευασίας ὀρύζομενοι· ἡ γάρ χλευασία ὑβρις τις, ὥστ' οὐ διαφορὰ ἀλλ' εἶδος ἡ χλευασία*. *χλευασία* therefore is a 'kind' of *ὑβρίς*, which exactly corresponds with the view of it taken here.

σκώπτειν, is not easily distinguished from the preceding, except by the greater frequency of its occurrence. It expresses an ill-natured joke, sneering, taunting, gibing at, another, for the purpose of bringing him into ridicule. This is the 'scornful jest', which, as Pope says, is 'most bitter'. *σκῶμμα* or *σκῶψις* is therefore opposed to *εὐτραπελία*, the easy well-bred pleasantry which distinguishes the conversation and composition of the accomplished gentleman. The ill-natured intention implied in *σκώπτειν* appears incidentally in the phrase *λυπεῖν τὸν σκώπτομενον*, which indicates that it is always attended with pain to the object of it, Eth. N. IV 14, 1128 a 7: and again this its *ordinary* character appears Ib. line 25, seq. *πότερον οὖν τὸν εὖ σκώπτοντα ὄριστέον τῷ λέγειν ἢ πρέπει ἐλευθεριώ, ἡ τῷ μὴ λυπεῖν τὸν ἀκούοντα ἡ καὶ τέρπειν*; (neither of which evidently belonged to the ordinary character and operation of the *σκῶμμα*), and again, line 30, *τὸ γὰρ σκῶμμα λοιδόρημά τι ἔστιν*. I suppose that the difference between this and *χλευασμός* must be something of this kind: *χλευάζειν* 'mockery' may be conveyed by the gesture or tone of voice or the manner as well as by the actual words, and is therefore the more general expression of contempt as conveyed by language or manner: in *σκῶμμα* the contempt is conveyed or embodied in a joke or taunting phrase. It occurs, as might be expected, constantly in Aristophanes, who dealt more largely in the commodity itself than most other writers. An examination of the passages where it is used by this author will help to confirm what I have said of the ill-natured use of it; for instance, Pac. 740, *ἐσ τὰ ράκια σκώπτοντας ἀεὶ καὶ τοῖς φθειροῖς πολεμοῦντας*, Nub. 540, *οὐδὲ ἔσκωπτε τοὺς φαλακρούς*, and so of the rest.

A second class of persons who are special objects of angry feeling, are 'those who inflict such injuries as bear upon them the marks of wanton outrage. These must be such as are neither in retaliation (for an injury already inflicted on the aggressor) nor beneficial to those who inflict them;

βλάπτουσιν ὄσα ὑβρεως σημεῖα. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοιαῦτα εἶναι ἢ μήτε ἀντί τυνος μήτ' ὡφέλιμα τοῖς ποιοῦσιν·
 13 ἥδη γὰρ δοκεῖ δὶ’ ὑβριν. καὶ τοῖς κακῶς λέγουσι καὶ καταφρονοῦσι περὶ ἢ αὐτοὶ μάλιστα σπουδάζουσιν, οἵον οἱ ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίᾳ φιλοτιμούμενοι ἐάν τις εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐάν τις τὴν ἰδέαν,
 14 ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ταῦτα δὲ πολλῷ μᾶλλον, ἐὰν ὑποπτεύσωσι μὴ ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, ἢ ὄλως ἢ

for when this is the case' (by this time, now at length; note on ἥδη, I 1. 7) 'then (and not till then) they are thought to be due to a wanton, malicious, unprovoked, intention to offend'—*ὑβρίς*, the worst of the three kinds of *ἀλιγωρία* by which anger is provoked; §§ 3, 5.

§ 13. A third are 'those who revile and express contempt for things in which the aggrieved parties are themselves most interested (or, to which they are earnestly devoted, or in which they most desire to distinguish themselves, or in which they most value themselves; the last of the four referring to such things as *ἰδέα*, personal beauty, the second example); as those who are eager and ambitious of distinction in the pursuit of philosophy are especially indignant at any slight, any slur cast upon their favourite study; or those who value themselves upon their personal appearance, if that be called in question; and similarly in all other cases'. This topic expresses the specially angry feeling that is called forth by any ridicule or contempt directed against a man's profession, his studies, his order, any class or society to which he belongs, and is carried even to the extent of a national feeling: any reflexion, in short, upon what he is particularly interested in and attached to or values himself upon, any association with which he is bound up, and on whose credit his own credit and importance in some measure depend. "Je me suis souvent despité, en mon enfance," says Montaigne (*du Pédantisme*, Livre I Ch. 24), "de veoir en comedies italiennes tousiours un Pedante pour badin, et le surnom de Magister n'avoir guères plus honorable signification parmy nous: car leur estant donné en gouvernement, que pouvois-je moins faire que d'estre jaloux de leur réputation?"

τῇ ἰδέᾳ] 'the form', the primary sense of the word¹, Plat. *Protag.* 315 E, *τὴν ἰδέαν πάνυ καλός*, *Phaed.* 73 A, ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ εἴδει, *Ib. D*, *τὸ εἶδος τοῦ παιδός*, 76 C, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ εἴδει, 109 B, περὶ τὴν γῆν πολλὰ κοῖλα καὶ παντόδαπα καὶ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ μεγέθη, *Pind. Olymp.* 10 (11). 123, *ἰδέα καλός*, et alibi. So *εἶδος*, *Arist. Pol.* I 2, 1252 δ 26, ὁσπερ δὲ καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἔντοις ἀφομοιούντον οἱ ἀνθρώποι, οὔτα καὶ τοὺς βίους τῶν θεῶν.

§ 14. 'But this angry feeling is much aggravated, if he suspect that this, whatever it may be, on which he prides himself, does not really belong to him, either not at all or in no great force (*ἰσχυρώς*), or that if it does, at all events other people don't think so (*ἴτ.* it does not appear so,

¹ The following is Buhle's note on *ἰδέα*, 'Cogitandum est de *ideis Platonicis*'! and this is quoted by Gaisford without a remark.

μὴ ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ μὴ δοκεῖν· ἐπειδὰν γὰρ σφόδρα οἴων- P. 1379 b.
ται ὑπάρχειν [ἐν τούτοις]¹ ἐν οἷς σκώπτονται, οὐ φρον-
15 τίζουσιν. καὶ τοῖς φίλοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς μὴ φίλοις·
οἴονται γὰρ προσήκειν μᾶλλον πάσχειν εὖ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν
16 ἢ μή. καὶ τοῖς εἰθισμένοις τιμᾶν ἢ φροντίζειν, ἐὰν

¹ ἐν τούτοις sine uncinis.

μὴ δοκεῖν): for whenever people have a strong conviction that they really possess the assumed advantage' (supply, ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς ἐφ ὃ φιλοτιμοῦνται from the last §, or ὃ οἴονται ἔχειν, or ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς, from οἴωνται ὑπάρχειν) 'in those particular things (studies, personal qualities, accomplishments, rank and position, before enumerated) at which the taunt is levelled', (ἐν οἷς 'in which', represents the sphere, or circumstances, the 'locality' as it were of the joke in which it resides), 'they care nothing about it'. A very acute observation. F. A. Wolf has a note upon *ἐν τούτοις*, for which he proposes to substitute *ἔαντοις* or *αὐτοῖς*. He insists upon connecting *σφόδρα* ὑπάρχειν, and pronounces that to be bad Greek or unintelligible. *σφόδρα* οἴωνται, if it required any justification, would be sufficiently defended by Phaedo 73 A, *σφόδρα* μέμνημαι. I think that the translation above given shews that the vulg. is correct, and there is no manuscript authority for any alteration. *σφόδρα* and *ἰσχυρῶς* (above) are used here in the same sense, 'in a high degree'. Wolf's conjecture is supported by Brandis' *Anonymous*, in Schneidewin's *Philologus* IV i p. 46.

[*ἰσχυρῶς*] 'fortiter', 'strongly', 'vigorously', means here 'in a high degree'. "ἰσχυρῶς, strongly, very much, exceedingly, Herod. IV 108, ἔθνος μέγα καὶ πολλόν, γλαυκόν τε πᾶν ἵσχυρῶς κ.τ.λ. Ib. 183, ἔθνος μέγα ἵσχυρῶς, Xen. Anab. I 7. 17, διώρυξ ἵσχυρῶς βαθεῖα; ἵσχυρῶς ἥδεσθαι, ἀνιᾶσθαι, φοβεῖσθαι, Ib. Cyr. VIII 3. 44, &c." Liddell and Scott's *Lexicon*.

§ 15. 'Again anger is more readily excited against those who are dear to us, than against those who are not ; because we think we are naturally entitled to expect from them kind treatment rather than the reverse' (ἢ μὴ εὖ). Comp. Polit. IV (VII) 7, 1328 a 1, σημειὸν δέ πρὸς γὰρ τὸν συνήθεις καὶ φίλους ὁ θυμὸς αἴρεται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸν ἄγνωτας, ὀλιγωρεῖσθαι νομίσας. διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος κ.τ.λ. Aristotle adduces this as a proof that (in the Platonic psychological division) the seat of *φιλία*, love, is the *θυμός* or τὸ θυμοειδές, the passionate element of the human composition, in which all the noble, generous impulses, zeal, enthusiasm, righteous indignation, resentment, courage, and with them anger, reside. Aristotle is here criticising Plato's scheme, while he recognises its general validity, who assigns (Tim.) *φιλία* to the belly, with the other ἐπιθυμίαι. A few lines further on the author adds, τοῦτο δὲ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς τὸν συνήθεις πάσχοντιν, ὅπερ ἔιρηται πρότερον, ἀν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίσωσιν καὶ τοῦτο συρβάνει κατὰ λόγον παρ' οἷς γὰρ ὁφείλεσθαι δεῖν τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ὑπολαμβάνοντι, πρὸς τῷ βλάψει καὶ ταύτης ἀποστερεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν. ὅθεν ἔιρηται "χαλεποὶ γὰρ ἀδελφῶν", (this line is more correctly given by Plutarch, de Frat. Amor. 480 D, χαλεποὶ πόλεμοι γὰρ ἀδελφῶν, ὡς Εὐριπίδης ἔιρηκεν, Dind. Eur. Fr. Inc. 57: it is in fact a *paroemiac* verse, the proper vehicle for 'proverbs'), καὶ "οἵ τοι περὰ στέρξαντες, οἱ δὲ καὶ περὰ μασοῦσιν."

§ 16. 'And similarly against those that have been accustomed to pay

πάλιν μὴ οὕτως ὁμιλῶσιν· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τούτων οἴον-
 17 ται καταφρονεῖσθαι· ταῦτὰ γὰρ ἀν ποιεῖν. καὶ τοῖς
 μὴ ἀντιποιοῦσιν εὐ, μηδὲ τὴν ἵσην ἀνταποδιδοῦσιν.
 καὶ τοῖς τάναντίᾳ ποιοῦσιν αὐτοῖς, ἐὰν ἡττους ὥσιν·
 καταφρονεῖν γὰρ πάντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι φαίνονται, καὶ οἱ
 18 μὲν ὡς ἡττόνων οἱ δ' ὡς παρ' ἡττόνων. καὶ τοῖς ἐν
 μηδενὶ λόγῳ οὖσιν, ἀν τι δλιγωρῶσι, μᾶλλον· ὑπό-

respect and attention to them, if they afterwards cease (to associate or live with them on the same terms) to treat them in the same way: for from such, this seems to imply contempt, otherwise (if their feeling towards them had *not* changed) they would have gone on doing as they used to do'.

καταφρονεῖσθαι] passive, see Appendix B, on 1 12. 22 [at the end of Vol. I].

§ 17. *τὴν ἵσην* sc. *μοῖραν*, Bos, *Ellips.* pp. 306—7, cites many instances of the omission of this subst. with various words, as numerals, *δεκάτη*, *τριακοστή* (Dem. c. Lept. § 32), *ἡμίσεια*. Analogous to *τὴν ἵσην* here, we have *ἐπ’ ἵσης*, *ἐπὶ ἵση*, *ἐξ ἵσης*, *ἐκ τῆς ἵσης*, *τὴν ὄμοιν* (Herod. IX 78), *ἐπὶ τῇ ὄμοιᾳ*, *ἐκ τῆς ὄμοιας*. With *πεπρωμένη*, it is a still more frequent ellipse. With this word *μοῖρα* is sometimes expressed; as it is likewise in Hom. Il. I (IX) 318, *ἵση μοῖρα μένοντι καὶ εἰ μάλα τις πολεμίζοι*. At the same time in § 23, we have *τοῖς χάριν μὴ ἀποδιδοῦσιν*; and Bos himself in a subsequent article on *χάρις* (p. 523) refers to this, Herod. VI 21, *οὐκ ἀπέδοσαν τὴν ὄμοιν* *Συβαρίται*; to which Schäfer adds, IV 119, *τὴν ὄμοιν* *ἱμῦν ἀποδίδονται*. However *μοῖραν* is just as natural a supplement as the other, and the more numerous analogies, by shewing that the ellipse of it was more usual than that of *χάριν*, are in favour of the former explanation.

καὶ τοῖς τάναντίᾳ—παρ’ ἡττόνων] ‘And against those that do things contrary to our interests, if they are our inferiors’ (from *inferiors* opposition was not to be expected, from *equals* or *superiors* it might be; therefore in the former case it is more provoking); ‘for from all such, opposition seems to imply contempt; either because (in opposing us) they seem to regard us as inferiors’ (*quis enim contra potentiores sponte contendit praelatiaturque*, Victorius; with *ὡς ἡττόνων* repeat *καταφρονεῖν φαίνονται*); ‘or else as if (these benefits had proceeded) from inferiors’ (and therefore need not be repaid; either not at all, or not in full). These belong to the class described in the preceding topic, ‘those who do not repay a benefit at all, or inadequately’; from which the ellipse in *ὡς παρ’ ἡττόνων* must therefore be filled up; by this non-repayment or inadequate repayment of the benefits received they shew their contempt.

Those who fail to repay benefits received, altogether or in part, seem to express contempt for their benefactors as inferiors; for they would not neglect such a manifest duty, or do what they know must give offence, unless they thought that it was not worth while to keep on good terms with them. So Victorius. With *παρ’ ἡττόνων*, *εὐεργετούμενοι*, or *εὐ ποιούμενοι*, is to be understood.

§ 18. ‘The angry feeling is aggravated against those who are of no

κειται γὰρ ή ὀργὴ τῆς ὀλιγωρίας πρὸς τοὺς μὴ προσ-
19 ἡκοντας, προσήκει δὲ τοῖς ἥπτοσι μὴ ὀλιγωρεῖν. τοῖς
δὲ φίλοις, ἐάν τε μὴ εὖ λέγωσιν ἢ ποιῶσιν, καὶ ἔτι
μᾶλλον ἐὰν τάναντία, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθάνωνται δεο-
μένων, ὕσπερ ὁ Ἀντιφῶντος Πλήξιππος τῷ Μελεά-

account, no repute at all, if they are guilty of any slight, any contemptuous indifference, to us and our pretensions'. This topic goes a step beyond the preceding. In that the offenders were only *relatively* contemptible, *inferior* to ourselves. Here they are *absolutely* contemptible and worthless, of no repute at all in *any one's estimation*—'For anger is assumed to be (referring to the definition, § 1) provoked by the *slight* against those who have no natural claim (to treat us in this way): the natural duty of inferiors is *not* to slight (their betters)'.

On *προσήκειν*, and the several kinds of obligation from which the terms expressive of 'duty' are derived, *δεῖ*, *χρή*, *πρέπει*, *προσήκει*, see on μὴ *προσηκόντως*, II 2. 1, note 2 on p. II.

§ 19. *τοῖς φίλοις*] Comp. § 15, and note. 'We are angry with friends if they *don't* speak of us, and treat us, well, and still more if they do the contrary; and if, when we are in want of anything, they *don't* perceive it (*don't* find it out before we tell them of it)—this manifests their *indifference* to us and our wants, which is a kind of *contempt*, and the sting of ὀλιγωρία—'as Antiphon's Plexippus was (angry with, *ῳργίζετο*) with his (*τῷ*) Meleager: for this want of perception (or attention) is a token of slight; because, when we do care for any one, (things of this kind) *don't escape us*'. ὅν γὰρ φροντίζομεν (*ταῦτα*) οὐ λανθάνει. This is expressed in the *abstract* neuter of all *things*, meaning of course *persons*. There were two poets named Antiphon: one a writer of the New Comedy, (Meineke, *Frags. Com. Gr.* I 489, *ποιητὴς καυνῆς κωμῳδίας Ἀντιφῶν Ἀθηναῖος*, Böckh, *Corp. Inscr.* I p. 767): and the other, a tragic writer, mentioned by Athenaeus as a *τραγῳδοποιός*, together with his character, Plexippus, XV 673 F. This second Antiphon is again referred to, Rhet. II 6. 27, 'Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητής, and his play Meleager, Ib. 23. 20, where two lines are quoted from it. Besides Antiphon's play, there were several others with the same title, and on the same subject, the Calydonian boar-hunt and its tragic consequences, by poets comic as well as tragic, Sophocles, Euripides, Sosiphanes, (Wagner, *Trag. Gr. Frags.* III 179,) Antiphanes, and Philetaerus, Mein., u. s., I 315, 349. (The Meleager of Antiphanes is doubtful, the names of Antiphon and Antiphanes being often interchanged, Mein.) See also Wagner, *Trag. Gr. Frags.* III 113.

Victorius notes on this allusion: 'Plexippus was brother of Althea, Meleager's mother, and with his brother Toxeus was put to death by Meleager, because they expressed indignation at his bestowing the prize, the boarskin, which he had received for the destruction of the Calydonian boar, upon his mistress Atalanta. Perhaps it was this very circumstance that Antiphon indicated: he may have represented Plexippus as expressing his vexation at Meleager's *insensibility to his want*, to his great anxiety, namely, to possess the boarskin, which his nephew (Meleager) had,

γρῷ ὀλιγωρίας γὰρ τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι σημεῖον· ὡν
 20 γὰρ φροντίζουμεν, οὐ λανθάνει. καὶ τοῖς ἐπιχαίρουσι
 ταῖς ἀτυχίαις καὶ ὅλως εὐθυμουμένοις ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν
 ἀτυχίαις· ἢ γὰρ ἔχθροῦ ἢ ὀλιγωροῦντος σημεῖον. καὶ
 τοῖς μὴ φροντίζουσιν ἐὰν λυπήσωσιν· διὸ καὶ τοῖς
 21 κακὰ ἀγγέλλουσιν ὄργιζονται. καὶ τοῖς ἢ ἀκούουσι P. 59.
 περὶ αὐτῶν ἢ θεωμένοις τὰ αὐτῶν φαῦλα· ὅμοιοι γάρ
 εἰσιν ἢ ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἢ ἔχθροῖς· οἱ γὰρ φίλοι συναλ-

regardless of the claims of consanguinity, bestowed nevertheless on Atlanta'. (I have altered the second sentence for the sake of clearness.)

The story of Meleager and the Caledonian boarhunt, is told by Ovid, Metamorph. VIII. The offence of the Thestiadae, Toxeus and Plexippus, and their death by the hand of their nephew, are described in 428—444: from which Victorius apparently derived his account.

§ 20. ‘We are angry also with those that rejoice at our misfortunes or in general maintain a cheerful demeanour in the midst of our distresses: for this is a mark either of downright enmity or of contemptuous indifference’. ὅλως, without any *special* indications of joy, yet maintain a most provoking air of serenity and indifference whilst they cheerfully contemplate our vexations and annoyances—everyone who has ever had experience of this (and who has *not?*) knows well how provoking it is.

‘And with those who don’t care (who exhibit no solicitude, or sympathy; comp. *infra* § 21, *οἱ γὰρ φίλοι συναλγοῦσιν*) when they give us pain; and this is why we are angry with the messengers of evil tidings’ (ingenious solution). Or the explanation might be, that the first surprise and annoyance at the unwelcome intelligence associates the bearer with his news. That messengers of unwelcome news are liable to a rough reception from those to whom they communicate them, is noticed also by Aesch., Pers. 255, ὡμοι κακὸν μὲν πρώτον ἀγγέλλειν κακά, Soph. Antig. 277, στέργει γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἀγγέλον κακῶν ἐπόν.

Shakespeare, *Henry IV*. Pt. II. Act I, sc. I. 100, *Yet the first bringer of unwelcome news hath but a losing office. Antony and Cleop. II 5, Though it be honest it is never good to bring bad news. Macbeth, V 5, Liar and slave*—(to the messenger, who comes to announce the moving of Birnam wood).

§ 21. ‘And with such as stand quietly, calmly, listening to an account of (*περὶ*), or looking on at (any painful exhibition of) our faults and weaknesses (*τὰ φαῦλα*), (without offering either help or sympathy); this looks like either contemptuous indifference, or actual enmity: because friends sympathise with us (*feel pain* as we do ourselves), (and these do not); and every one *feels pain* at the spectacle, the contemplation, when he witnesses the exposure, of his own infirmities—the friend, being *ἴτερος αὐτός* or *ἄλλος αὐτός*, ‘a second self’ (Eth. Nic. IX several times repeated), must regard the exposure of his friend’s weaknesses just as he would of his own.

γοῦσιν, θεώμενοι δὲ τὰ οἰκεῖα φαῦλα πάντες ἀλγοῦ-
 22 σιν· ἔτι τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσι πρὸς πέντε, πρὸς οὓς φιλο-
 τιμοῦνται, πρὸς οὓς θαυμάζουσιν, ὡφ' ὃν βούλονται
 θαυμάζεσθαι, ἢ οὓς αἰσχύνονται, ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσχυνομέ-
 νοις αὐτούς· ἐν τούτοις ἔαν τις ὀλιγωρῆ, ὄργιζονται
 23 μᾶλλον. καὶ τοῖς εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ὀλιγωροῦσιν ὑπὲρ
 ὃν αὐτοῖς αἰσχρὸν μὴ βοηθεῖν, οἶνον γονεῖς, τέκνα,
 γυναῖκας, ἀρχομένους. καὶ τοῖς χάριν μὴ ἀποδιδοῦ- P. 1380.

§ 22. ‘And further, with those who shew slight to us before (in respect of) five different kinds of persons; (1) to those whom we are ambitious of rivalling¹ (in the race for distinction; φιλοτιμεῖσθαι expresses the ambitious views, and πρὸς οὓς the competition, comp. c. 4.24, 6.15, 10.5, &c.); (2) πρὸς (τούτους) οὓς, to those whom we respect and admire; (3) those by whom we wish to be respected and admired; (4) those of whom we stand in awe; (5) ἢ (τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσιν ἡμῶν, or αὐτῶν as Ar. writes it,) or, (we are angry with those who slight us) when *in the company* of (ἐν) those who hold us in awe. In the society of any of these, a slight offered is provocative of a greater degree of anger (than it would be elsewhere).’

αἰσχύνεσθαι, with the accus. of the *person*, means to ‘be ashamed in a man’s presence, or before him; to be afraid to look one in the face, from reverence; to stand in awe of him’. Soph. Phil. 1382, οὐ κατασχύνει θεός; τὸν προστρόπαιον τὸν ικέτην; The accusative is the *local* accus., an extension of the *cognate* accus., the person, whose presence causes the shame or awe, being represented as the *seat* of it, as when we say *ἀλγεῖν τὴν κεφαλήν*. Matth., Gr. Gr. 441, has given a few examples of this use of *αἰσχύνεσθαι* and *αἰδεῖσθαι*—four from Eur. Ion, 353, 379, 952, and 1093, *αἰσχύνομαι τὸν πολύūμνον θεόν*, and one from Xen. de Rep. Lac. II II. Add Hom. Il. A 23, *αἰδεῖσθαι θ' ιερῆα*, Z (vi) 442, *αἰδεόμαι Τρῶας καὶ Τρώαδας ἐλκεσιπέλους*: so *αἰδεῖσθαι ικέτην*, as Hom. Il. x (xxii) 124. Aesch. Agam. 362, (Dind.), Δία τοι ξένων μέγαν αἰδοῦμαι. Aristoph. Thesm. 848, 903, Eccles. 381, Plut. 1077. Plat. Theaet. 183 E, Μέλισσον...ἡττον αἰσχύνομαι. Symp. 216 B, 218 D, Protag. 312 A, οὐκ ἀν αἰσχύνοιο σαντόν; Rep. VIII 562 E, *αἰσχύνεσθαι τοὺς γονέας, κ.τ.λ.* Comp. Lat. *pudere, suppudere, aliquem alicuius*, Cic. Ep. ad Fam. IX 1 sed quod eorum me suppudebat. Orator 155 ‘*Patris mei, meum factum* (i.e. meorum factorum) *pudet*.’

§ 23. ‘And those whose slight is offered to such objects as it would be a disgrace to us not to help and protect, such as parents, children, wives, rulers and governors’, such as have a natural claim upon our help and protection. ‘And those that have failed to make a due return (for a benefit received); for in this case the slight (neglect, contemptuous *indifference to moral obligation*) is a violation of the *natural*

¹ The phrase has been otherwise understood, ‘those whom they are anxious to stand well with’. But to say nothing of its not properly representing the Greek, this interpretation leaves no difference between this first class and the third.

24 σιν· παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον γάρ ή ὀλιγωρία. καὶ τοῖς εἰρωνευομένοις πρὸς σπουδάζοντας· καταφρονητικὸν
 25 γάρ ή εἰρωνεία. καὶ τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων εὐποιητικοῖς,
 ἐὰν μὴ καὶ αὐτῶν· καὶ γάρ τοῦτο καταφρονητικόν,
 26 τὸ μὴ ἀξιοῦν ὥν πάντας καὶ αὐτόν. ποιητικὸν δὲ
 ὄργῆς καὶ η λήθη, οἷον καὶ η τῶν ὄνομάτων οὕτως
 οὖσα περὶ μικρόν· ὀλιγωρίας γάρ δοκεῖ καὶ η λήθη
 σημεῖον εἶναι· δι' ἀμέλειαν μὲν γάρ η λήθη γίγνεται,
 η δὲ ἀμέλεια ὀλιγωρία ἔστιν.

27 οἵς μὲν οὖν ὄργιζονται καὶ ως ἔχοντες καὶ διὰ ποῖα, ἀμα εἴρηται· δῆλον δὲ τι δέοι ὥν κατασκευά-

claim, duty, or obligation. The *nature* or *fitness* of things requires (under this theory, which is that of justice, the *lex talionis*) such a *compensation*, or the repayment of the favour.

§ 24. ‘And those (are provoking) who use irony to (*πρός*, in reply to, or conversation with) us when we are in serious, earnest (whether merely talking, or engaged in some serious pursuit: either of these is provoked by untimely levity; which is construed as a kind of contempt), for irony is expressive of contempt’. This characteristic or construction of irony is not noticed in the analysis of it in Eth. Nic. IV 13, 1127 b 22 seq. In IV 8, 1124 b 30, it appears as a trait in the character of the *μεγαλόψυχος*, and is part of the *contemptuous* bearing (1124 b 5 ὁ δὲ *μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ*) to the vulgar which is suitable to his dignity, *εἴρωνα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς*. On irony and its uses in Rhetoric, besides the passage from the Ethics already quoted, see Rhet. ad Alexandrum 22. I, Cic. de Orat. II 67. 269 seq., III 53. 203, Quint. VIII 6. 54, IX 2. 44 seq. Socrates was probably one of those whose constant use of *εἰρωνεία* was construed as contempt, and contributed to his unpopularity.

§ 25. ‘And (again we feel ourselves slighted) by those who are naturally or habitually disposed to acts of kindness, if they don’t extend their kindness to ourselves: for this has the air of contempt, to consider us (*αὐτόν* is ‘an individual’ opposed to *πάντας*) unworthy to be treated in the same way as every one else’.

§ 26. ‘Forgetfulness too is provocative of anger, even, for instance, forgetting your friend’s name, though it be (shewn) in such a mere trifle: for even forgetfulness (trifle though it be, *καὶ*) is construed as a sign of contempt: because this oblivion is due to neglect, and neglect is slight’. Falconbridge, in *King John*, Act I, sc. I. 187, *And if his name be George, I'll call him Peter; For new-made honour doth forget men's names.*

§ 27. ‘So the objects, dispositions, and provocatives of anger have been all treated together’. On the grammar of *οἵς.. εἴρηται*, see note, II 9. 11 (at the end).

The following sentence is a note upon the mode of applying the foregoing analysis to the conduct and management of the speech, for the

ζειν τῷ λόγῳ τοιούτους οἵοι ὄντες ὀργίλως ἔχουσιν, καὶ τοὺς ἐναντίους τούτοις ἐνόχους ὄντας ἐφ' οἷς ὀργίζονται, καὶ τοιούτους οἵοις ὀργίζονται.

I ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἐναντίον τῷ πραῦνεσθαι CHAP. III.
καὶ ὄργὴ πραότητι, ληπτέον πῶς ἔχοντες πρᾶοι εἰσι

benefit of the student of Rhetoric: how, namely, to excite and direct this passion in conformity with the interests of the speaker, and it is plain that what is required is, to bring the audience by the speech into such a state of mind as men are in, when they are irascible (so that their anger may be brought to bear upon the opponent); and to represent the adversary as liable to the imputation of such feelings and acts as provoke men to anger, and of such character or disposition as men are angry with. *κατασκευάζειν* has the same double meaning, or at least application, as we noticed on II I. 2, q. v. In the one case, it is ‘to establish’, or produce the feelings in the minds of the audience; in the other, to produce in their minds by the speech an impression of the state of feeling of the adverse party, to establish, i.e. to *represent* in the speech. *αὐτὸν* after *δέοι* *ἄν*, the reading of most MSS, is rightly omitted by Bekker with A^c.

CHAPTER III.

Analysis of *πραότης*, patience; the opposite of *ὄργη*, as it is *here* stated. In the Nic. Eth. IV 11, init. the statement is different. *πραότης* is there the mean state, or virtue, lying between *ὄργιλότης* irascibility, the excess of angry emotion, and *δοργηστὰ* want of spirit, insensibility (to provocation or wrong), the defect; *τὸ δὲ προπτηλακύζομενον ἀνέχεσθαι καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους περιορᾶν ἀνδραποδῶδες*. *ὄργη* is the basis of the whole, the *πάθος* in general, the natural emotion in respect of provocation, capable of modification so as to assume three different forms: its three *ἔξεις* are *περὶ τὴν ὄργήν*, c. 12 init. *πραότης* then, *here*, as a *πάθος*—in the Ethics it is a *ἔξις* or virtue—is this instinctive *affection*, feeling, emotion, in a mild, calm, subdued state (opposed to *ὄργη* an emotion in a state of excitement); placidity of temper. As a virtue (in the Ethics) it is as described by Grant (Eth. Nic. *Plan of book*, IV p. 150, first ed.) ‘the virtue of the regulation (or control) of the temper’. In the de Anima, I 1, 403 a 16, it is still only a *πάθος*, together with *θυμός*, *φόβος*, *ἐλέος*, *θάρσος*, *χαρά*, *φιλία*, and *μῖσος*. Again *πραότης*, the feeling, stands in the same relation to *πράντης*, the quieting, calming, lowering process of the excited, angry emotion, as *ὄργη* does to *ὄργιζεσθαι*, (and would to *ὄργης* if the word were in existence). And lastly, as *ὄργη* is a *κίνησις* (setting in motion in the way of stirring up and exciting) de Anima, I 1, 403 a 26, *τὸ ὄργιζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιονδὶ σώματος ἡ μέρους κ.τ.λ.*, so *πράντης* is a *κατάστασις*, a process of settling down, and *ἡρέμησις*, a passing to a state of rest—*ἡρεμεῖν* the regular opposite of *κινεῖσθαι*. The fifth book of the Physics is on these two opposites, *κίνησις* and *ἡρεμία*; see especially ch. 6. ‘And whereas growing angry is opposite to growing calm, and anger to calmness, (and we rhetoricians are bound to be equally acquainted with both sides of every question), we must now proceed to ascertain the several

καὶ πρὸς τίνας πράως ἔχουσι καὶ διὰ τίνων πραῦνον-
2 ται· ἔστω δὴ πράυνσις κατάστασις καὶ ἡρέμησις ὁρ-
3 γῆς. εἰ οὖν ὄργιζονται τοῖς ὀλιγωροῦσιν, ὀλιγωρίᾳ
δ' ἔστιν ἐκούσιον, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν τούτων
ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἀκούσιως ποιοῦσιν ἢ φαινομένοις τοιούτοις
4 πρᾶοι εἰσίν. καὶ τοῖς τάναντίᾳ ὥν ἐποίησαν βουλο-
μένοις. καὶ ὅσοι καὶ αὐτοὶ εἰς αὐτοὺς τοιοῦτοι· οὐ-
5 δεῖς γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ δοκεῖ ὀλιγωρεῖν. καὶ τοῖς ὁμο-
λογοῦσι καὶ μεταμελομένοις· ὡς γὰρ ἔχοντες δίκην τὸ
λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς πεποιημένοις παύονται τῆς ὄργῆς.
σημεῖον δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν οἰκετῶν κολάσεως· τοὺς μὲν p. 60.
γὰρ ἀντιλέγοντας καὶ ἀρνουμένους μᾶλλον κολάζο-

dispositions of calmness (in the subject), the states of mind (in the objects) which are regarded with calmness (*sang-froid*), and the means of bringing them into this state'.

§ 2. [ἔστω] See note on 1 5. 3, 6. 2, &c. ‘Let it be assumed then (as sufficient for our purpose) that the process or growth of this even and indifferent state of mind is a subsiding or *settling down*, and a process tending to rest (a quieting process) of the *motion* (i.e. excitement, ferment, ebullition) of anger’. ‘In V. Nat. Ausc. [φυσικῆς ἀκροάστεως, Ε p. 230 a 4,] (32, ἢ γὰρ εἰς αὐτὸς κίνησις ἐν φόβῳ ἔστηκεν, ἡρέμησις μᾶλλον ἔστιν) valet Aristoteli ἡρέμησις, via progressusque ad quietem’. Victorius.

§ 3. ‘If then anger is roused by slight, and slight is voluntary (i.e. intentional), it plainly follows that to those who do none of these things (the various kinds of ὀλιγωρία enumerated in this last chapter) or do it unintentionally, or have that appearance (though they may in reality have intended a slight), men are calm (quiet, placable, take no offence)’.

§ 4. ‘And to those who offer a slight without intending it (with the contrary intention). And to those whose feelings or dispositions and conduct’ (both included in τοιοῦτοι) ‘are alike to themselves and to the others (*lit.* who behave in the same way themselves to themselves); for no one is ever supposed to slight himself’.

§ 5. ‘And to those who offer a slight, and then repent of it; for, accepting as a sort of satisfaction the pain felt at what has been done, their anger ceases. A sign of this is what happens in the punishment of slaves; for those that *answer*, or contradict us, and deny the fault, we punish more severely, whilst we cease to be angry with those that admit the justice of their punishment’.

μεταμελομένοις] ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ.....τοῦ δὴ δι᾽ ἄγγοιν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἀκων δοκεῖ κ.τ.λ. Eth. Nic. III 2 init. p. 1110 b 18. So that repentance is a sign that the act was unintentional, and from ignorance of the probable effect.

ἀντιλέγοντας] Arist. Ran. 1072, λαλιὰν καὶ στωμιλίαν ἢ ἔξεκένωστεν τάς τε παλαστρας, καὶ τοὺς παράλοους ἀνέπεισεν ἀνταγορεύειν τοῖς ἄρχουσιν.

μεν, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας δικαίως κολάζεσθαι, πανόμεθα θυμούμενοι. αἴτιον δ’ ὅτι ἀναισχυντία τὸ τὰ φανερὰ ἀρνεῖσθαι, ή δ’ ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία καὶ καταφρόνησις· ὥν γοῦν πολὺ καταφρονοῦμεν, οὐκ 6 αἰσχυνόμεθα. καὶ τοῖς ταπεινουμένοις πρὸς αὐτοὺς καὶ μὴ ἀντιλέγοντιν φαίνονται γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν ἡττους εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἡττους φοβοῦνται, φοβούμενος δὲ οὐδεὶς ὀλιγωρεῖ. ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ταπεινουμένους παύεται

πρὸς τοὺς ὁμολογοῦντας] Schrader refers in illustration to Terent. Andr. III 5. 15, Pamph. *annon dixi esse hoc futurum?* Dav. *dixti.* Pamph. *quin meritus's?* Dav. *crucem.....Pamph.* (who is mollified by the admission) *hei mihi, cum non habeo spatum ut de te sumam supplicium, ut volo.* Jul. Cæsar, IV 3, 116, Brut. *When I spoke that, I was ill-tempered too.* Cass. *Do you confess so much? Give me your hand.* ‘The cause of this (of the heavier punishment of those that aggravate their offence by denying it), is that to deny evident facts is effrontery’ (*ἀναισχυντία* is a want of respect for the opinions and feelings of others), ‘and effrontery implies slight regard and contempt—at all events we feel no respect for’ (*αἰσχύνεσθαι τινα*, note on II 2. 22) ‘those whom we greatly despise’. This is an argument in support of the assertion that *ἀναισχυντία* implies *ὀλιγωρία* and *καταφρόνησις*. *ἀναισχυντία* is ‘disrespect’; now as experience shews that we *do* treat with disrespect those whom we very much despise, it follows from this that disrespect, effrontery, impudence, must carry with it, as its outward expression, the feeling of contempt. Comp. c. 6 § 2, η δὲ *ἀναισχυντία δλιγωρία τις.*

ἀναισχυντία τὸ τὰ φανερὰ ἀρνεῖσθαι] The sausage- (or black-pudding-) monger in the Knights (296) is a perfect model of this kind of effrontery. Cleon, who is represented as not overburdened with modesty, candidly admits his thefts, *ὁμολογῶ κλέπτειν σὺ δὲ οὐχί.* The other lays his hands upon something under the very eyes of the bystanders, and then swears that he never touched it: *μή τὸν Ἐρμῆν τὸν ἀγοράνον, κάπιορκῷ γε βλεπόντων.*

§ 6. What follows, though put forward as an independent topic, may also be regarded as the explanation of the second member of the alternative, the mitigation of the penalty consequent upon the admission of the offender.

‘And to those who humble themselves before us, and do not answer or contradict us; for in doing so they seem to admit their inferiority, and (conscious) inferiority implies fear, (not contemptuous indifference), and no one in that state of mind is ever guilty of a slight’. (Fear and anger cannot coexist, § 10.) ‘That our anger does cease towards those who humble themselves before us, is shewn also by the habit which dogs have of not biting those that sit down (when they attack them)’. This fact in the natural history of dogs is attested not only by Homer—Od. § 26 *ἔξαπίνης δ' Ὁδυσῆα ἵδον κύνες ὑλακόμωροι οἱ μὲν κεκλήγοντες ἐπέδραμον, αὐτὰρ Ὁδυσσεὺς ἔζετο κερδοσύνη, σκῆπτρον δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε χειρός*—but also by the experience of modern travellers in Albania [see esp. Mure’s *Tour in Greece*

ἡ ὄργη, καὶ οἱ κύνες δηλοῦτιν οὐ δάκνοντες τοὺς καθ-
7 ἵζοντας. καὶ τοῖς σπουδάζουσι πρὸς τοὺς σπουδά-
ζοντας· δοκεῖ γὰρ σπουδάζεσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ καταφρο-
8 νεῖσθαι. καὶ τοῖς μείζω κεχαρισμένοις. καὶ τοῖς
9 δεομένοις καὶ παραιτουμένοις· ταπεινότεροι γάρ. καὶ
τοῖς μὴ ὑβρισταῖς μηδὲ χλευασταῖς μηδὲ ὀλιγώροις, ἢ
εἰς μηδένα ἢ μὴ εἰς χρηστοὺς μηδὲ εἰς τοιούτους οἵοι
10 περ αὐτοί. ὅλως δ' ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ
πραῦντικά. καὶ οὓς φοβοῦνται ἢ αἰσχύνονται· ἔως

[193—100 or De Quincey's review XIII 301—9]. I myself heard of it there. In illustration of *καθίζοντας*, *sitting* as a *suppliant* posture, Victorius cites Soph. Oed. R. init. *τίνας ποθὲ ἔδρας τάσθε κ.τ.λ.* Arist. Plut. 382, *ὅρῳ τινὶ* ἐπὶ τοῦ βῆματος καθεδούμενον, *ἴκετρίαν ἔχοντα.* Demosth. de Cor. § 107 οὐκ ἐν Μούνχιᾳ ἐκάθεξετο (took sanctuary at the altar of Artemis in Munychia).

§ 7. ‘And to those who are serious with the serious’ (earnest in anything—the opposite of those who joke *παίζοντες*, or use irony, when you are disposed to be serious, which makes you angry; c. 2 § 24); ‘because then you consider yourself to be treated seriously’ (which implies *respect*, that you are worthy of serious consideration), ‘and not with contempt’ (as in the other case, in which people seem to ‘make a joke’ of you).

σπουδάζεσθαι and *καταφροεῖσθαι*] On this formation of the passive, see Append. B on I 12. 22 (at the end of the notes to Book I).

§ 8. ‘And to those who have done us more kindness and service (than they have received from us)’. The explanation of this is not given because it is too clear to require one. It is that this superiority in conferring favours constitutes a *debt* and an *obligation* on the part of the inferior in this social commerce, whose account is on the debit side in the books of the other; who is therefore *obliged* to him, and disinclined to resent any real or supposed offence: the gratitude overpowers the sense of slight.

‘And those who beg for anything and deprecate our wrath or resentment’—both of these are confessions of inferiority, we acknowledge that we are in want of something, a deficiency which they can supply, and this shews superiority—‘for they are humbler’ (than they would otherwise be, if they *didn't* want anything).

§ 9. ‘And those who are not given to wanton outrage, or to mockery, or slight’—the opposite dispositions and conduct being of all the most provocative of anger, C. 2 §§ 3, 5, 12—‘either such as never indulge them against any one, or never against the good and worthy, or never against those who are like ourselves’.

§ 10. ‘And as a general rule, the things (words or deeds) that are productive (in our intercourse with others) of a calm temper’ (a quiet, indifferent, unexcited state of feeling; *πραότης* is purely negative; I believe, strictly speaking, that it is no true *πάθος* at all, and is better represented as a virtue or mean state in the Ethics) ‘may be ascertained from their

γὰρ ἀν οὕτως ἔχωσιν, οὐκ ὄργιζονται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ
 11 ἄμα φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ὄργιζεσθαι. καὶ τοῖς δὶς ὄργὴν
 ποιήσασιν ἢ οὐκ ὄργιζονται ἢ ἡπτον ὄργιζονται· οὐ
 γὰρ δὶς ὀλιγωρίαν φαίνονται πρᾶξαι· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὄργι-
 ζόμενος ὀλιγωρεῖ· ή μὲν γὰρ ὀλιγωρία ἄλυπον, ή δ'
 12 ὄργὴ μετὰ λύπης. καὶ τοῖς αἰσχυνομένοις αὐτούς.
 καὶ ἔχοντες δὲ ἐναντίως τῷ ὄργιζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι

P. 1380 b.

opposites' (viz. the *exciting* topics of *ὄργη* in c. 2). Buhle objects to this clause, *ὅτις ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων* as interrupting the analysis and out of place, and pronounces it an interpolation. It is however a not unnatural observation to make here. Up to this point Aristotle has been going over very nearly the same ground as the topics of the last chapter; when he has got thus far, the resemblance strikes him, and he says by way of a note: "but in fact this is true as a general rule, *all* the topics of *πράξης* may be derived by merely reversing them from those of *ὄργη*". I do not mean to say that he was previously unaware of this fact, but only that it struck him more vividly at the moment, when he had the preceding examples written down on his parchment or papyrus (probably the latter) before his eyes.

After this little digression we return to the topics of *πράξης*.

'The presence of those that we are afraid of, or stand in awe of, makes us calm: for as long as we are in this state of mind we cannot feel anger; because fear and anger cannot coexist in the mind'.

§ 11. 'At offences committed under the influence of passion we either feel no anger at all, or in a less degree; because in this case the offence appears not to be due to slight; for no one when angry with another can feel indifferent about him and his proceedings; because a contemptuous and indifferent state of mind, or slight, implies the absence of pain, whereas anger is always accompanied by it'. ὄργη ὄρεξις μετὰ λύπης, defin. II 2. 1. "Eodem argumento Eth. Nic. III (4, IIII δ 17,) distinxit προαίρεσιν αἱ cupiditate: καὶ η μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδεός καὶ ἐπιλύπον, η δὲ προαίρεσις οὐτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδεός". Victorius.

τοῖς δὶς ὄργὴν ποιήσασιν] As here the influence of passion mitigates the offensiveness of an act, and the amount of provocation caused by it, so in Eth. Nic. V. 10, 1135 δ 19, ὅταν εἰδὼς μὲν μὴ προβούλεύσας δέ, ἀδίκημα, οἷον ὅσα τε δὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἡ φυσικά, συμβάνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, it diminishes its criminality. The supposition is, that a man who kills another, for instance, in a fit of passion, is *blinded* by it, deprived thereby of the knowledge of the particular circumstances of the case, which is necessary to constitute *guilt*, Eth. N. III 2, and the want of which exempts in some degree from responsibility; there is no malice prepose which makes the complete crime. The question of the degree in which acts of this kind can be properly called *involuntary* is briefly discussed in c. 3 of the same book.

§ 12. 'Again, an offence from one who stands in awe of us', does not provoke us to anger, because we know or guess that from one who

πρᾶοι εἰσίν, οῖον ἐν παιδιᾷ, ἐν γέλωτι, ἐν ἑορτῇ, ἐν εὐημερίᾳ, ἐν κατορθώσει, ἐν πληρώσει, ὅλως ἐν ἀλυπίᾳ καὶ ἡδονῇ μὴ ύβριστικῇ καὶ ἐν ἐλπίδι ἐπιεικεῖ.

13 ἔτι κεχρονικότες καὶ μὴ ύπόγυιοι τῇ ὄργῃ ὄντες παύει

habitually regards us with awe or reverence the offence is unintentional, being inconsistent with his ordinary feeling toward us. ‘Also it is plain that men are calm and placable when they are in any state (in any condition or circumstances, internal or external) which is antagonistic to angry feeling, as when engaged in any sport or amusement, when they are laughing, at a feast, in fine weather (or in a prosperous state), in success, in a state of repletion or satisfaction; in short, in any condition of freedom from pain (negative pleasure), or (positive) pleasure—except that of wanton outrage (*ύβρις* is always ὥπως ἡσθῆ, II 2. 5)—and of virtuous, good hope’. Of ἐπιεικής it is said, Eth. N. v. 14, init. *μεταφέρομεν* ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. It can be substituted, by metaphor, for ἀγαθός. The *bad* state of mind implied by a *vicious* hope does not exclude the feeling of anger.

[*εὐημερίᾳ*] It is hard to say whether this is meant for a ‘fine day’, ‘fine weather’, like *εὐδία*, which certainly tends to placidity of temper, and general *εὐθυμία* and *εὐκολία*—(in which sense it is actually used in Hist. Anim. VI 15. 6, ὅταν εὐμερίας γενομένης ἀναθερψαίηται ἡ γῆ, and again § 7, ὅταν εὐημερίᾳ ἦ, and Xenoph. Hellen. II 4. 2, καὶ μάλ’ εὐημερίας, οὐσῆς, Soph. Aj. 709, λευκὸν εὐάμερον φάσι)—or *metaphorically*, for a ‘state of prosperity, health and happiness’, in which sense *εὐημερος*, *εὐημερεῖν* and *εὐημερία* are employed. See again Hist. Anim. VIII 18. I, *εὐημεροῦσι* δὲ (are in a flourishing condition) τὰ ζῷα κατὰ τὰς ὕρας κ.τ.λ. v 11. 5, πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην τοῦ σώματος εὐημερίαν. Pol. III 6, 1278 δ 29, ὡς ἐνούσης τυῖδος εὐημερίας ἐν αὐτῷ (τῷ ζῆν) καὶ γλυκύτητος φυσικῆς. IV (VII) 2, 1324 a 38, ἐμπόδιον τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν εὐημερίᾳ (of the prosperity of a country). VII (VI) 8, 1322 b 38, εὐημερούσαις πόλεσιν, VIII (V) 8, 1308 δ 24, τὸ εὐημεροῦν τῆς πόλεως. And in the same sense *εὐετηρίας* γινομένης δι’ εἰρήνην κ.τ.λ., of a *state*, as before, VIII (V) 6, 1306 δ 11. De Gen. An. IV 6. 16, *εὐημερεῖν* τοῖς σώμασιν. Eth. Nic. I 9, sub fin. τῆς τουτῆς εὐημερίας, including all the elements of happiness or prosperity, according to the vulgar notion. In Aristotle at all events the preponderance of usage is decidedly on the side of the *metaphorical* application.

§ 13. ‘Further (men are brought to a calm or placid state of mind) by lapse of time when they are no longer fresh in their anger (when their anger is no longer fresh); for time brings anger to an end’.

χρονίζειν is ‘to pass’ or ‘spend time’, *κεχρονικότες*, men that have ‘already passed some time’, since the angry fit came on. For examples of the use of the word see the Lexx. *ὑπόγυιοι*, ‘fresh, recent’, of things still *under the hand* of the workman. See note on I 1. 7.

Gaisford quotes in illustration of the topic, Thucyd. III 38, (Cleon) θαυμάζω μὲν τῶν προθέντων αὐθίς περὶ Μυτιληναίων λέγειν, καὶ χρόνου διατριβῆν ἐμποιησάντων ὃ ἔστι πρὸς τῶν ἡδικηκότων μᾶλλον. ὃ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι ἀμβλυντέρα τῇ ὄργῃ ἐπεξέρχεται. And Eustath. ad Il. Ω, p. 1342. 46, ὃ διὰ μέσου καιρὸς μαλάττει τὴν ἐν τοῖς θυμουμένοις σκληρότητα, ὥστε ἀληθεύειν τὸν

γὰρ ὄργὴν ὁ χρόνος. παύει δὲ καὶ ἑτέρου ὄργὴν μείζω
ἡ παρ' ἄλλου ληφθεῖσα τιμωρία πρότερον· διὸ εὑ
Φιλοκράτης, εἰπόντος τινὸς ὄργιζομένου τοῦ δήμου “τί
οὐκ ἀπολογεῖ;” “οὕπω γε” ἔφη. “ἄλλὰ πότε;”
“ὅταν ἄλλον ἵδω διαβεβλημένον.” πρᾶοι γὰρ γίγ-
νονται ὅταν εἰς ἄλλον τὴν ὄργὴν ἀναλώσωσιν, οἷον

εἰπόντα ὅτι (Soph. Electr. 179) *χρόνος εὐμαρῆς θεός*. Virg. Aen. v 781,
Junonis gravis ira, nec exsaturabile pectus, quam nec longa dies pietas
nec mitigat ulla (Victorius), describes the implacability, the lasting
nature, of Juno's anger, which is the direct opposite of *πρᾳότης*. This
is *πικρότης*: οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ὄργιζονται, Eth. N. IV
11, 1126 a 20: likewise *κότος*, rancorous, vindictive wrath, said of one who
πέττει τὴν ὄργην, (*nurses his wrath to keep it warm*. Burns,) Ib. line 25.
And opposed to these are the *ὄργιλοι* (irascible), *δξεῖς*, *ἀκρόχολοι*, (ita Bekk.)
Ib. line 18; these *ταχέως ὄργιζονται* and *παύονται ταχέως*, lines 13, 15.

'And again a more violent animosity conceived against one person is appeased by punishment previously exacted from another (who may not have excited it so strongly): and therefore the saying of Philocrates was to the point, when some one asked at a time of popular excitement against him, 'why do not you defend yourself?' 'No, not yet', he replied. 'Well, but when?' 'As soon as I have seen some one else under accusation', (or 'under a similar suspicion': *διαβάλλειν*, 'to set two people at variance', being specially applied to 'calumny'). 'For men recover their calmness and evenness of temper, as soon as they have expended their anger upon another object'. So Eth. N. u. s., 1126 a 21, *παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν ἀνταποδιδῶ* ἡ γὰρ τιμωρία *παύει τῆς ὄργης, ηδονὴν ἀντὶ τῆς λύπης* *ἐμποιούσα*. "Tanta enim est primi impetus in ira vis, ut cupiditatem fere omnem effundat." Schrader. He also cites from Plutarch's Life of Alexander the case of Alexander the Great, who expended his anger against the Greeks on the destruction of Thebes, and afterwards spared Athens. Victorius supplies a very pertinent passage from Lysias, Or. xix
ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἀριστοφάνους χρημάτων §§ 5, 6, ἀκούων γὰρ ἔγωγε...ὅτι πάντων δεινότατον ἔστι διαβολή· μάλιστα δὲ τούτῳ ἔχοι ἄν τις δεινότατον, ὅταν πολλοὶ ἐπὶ τῇ αὐτῇ αἵρᾳ εἰς ἀγώνα καταστῶσιν ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῷ πολὺ οἱ τελευταῖοι κρινόμενοι σώζονται· πεπαυμένοι γὰρ ὄργης αὐτῶν ἀκροῦσθε, καὶ τοὺς ἐλέγχους ἥδη ἐθέλοντες ἀποδέχεσθε.

On Philocrates, of the Attic deme Hagnus ('Αγνούσιος), a contemporary and political rival of Demosthenes, see two columns of references from the Orators, chiefly Demosthenes and Aeschines, in Baiter and Sauppe's excellent *Index nominum*, appended to their edition of the Greek Orators, III 137 seq. [See also Arnold Schaefer's *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, II 345 and elsewhere. S.]

'As happened in the case of Ergophilus; for though they (the Athenian assembly) were more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, they let him off, because they had condemned Callisthenes to death the day before'. Callisthenes and Ergophilus were both of them Athenian generals commanding in the Chersonese, B. C. 362. See Grotc, *Hist. of*

συνέβη ἐπὶ Ἐργοφίλου. μᾶλλον γὰρ χαλεπαίνοντες π. 61.
 ἡ Καλλισθένει ἀφεῖσαν διὰ τὸ Καλλισθένους τῇ προ-
 14 τεραιά καταγνῶναι θάνατον. καὶ ἐὰν ἐλεῶσιν, καὶ
 ἐὰν μεῖζον κακὸν πεπονθότες ὥστιν ἡ οἱ ὄργιζόμενοι
 ἀν ἔδρασαν· ὥσπερ εἰληφέναι γὰρ οἴονται τιμωρίαν.
 15 καὶ ἐὰν ἀδικεῖν οἴωνται αὐτοὶ καὶ δικαίως πάσχειν· οὐ
 γίγνεται γὰρ ἡ ὄργη πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι
 παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον οἴονται πάσχειν, η δ' ὄργη τοῦτο
 ἦν. διὸ δεῖ τῷ λόγῳ προκολάζειν· ἀγανακτοῦσι γὰρ
 16 ἥττον κολαζόμενοι καὶ οἱ δοῦλοι. καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αἰσθί-
 σεσθαι οἴωνται ὅτι δὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀνθ' ὧν ἔπαθον· η

Gr. x 508, 511, and the references in Baiter and Sauppe, *u. s.* pp. 45 and 73 [also A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I 134]. The former is to be distinguished from Callisthenes the contemporary Orator. Of Ergophilus, Demosthenes says, de Fals. Leg. § 180, *καὶ ὅσοι διὰ ταῦτ' (corruption and treachery in the exercise of military command) ἀπολώλασι παρ' ὑμῖν, οἱ δὲ χρήματα πάμπολλ' ὀφλήκασιν οὐ χαλεπὸν δεῖξαι*, Ἐργόφιλος, Κηφισόδοτος, Τιμόμαχος, κ.τ.λ. To reconcile this passage with that of Aristotle, we must suppose that Ergophilus was one of those that were fined, but acquitted on the capital charge; which is not quite accurately expressed by ἀφεῖσαν: or possibly the two cases may be distinct.

§ 14. ‘Sympathy or compassion calms angry feeling; and if the offence (which has aroused their indignation) has been visited by a heavier punishment than those who are thus angry would themselves have inflicted (their anger is appeased); for they think they have received a sort of (*ὥσπερ*) satisfaction (for the injury), or ‘exacted as it were a penalty (for the offence)’.

§ 15. ‘Or again, if they think that they are themselves in fault, and are suffering no more than they deserve; for justice, ‘reciprocity’, or fair retaliation, excites no anger: and so they no longer think that the treatment they receive is in violation of their natural rights, and this, as we said, is essential to (or the notion of) anger’. *ἡν* ‘was—when we said it’: that is, in the definition II 2. I. On *προσῆκον*, the appeal to *nature* as the basis of *obligation*, see note on *μὴ προσῆκοντος* (on II 2. I at the end). ‘And therefore punishment should always be preceded by the (appropriate, *τῷ*) explanation (of the nature of the offence and the justice of the punishment); for even slaves are less vexed at being punished (when treated in this way)’. This is Mureetus’ interpretation, against Victorius. It is no doubt the natural and correct explanation. [‘Decet verbis castigare, antequam puniamus.’ Spengel.]

§ 16. ‘(And men in anger are more easily pacified) if they think that (those that they desire to punish) will never find out that the punishment is due to them (that they are the authors of it) and that it is in compensation for their own injuries’; (this is the *φαινομένη ὀλιγωρία* of the defi-

γὰρ ὁργὴ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστόν ἐστιν δῆλον δὲ ἐκ τοῦ
ὅρισμοῦ. διὸ ὁρθῶς πεποίηται

φάσθαι Ὁδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον,

ὡς οὐ τετιμωρημένος εἰ μὴ ἥσθετο καὶ ὑφ' οὐ καὶ
ἀνθ' ὅτου. ὡστε οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσοι μὴ αἰσθά-
νονται ὄργιζονται, οὔτε τοῖς τεθνεῶσιν ἔτι, ὡς πε-
πονθόσι τε τὸ ἔσχατον καὶ οὐκ ἀλγήσουσιν οὐδὲ
αἰσθησομένοις, οὐδὲ οἱ ὄργιζόμενοι ἐφίενται. διὸ εὖ
περὶ τοῦ Ἐκτορος ὁ ποιητής, παῦσαι βουλόμενος τὸν
Ἀχιλλέα τῆς ὄργης τεθνεῶτος,

κωφὴν γὰρ δὴ γαῖαν ἀεικίζει μενεαίνων.

nition: see note on p. 10,) ‘for anger is always directed against individuals, (II 2, 2, *infra* 4. 31, where this is made the characteristic of *anger*, as opposed to *hatred*), as appears from the definition’. This *inference from the definition* is drawn from the *φανομένη τιμωρία* which is the object of the angry man. If the punishment is to be such as can be actually seen, the anger cannot be directed against abstractions like classes or kinds, but must have a single, palpable, concrete, and also animated object; something that can *feel*, and *shew* that it is hurt.

‘And therefore (the trait of character, the representation, in) the verse’ (of Homer, Odys. IX 504) ‘is right and true (to nature, rightly conceived and expressed), “Tell him that it is *Ulysses* waster of cities (that blinded him)” —as though his revenge was not complete’ (i. e. the revenge of Ulysses, or of the character in Homer; which is the suppressed nomin. to *πεποίηται*, and with which *τετιμωρημένος* agrees: *lit.* the character is rightly represented in the verses as not fully avenged) ‘unless the other (the Cyclops) was aware by whom and for what’ (the blindness was inflicted).

The passage runs thus: Κύκλωψ, αἴ κέν τίς σε καταθυητῶν ἀνθρώπων
δόφθαλμοῦ ἔρηγαι δεικελίνη ἀλαωτύν, φάσθαι Ὁδυσσῆα πτολιπόρθιον ἔξα-
λαῶσαι, νιὸν Δαέρτεω, Ἰθάκῃ ἔνι οἰκί' ἔχοντα. ‘So that men are not
angry with all the rest (all besides those who are actually within reach),
who are out of sight (far away, for instance), nor any more with the dead’
(ἔτι, they do not *retain* their anger beyond the grave) ‘as with those who
have endured the last extremity, and are no longer susceptible of pain,
nor indeed of any feeling, which (to give the other pain and to make him
feel) is what the angry man aims at. And therefore the poet (Homer,
Iliad, Ω 54) has well said of Hector, wishing to represent Achilles as
ceasing from his anger against the dead (*lit.* wishing to put a stop to his
anger, i. e. *represent it as ceasing*): “For in truth it is but dumb (sense-
less) earth that he is outraging in his wrath.”’ Or rather, *παῦσαι βουλό-
μενος* means to suggest or assign a reason or motive for Achilles’ ceasing
from his anger: the words being those of Apollo, who is haranguing the

17 δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τοῖς καταπραῦνειν βουλομένοις ἐκ τούτων τῶν τόπων λεκτέον, αὐτοὺς μὲν παρασκευάζουσι τοιούτους, οἷς δὲ ὄργιζονται, ἢ φοβεροὺς ἢ Gods on the propriety of permitting Hector's body to be buried, and concludes his speech very emphatically with this line.

[πᾶσαι βουλόμενος] These words, applied to the poet himself instead of the character Apollo, *represented* in the poem, are an instance of a not unfrequent confusion in expressions of this kind. It is the substitution of the author himself for his personage or character; or the conversion of the doctrine of a given philosopher or school into the philosopher or school that holds it. Plat. Rep. II 363 D, τοὺς δὲ ἀνοσίους...κατορύττουσιν ἐν "Αἰδον, καὶ κοσκίνῳ ὑδῷ ἀναγκάζοντι φέρειν, of Musaeus and the Orphics, who 'represent them as buried, and compelled to carry...' Theaet. 183 A, ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ, the Heracliteans to wit, 'that we may not represent them as stopping'—contrary to their doctrine of the universal flux. Similarly the Eleatics, Ib. 157 A, are called *οἱ ἱστατες*, 'the stationers', meaning those who represent every thing as stationary or at rest. So Soph. 252 A, the opposition *school*, of Heraclitus, receives the name of *οἱ πέοντες*, 'the fluent philosophers', 'the flowing gentry', instead of their theory: and compare Theaet. 181 A, τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. A good example is Thuc. I 5, οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν τὰς πύστεις τῶν καταπλεόντων...ἐρωτῶντες εἰ λησταὶ εἴσιν, making their characters put these questions. Arist. Ran. 15, if the vulg. be retained (Meineke omits it), Ib. 833, ἐτεραπεύετο, 911 (Aeschylus), πρώτιστα μὲν γὰρ ἔνα τιν' ἄν καθίσεν (introduced in a sitting position) ἐγκαλάνθας. In Aristotle it is still more common: de Gen. Anim. 722 b 19, καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς γεννᾷ. Metaph. A 8, 989 b 34, οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι...γεννῶσι τὸν οὐρανόν, de Anima I 2, 405 a 25, καὶ Ἡράκλειτος...ἔξι ἡς τᾶλλα συνιστησιν, 'of which he represents, holds theoretically, everything else to be composed'. Ib. 404 b 16 and 24, (certain philosophers) τὴν ψυχὴν συνιστάσιν. De Gen. et Corr. I 1, 314 a 9, ὅσοι πάντα ἔξι ἔνδος γεννῶσιν, and b 1, τοῖς ἔξι ἔνδος πάντα κατασκευάζονται. De part. Anim. I 1. 21, 640 b 11, οὔτως τὸν κόσμον γεννῶσιν, and § 22, 640 b 17, ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων σωμάτων συνιστάσι τὴν φύσιν πάντες. See Dr Lightfoot's notes on Ep. ad Gal. vi 13, οἱ περιτεμόμενοι, 'the Circumcisionists', the advocates of Circumcision. Similarly in Latin, Juven. VII 151, *quum perimit saevos classis numerosa tyrannos*. Hor. Sat. II 5. 41, *Furius hibernas cana nive conspuet Alpes*.

§ 17. 'It is plain therefore that those who want to soothe a man down (bring him down to a placid state from the *exaltation* of his passion) must derive their propositions (or the traits of character) from these topics, presenting *themselves* in such a light—assuming such a character *themselves*—(as is represented in the foregoing analysis), and the objects of their anger as either formidable, or worthy of high respect, or benefactors, or involuntary agents, or as excessively afflicted at what they have done'. *αἰσχύνη* here is the feeling of reverence or awe which is felt in the presence of any one who is entitled to unusual respect or admiration (see note on c. 2. 22); and *αἰσχύνης ἀξίους* is equivalent to *τοιούτους πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνεσθαι δεῖ*: and *ὑπεραλγοῦντας* is the representative of the *μεταμελόμενοι* of § 5.

αἰσχύνης ἀξίους ἢ κεχαρισμένους ἢ ἄκοντας ἢ ὑπεραλγοῦντας τοῖς πεποιημένοις.

1 *τίνας δὲ φιλοῦσι καὶ μισοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τί, τὴν* CHAP. IV.
 2 *φιλίαν καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν ὅρισάμενοι λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ τὸ φιλεῖν τὸ βούλεσθαι τινὶ ἀοίεται ἀγαθά, ἐκείνου*

I have already hinted a doubt in the notes on the preceding chapter whether *πραότης* is properly ranked amongst the *πάθη*. I think that it can be made plainly to appear that it is not. It is introduced no doubt for the purpose of giving the opposite side to the topics of anger, because the student of Rhetoric is in every case required to be acquainted with both sides of a question. And this purpose it may answer very well without being a real opposite of *δργή* or indeed a *πάθος* at all. If we compare *πραότης* with the other *πάθη* analysed in this second book, we find that it differs from all of them in this respect—that the rest are emotions, instinctive and *active*, and tend to some positive result; whereas *πραότης* is inactive and leads to nothing but the allaying, subduing, lowering, of the angry passion, which it reduces to a particular state, the right or mean state of temper. It seems plain therefore that it is in reality, what it is stated to be in the Ethics, a *ξεις*, not a *πάθος*, of the *temper*; an acquired and settled state of one of the *πάθη*, viz. *δργή*, in the mean state (or due measure) of which (the *πάθη*) all virtue resides. It is accordingly represented in the Ethics as a virtue, the mean between irascibility and insensibility, the due measure of the passionate element or emotion of our nature; and as a virtue it is the control or regulation of our temper. The true *πάθος* is the *δργή*, the instinctive capacity of angry feeling, which may be cultivated by habit and education and developed in either direction, for good or evil; till it becomes *δργιλότης* irascibility, or *ἀδργητία* insensibility—if it take a *wrong* direction—or else settles into the mean state of a calm and placid temper. And this is the view that is taken of it in Nic. Eth. IV 11, init. *πραότης* is *μεσότης περὶ δργάς*; Ib. 1125 b 30, *τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάθος ἔστιν δργή*; line 34, *βούλεται γὰρ ὁ πρᾶπος ἀτάραχος εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀν ὁ λόγος τάξῃ οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον χρόνον χαλεπαίνειν*. This is doubtless the correct view; and the other, though no doubt *subsequent* to that of the Ethics, is adopted in the Rhetoric merely for convenience, philosophical accuracy not being required. Compare the introductory note to this Chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

I. ‘Let us now proceed, after having first defined love and loving, to analyse its *objects, motives or occasions*’.

§ 2. [ἔστω] as usual, in the *popular* Rhetoric. See note on 1 5. 8, &c.

‘Let love then be assumed to be, the wishing to another whatever we think good, for *his* sake, not for our own, and the inclination to do such things (to do him good) to the utmost of our power’. Eth. Nic. VIII 3, sub init. *οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τάγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις ταύτη γέ φιλοῦσιν*. This makes the nearest approach to a regular definition of *φιλία* in the Ethics, and is constantly recognised as the principle of love through-

ἔνεκα ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων. φίλος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ φιλῶν καὶ ἀντιφιλού-^{P. 1381.}
μενος. οἴονται δὲ φίλοι εἶναι οἱ οὔτως ἔχειν οἰόμενοι
ἢ πρὸς ἄλλήλους. τούτων δὲ ὑποκειμένων ἀνάγκη φίλον
εἶναι τὸν συνηδόμενον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ συναλγοῦντα
τοῖς λυπηροῖς μὴ διά τι ἔτερον ἀλλὰ δὶ' ἔκεινον. γιγ-
νομένων γὰρ ὡν βούλονται χαίρουσι πάντες, τῶν
ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, ὥστε τῆς βουλήσεως σημεῖον^{p. 62.}

out the treatise on *φιλία*, in Books VIII and IX. It represents the desire or the inclination of doing good to the object of your affection, which is naturally, or has become by habit, instinctive, and therefore a *πάθος*. In both definitions *βούλεσθαι* is prominent and characteristic. Love is a feeling, a sort of appetite, the wish to do good; the power and the means of doing good being alike accidental and non-essential, though it is true (which is here added to the definition) that the inclination is always present, and will be gratified when the means are forthcoming. The words *ἔκεινον* *ἔνεκα* *ἀλλὰ μὴ αὐτοῦ* express the unselfishness, the disinterested character, of the emotion. ὁ δὲ *βούλόμενός τιν' εὐπραγεῖν ἐλπίδα ἔχων εὐπορίας δὶ' ἔκεινον*, οὐκ ἔστι εὖνος *ἔκεινῷ εἶναι*, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔαντῷ, καθίπερ οὐδὲ φίλος, εἰ θεραπεύειν αὐτὸν διὰ τινα χρῆσιν (Eth. Nic. IX 5 sub fin.). Cicero, de Nat. Deor. I ult. (quoted by Schrader), has the same remark. He adds, 'Prata et arva et pecudum greges diliguntur isto modo quod fructus ex iis capiuntur. Hominum caritas et amicitia gratuita est.'

'And a friend is one that loves, and is beloved in return. And those that have this disposition, or entertain this feeling to one another'. *εὗνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι φίλιαν εἶναι*. Eth. N. VIII 2, 1155 b 34.

§ 3. 'From this assumption the necessary consequence is that a friend is one who sympathizes with us in our joys and sorrows, rejoicing at the good that befalls us, and grieved at that which gives us pain, not with any ulterior motive; but solely on our friend's account. For all feel joy in obtaining the object of their wishes, and pain at the reverse, so that the pleasures and pains that they feel are an indication of the nature of their wish'. The pleasure or pain felt on the occasion of a friend's good or bad fortune is the test of the nature of their wishes, and therefore of their friendship or hatred. And also, as every one feels pleasure at *his own* success and pain at disappointment, so by the rule *φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός, ἔτερος αὐτός*, 'a friend is a second self', (Eth. N. IX 4, 1166 a 31, 9, sub init. et 1170 b 6), the test of friendship is this community of pleasure and pain between friend and friend. *Idem velle atque idem noille ea demum firma amicitia est*, says Sallust. This same principle of 'fellow-feeling' as the basis of friendship (which is here principally in question) runs through the following sections to § 7. Zeno, the Stoic, *ἔρωτηθεῖς, τι ἔστι φίλος; ἄλλος, ἔφη, ἔγώ*. Diog. Laert. VII 1, (Zeno) § 23.¹

¹ The reverse of the medal is presented by the cynical La Rochefoucauld, Maxime 81, "Nous ne pouvons rien aimer que par rapport à nous, et nous ne

4 αἱ λῦπαι καὶ αἱ ηδοναί. καὶ οἵς δὴ¹ ταύτὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς φίλοι, καὶ οἱ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔχθροι· ταύτὰ γὰρ τούτοις βούλεσθαι ἀνάγκη, ὥστε ἡ περ αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλῳ βουλόμενος, τούτῳ φαίνεται 5 φίλος εἶναι. καὶ τοὺς πεποιηκότας εὑ̄ φιλοῦσιν, ἢ αὐτοὺς ἢ ὅν κηδονται· ἢ εἰ μεγάλα, ἢ εἰ προθύμως, ἢ

¹ ηδη

§ 4. ‘And those who have *now* (by this time, *ηδη*) learnt to regard the same things as good and bad (to each)’, ‘id est, qui eandem fortunam subiere, et in eum statum ac conditionem vitae venere, ut quod aliis molestum sit ipsis quoque incommodet, et quod alios iuvet eodem pacto ipsos sublevet’ (Victorius); ‘and those who have the same friends and the same enemies; for between such there must needs be a community of wishes, (good to the common friend, harm to the common enemy,) and therefore, by wishing for another the same things that he desires for himself, a man plainly shews that he is that man’s friend’. See the illustrations from the Eth. N. quoted in the preceding note. For *καὶ οἵς δὴ* (A^c and Bekker), Q, Y^b and Z^b have *ηδη*, which is the reading of Victorius, and is supported by Vater. The latter notes (as I had myself observed) that *δὴ* ‘you know’, ‘to be sure’, to attract attention, is not at all in Aristotle’s manner (it is Platonic, not Aristotelian) in a mere enumeration like this. I doubt if there is another instance of it in the Rhetoric. *ηδη* on the contrary, which Victorius has represented in his explanation, is quite in point, and in fact *adds* something to the sense.

§ 5. ‘And men love their benefactors in general, (those who have done good) either to themselves or to those whom they care for; or those who have done them great and important services, or have shewn forwardness; readiness, in doing them; or if they were done on similar, i.e. great, occasions (when the need was urgent, or the benefit signal), and for their sakes alone; or those whom they suppose to wish to do them good’: the manifest inclination, *τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν πρακτικὸν εἶναι τούτων*, § 2, being, as a test of friendship, equivalent to the actual performance. For *ἢ οὓς* Ḥv, Muretus, Wolf, and Brandis’ *Anonymus* (in Schneidewin’s *Philologus* iv. i. p. 46) read *καὶ οὓς*, as the commencement of a new topic.

faisons que suivre notre goût et notre plaisir quand nous préférerons nos amis nous-mêmes; c'est néanmoins par cette préférence seule que l'amitié peut être vraie et parfaite;” and 83, “*Ce que les hommes ont nommé amitié n'est qu'une société, qu'un ménagement réciproque d'intérêts, et qu'un échange de bons offices; ce n'est enfin qu'un commerce où l'amour propre se propose toujours quelque chose à gagner.*” The author of the *Leviathan* takes an equally low view of human nature, and derives from self-love, in some form or other, all our emotions and desires. They are all reducible to ‘appetite’ or ‘desire’. “That which men desire they are also said to *love*: and to *hate* those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire we always signify the absence of the object; by love most commonly the presence of the same.” Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Pt. I. ch. 6. For a philosophical analysis of the ‘Tender Emotion,’ its origin and varieties, see Bain, *Emotions and Will*, Ch. vi [Ch. VII, ed. 1875].

εἰ ἐν τοιούτοις καιροῖς, καὶ αὐτῶν ἔνεκα· ἡ οὖς ἀν
6 οἴωνται βούλεσθαι ποιεῖν εὖ. καὶ τοὺς τῶν φίλων
φίλους καὶ φιλοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ φιλοῦσιν. καὶ τοὺς
7 φιλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν φιλουμένων ἑαυτοῖς. καὶ τοὺς
τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔχθροὺς καὶ μισοῦντας οὓς αὐτοὶ μισοῦσιν,
καὶ τοὺς μισουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτοῖς μισουμένων
πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις ταύτᾳ ἀγαθὰ φαίνεται εἶναι καὶ
8 ἑαυτοῖς, ὥστε βούλεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθά, ὁ περ ἦν
τοῦ φίλου. ἔτι τοὺς εὐποιητικοὺς εἰς χρήματα καὶ

τοιούτοις] ‘such as, similar to’ the before-mentioned, i.e. *μεγάλοις*. With this use of *τοιούτος* comp. Pl. Phaedo 59 A, 67 A, 79 C, 80 C, ἔαν τις *χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐν τοιαύτῃ ὥρᾳ*, ‘at a similar period of life’, like the preceding, i.e. *χαριέσση*. (See Stallbaum’s note.) Thuc. III 58, Πανσανίας ἔθαπτεν αὐτοὺς νομίζων ἐν γῇ τε φιλίᾳ τιθέντας καὶ παρ’ ἀνδράσι τοιούτοις ‘and amongst men of the same sort’, i.e. *φίλοις*. Demosth. de F. Leg. § 103, καὶ τοιναρτίον ὄργην, ἀν τοιαύτα φαίνηται πεποικώς, sc. ὄργης ἄξια. Arist. Pol. I 8, 1256 a 36, οἱ δὲ ἀφ’ ἀλιείας, οἵτοι λίμνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμοὶ ἡ θάλαττα τοιαύτην προσοικοῦσιν, ‘who live by a sea of the same kind’, i.e. of the same kind as the before-mentioned lakes, marshes, rivers, in which *fish* are to be found. Ib. II 4, 1262 b 1, ἡττον γὰρ ἔσται φιλία..... δεῖ δὲ τοιούτους εἶναι τοὺς ἀρχομένους, sc. ἡττον φίλους. Ib. VIII (v) 10, 1310 b 12, ἡ καθ’ ὑπεροχὴν τοιούτου γένους ‘a similar family’, to the preceding.

§ 6. ‘And friends’ friends, that is (*καὶ*) the friends of those whom we love ourselves. And those who are beloved by those that are beloved by ourselves’. If friendship is *mutual*, surely this is a ‘vain repetition’.

§ 7. ‘And those who have the same enemies, or hate the same people that we ourselves hate, and those that are hated by the same people as we are hated by: for all such persons suppose the same things to be good as we do ourselves, and therefore they *wish* the same things as we do; which was the definition of a friend’. § 2, *βούλεοθαί τινι ἀολέται ἀγαθά*. These common hatreds, founded on the principle of *idem velle atque idem nolle*, and expressed in the proverb *κοινὰ τὰ φίλων*, are one of the strongest bonds of union by which religious and political parties, for example, are held together. On *κοινὰ τὰ φίλων*, see Plat. Legg. V 10, 739 C, a passage worth comparing on this subject of ‘communism’: Rep. IV 424 A, V 449 C, Arist. Eth. Nic. VIII 11 sub init. and the entire chapter, on this topic; *καὶ ἡ παρομία “κοινὰ τὰ φίλων” ὄρθως, ἐν κοινωνίᾳ γὰρ ἡ φιλία*, 1159 b 32. And on the same, IX 8, 1168 b 6, *καὶ αἱ παρομίαι δὲ πάσαις ὅμογνωμονοσιν, οἷον τὸ “μία ψυχή” καὶ “κοινὰ τὰ φίλων” καὶ “ἰσότητες φιλότητες” καὶ “γόνου κνήμης ἔγγιον”* κ.τ.λ.

τὸν φίλον] *Anglice*, ‘a friend’; on the generic use of the Greek definite article see note on § 31 of this Chapter.

§ 8. ‘Again, those who are capable of and inclined to’ (both of which are contained in the termination *-ικός*) ‘do service to others in the way of assist-

*εἰς σωτηρίαν· διὸ τοὺς ἐλευθερίους καὶ τοὺς ἀνδρείους
οἱ τιμῶσι, καὶ τοὺς δικαίους. τοιούτους δὲ ὑπολαμβά-
νουσι τοὺς μὴ ἀφ' ἔτέρων ζῶντας· τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ
τοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι, καὶ τούτων οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων οἱ αὐτουργοὶ μάλιστα. καὶ τοὺς σώφρονας,
ὅτι οὐκ ἄδικοι. καὶ τοὺς ἀπράγμονας διὰ τὸ αὐτό.*

ance, either pecuniary, or tending to their personal safety : and this is why the liberal, and brave, and just are held in honour'. The liberal aid them with money ; the brave defend them from personal injury (*εἰς σωτηρίαν*) ; and the just are always ready at least to pay their debts, and if they don't do them any *positive* service, at any rate can be depended upon to abstain from fraud and wrong. This is the utilitarian view of virtue, which we have had already very prominently brought forward in I 9 ; see for instance §§ 4, 6. Comp. I 6.6.

§ 9. The connexion between this topic and the preceding is thus given by Victorius. 'The truly just are not easy to recognise, and we are apt to be deceived by the outside show and to mistake unreal for real justice. Consequently, in default of better evidence of justice in men, they assume (*ὑπολαμβάνοντιν*) those to be just who mind their own business, and live upon their own resources or labour, and do not prey upon others, *μὴ ἀφ' ἔτέρων ζῶντας*. Such are those who work for their bread, and amongst these especially, those who live upon (from the produce of) agriculture; and of all *the rest*¹ (or else), those most of all who labour with their own hands'.

οἱ ἀπὸ γεωργίας αὐτουργοὶ] See note on I 12.25. Hesych. *αὐτουργός*, δὲ δι' εἰντοῦ ἐργαζόμενος. In the Oeconomics, attributed to Aristotle, I 2, 1343 a 25, agriculture is described as the first (in the natural order), and the greatest and most virtuous of all employments, *κτήσεως δὲ πρώτη ἐπιμέλεια ή κατὰ φύσιν κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ή γεωργικὴ προτέρα, καὶ δεύτεραι ὅσαι ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, οἷον μεταλλευτικὴ καὶ εἴ τις ἄλλη τοιάνη. ή δὲ γεωργικὴ μάλιστα ὅτι δικαία· οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων οὕθ' ἐκόντων, ὥσπερ καπηλεία καὶ αἱ μισθωρικαὶ, οὗτοί ἀκόντων ὥσπερ αἱ πολεμικαὶ.* This explains the *μὴ ἀφ' ἔτέρων ζῶντας* of the text. Agriculturalists do not make their profit of *men*, but of the *land* which they cultivate.

§ 10. 'And the temperate' (those who exercise self control), 'because they are not inclined to wrong'. Being temperate, and their passions under strict control, they are not tempted by any licentious and ill-regulated desires to gratify these by wrong doing. The import and extent of the virtue of *σωφροσύνη* are best set forth by Plato in the Gorgias. It is the principle of order and moderation in the human composition, and is hardly distinguishable from the conception of *δικαιοσύνη*, the virtue that regulates the entire human machine, in the Republic.

¹ This redundant *ἄλλος* with the superlative—the superfluous union of the comparative with the superlative—may be illustrated here by two parallel examples from Shakespeare. *Mids. Night's Dream*, v. i. 250, *This is the greatest error of all the rest.* *Macbeth*, v. 8. 4, *Of all men else I have avoided thee.*

11 καὶ οἱς βουλόμεθα φίλοι εἶναι, ἐὰν φαίνωνται βουλό-
μενοι· εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἵ τ' ἀγαθοὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ
οἱ εὐδόκιμοι ἢ ἐν ἄπασιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς βελτίστοις ἢ ἐν
τοῖς θαυμάζομένοις υφ' αὐτῶν ἢ ἐν τοῖς θαυμάζουσιν
12 αὐτούς. ἔτι τὸν ἡδεῖς συνδιαγαγεῖν καὶ συνδημε-
ρεῦσαι· τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ εὔκολοι καὶ μὴ ἐλεγκτικοὶ

Dr Whewell in his Transl. of the Gorgias thinks that the character assigned to it by Plato is best expressed by the term 'self-control'.

'And those who abstain from business', lead an easy quiet life, and don't meddle with *other people's* business, 'for the same reason'. *ἀπράγματοι* is opposed to *πολυτράγματοι*, a meddler, or busy-body.

§ 11. 'And those we should (otherwise, on general considerations) like to be friends, provided they manifest the same inclination—make it clear' (*φαίνωνται* emphatic,) 'that they wish it (on their side); and such are the good in respect of moral virtue', (men may be *good* or excel in other things, as the *βοην ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος* excellent in shouting, and *πνεῦ ἀγαθὸς Πολυδεύκης* in boxing); 'and men who are held in repute, either by every one, or by the best, or by those whom we ourselves admire and respect, or by those who respect and admire us'. If we read *ἐν οἷς θαυμάζοντιν αὐτούς* (Bekker retains *τοῖς*) with A^c, Q, Y^b, Z, which Spengel adopts, these four last particulars will be all neuters. 'And those who are distinguished, either in every thing ('admirable Crichtons'), or in the best things (qualities, pursuits, studies, accomplishments, or rank, wealth, power, according to taste), or in things which we ourselves respect and admire, or in those things which they admire in us (*lit.* in those things in which they admire us)'.

§ 12. 'And further, those who are pleasant to pass our life, or spend the day, with; such are men who are good-tempered and cheerful', (*εὔκολος* contrasted with *δύσκολος*, transferred from good and bad digestion *κῶλον*, to the temper and character; Arist. Ran. 82, of the good-tempered, genial Sophocles), 'and not inclined to find fault with any accidental error or mistake (not critical and censorious), and not quarrelsome, or contentious: for all such are combative, pugnacious; and people that contend with one (in word or act, by contradiction, or interference with and opposition to our tastes and wishes) appear to have wishes contrary to ours'—and as to have *the same* wishes is characteristic of friendship, § 4, it is plain that people of this sort cannot be our friends. Comp. Eth. Nic. VIII 6, 1157 δ 15, *οὐδεὶς δὲ δύναται συνημερεύειν τῷ λυπηρῷ οὐδὲ τῷ μὴ ἡδεῖ*. These two words are joined together again in Eth. Nic. VIII 6, 1157 δ 21, Ib. c. 15, 1162 δ 14, 16.

[συνδιαγαγεῖν, συνδημερεῦσαι] This form of verb, principally with the prepositions *ἐν* and *σύν*—also in two or three cases with *ἐπί*—which assumes for its explanation the dative of the indefinite pronoun, *αὐτῷ* or *αὐτῇ*, *αὐτοῖς* or *αὐταῖς*, as the case may be, (the repetition of some substantive immediately preceding *in which* the person or thing resides, or with which it is associated,) as understood after the preposition, is expressed in our idiom by adding the preposition at the end

τῶν ἀμαρτανομένων καὶ μὴ φιλόνεικοι μηδὲ δυστέριδες· πάντες γάρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι μαχητικοί, οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι 13 τάναντία φαίνονται βούλεσθαι. καὶ οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι καὶ

of the phrase. Thus, the two verbs here in question are represented in English by ‘to pass one’s life with’, ‘to spend the day with’, the phrase at full length being, *τοὺς ἡδεῖς ὥστε τιὰ συνδιαγαγεῖν αὐτοῖς*, *αὐτοῖς* being the persons previously mentioned. Porson, *Advers.* p. 265, has referred to notes of various Commentators, who have illustrated this idiom, and Elmsley has supplied four examples, on *Eur. Bacch.* 508, *ἐνδυστυχῆσαι τοῦνομ' ἐπιτήδεος εἰ.* Add the following, *Soph. Oed. Col.* 790, *χθονὸς λαχεῖν τοσοῦτον, ἐνθανέν μόνον, ‘earth enough to die in’.* *Phoen.* 727, *ἐνδυστυχῆσαι δεινὸν εὐφρόνης κνέφας* (comp. *Shaksp. Lear*, III 4. 116, *a naughty night to swim in*). *Ib. Erechth. Fragm. XX V 22 (Dind.) ἥθη, λαμπρὰ συγγελᾶν μόνον.* *Arist. Nub.* 422, *ἐπιχαλκεύειν παρέχουμ' ἄν, ‘I would lend myself to be forged on’* (*παρέχουμ'* ἄν supply *έμαυτόν*, as *Aj.* 1146, *πατέν παρέχει τῷ θέλοντι ναυτίλων, ‘lent himself to be trodden on’*); *Id. Equit.* 616, *ἄξιον γε πᾶσιν ἐπολολύξαι, ‘to shout at’*, *Pac.* 1127, ap. *Elms. Thuc.* III 23, *οὐ βέβαιος ὥστε ἐπελθεῖν, ‘ice, not firm, unsafe, to tread on’*. And the false antithesis in II 44, *καὶ οἷς ἐνενδαιμονῆσαι τε ὁ βίος ὅμοιος καὶ ἐντελευτῆσαι ἔνυμετρήθη.* II 74, *γῆν...εύμενή ἐναγωνίσασθαι τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ‘a land propitious for the Greeks to fight in’.* I 2, *ὅσον ἀποξῆν, ‘enough to live off’ or ‘on’.* *Xenoph. Symp.* II 18, *οἴκημα ἐνιδρώσαι, Ib. III 8, (γῆν) ἵκανώς γένοιτο ἐγκονίσασθαι.* *Memor.* III 8. 8 (*οἰκία*) *ἡδίστη ἐνδαιτᾶσθαι.* *Plat. Polit.* 302 B (*πολιτεία*) *ἥκιστα χαλεπή συζῆν, ‘by no means hard to live with’.* *Ib. E, βαρυτάτῃ ἔνυοικῆσαι.* *Phaedr.* 228 E, *έμαυτόν σοι ἐμμελετᾶν παρέχειν.* *Phaedo* 84 A, *παραδιδόναι ἔντην (τὴν ψυχὴν) πάλιν αὖ ἐγκαταδεῖν.* *Herod.* VII 59, *δ χῶρος ἐπιτήδεος ἐνδιατάξαι τε καὶ ἐναριθμῆσαι.* Comp. VI 102, IX 7, quoted by Elmsley. *Arist. Pol.* IV (VII) 12, 1331 δ 12, *ἀγορα ἐνσχολάζειν ‘a market-place to lounge in’.* *Lucian, Ver. Hist.* I 31, *ἵκανὸν μυριάδρῳ πόλει ἐνουκεῖν.* *Aelian, Hist. Anim.* VI 42, *στιβάδα ἐγκαθεύδειν.* *Dem. de Cor.* § 198, *τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀτυχήματα ἐνευδοκιμεῖν ἀπέκειτο. ἐγκαταλείπειν, passim.* *Matth. Gr. Gr.* 533, obs. 2.

§ 13. *καὶ οἱ ἐπιδέξιοι]* Arist. has changed his construction from the accus. to the nomin., from the *objects* to the *subjects* of *liking—for love* is here out of the question: these are men who are popular and agreeable in society. We may supply *φιλοῦνται*, or *ῥαδίως φίλοι γίγνονται.* ‘And those who are dexterous at replying and submitting to *raillery*—who can take, as well as give, a joke, gibe—’ (for here again there is community of sentiment, another instance of fellow-feeling *ταντὸ φαίνεται ἀγαθόν*, the foundation of friendship) ‘for the mind of each party is set upon (their efforts are directed to, *σπεύδουσι*) the same thing (mutual amusement, a friendly reciprocity in amusing each other) as (that of) his neighbour, (the *opposite* in the ‘wit-combat’ or jesting-match), and each of them is equally capable of taking a joke, and returning the taunt, but *neatly, gracefully, with propriety*’.

ἐπιδέξιος is one of those adjectives compounded with *ἐπί*, in which the preposition expresses either the *tendency* or inclination (*lit. direction*), or the *liability* to anything, which is defined in the second part of the

τωθάσατ καὶ ὑπομεῖναι· ἐπὶ ταύτῳ γὰρ ἀμφότεροι

compound. *ἐπιδέξιος* is a man that has a tendency to the use of his *right hand*, the sign of skill and *dexterity*; the right and left hand being severally the symbols of dexterity or cleverness and awkwardness; *dexter*, *laevus*; *δεξιός*, *δεξιότης*, *σκαύσ*, *ἀριστερός*; *gauche*.

Another secondary notion, propitious and unpropitious, belonging to these terms, is derived from the observations of augury, according as the omens appear on the right or left hand: but in Latin, at all events, the notion of ‘awkwardness’ conveyed by *laevus*, and the opposite by *dexter*, cannot have been suggested by this, because in their practice omens *on the left*, *laeva*, *sinistra*, were *favourable*.

ἐπιδέξιος is therefore one who has a tendency to *δεξιότης*, and follows the analogy of *ἐπικίνδυνος*, *ἐπιθάνατος* (liable to danger and death), *ἐπί-
αίτιος*, *ἐπίδικος*, *ἐπίκαιρος* or *ἐπικαίρος*, *ἐπιλήσμων*, *ἐπιζήμιος*, *ἐπιμορφω*, *ἐπί-
λυπτος*, *ἐπίνοσος*, *ἐπίκλοπος*, *ἐπιμελής*, *ἐπίμαχος*, *ἐπαναγκής*, *ἐπιεικής*, *ἐπίδοξος* (‘one who is expected to’... *liable to that expectation*, Isocr. Areop. § 48). *ὑπό* in comp. has very nearly the same signification, derived from the ‘subjection’ which it implies. So *ὑπεύθυνος* (subject or liable to a scrutiny), *ὑπόδικος*, *ὑπόλογος* (amenable to an account, accountable, responsible), by metaphor from the analogy of *ὑπόσκιος* ‘under the shade of’, *ὑποσμος*, Arist. de Anima, II 9, 421 b 12. *ὑπόστεγος*, *ὑπαίθριος*, *ὑπομβρος*, *ὑπόφορος*, *ὑπόσπορος*.

τωθάσειν is a variety of *σκώπτειν*, to gird at, mock, jeer at, some one in particular; both of them (as well as others of the same class) being distinguished from other forms of wit or pleasantry by their personal direction, or *personality*. The word occurs in Plato and Aristophanes, Vesp. 1362 and 1368, and once in Herodotus [II 60]. It is plain from the application of it, for instance in the passages of Aristophanes, that its special meaning is what we now call ‘chaffing’ or ‘poking fun at’, the repartees, or witticisms, mostly of a highly personal character, which pass between the combatants in what is also nowadays called ‘a slanging match’. This is confirmed by the use of the word in Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 17, 1336 b 17. The author is there condemning the practice of *αἰσχρολογία*, ‘indecent language’, which should not be tolerated in a model state. An exception however is made in favour of certain seasons of especial licence, as at the Eleusinian mysteries, and the orgies of particular deities to whose worship this *τωθασμός* ‘licentious raillery’ was appropriate, and permitted by law, *οἷς καὶ τὸν τωθασμὸν ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νόμος*: such were Dionysus during the celebration of the Bacchanalia, Aphrodite, Priapus, Hermaphroditus, Ilythia, and others; see Schneider ad loc. Comp. Addenda p. 509, and Eaton.

All this is abundantly illustrated in the Chorus of the Ranae, 316—430. It is descriptive of the wild license that prevailed, and of the indecent language of the *τωθασμός* that was then allowed—see particularly the *application* of the *τωθασμός*, in the shape of *indecent personalities*, 416—430; and the *τωθασμός* is there represented by various phrases indicative of its character, *τὰν ἀκόλαστον φιλαπαίγμονα τιμάν*, 334; *βωμολόχοις ἔπεστι*, ‘scurrilous’ phrases, 358; *κάπισκώπτων καὶ παιζῶν καὶ χλενάζων*, 375; *παισαντα καὶ σκώψαντα*; and finally (as already mentioned) by the

σπεύδουσι τῷ πλησίον, δυνάμενοί τε σκώπτεσθαι καὶ
14 ἐμμελῶς σκώπτοντες. καὶ τὸν ἐπαινοῦντας τὰ ὑπάρ-
χοντα ἀγαθά, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα ἡ φοβοῦνται μὴ
15 ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς. καὶ τὸν καθαρίους περὶ ὄψιν, περὶ

specimen given at the end. Comp. Vespa. 1362, *ἴν' αὐτὸν τωθάσω νεανικῶς* *οἶος ποθ' οὗτος ἐμὲ πρὸ τῶν μυστηρίων.* This license of language, allowed during the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries, reached its height at the bridge over the Cephissus, which was crossed and recrossed by the initiated on their way to and from Eleusis; where they were doubtless also awaited by a very numerous mob quite ready to take part in the fun. Hence γεφυρίζειν and γεφυρισμός, ἐξ ἀμάξης λέγειν. Bentl. Phal. I p. 335, Monk's Ed. [p. 307, ed. Wagner]. See on this also Müller, *Hist. of Gk. Lit.* c. xi § 5, p. 132, Engl. Tr.

A similar license of language and conduct was permitted at the Roman Saturnalia, 'the slaves' holiday': and was also illustrated by the *Fescennina*, or Fescennine verses (Liv. VII 2), in which the countryfolk (and afterwards the townsfolk) assailed and ridiculed one another in extemporaneous verses. *Fescennina per hunc inventa licentia morem, versibus alternis opprobria rustica fudit*, Hor. Ep. II I. 145; *procax Fescennina locutio*, Catull. 61. 124; Victorius ad Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 17, u. s. quotes Athenaeus, XIV 622 E, of the φαλλοφόροι, εἴτα προστρέχοντες ἐτώ-*θαζον* οὐν προέλοντο.

§ 14. 'We like also those that praise our virtues and accomplishments (the goods we have, and those in particular of which the possession is doubtful (which we are afraid we do *not* possess)'). Praise is the test of virtue, (I 9, and Introd. Appendix B, p. 212,) and the acknowledgment of others that we do actually possess the excellences of which we are ourselves in doubt. This confirmation of our hesitating opinion as to our own merits must of course be gratifying, and we accordingly like those that praise us.

§ 15. 'Cleanliness and neatness in the face and general appearance, and in the dress, and in fact (as it is exhibited) in the whole life'; in a man's habits, and all that he does in his daily life. "Cleanliness" is said to be "next to Godliness"; and there is no doubt that neat and cleanly habits and appearance in person and dress, some of which also heighten personal attractions, are *prepossessing*, and apt to inspire a *liking* for a man. We (English) also apply the same terms to the build or frame of the body of men and animals—to denote the absence of all *impurity* and imperfection, the superfluities, excrescences, deformities, which, like the dirt that overlies and disguises and deforms the true surface underneath, mar the symmetry and harmonious proportions of the body—'clean built', 'clean made', 'neatly built and made'. This form of 'cleanliness' is also *prepossessing*, and an element of comeliness, which tends to *liking*. It is the *apta compositio membrorum quae movet oculos, et delectat hoc ipso*, &c. Cic. de Off. I 28. And besides this, cleanliness of person and neatness in dress, implying a regard for personal appearance, imply also thereby attention to and regard for the opinion of

- 16 ἀμπεχόνην, περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον. καὶ τοὺς μὴ ὄνει-^{τ. 1381 b.}
 διστας μήτε τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων μήτε τῶν εὐεργετη-^{ρ. 6.}
 17 μάτων ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐλεγκτικοί. καὶ τοὺς μὴ μητικάκους, μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς τῶν ἐγκλημάτων, ἀλλ᾽
εὐκαταλλάκτους· οἵους γὰρ ἀν ἵπολαμβάνωσιν εἶναι

others—whereas a solitary or savage would never think it worth while—and thus establish a sort of claim upon our regard. The excess of this attention to the person, shewn in the coxcomb and the *petit maître*, is a sign of egotism and vanity, and consequently displeasing.

καθάριος is Lat. *mundus*. Of personal appearance, *καθάριος ἀκολουθίσκος*, ‘a neat little footboy’, Posidon. ap. Ath. XII 550 A; ἡ σκευασία *καθάριος*, Menand. Fr. Phasm. ap. Meineke, *Fr. Comm. Gr.* IV 218, ‘de coquorum artibus dicens’, Meineke ad loc., ‘neatness and cleanliness in dressing and serving a dinner’. In two Fragments of Eubulus,—Τίτθαι, Fr. 1, (Meineke, u. s. III 258,) and Ephippus, Obeliaph. Fr. 1 (Meineke u. s. III 334), in both of which the same verse is found, μὴ πολυτελῶς, ἀλλὰ *καθαρεῖως* ὅτι ἀν ὕ, ὥστας ἔνεκα,—*καθαρεῖως* (another form of *καθαρίως*) is applied to *cleanliness* in a religious sense. The subject is the purchase of fish. The same opposition of *καθαρεῖως* and *πολυτελῶς* occurs again in Nicostr. Antyll. Fragm. 3 (Meineke, III 280) where Meineke notes, “His locis *καθαρεῖως* fere munditia cum frugalitate coniunctae notionem habet, ut apud Strabonem III p. 154 a, *καθαρίως καὶ λιτῶς*.” In Athen. III 74 D (ap. Liddell and Scott), *καθάρετος βίος* has the sense of ‘a frugal life’, opposed to *πολυτελῆς*, as in the Comic Fragments, and in Diod. V 33 (ap. eosdem), *καθάριος τῇ διάτῃ*. Xenoph. Memor. II 1. 22, of virtue, in Prodicus’ dialogue, *κεκομημένη τὸ μὲν σώμα καθαριότητη* (to make her attractive) τὰ δ’ ὅμρα αἰδοῦ. Herod. II 37 of the Egyptian practice of circumcision ‘for cleanliness’ sake’, *καθαριότητος εἴνεκε*. Such are the examples of this attractive *καθαριότης*, in habits of life, manners, dress and personal appearance, as they appear in the ordinary language and in common life.

§ 16. ‘And we like those who are not inclined to reproach us either for trifling faults and errors, or for the benefits (they have conferred on us); for both of these are censorious, (faultfinders).’

§ 17. ‘And those who don’t bear malice’ (this is one of the characteristics of the *μεγαλόφυχος*, Eth. Nic. IV 9, 1125 a 2, οὐδὲ *μητικάκος*’ οὐ γὰρ *μεγαλοφύχου* τὸ ἀπομημονεύειν, ἀλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν), ‘and are not retentive’ (if *φυλάττειν* be ‘to guard, keep in possession’, as Xen. Mem. III 4. 9, *ad servandum idoneus*, Sturz, *Lex.*: or ‘observant’, ‘on the watch for’, if ‘to be on the look out for’; so Xen. Mem. III 1. 6, *φυλακτικὸν καὶ κλέπτην*: opposed to *ἀφύλακτος*, and *ἀφνλαξία*, Hier. VI 4) ‘of complaints and accusations, but easily reconciled’. Instead of keeping in mind the complaints and accusations to which our errors and faults, though perhaps trifling, will give rise, and so prolonging the estrangement and the quarrel between the two friends, these are ready at any moment for a reconciliation. And this is, ‘because they think themselves equally liable (to these faults and errors, and equally requiring forgive-

18 πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς οἴονται. καὶ τοὺς μὴ κακολόγους μηδὲ εἰδότας μήτε τὰ τῶν πλησίον κακὰ μήτε τὰ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τάγαθά· ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς 19 τοῦτο δρᾶ. καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀντιτείνοντας τοῖς ὄργιζομένοις ἢ σπουδάζουσιν μαχητικὸν γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. καὶ τοὺς πρὸς αὐτοὺς σπουδαίως πως ἔχοντας, οἷον θαυμάζοντας αὐτοὺς καὶ σπουδαίους ὑπολαμβάνοντας 20 καὶ χαίροντας αὐτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα πεπονθότας περὶ ἀ μάλιστα βούλονται αὐτοὶ ἢ θαυμάζονται 21 ζεσθαι ἢ σπουδαῖοι δοκεῖν εἶναι ἢ ήδεῖς. καὶ τοὺς

(ness) with the others', *lit.* because such as they suppose themselves to be to the rest of mankind, (*i. e.* such as is their liability to give unintentional offence to others,) such they think others are to them: that others are no more liable to them than themselves.

§ 18. ‘And those who are not inclined to evil-speaking’, (those who are constitute a topic of ὄργη, c. 2. 13,) ‘and don’t know (don’t notice) what is bad in their neighbours, nor in themselves, but only what is good (all their good points); for this is the conduct of the good man’. Comp. Plat. Theaet. 173 D, of the wise man, εὐ δὲ ἡ κακῶς τι γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τῷ κακῷ ἔστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονός ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἡ γυναικῶν, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες. An indisposition to evil-speaking is also a characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος, Eth. N. IV 9, 1125 a 8, διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν. (This is from no wish to avoid offence, but because he is so supremely indifferent to all others, that he abstains from blaming, as from praising, them.)

§ 19. And people are liked ‘who do not strive against, try to thwart, offer opposition to, those who are angry, or in earnest’ (earnestly, seriously, occupied with anything); ‘for all such are pugnacious’. Comp. § 12, πάντες γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι μαχητικοί, οἱ δὲ μαχόμενοι τάνατία φαίνονται βούλεσθαι, which is the opposite to friendly feeling. ‘And we have a liking for any one that has a good feeling of any kind towards us, such as admiration, and respects us; and thinks well of us, and delights in our society; and this most especially when it happens in the case of any thing for which we wish to be admired ourselves, or thought well of, or to be agreeable’. The first of the two is also a topic of ὄργη, 2. 17.

§ 21. ‘And those who resemble one another (have a mutual liking), and those who are engaged in the same pursuits’; (the pleasures of similarity are noticed and illustrated in I 11. 25, see the notes there); ‘provided their interests don’t clash’, (they don’t trouble or annoy one another. ἐνοχλεῖν, see note on II 2. 9; παρά in the compound here, expresses an aggravation of the annoyance, the going still further *astray* from the right path,) ‘and they are not competitors for their livelihood, (as all tradesmen are;) whence the proverb (of rival artists or tradesmen) κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ’, ‘two of a trade’, Hesiod, Op. et D. 25. On this and the opposite proverbs, see note on I 11. 25.

όμοίους καὶ ταύτα ἐπιτηδεύοντας, εἰὰν μὴ παρενοχλῶσι μηδ' ἀπὸ ταύτου ἡ ὁ βίος γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτω
 22 τὸ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ. καὶ τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιθυμοῦντας,
 23 ταύτὸ καὶ οὕτω συμβάίνει. καὶ πρὸς οὓς οὕτως
 ἔχουσιν ὥστε μὴ αἰσχύνεσθαι τὰ πρὸς δόξαν, μὴ
 24 καταφρονοῦντες. καὶ πρὸς οὓς αἰσχύνονται τὰ πρὸς

§ 22. ‘And those who desire the same things, so long as there is enough for them to share them together: otherwise, the case is the same here again’. Here again, as in the preceding topic, the competition is fatal to friendship.

§ 23. ‘And those (we like) with whom we are on such terms as to feel no shame in betraying our (apparent) conventional faults before them, provided, however, that this does not arise from contempt’; provided that they are not so far our inferiors that we totally disregard their presence. That is, those who are so intimate that we can afford to *take liberties* with them. Such are the members of a domestic circle, or any very intimate friend, who knows our ways, and from habit has learned to overlook any slight mark of disrespect. Schrader has illustrated this by an epigram of Martial, x 14, which though rather coarse is too apposite to be passed over: *Nil aliud video quo te credamus amicum Quam quod me coram pedere, Crispe, soles.*

ἀλγήνεοβαί] See note on II 2. 22.

τὰ πρὸς δόξαν] opposed to *τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν* (= *τὰ καθ' αὐτά*) in the next topic, ‘the apparent or conventional’ faults which violate the rules of society and good-breeding—and ‘the real’, moral and legal offences, *Rhet.* II 6. 23, 12. 10. *τὸ πρὸς δόξαν* in this opposition is defined, Topic. Γ 3, 118 a 21, *ὅπος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν τὸ μηδενὸς συνειδότος μὴ ἀν σπουδάστα.* *ὑπάρχειν*, which is an exact description of the conventional and unreal, *τὸ διὰ τὴν δόξαν αἰρέτον*. The same distinction of the conventionally and really disgraceful occurs in Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 b 23, *εἰ δ' ἔστι τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν, οὐθὲν διαφέρει, οὐδέτερα γὰρ πρακτέα.* The conventionally disgraceful is illustrated by Aspasia ad locum, *ώς τὸ ἐν ἀγορᾷ ἔσθιειν* (and this by Theophr. Char. XI ὁ βδελυρός, who goes in full market, *πληθούσῃς τῆς ἀγορᾶς*, to the fruit-stalls, and stands chattering with the vendor, and eating the fruit). Dancing was another of these conventional solecisms. See the story of Cleisthenes and Hippocleides in Herod. VI 129, which gave rise to the proverb *οὐ φοντὶς Ἰπποκλείδη* (*διὰ τὴν ὄρχησιν καὶ τὴν ἀναιδείην*): and of Socrates in Xenoph. Symp. II 17, see note 6 p. 152 of *Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology*, Vol. I No. 2 on ‘The Sophists’.

Compare also I 7. 36, where *τὸ πρὸς δόξαν* is defined much as in the Topics, *ὁ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ἀν ἔλοιτο.* See note ad loc.

§ 24. ‘And the reverse, those before whom we are ashamed to exhibit our real faults’. Those whom we respect and stand in awe of, and whose good opinion we value.

ἀλήθειαν. καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἡ ύφ' ὥν
 ζηλοῦσθαι βούλονται καὶ μὴ φθονεῖσθαι, τούτους ἡ
 25 φιλοῦσιν ἡ βούλονται φίλοι εἶναι. καὶ οἱ ἀν τάγαθὰ
 συμπράττωσιν, ἐὰν μὴ μέλλῃ αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι μείζω
 26 κακά. καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς ἀπόντας καὶ τοὺς
 παρόντας φιλοῦσιν διὸ καὶ τοὺς περὶ τοὺς τεθνεῶτας
 τοιούτους πάντες φιλοῦσιν. καὶ ὅλως τοὺς σφόδρα
 φιλοφίλους καὶ μὴ ἐγκαταλείποντας· μάλιστα γὰρ
 27 φιλοῦσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τοὺς φιλεῖν ἀγαθούς. καὶ τοὺς
 μὴ πλαττούμενους πρὸς ἑαυτούς· τοιοῦτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ
~~δισσε, κλε~~ φαῦλα τὰ ἑαυτῶν λέγοντες. εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι πρὸς

'And those with whom we vie (in friendly rivalry, for distinction; see note on I 2. 22.), or by whom we wish to be emulated—not envied (which is destructive of friendly feeling)—we either love (already from the very first sight of them) or conceive the wish to become friends with them'.

§ 25. 'And those whom we help to secure any good for themselves (so Victorius)—provided in so doing we do not ourselves incur greater evil'. The joint efforts are a bond of sympathy, and fellow-feeling (*συμπάθεια*) makes men friends: but this community of feeling would be destroyed if we were to be losers by our help; for then the other's feeling would be pleasurable but our own painful.

§ 26. 'Another amiable quality which secures regard, is the remembrance of and continued affection to friends absent as well as present; and this is why everybody likes those who extend this feeling to the dead. And in general, all (are liked by others) that shew a strong affection for their friends, and never leave them in the lurch, never desert them in distress and difficulty; for of all kinds of good men those are most liked who shew their goodness in the strength of their affections'. Eth. Nic. VIII 1, sub fin. τοὺς γὰρ φιλοφίλους ἐπαινοῦμεν; and c. 10, init. μᾶλλον δὲ τῆς φιλίας οὕστης ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν, καὶ τῶν φιλοφίλων ἐπαινούμενών, φίλων ἀρετῆ τὸ φιλεῖν ἔοικε, ὥστ' ἐν οἷς τοῦτο γίνεται κατ' ἀξίαν, οὗτοι μόνιμοι φίλοι καὶ ἡ τούτων φιλία. Victorius refers to Terent. Phorm. III 3. 30, *solus est homo amico amicus*, and Apollodorus, from whom Terence translated it, *μόνος φιλεῖν γὰρ τοὺς φίλους ἐπίσταται*; (this is Apollodorus of Carystus in Euboea, a poet of the New Comedy, to be distinguished from another of the same name, of Gela; his play *Ἐπιδικαζόμενος* is represented in Terence's Phormio, Prolog. 25). Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr. Hist. Crit.* Vol. I 464—6, Vol. IV 447.

§ 27. 'And those who don't assume an artificial character in their intercourse with us'; (who are open, sincere, frank, straightforward: this is the social or conversational virtue of ἀλήθεια, Eth. Nic. IV 13, the mean between ἀλαζονεία and εἰρωνεία. ὁ δὲ μέσος αὐθέκαστός τις ὃν ἀληθευτικὸς καὶ τῷ βίᾳ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ὁμολογῶν

τοὺς φίλους τὰ πρὸς δόξαν οὐκ αἰσχυνόμεθα· εἰ οὖν ὁ αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φιλεῖ, ὁ μὴ αἰσχυνόμενος φιλοῦντι ἔστικεν. καὶ τοὺς μὴ φοβερούς, καὶ οὓς θαρροῦμεν·
28 οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὃν φοβεῖται φιλεῖ. εἴδη δὲ φιλίας ἑταρεία
29 οἰκείοτης συγγένεια καὶ ὄστα τοιαῦτα. ποιητικὰ δὲ p. 64.

φιλίας χάρις, καὶ τὸ μὴ δεηθέντος ποιῆσαι, καὶ τὸ ποιήσοντα μὴ δηλώσαι· αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὕτως ἐνεκα φαίνεται καὶ οὐ διά τι ἔτερον.

εἶναι περὶ αὐτὸν, καὶ οὔτε μείω οὔτε ἀλάττω. 1127 a 24. The *εἰρων* of the Ethics, the self-depreciator—like Socrates—who affects humility, is here δ *πλαττόμενος* of the example); ‘and such are those who are always talking about their own weaknesses and failings’.

πλάττειν, properly said of a sculptor, who moulds a clay model, is extended to moulding or fashioning in general, and hence to any artificial production; *artificiosa fingere*: and so here. It is hence applied to the training of the body, *σώματα πλάττοντες*, Plat. Phaedo 82 D (Heindorf ad loc.), Tim. 88 C, and of the mind, Rep. II 377 C, καὶ πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ σώματα ταῖς χεροῖν. Ib. v 466 A, of a society; VI 509 D, of general education; Gorg. 483 A, of moral training.

‘For it has been already said that in the company of friends we are not ashamed of any little violation of conventional propriety (§ 23): consequently, if one who *is* ashamed is no friend, one who is *not* ashamed in such cases is likely to be a friend’.

‘And those who are not *formidable* to us, and in whose society we feel confidence; for no one loves one of whom he is afraid’. I Ep. St John iv 18, “*There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear; because fear hath torment. He that feareth is not made perfect in love;*” gives the reverse; no one can fear one whom he perfectly loves¹.

§ 28. ‘The kinds of friendship are, (1) companionship (the mere fact of being often together, implying no high degree of friendship—*sodalitas eorum qui saepe una versantur*, Schrader), (2) intimacy, familiarity, (constant and intimate, ‘domestic’, association, like that of members of the same family, *οἰκείοτης* from *οἶκος*; a higher degree of friendship, confirmed by habit and long association), (3) actual relationship, and all other connexions, relations, of the like nature’. These are three degrees of association; and, ἐν κοινωνίᾳ πᾶσα φίλα ἔστι, Eth. N. VIII 14, init. The whole chapter is upon the various degrees and relations of friendship or love, of marriage, of parent and offspring, the several bonds of connexion, and the foundations of them. The same principle lies at the root of all, *συνέχει τὸ κοινόν*.

§ 29. ‘Affection and love are produced by a favour or benefit conferred, and conferred without solicitation, and never disclosed, by the benefactor: under these conditions the recipient construes it as

¹ A striking contrast in the point of view between the Philosopher illustrating a rhetorical topic, and the Christian Apostle illustrating the love of God.

30 περὶ δὲ ἔχθρας καὶ τοῦ μισεῖν φανερὸν ὡς ἐκ τῶν P. 138^a.
ἐναντίων δεῖ θεωρεῖν. ποιητικὰ δὲ ἔχθρας ὄργη, ἐπη-

31 ρεασμός, διαβολή. ὄργη μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς
έαυτόν, ἔχθρα δὲ καὶ ἀνεν τοῦ πρὸς έαυτόν· ἐὰν γὰρ

conferred for his sake alone, and from no other motive'; which is the definition of *φιλία*, § 2. The plural *ποιητικά* includes the *χάρις* and its two qualifications.

§ 30. 'The affections of enmity and hatred may plainly be studied from the opposites (of the preceding topics of *φιλία*)'. On *περὶ ἔχθρας θεωρεῖν*, see note on I 9. 14. 'Productive of enmity are anger, spite, calumny'. [On *ἐπηρεασμός*, see note on II 2. 3.]

§ 31. 'Now anger is excited by personal offences, but enmity without personal offence as well; for if we suppose a man to be of such and such a character we hate him. And anger always deals with individuals, as Callias or Socrates' (*όργη* is here made to govern the same case as its verb *όργιζεσθαι*). With the statement comp. II 2. 2); 'but hatred is directed also against classes; for every one hates a thief or an informer'. On *τὸν κλέπτην*, the def. art. denoting a member of a class, which we render by the *indefinite*, see note on I 7. 13. 'And the one is curable by time, the other incurable. And the one is desire (*ἔφεσις* subst. of *ἔφιεσθαι* 'to aim at'²) of (inflicting temporary) pain, the other of (permanent) mischief; for the angry man wishes to see (the effect of his vengeance), to the other this makes no difference (whether he see it or not)'.

¹ Compare Pl. Phaedo 88 C, *ἀπιστίαν τοῦ προειρημένου λόγου*; Euthyphr. 13 D, ἡ *λατροῖς ὑπηρετική*; 15 A, τὰ παρ’ ἡμῶν δῶρα τοῦ θεοῦ; Theaet. 177 A, τὴν αὐτοῖς δυούσητην; 176 B, δομούσις θεῷ; Soph. 252 D, ἀλλῆλοις ἐπικοινωνίας; Gorg. 622 D, βοήθεια έαυτῷ; Parmenid. 128 C, βοήθεια τῷ Παρμενίδου λόγῳ (Arist. Polit. VII (VI) 5, 1320 a 32, ἡ βοήθεια τοῦ ἀπόρου); Symp. 182 D, ἡ παρακέλευσις τῷ ἔρωντι παρὰ πάντων; Rep. VI 493 D, πολὺει διακονία; Ib. 498 B, ὑπηρεσίαν φιλοσοφίας; Aesch. Agam. 415, πτεροῦς ὀπαδοῦς ὅπνου κελεύθους; Soph. Oed. Col. 1026, τὰ δόλῳ τῷ μὴ δικαιῷ κτήματα; Trach. 668, τῶν σῶν Ἡρακλέη δωρημάτων; Aj. 717, θυμῶν Ἀτρεδᾶς μεγάλων τε νεικέων; Eur. Ion 508, τὰ θεόθεν τέκνα θνατοῖς; Iph. T. 1384, οὐρανοῦ πέσσημα (i.e. τὸ δῆπ’ οὐρανοῦ πεπτωκός). On a similar constr. of *ὑπὸ* and other prepositions with the genitive after a passive *substantive* (instead of *verb*) see Stallbaum on Pl. Phaedo 99 C, *διηγην ὑπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*. Add to the examples there given in the following: Eur. Herc. Fur. 1334, *στέφανος Ἑλλήνων ὑπὸ*; Thuc. VI 87, *ἐπικουρίας ἀφ’ ἡμῶν*; Pl. Protag. 354 A, τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν λατρῶν θεραπειας; Gorg. 472 E, *τυγχάνειν ὀλέης ὑπὸ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων*; Rep. II 378 D, *Ἡρας δὲ δεσμῶν ὑπὸ νέος καὶ Ἡφαλοτου βίψεις ὑπὸ πατρός*; Arist. Eth. Nic. X 9, 1179 a 25, *ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν*; Categ. 8, 8 b 32, *μεταβολὴ ὑπὸ νόσου*; de Anima II 8. 11, 420 b 27, *ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀερὸς ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις μορίοις ψυχῆς*.

² *ἔφεσις*, a rare word. It occurs twice in Plat. Legg. IV 717 A, where the metaphor is thus illustrated; *σκοπός* μὲν οὖν ἡμῶν οὗτος, οὐδὲ στοχάξεσθαι· βέλη δὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἷον ἡ τοῦ βέλεος ἔφεσις κ.τ.λ. Ib. IX. 864 B, *ἔλπιδων* δὲ καὶ δόξης τῆς ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὸ ἀριστὸν ἔφεσις. Defin. 413 C, *βούλησις ἔφεσις μετὰ λόγου δροῦ*. [So also in Eth. Nic. III 7, 1114 b 6, *ἔφεσις τοῦ τέλους*. For its *legai* sense, 'appeal', see Dem. Or. 57, *ἔφεσις πρὸς Εὐβουλίδην*, § 6, *τὴν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἔφεσιν*, and Pollux 8. 62 and 126. s.]

νπολαμβάνωμεν εἶναι τοιόνδε, μισοῦμεν. καὶ ή μὲν ὁργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ' ἔκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη· τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ καὶ τὸν συκοφάντην ἄπας· καὶ τὸ μὲν ιατὸν χρόνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἀνίατον. καὶ τὸ μὲν λύπης ἔφεσις, τὸ δὲ κακοῦ· αἴσθεσθαι γὰρ βούλεται ὁ ὁργιζόμενος, τῷ δὲ οὐδὲν διαφέρει. ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν λυπηρὰ αἰσθητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ μάλιστα κακὰ ἡκιστα αἰσθητά, ἀδικία καὶ ἀφροσύνη· οὐδὲν γὰρ λυπεῖ η παρουσία τῆς κακίας. καὶ τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης, τὸ δὲ οὐ μετὰ λύπης· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὁργιζόμενος λυπεῖται, ὁ δὲ μισῶν οὐ. καὶ ὁ μὲν πολλῶν ἀν γενομένων ἐλεήσειν, ὁ

Comp. def. of ὁργὴ II 2. 1, ὅρεξις τιμωρίας φαινομένης, and the note. ‘Now all *painful* things (all things that give pain) are things of sense, (pain is conveyed to us only by the senses,) but the most *evil* things are least perceptible, wickedness and folly; for the presence of *evil* (of this kind) causes no (sensible) pain. And the one is accompanied by pain (in the *subject* of the affection, by definition), but the other is not: for one who is angry feels pain himself, but one who hates does not. And the one might under many circumstances feel compassion (for the offender, and remit the punishment), the other never; for the angry man only requires compensation (for his own suffering) in the suffering of the object of his anger, but the other his utter destruction (annihilation)’.

With τὸ μὲν μετὰ λύπης κ.τ.λ., compare Pol. VIII (v) 10, 1312 δ 32, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ μῖσος· η μὲν γὰρ ὁργὴ μετὰ λύπης πάρεστι, ὥστε οὐ ράδιον λογίζεσθαι, η δὲ ἔχθρα ἀνεν λύπης.

[*ἔλεησειν*] Victorius refers in illustration to Soph. Aj. 121, where Ulysses says of Ajax, ἐποικείρω δέ νιν δύστηνον ἔμπης καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενῆ. This shews that the feeling by which he was affected towards his rival was not a long-standing grudge or hatred, but a temporary animosity arising out of the contest for Achilles' arms.

Plutarch in his little treatise, περὶ φθόνου καὶ μίσους, p. 536 D, Wyttbach, Vol. III p. 165, gives an account of μῖσος from which something may be added to Aristotle's description. In c. 2, it is said that hatred is due to a sense of injury either to oneself, or to society at large, and sense of wrong to oneself: μῖσος ἐκ φαντασίας τοῦ ὅτι πονηρὸς ἡ κουώση ἡ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔστιν ὁ μισούμενος· καὶ γὰρ ἀδικεῖσθαι δόξαντες αὐτοὶ πεφύκασι μισεῖν κ.τ.λ. In c. 3, the author remarks that hatred may be directed against irrational animals; some people hate cats, or beetles, or toads, or snakes; Germanicus could not abide either the sight or the crowing of a cock, and so on; *envy* however arises only between man and man. This is not the case with anger; which is sometimes excited even by inanimate objects—Bain [quoted on p. 13]. c. 5; Hatred may be praiseworthy, as

δὲ οὐδενός· ὃ μὲν γὰρ ἀντιπαθεῖν βούλεται ω̄ ὄργι-
ζεται, ὃ δὲ μὴ εἶναι.

32 φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ἔχθρος καὶ
φίλος καὶ ὄντας ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ μὴ ὄντας ποιεῖν καὶ
φάσκοντας διαλύειν, καὶ δι' ὄργὴν ἢ δι' ἔχθραν ἀμφι-
σβητοῦντας ἐφ' ὁπότερ' ἀν προαιρῆται τις ἄγειν.

I ποῖα δὲ φοβοῦνται καὶ τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ὥδ' CHAP. V.
ἴσται φανερόν. ἔστω δὴ φόβος λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ
ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ.
οὐ γὰρ πάντα τὰ κακὰ φοβοῦνται, οἷον εἰ ἔσται

μισοπονητὰ—as also anger, in the shape of *νέμεσις*, righteous indignation, or of moral disapprobation—envy never can. In the last chapter, 538 D, he thus defines it; *ἔστι δὲ μισῶντος μὲν προαιρεσίς κακῶς ποιῆσαι* (Arist. *ἔφεσις κακοῦ*) *καὶ τὴν δύναμιν οὕτως ὅρίζονται, διάθεσίν τινα καὶ προαιρεσίν ἐπιτηρητικὴν τοῦ κακῶς ποιῆσαι* (on the watch to do him mischief) *τῷ φθόνῳ δὲ τοῦτο γοῦν ἀπεστι.* The distinction between envy and hatred, in respect of the amount of mischief which they would do to their respective objects, is then described, and the treatise ends.

§ 32. This section points out the application of the contents of the preceding chapter to the purposes of Rhetoric. ‘It is plain from all this that it is possible, in respect of enmity and friendship, either, when men are enemies or friends, to prove it; or if not, to represent them as such; or if they assert or maintain it, to refute their assertion; or, if there be a dispute (about a feeling or an offence), whether it be due to anger or enmity, to refer it, to either of the two which you may prefer’.

διαλύειν] sc. τὴν φάσιν, *diluere, dissolvere, argumentum, obiecta, argumentationem*, ‘to break up, dissolve’, and so metaph. ‘answer, refute’ an opposing *argument*. See Introd. on *λύειν*, p. 267, note. This seems the most natural interpretation of *φάσκοντας διαλύειν*. However, in II 11.7, it is applied to the breaking up, dissolution, or extinction of the *emotions* themselves: so that it is *possible*—I think, not *probable*—that here also it may be meant ‘in case of their asserting that they *are* friends or enemies to proceed to destroy those relations in them’—only, I don’t quite see the use of this for rhetorical purposes; and the other is certainly not only easier to effect in itself, but also more to the point here. If they assert that they are friends or enemies, and you wish to shew the opposite, you must refute their arguments, or *destroy their case*, which the preceding analysis will enable you to do.

CHAP. V.

On Fear. Compare Bain, on the ‘Emotion of Terror’; *Emotions and Will*, c. 5 [c. viii, ed. 1875].

§ 1. ‘What sort of things, and what persons, are the objects of fear, and how it is manifested, will be plain from what follows’.

ἴστω] as before; see note on I 5.3.

ἀδικος ἡ βραδύς, ἀλλ' ὅτα λύπας μεγάλας ἡ φθορὰς δύναται, καὶ ταῦτ' ἐὰν μὴ πόρρω ἀλλὰ σύνεγγυς φαίνηται ὥστε μέλλειν. τὰ γὰρ πόρρω σφόδρα οὐ φο-

'Let fear be defined, a pain or disturbance arising from a mental (presentation or) impression (*φαντασία*, note on I II. 6) (a vivid presentation) of coming evil, destructive or painful: for it is not *all* evils that men are afraid of, as for instance of the prospect of being wicked or dull (slow, stupid), but only those that amount to great pain or ruin: and this too only if they appear to be not far off, but close at hand, so as to be imminent or threatening. For things very remote are not subjects of alarm: for every one knows that he must die, but by reason of death not being actually impending, people care nothing at all for it'.

It is the proximity of danger that causes fear. Gaisford quotes a poetical illustration from Pind. Nem. VI 94, *τὸ δὲ πάρ ποδὶ ναὸς εἰσσόμενον ἀεὶ κυμάτων λέγεται παντὶ μᾶλιστα δονέν θυμόν.*

On fear, and its proper objects, see Eth. Nic. III 9. At the commencement of the chapter it is said, *φοβούμεθα δὲ δῆλον ὅτι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὄριζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ.* But of evil in general, all *moral* evil is to be shunned, and the fear of *it* is right, and to be encouraged: in the control of *this* kind of fear, courage is not shewn. It is in overmastering the sense of danger, in controlling the fears that interfere with the exercise of our duties, and especially the dread of death (the most fearful of all things) in battle, that true courage resides—*ὅλως μὲν οὖν φοβερά λέγεται τὰ ποιητικὰ φόβον. τοιάτα δ' ἔστιν ὅτα φαίνεται ποιητικὰ λύπης φθαρτικῆς*: it is not the anticipation of pain of all kinds, as the pain of envy, of rivalry, of shame, that is entitled to the name of 'fear', *ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μόναις ταῖς τοιάταις φαινομέναις ἔστεσθαι λύπας φόβος γίνεται, ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἀναιρετικὴ τοῦ ζῆν.....δὲ γὰρ κίνδυνος ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις λέγεται μόνοις τῶν φοβερῶν, ὅταν πλήσιον ἦ τὸ τῆς τοιάτης φθορᾶς ποιητικόν. φαίνεται δὲ κίνδυνος ὅταν πλήσιον φαίνεται.* Eth. Eudem. III I, 1229 a 33, which is in exact conformity with Aristotle's definition. Comp. *infra* § 2, *τοῦτο γάρ ἔστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ πλησιασμός.*

δύνασθαι, to have the *capacity, power, the force, and hence value, of; to amount to;* becomes thus equivalent to *ιτχέειν* or *σθένειν*, Elmsley ad Med. 127, *οὐδένα καιρὸν δύναται θυητοῖς.* Thuc. I 141, *τὴν αὐτὴν δύναται δούλωσιν.* VI 40, *λόγοι ἔργα δυνάμενοι.* Similarly it denotes the value of money, Xen. Anab. I 5. 6, *ὅ στιγλὸς δύναται ἐπτὰ δράχμους καὶ ἡμιοβύλιον Ἀρτικόν:* or the general *force or effect or amount* of anything. Rhet. III 14. 5, *τὰ τοῦ δικαιοκοῦ προοίμια ταῦτα δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι, 'amount to much the same', 'have much the same effect'.* It also expresses in particular the *value or meaning, signification*, of a word, or anything else (like the Latin *valere*), Herod. II 30, *δύναται τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος οἱ ἔξ ἀριστερᾶς χειρὸς παριστάμενοι βασιλεῖ.* Ib. IV 192, *τὸ οὖνομα δύναται κατὰ Ἑλλάδα γλώσσαν, βουνοί.* Ib. VI 98. Thuc. VII 58, *δύναται δὲ τὸ νεοδαμῶδες ἐλεύθερον ἥδη εἶναι.* Aristoph. Plut. 842, *τὸ τριβάνιον τί δύναται;* (What's the meaning of this thread-bare cloak?). Plat. Protag. 324 A, Crat. 429 D, *ἄρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος;* Euthyd. 286 C, *δύναται ὁ λόγος.* Xenoph. Anab. II 2. 13. Demosth. de Cor. § 26, *τί δὲ τοῦτο*?

βοῦνται· ἵσασι γὰρ πάντες ὅτι ἀποθανοῦνται, ἀλλ’
2 ὅτι οὐκ ἐγγύς, οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. εἰ δὴ ὁ φόβος
τοῦτ’ ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβερὰ εἶναι ὅσα
φαίνεται δύναμιν ἔχειν μεγάλην τοῦ φθείρευν ἢ βλάπ-
τειν βλάβας εἰς λύπην μεγάλην συντεινούσας. διὸ p. 65.
καὶ τὰ σημεῖα τῶν τοιούτων φοβερά· ἐγγὺς γὰρ φαί-
νεται τὸ φοβερόν· τοῦτο γάρ ἔστι κίνδυνος, φοβεροῦ
3 πληγαισμός. τοιαῦτα δὲ ἔχθρα τε καὶ ὄργὴ δυνα-
μένων ποιεῖν τινὰ δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι βούλονται, ὥστε ἐγ-
4 γύς εἰσι τοῦ ποιεῖν. καὶ ἀδικία δύναμιν ἔχουσα· τῷ
5 προαιρεῖσθαι γάρ ὁ ἀδικος ἀδικος. καὶ ἀρετὴ ὑβρι- P. 1382;
ζομένη δύναμιν ἔχουσα· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι προαιρεῖται
6 μέν, ὅταν ὑβρίζηται, ἀεί, δύναται δὲ νῦν. καὶ φόβος

ἡδύντα; ‘What did this mean?’ Arist. Metaph. Γ 6, 1011 a 7, δύνανται
δ’ αἱ ἀπορίαι αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι τὸ αὐτό.

§ 2. This being the definition of fear, *fearful* things, the objects of fear, must needs be such as appear’ (fear being *ἐκ φαντασίας*) ‘to have a great power of destroying, or doing mischief, all kinds of mischief, that is, which tend to, take the direction of, great pain’. *συντείνειν* is ‘to send together’, said properly, of several things which conspire or converge to one focus or centre of attraction; or metaph., which have a common aim or tendency. ‘And therefore the signs or indications of such things (the symptom of the approaching fever or death, the clouds gathering before the storm, the first threatenings or indications of any great calamity, as impending ruin, the death of a dear friend, and so forth) are themselves fearful: because they announce the proximity of the object of dread, that it is near at hand; for this is the meaning of danger—the near approach of anything that is dreaded’.

§ 3. ‘Examples of such things are the enmity or anger of those that have this power of doing mischief: for as it is quite clear that they desire it, it follows that it must be close at hand’. That they *desire* it, we know from the definitions of *ὄργὴ* and *ἔχθρα*: the former being an *ὅρεξις τυμωρίας*, the other an *ἔφεσις κακοῦ*, II 4. 31.

§ 4. ‘A second is wickedness or vice armed with power; for it is the inclination, the deliberate purpose, the evil will, which is characteristic, is involved in the very notion, of vice or wickedness (as of virtue)’. And therefore injustice, the desire of unfair advantage, or any other vice, when it has the power will be certain to exercise it, in order to gratify this constant inclination.

§ 5. ‘Again, outraged virtue, if it have the power’ (of avenging the wrong: revenge is a virtue, I 6. 26, I 9. 24), ‘is formidable; for it is plain that she has always the inclination when outraged (to right herself by retaliation, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθῆσθαι δίκαιον), and now she has the power’.

τῶν δυναμένων τι ποιῆσαι· ἐν παρασκευῇ γάρ ἀνάγκη
 7 εἶναι καὶ τὸν τοιοῦτον. ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ χείρους καὶ
 ἥττους τοῦ κερδαίνειν καὶ δειλοὶ ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις,
 φοβερὸν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ἐπ' ἄλλῳ αὐτὸν εἶναι,
 ὥστε οἱ συνειδότες πεποιηκότι τι δεινὸν φοβεροὶ ἦ
 8 κατειπεῖν ἡ ἐγκαταλιπεῖν. καὶ οἱ δυνάμενοι ἀδικεῖν
 τοῖς δυναμένοις ἀδικεῖσθαι· ὡς γάρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἀδι-

§ 6. ‘And fear in those that have the power of doing mischief’ (*φοβερός εστι*, is to be dreaded); ‘because any such also (as in the two preceding cases) must always be on the watch, ready to act in a state of preparation’. He is always prepared to anticipate the attack of others, which he dreads, by attacking them as a precautionary measure; but he also has the power of executing his designs against them; his *fear* therefore is formidable.

§ 7. ‘And as the majority of mankind are no better than they should be (inclined to the worse; *χείρος τοῦ δέοντος*, ‘worse than they ought to be’, or *τοῦ εἰωθότος*, ‘below the mean standing of morality’, ‘rather bad’), and slaves to their own interest, and cowardly in all dangers, it is for the most part a formidable thing to be dependent upon any one else (at the mercy of, in the power of; *ἐπὶ φενες*, see note on I 1. 7, *ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνοντι*); and therefore the accomplices in any deed of horror are to be feared as likely either to turn informers’ (if they are *ἥττους τοῦ κερδαίνειν*, especially; though cowardice might have the same effect), ‘or to leave their comrades in the lurch’ (*ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις* namely, in which their cowardice is shewn); run away and leave them to bear the brunt of the danger.

That the ‘majority are worse’ is proverbial; *οἱ πλείους κακοί*.

[*ἐγκαταλιπεῖν*] See note on *συνδιαγαγεῖν* καὶ *συνδημερεῦσαι*, II 4. 12, ib. § 26.

§ 8. ‘So are those that have the power of doing wrong, to those who have the capacity of (are particularly liable, or exposed to) being wronged; for, for the most part, men do wrong whenever they can’. With the doctrine of man’s fallen nature we have here of course nothing to do. But the imperfection and frailty of man, his weaknesses and liability to error, are recognised by the popular philosophy of the multitude and confirmed by the proverbs that convey it, *οἱ πλείους κακοί, errare humanum est*, and the like. Compare the observations on equity, the merciful or indulgent consideration of these human infirmities, in I 13. 15—17, and the ordinary language on the subject illustrated in the note on the *alτίαι ἀνθρωπικαί*, I 2. 7—all of which belongs properly to Rhetoric. Victorius quotes Arist. Plut. 362, ὡς οὐδὲν ἀτεχνῶς ὑγίεις ἔστιν οὐδενός, ἀλλ’ εἰσὶ τοῦ κέρδους ἀπαντεῖς ἥττονες. Plato seems to be nearer the truth on this point, οὐτως ἀν ἤγγιστο, τοὺς μὲν χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς σφόδρα δλίγους εἶναι ἔκατέρους, τοὺς δὲ μεταξὺ πλείστους.

‘And those who have already been wronged, or think they are wronged at the time; for these are always on the watch for an opportunity’ (of avenging the wrong received). ‘And those that have already *done* a wrong, if they have the power (of doing an injury), are to be

κοῦσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι δύταν δύνωνται. καὶ οἱ ἡδικημένοι
 ἢ νομίζοντες ἀδικεῖσθαι· ἀεὶ γὰρ τηροῦσι καιρόν. καὶ
 οἱ ἡδικηκότες, ἐὰν δύναμιν ἔχωσι, φοβεροί, δεδιότες
 τὸ ἀντιπαθεῖν ὑπέκειτο γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτο φοβερόν.
 9 καὶ οἱ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀνταγωνισταί, ὅσα μὴ ἐνδέχεται
 ἄμα ὑπάρχειν ἀμφοῖν· ἀεὶ γὰρ πολεμοῦσι πρὸς τὸν
 10 τοιούτους. καὶ οἱ τοῖς κρείττοσιν αὐτῶν φοβεροί·
 μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀν δύναντο βλάπτειν αὐτούς, εἰ καὶ τὸν
 κρείττον. καὶ οὓς φοβοῦνται οἱ κρείττονες αὐτῶν,
 11 διὰ ταύτο. καὶ οἱ τὸν κρείττονα αὐτῶν ἀνηρηκότες.
 καὶ οἱ τοῖς ἥπτοσιν αὐτῶν ἐπιτιθέμενοι· *η γὰρ ηῷ φοβεροὶ ἢ αὐξηθέντες*. καὶ τῶν ἡδικημένων καὶ ἔχθρῶν

dreaded, because they are afraid of retaliation (*τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός*, Eth. N. v 8, init.); for it was previously laid down that anything of that kind is to be feared'. § 6, καὶ φόβος τῶν δυναμένων τι ποῆσαι. *Proprium humani ingenii est odisse quem laeseris*, Tacit. Agric. c. 42. Seneca, de Ira, II 23, *Hoc habent pessimum animi magna fortuna insolentes: quos laeserunt et oderunt* (Lipsius ad locum). Ennius ap. Cic. de Off. II 7, *Quem metuant oderunt; quem quisque odit periisse expedit*.

§ 9. 'And rivals in the same pursuits, for the same objects, (are afraid of one another)—rivals, I mean, for those things which they cannot both enjoy together; for with such, men are always at war'.

§ 10. 'And those who are evidently formidable to our superiors (must necessarily be so to us; the *a fortiori* argument, or *omne maius continet in se minus*), because they must have more power to hurt us, if they have it also to hurt our superiors. And also those who are feared by our superiors (must also be formidable to us) for the same reason'. The difference between these two cases lies in the *φοβερός* and *φοβοῦνται*. The first are those who are evidently and notoriously objects of dread by reason of their rank, power, station on the one hand, and their manifest hostility on the other: the second are *secret* enemies, men of no apparent resources for mischief, whose real character and designs are known to our superiors, though not to the world at large. This is the substance of Victorius' explanation.

§ 11. 'And those who have ruined or destroyed our superiors'; again the *a fortiori* argument; 'and those who assail our inferiors; for they are either already formidable to us, or (will be so) when their power has increased. And of those that have been injured (by us), and our acknowledged enemies, or rivals, not the quick-tempered and out-spoken', (the *μεγαλόψυχος* is *παρρήσιαστής*, one who freely and frankly speaks his mind to and about his neighbours, without mincing his language, Eth. N. IV 9, 1124 b 29; *παρρήσια* 'frankness', between friends and brothers, Ib. IX 2, 1165 a 29), 'but the calm and composed, and dissemblers, and cunning;

ἢ ἀντιπάλων οὐχ οἱ δξύθυμοι καὶ παρρησιαστικοί, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ πρᾶοι καὶ εἰρωνεῖς καὶ πανοῦργοι ἀδηλοι γὰρ εἰ 12 ἐγγύς, ὡστ' οὐδέποτε φανεροὶ ὅτι πόρρω. πάντα δὲ τὰ φοβερὰ φοβερώτερα ὄστα, ἀν ἀμάρτωσιν, ἐπανορθώσασθαι μὴ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅλως ἀδύνατα, ἢ μὴ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις. καὶ ὥν βοήθεια μή εἰσιν ἢ μὴ ράδιαι. ὡς δὲ ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν,

for these leave us in doubt whether their attack is imminent, and consequently never make it evident that it is remote'. Cf. definition, in § 1. *πρᾶοι*, such as hide under a calm exterior resolution and a deliberate, vindictive purpose: 'still waters' that 'run deep'.

[*εἰρωνεῖς*] is here employed in its primary and proper sense, of dissimulation or cunning, Philemon. Fab. Inc. Fragn. III 6, οὐκ ἔστι ἀλώπηξ η μὲν εἴρων τῇ φύσει η δ αὐθέκαστος, Meineke, *Fr. Comm. Gr.* IV 32; not in the special meaning which Aristotle has given it in Eth. N. II 7, and IV 13, sub fin., where *εἰρωνεία* stands for the social vice or defect in *προσποίησις*, (pretension) 'self-depreciation', undue remissness in asserting one's claims; and is opposed to *ἀλαζονεία*, excessive self-assertion, braggadocio and swagger.

ἀδηλοι, *φανεροὶ*] attracted to the subject of the sentence, instead of *ἀδηλόν ἔστι μὴ εἶναι*. The participle is used instead of the infinitive in most of these cases, *δῆλός είμι ποιῶν*. Other adjectives follow the same rule; Aristoph. Nub. 1241, Ζεὺς γελοῖος δύναμενος, Pl. Phaedr. 236 D, γελοῖος ζομαι αὐτοσχεδιάζων, Arist. Eth. N. x 8, 1178 δ 11, οἱ θεοὶ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάγοντες κ.τ.λ. Comp. IV 7, 1123 δ 34. Thucyd. I 70, ἀξιοὶ νομίζουμεν εἶναι τοῖς πέλας ψύγον ἐπενεγκεῖν. Other examples are given in Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 279, comp. 549. 5. Stallbaum, ed. Gorg. 448 D.

§ 12. 'And all fearful things are more fearful, in dealing with which (Victorius) any mistake we happen to make cannot be rectified, i. e. remedied—when the consequences of an error of judgment in providing against them are fatal, and can never be repaired where the remedy (of the error and its consequences) is either absolutely impossible, or is not in our own power but in that of our adversaries'. When we are threatened with any formidable danger, from the machinations (suppose) of an enemy, if we make any fatal or irreparable mistake in the precautions we take to guard against it, the danger is greatly aggravated: our precautions and defences have failed, and we lie unprotected and exposed to the full weight of the enemy's blow. 'And those dangers which admit of no help or means of rescue, either none at all, or not easy to come by. And, speaking generally, all things are to be feared which when they happen in the case of others, or threaten them, excite our pity'. Comp. c. 8. 13, ὅστα ἐφ' αὐτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπ' ἄλλων γιγνόμενα ἐλεοῦσιν.

'Such then are pretty nearly, as one may say, the principal *objects* of fear, and things that people dread: let us now pass on to describe the state of mind or feelings of the *subjects* of the emotions themselves'.

φοβερά ἔστιν ὅσα ἐφ' ἐτέρων γιγνόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα
ἔλεεινά ἔστιν.

τὰ μὲν οὖν φοβερά, καὶ ἡ φοβοῦνται, σχεδὸν ὡς p. 66.
εἰπεῖν τὰ μέγιστα ταῦτ' ἔστιν· ὡς δὲ διακείμενοι
13 αὐτοὶ φοβοῦνται, νῦν λέγωμεν. εἰ δὴ ἔστιν ὁ φόβος,
μετὰ προσδοκίας τοῦ πείσεσθαι τι φθαρτικὸν πάθος,
φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται τῶν οἰομένων μηδὲν ἀν
παθεῖν, οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἡ μὴ οἴονται παθεῖν, οὐδὲ τούτους
νῦφ' ὅν μὴ οἴονται, οὐδὲ τότε ὅτε μὴ οἴονται. ἀνάγκη

Ἐλεεινός, as Aristotle, according to the MSS, is accustomed to write it, violates Porson's rule, *Praef. ad Med.* p. viii, that Ἐλεεινός and not Ἐλεεινός is the Attic form of the word.

§ 13. ‘If then fear is always accompanied with the expectation of some destructive suffering’:—the necessary alternative ἡ λυπηρὸς of the defin. § 1 is here omitted and left to be understood: as it stands, the assertion is untrue; fear can be excited by something short of absolute ruin or destruction. A general who had seen hard service replied to one who was boasting that he had never known the sensation of fear, *Then sir you have never snuffed a candle with your fingers* (this was in the days of tallow):—‘it is plain that no one is afraid who thinks that he is not likely (*ἄν*) to suffer anything at all, (that he is altogether exempt from the possibility of suffering,) or of those (particular) things that *they* think themselves unlikely to suffer; nor are they afraid of those (persons) whom they think incapable of doing them harm’, (*μὴ οἴονται, sc. παθεῖν* *ἄν*: and *νῦφ' ὄν* is allowed to follow *παθεῖν*, because a passive sense is implied in it, ‘to be hurt or injured by’¹), ‘nor at a time when they don’t think them likely to do so’.

As an illustration of *νῦφ' ὄν μὴ οἴονται*, Victorius quotes Homer Od. i (ix) 513, where the Cyclops expresses his disgust at having been blinded by a contemptible little fellow, ‘weak and worthless’ like Ulysses: *νῦν δέ μ' ἔών ὀλίγος τε καὶ οὐτιδανός καὶ ἄκικυς ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀλάωσεν ἐπεὶ μ' ἔδαμάσσατο οἴνῳ.*

¹ This is one of the very numerous varieties of the *σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαντεύοντα*, and is especially common after neuter verbs, but also occurs with transitives, or indeed any verb which is capable of being interpreted in a passive sense. Such are *θανεῖν*, Eur. Ion 1225, *φυγεῖν* ‘to be banished’, *ἀναστῆναι*, *γεγονέναι*, Gorg. 515 E, *πάσχειν* (very common), *ἐκπίπτειν*, *ἐκπλεῖν*, Dem. c. Aristocr. 678, *ἐστάναι* (to be stopped) *ὑπέ*; Arist. Top. E 4, 133 b 4, *κεῖσθαι*; Herod. I. 39, VII. 176, *τελευτῆν*, *παρεῖναι*; Plat. Rep. VI 509 B, *τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπώλεσεν* *ὑπό* Μῆδων; Ib. Legg. 695 B, *ὑπὸ φόβου τε δείσαντες*; Rep. III 413 C, *οἰδοῦσαν ὑπὸ κομπασμάτων*; Arist. Ran. 940, &c. &c. And so with *ἔκ*, *ἀπό*, *πρὸς*, especially in the Tragic poets: Soph. Oed. Rex 37, 429, *πρὸς τούτου κλύειν ὄνειδήσθαι*; 516, *πρὸς γ' ἔμοι πεπονθέναι*; 854, *παιδὸς ἔξ ἔμοι θανεῖν*; 970, 1454, *ἴν' ἔξ ἐκείνων...θάνω*, 1488. Aj. 1253, *βοῦς ὑπὸ σμικρᾶς μάστιγος...εἰς ὅδον πορεύεται*, and 1320, *οὐ κλύοντές εσμεν...τοῦδ' ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἀρτίως*.

τοίνυν φοβεῖσθαι τὸν οἰομένους τι παθεῖν ἄν, καὶ
14 τὸν ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε. οὐκ οἴονται P. 1383.

δὲ παθεῖν ἄν οὔτε οἱ ἐν εὐτυχίαις μεγάλαις ὄντες καὶ δοκοῦντες, διὸ ὑβρισταὶ καὶ ὀλίγωροι καὶ θρασεῖς (ποιεῖ δὲ τοιούτους πλούτος ἵσχὺς πολυφιλία δύναμις), οὔτε οἱ ἥδη πεπονθέναι πάντα νομίζοντες τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀπεψυγμένοι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀποτυμπανίζομενοι ἥδη ἀλλὰ δεῖ τινὰ ἐλπίδα ὑπεῖναι

'Fear therefore necessarily implies, or is a necessary consequence of, the expectation of probable suffering in general (the opinion that they *might* suffer, of the *likelihood* of suffering), and (suffering) from particular persons (*τούτων*), and of particular things, and at particular times'.

§ 14. Consequently also, the following classes of persons are *not* liable to fear.

'Exempt from (not liable to) the expectation of probable suffering are those who are, or think they are, in a condition of great prosperity', (the plural of the abstract noun indicates the various items or kinds of success, prosperity, or good luck, represented by *εὐτυχία*), 'and therefore they are insolent (inclined to wanton outrage) and contemptuous (prone to slight—contemptuously indifferent to—the opinions and feelings of others) and audacious or rash—men are made such by, (such characters are due to), wealth, bodily strength, abundance of friends, power—and (on the other hand) those who think that they have *already* endured all the worst extremities (all that is to be dreaded, *πάντα τὰ δεινὰ*) and have been thus cooled down (frozen, their sensibilities blunted, all the animal heat, and its accompanying sensibility, has been evaporated) (to apathy and indifference) as respects the future (possibility of suffering) like those who are already under the hands of the executioner (*ἥδη*, in the very act of undergoing the sentence of death); but (that fear may be felt) there must be at the bottom' (of Pandora's box, as a residuum; or underlying, as a *basis* or *ground* of confidence, *ὑπείναι*) 'a lurking hope of salvation remaining, (*περὶ οὐ* about which is concerned) to prompt the anguish' (of the mental struggle, *ἀγών*, implied in fear). Romeo and Juliet, v i. 68, *Art thou so base and full of wretchedness, and fear'st to die?* and foll. King Lear, IV i. 3, *To be worst, The lowest and most dejected thing of fortune.....lives not in fear.*

ἀποτυμπανίζομενοι] *τυμπανίζειν* denotes a punishment—often capital, as it is here—or somewhat uncertain signification. It is generally understood to mean flogging or beating, sometimes to death, with cudgels; so much is certain; and the *τύμπανον*, the drum, or instrument made to resemble it, probably served as the block. So Alford explains it, note on Ep. to Hebr. xi. 35, q. v. "an instrument like a wheel or drumhead on which the victim was stretched and scourged to death." (It was not scourging, but beating to death with sticks). It is sometimes called *τροχός*, Schol. ad Arist. Plut. 476, *ῳ τύμπανα καὶ κύφωνες τύμπανα ξύλα ἐφ' οἷς*

σωτηρίας, περὶ οὐ ἀγωνιῶσιν. σημεῖον δέ· ὁ γάρ φόβος βουλευτικοὺς ποιεῖ, καίτοι οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται

ἐτυμπάνιζον ἔχρωντο γὰρ ταῦτη τῇ τιμωρίᾳ. “Non infrequens verbum” (*ἀποτυμπανίζειν*: it is *common* only in Plutarch; Wytttenbach supplies several instances; and it appears in the Septuagint, Maccab. III 3.27, IV 5.32, 9.20, where the instrument is called *τροχός*, in the Epist. to the Hebrews, l.c., and in Josephus) “nec tamen eadem ac diserta significacione; nam universe est *verberare*, ut *τυμπανίζειν*, sed addita prapositio adfert notionem *ad finem verberare*; quod est vel eiusmodi ut *verberatus* inter *verbera moriatur, fustuarium*: vel ut *vivus dimittatur, quae fustigatio quibusdam dicitur?*” and then follow some examples. Wytttenbach, ad Plut. Mor. 170 A de Superst., item ad 60 A. Hesych. *τυμπανίζεται, ἵσχυρῶς τύπτεται*. *τύμπανον, εἴδος τιμωρίας*. Phot. Lex. *τύμπανον, τὸ τοῦ δημίου ξύλον, φ τοὺς παραδίδομένους διεχείριζετο*. Comp. Bretschneider, *Lex. Nov. Test. S. V.*

ἀποτυμπανίζειν, as Wytttenbach observes, denotes the *fatal character* of the beating, *ἀπό ‘off’*; that the punishment was ‘finished off’, ‘brought to an end’. So *ἀπεργάζεσθαι* ‘to complete a work’, *ἀποτελεῖν, ἀποκάμειν, ἀπομάχεσθαι* (*‘to fight it out’*, Lysias, *πρὸς Σιμωνα* § 25), *ἀποπειράσθαι, ἀποτολμᾶν, ἀποθνήσκειν* (to die off, die away), *ἀποκναίειν* (grate away), *ἀποτρίβειν* (rub away, to an end), *ἀπόλλυσθαι* and *ἀπόλλυναι*. The same notion of carrying out, or completion, is conveyed by *ἐκ* in composition, as *ἐκτελεῖν, ἐξιέσθαι, ἐκβαίνειν*, and others; the difference between the two prepositions being, that *ἀπό* is ‘from a surface’, ‘off’, *ἐκ* is ‘from the inside’, ‘out of’, ‘out’. The verb *ἀποτυμπανίζειν* in this form denotes the *aggravation* of an ordinary beating; and corresponds to the Roman *fustuarium*, which is confined to *capital* punishment by *beating with sticks* for desertion in the Roman army; Cic. Phil. III 6, Liv. v 6 ult. *Fustuarium meretur qui signa deserit aut praesidio recedit*; and is opposed, in its severity and fatal termination, to the ordinary *flagellatio* or *verbera*. The verb is found in Lysias, *καὶ Ἀγοράτου, § 56, (Ἀγόρατος) τῷ δημίῳ παρέδοτε, καὶ ἀπετυμπανίσθη, 57 and 58*. Demosth. Phil. Γ 126.19, *ἀντὶ τοῦ τῷ μὲν βοηθείν τοὺς δὲ ἀποτυμπανίσαι*. Rhet. II 6.27.

σημεῖον δὲ—οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν ἀνέλπιστων [‘an indication’ (*a sign*, not an absolute proof, or conclusive sign, *ἀπόδειξις* or *τεκμήριον*) ‘of this is, that fear inclines men to deliberation, and yet no one deliberates about things that are hopeless’, or beyond the sphere of expectation. On the objects of *βούλευσις*, see Eth. Nic. III 5. We do *not* deliberate about things eternal and unchangeable; or about the *constant* motions of the heavens, or of the processes of nature; or about things that are constantly varying; or about things accidental and due to chance. We deliberate only about things which concern ourselves and human affairs in general, and of these only such as are in our own power, in which the event can be controlled by our own agency: and this is repeated throughout the chapter. Comp. VI 2, 1130 a 13, *οὐθεὶς δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν*, things necessary and invariable; over which therefore we have no control. It is plain therefore that these things which we do *not* deliberate about are *ἀνέλπιστα*; they are beyond our

15 περὶ τῶν ἀνελπίστων. ὡς τε δεῖ τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν, ὅταν ἡ βέλτιον τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτούς, ὅτι τοιοῦτοί εἰσιν οἱοι παθεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι μείζους ἔπαθον· καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δεικνύναι πάσχοντας ἡ πεπονθότας, καὶ ὑπὸ τοιούτων ὑφ' ὧν οὐκ ὠντο, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε δέ τε οὐκ ὠντο.

16 ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φόβου φανερὸν τί ἐστι, καὶ τῶν φοβερῶν, καὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι ἔχοντες δεδίαστι, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων καὶ τὸ θαρρεῖν τί ἐστι, καὶ περὶ ποια θαρραλέοι καὶ πῶς διακείμενοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν· τό τε γὰρ θάρσος ἐναντίον τῷ φόβῳ καὶ τὸ θαρραλέον τῷ φοβερῷ· ὡς τε μετὰ φαντασίας ἡ ἐλπὶς τῶν σωτηρίων ὡς ἐγγὺς ὄντων, τῶν δὲ φοβερῶν ἡ μὴ ὄντων ἡ 17 πόρρω ὄντων. ἐστι δὲ θαρραλέα τά τε δεινὰ πόρρω

knowledge and control, and cannot therefore be the objects of future expectation.

§ 15. This is now applied to the *practice* of the rhetorician. ‘And therefore they (the audience) must be made to think, or feel, whenever it is better (for you, the speaker) that they should be afraid, (when the occasion requires you to excite this emotion in your hearers,) that they are themselves liable to suffering ; for in fact (as you suggest) others greater than they have suffered (and therefore *a fortiori* they are liable to it); and you must shew that their equals and those like them (in position, character, and circumstances) are suffering or have suffered, and *that* from such as they never expected it from, and in the particular form, and at the particular time, when it was unexpected’.

παρασκευάζειν] ‘to bring into a frame of mind, or excite a feeling is used here as above, II 1.2 and 7. See the notes there.

§ 16. ‘From this explanation of the nature of fear and things fearful, and of the several dispositions that incline us to fear individually, we may plainly gather what confidence is, and the sort of things that inspire confidence, and the dispositions or habits of mind that incline us to confidence: because confidence is the opposite of fear, and that which inspires the one, the object of the one, is opposite to that which inspires, the object of, the other: and therefore, the hope (which *θάρσος* implies, *its* hope) of what is conducive to security, is attended by a fancy’ (or mental representation, or impression, derived from and connected with sense, see on I II. 6) ‘of their being close at hand, and the expectation’ (*ἐλπὶς* in its alternative, general, sense) ‘of things to be dreaded by a fancy of either their non-existence or remoteness’. This latter fancy being characteristic of fear, defin. § 1, we may infer that the opposite fancy is characteristic of confidence.

ὅντα καὶ τὰ θαρραλέα ἐγγύς. καὶ ἐπανορθώσεις ἐὰν
ωσι καὶ βοήθειαι, ἢ πολλαὶ ἢ μεγάλαι ἢ ἀμφω, καὶ
μήτε ἡδικημένοι μήτε ἡδικηκότες ωσιν, ἀνταγωνισταί
τε ἢ μὴ ωσιν ὅλως, ἢ μὴ ἔχωσι δύναμιν, ἢ δύναμιν
ἔχοντες ωσι φίλοι ἢ πεποιηκότες εὖ ἢ πεπονθότες.
ἢ ἐὰν πλείους ωσιν οἷς ταῦτα συμφέρει, ἢ κρείττους,
18 ἢ ἀμφω. αὐτοὶ δὲ οὕτως ἔχοντες θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, p. 67.
ἐὰν πολλὰ κατωρθωκέναι οἴωνται καὶ μὴ πεπονθέναι,
ἢ ἐὰν πολλάκις ἐληλυθότες ωσιν εἰς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ δια-

§ 17. ‘Things that inspire confidence are (therefore) things dreadful or dangerous when at a distance’—it is the remoteness of them, not the things themselves as the text *seems* to say, that inspires the confidence—‘and things that embolden us (cheering, inspiriting) when close at hand. And if there be means of rectifying, setting right again, repairing, reme-
dying, the mischief we dread (*after* it is done), or of helping, defending ourselves against it, rescuing ourselves from it, (*before* it is done; comp. § 12, where Schrader thus distinguishes the two, *correctio mali prae-teriti, auxilium mali imminentis*,) numerous or effective, or both, and we have neither been already injured ourselves nor injured others’—the first on the principle on which the proverb is founded, “the burnt child dreads the fire,” what we have already suffered we fear to suffer again; and the second, because when we have done no injury we fear no retaliation—‘or again if we have either no rivals and competitors at all, or such as we have are powerless; or, if they have power, are our friends or benefactors or indebted to us for services’. All these are topics opposite to those of fear, comp. §§ 8, 9, 10, 12; from which it appears that the rivalry of the *ἀνταγωνισταί* consists in the competition for the same things, where there is not enough of them for both the competitors; the rivalry, which naturally engenders ill-feeling, makes you afraid of some injury from your competitor, a fear which is exchanged for confidence, as far as the other is concerned, when there is no rivalry between you. ‘Or if those who have the same interests are more numerous or more powerful, or both, (than those whose interests are different, our rivals or competitors)).

§ 18. This is an answer to the question *πῶς διακείμενοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν* § 16. ‘The feelings and dispositions in ourselves indicative of confidence, are, the opinion which we entertain of great success in our previous undertakings, and of having hitherto been exempt from injury, or if we have often run into danger and escaped’: all of these are apt to make men sanguine as regards the future. Comp. Virg. Aen. I 198, *O socii, neque enim ignari sumus ante malorum, O passi graviora, dabit deus his quoque finem. Vos et Scyllaeam rabiem...revocate animos maestumque timorem mittite, forsitan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit...illic fas regna resurgere Troiae. Durate et vosmet rebus servate secundis.* Hor. Od. I 7. 30, *O fortis, peioraque passi mecum saepe viri, nunc vino*

πεφευγότες· διχῶς γὰρ ἀπαθεῖς γίγνονται οἱ ἀνθρωποι, ἢ τῷ μὴ πεπειρᾶσθαι ἢ τῷ βοηθείᾳ ἔχειν, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ θάλατταν κινδύνοις οἵ τε ἀπειροι χειμῶνος θαρροῦσι τὰ μέλλοντα καὶ οἱ βοηθείας ἔχοντες 19 διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. καὶ ὅταν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἢ μὴ φοβερόν, μηδὲ τοῖς ἥπτοσι καὶ ὥν κρείττους οἴονται εἶναι· οἴονται δέ, ὥν κεκρατήκασιν ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ τῶν

pellite curas, cras ingens iterabimus aequor. ‘For there are two things which make men insensible (to danger), either never to have experienced it (from ignorance, which inspires confidence) or to have plenty of helps, resources, means of defence, to resist and overcome it; as in dangers at sea, those who have never had experience of a storm are confident as to the future, and those who have derived from their experience plenty of resources’. What is said here of the inexperience of men at sea tending to confidence seems to be contradicted by the observation in Eth. Nic. III 9, 1115 b 1, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς οἱ θαλάττιοι οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεγνώκασι τὴν σωτηρίαν καὶ τὸν θάνατον τὸν τοιούτον δυσχεραίνουσιν, οἱ δὲ εὐέλπιδές εἰσι παρὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. Victorius thus reconciles the apparently conflicting statements: in the passage of the Ethics the brave men, who have had no experience, *do* keep up their courage though they despair of safety, and are indignant at such a death as that of drowning; the death which they covet being death on the field of battle: the sailors on the contrary are sanguine by reason of the resources which their experience has taught them. Still the contradiction is not removed by this explanation; for in the Rhetoric the inexperienced are confident, in the Ethics they are in despair, though their courage may not fail. In fact the two cases are not identical, nor intended to be so. In the Ethics the virtue of courage is displayed in the extremest danger, in the other there is no virtue at all; the ignorance of the danger inspires confidence—not courage—and that is all. The passage of the Rhetic is explained by another in Magn. Mor. I 21, quoted by Schrader, ἔστι γὰρ καὶ κατ’ ἐμπειρίαν τις ἀνδρεῖος, οἷον οἱ στρατιῶται οὗτοι γὰρ οἴδασι δι’ ἐμπειρίαν, ὅτι ἐν τοιούτῳ τόπῳ ἡ ἐν τοιούτῳ καιρῷ ἡ οὕτως ἔχοντι ἀδύνατόν τι παθεῖν...πάλιν οὖν εἰσιν ἀνδρεῖοι ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου τῆς ἐμπειρίας οἱ γὰρ ἀπειροτάντες οὐ φοβοῦνται διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν.

διχῶς γὰρ ἀπαθεῖς] ‘Tritum apud Graecos proverbium a priore horum modorum pendet, quo affirmatur, *suave esse bellum inexperto: γλυκὺς ἀπειρφ πόλεμος.*’ Victorius.

§ 19. Comp. § 10. ‘And whenever (the danger apprehended) is not an object of apprehension to our peers (those resembling us in rank, station, wealth and resources), or to our inferiors, or to those whose superiors we suppose ourselves to be; this opinion (of superiority) is entertained toward those whom we have overcome (in some previous competition, or contest for the mastery), either themselves, or their superiors or equals’.

20 κρειττόνων ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων. καὶ ἐὰν ὑπάρχειν αὐτοῖς
οἴωνται πλείω καὶ μείζω, οἷς ὑπερέχοντες φοβεροί ^{P. 1383 b.}
εἰσιν· ταῦτα δὲ ἔστι πλῆθος χρημάτων καὶ ἴσχύς
σωμάτων καὶ φίλων καὶ χώρας καὶ τῶν πρὸς πόλεμον
21 παρασκευῶν ἢ πασῶν ἢ τῶν μεγίστων. καὶ ἐὰν μὴ
ἡδικηκότες ὥστιν ἢ μηδένα ἢ μὴ πολλοὺς ἢ μὴ τοιού-
(21) τοὺς περὶ ᾧν φοβοῦνται¹. καὶ ὅλως ἀν τὰ πρὸς θεοὺς
αὐτοῖς καλῶς ἔχῃ, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ σημείων

¹ φοβοῦνται.

§ 20. Another ground of confidence is, ‘the supposition that we possess in greater quantity or in a higher degree those points of superiority which make (our enemies) formidable: such are wealth, bodily strength’, (carry on *πλῆθος* and *ἴσχυς* to the three following genitives,) ‘number and power (force) of friends, of territory, of military provision, (the last) either of every kind, or the most important and valuable.

§ 21. ‘And if we have done no injury, either to no one at all, or to few, or if those few are not the sort of persons that are feared’. Compare § 8, which supplies the reason: it is, because they don’t fear retaliation. On *περὶ ᾧν* (=οὗς) φοβοῦνται, see note on I 9.14.

‘And, in general, if our religious relations are in a favourable state (our account with Heaven stands well), and especially’ (*τά τε ἄλλα καὶ*, ‘not only in everything else, but especially in this’: comp. *ἄλλως τε καὶ, καὶ δὴ καὶ*) ‘in the communications of’ (*τὰ ἀπό*, ‘what proceeds from’ the intimations as to our future conduct derived from them) ‘omens’ (*signis* from heaven, to direct us) ‘and oracles’. Victorius quotes Cicero (who calls *σημεῖα* sometimes *notae*, indications, sometimes *signa*), and Plutarch to shew that *λόγια* means ‘oracles’. *λόγιον* and *χρηστός* are used indifferently by Herodotus for ‘oracle’, and the word is also found, though rarely, in other writers; Thucydides, Aristoph. Eq. 120, Eurip. Heracl. 405.

‘For the angry feeling is accompanied with confidence, and to abstain from wrong oneself and yet to be wronged by others is provocative of anger, and the divine power is supposed to aid (side with) the injured’. The argument is this, Innocence of wrong is a ground of confidence: but this may be extended to the general (*ὅλως*) case of the divine favour, and the feeling of confidence is heightened if we believe that we have heaven on our side, which we argue from favourable omens and oracles. This divine authority strengthens our conviction of our innocence, of our having right on our side (so Victorius), and therefore our confidence. Another reason for this increase of confidence is the *angry feeling* which is excited in us by the sense of unjust treatment from others to whom we have done no wrong, for anger always implies confidence; and at the same time we feel ourselves under the protection of heaven, which is always supposed to take the part of the innocent and injured. *θερό-λέοντι ἡ ὄργη*. Comp. Cic. Acad. Pr. 11 44. 135, *ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cōtem esse dicebant* (veteres Academicī), referred to by Victorius and Majoragius.

καὶ λογίων· θαρραλέον γὰρ ἡ ὄργη, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀδικεῖν
ἀλλ' ἀδικεῖσθαι ὄργῆς ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον ὑπολαμ-
22 βάνεται βοηθεῖν τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις. καὶ ὅταν ἐπι-
χειροῦντες ἡ μηδὲν ἀν παθεῖν μηδὲ πείσεσθαι ἡ κατορ-
θώσειν οἴωνται.

καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων εἴρηται.
ι ποῖα δὲ αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀναισχυντοῦσιν, καὶ πρὸς CHAP. VI.

§ 22. The last ground of confidence is ‘the thought or opinion, in undertaking any enterprise, that we are not likely to, or (certainly) shall not, meet with any disaster, or that we shall succeed. And so much for objects of fear and confidence’.

CHAP. VI.

On shame or modesty, and shamelessness or impudence and effrontery.

Prof. Bain's remarks on shame—*Emotions and Will*, p. 142—are so brief that they may here be quoted entire. It falls under the general head of Emotions of Self, and in the subordinate division under that of self-love. “The feeling of shame is resolved by a reference to the dread of being condemned, or ill-thought of, by others. Declared censure and public infliction, by inviting the concurrent hostile regards of a wide circle of spectators, constitute an open shame. One is also put to shame by falling into any act that people are accustomed to disapprove, and will certainly censure in their own minds, although they may refrain from actually pronouncing condemnation. This is the most frequent case in common society. Knowing the hard judgments passed upon all breaches of conventional decorum, it is a source of mortification to any one to be caught in a slip; they can too easily imagine the sentence that they do not actually hear. The character of the pain of all such situations exactly accords with the pains of expressed disapprobation.” [Chap. XI § 16, ed. 1875.]

§ 1. ‘The exciting causes of shame and shamelessness, the objects of them, i. e. the persons to whom they are directed, and the dispositions or states of mind that they represent, will be clear from the following analysis’. *ποῖα* here is generally expressed by *ἐπὶ ποίους*, of the exciting causes, which occurs in § 3.

On *αἰδώς*, as a *πάθος*, the sense of shame, see Arist. Eth. Nic. II 7, and more at large, IV 15. There, as here, no distinction is made between *αἰδώς* and *αἰσχύνη*. On the distinctions which may and may not be made between them, see Trench, *N. T. Syn.* [§ XIX] p. 73; and on *αἰδώς* contrasted with *σωφρούνη*, ib. § XX. p. 76. They differ as the Latin *verecundia* (*αἰδώς*), and *pudor* (*αἰσχύνη*): the first is a subjective feeling or principle of honour, Germ. *scheu*; the second presents this in its objective aspect, as the fear of disgrace (from others, external) consequent on something already done, Germ. *schaam* and *schande*. Döderl. *Lat. Syn.* Vol. III. p. 201. *αἰδώς* precedes and prevents the shameful act, *αἰσχύνη* reflects upon its conse-

τίνας καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ἔστω δὴ

quences in the *shame* it brings with it. This latter conception of *αἰσχύνη* corresponds to Aristotle's definition here, and in Eth. N. IV 15 init. *φόβος τις ἀδοξίας*. On *αἰδώς*, as a principle of action, and *νέμεσις*, the two primary notions of duty, duty to oneself, and duty to others or justice, see an interesting note of Sir A. Grant, on Eth. N. II 7. 14. In Soph. Aj. 1073—1086, the two fundamental principles, by which human conduct should be regulated, the foundations of law, justice, and military discipline, are *αἰδώς* or *αἰσχύνη*, and *δεός* or *φόβος*. *δεός γὰρ φρόσεστιν αἰσχύνη θρόνῳ σωτηρίᾳ ἔχοντα τόνδε ἐπίστασο*. See Schneidewin's note on line 1079.

Aristotle both here and in the Ethics represents *αἰδώς* or *αἰσχύνη*, and consequently the opposite, as *πάθη*, instinctive emotions; and Bain by classing shame amongst the emotions takes the same view. Eth. N. IV 15, init. *περὶ δὲ αἰδοῦς ὡς τίνος ἀρετῆς οὐ προσήκει λέγειν πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔουκεν ἢ ἔξει. ὄριζεται γοῦν φόβος* (which is a *πάθος*) *τῆς ἀδοξίας, ἀποτελεῖται δὲ τῷ περὶ τὰ δεινὰ φόβῳ παραπλήσιον ἐρυθράνονται γὰρ οἱ αἰσχυνόμενοι, οἱ δὲ τὸν θάνατον φόβούμενοι ωχράδσιν. σωματικὰ δὴ φαινεταὶ πῶς εἴναι ἀμφότερα, δπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεις εἴναι*. This view of 'shame' or 'modesty' as a *πάθος* and not a *ἔξις*, an emotion and not a moral state or virtue, is commented on and criticized by Alexander Aphrodisiensis in his *ἀπορία καὶ λύσεις*, Bk. Δ c. κα' (21), *περὶ αἰδοῦς*. The chapter opens with a reference to the two passages of the Nic. Ethics in which the subject is treated, and after an examination and criticism of the definition, he proceeds thus; *ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς οὐκ ἔουκεν ἀπλῶς εἴναι φόβος ἀδοξίας, ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρότερον ἀλλοτριότης πρὸς τὰ αἰσχρά, δι' ἣν οἱ οὔτως ἔχοντες φοβοῦνται τὴν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ἀδοξίαν. εἰ δέ ἔστι τοιοῦτον ἡ αἰδώς, οὐκ ἔτ' ἀν οὐδὲ πάθος ἀπλῶς εἴη, ἀλλ' ἔξις τις καὶ διάθεσις, ἢ τὸ προειρημένον ἔπειται πάθος*.

The character of the *ἀναισχυντος*, as depicted by Theophrastus, Charact. c. θ'. *περὶ ἀναισχυντίας*, has not much in common with the analysis of Aristotle. One common feature appears in § 6 of this chapter, *τὸ κερδαίνειν ἀπὸ μικρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ αἰσχρῶν*; Theophrastus' definition of *ἀναισχυντία* being *καταφρόνησις δόξης αἰσχροῦ ἔνεκα κέρδους*. But the completest portrait of the *ἀναισχυντος* that Greek antiquity has bequeathed to us, is doubtless the *ἀλλαντοπώλης* of Aristophanes' Knights. In this character the ideal of 'shameless impudence' seems to be reached, and human nature can go no further.

§ 2. *ἔστω]* marking the popular nature of the definition, which may be assumed for the occasion, though perhaps not strictly exact and scientific, has been already noticed several times, and will occur again in the definitions of the next two chapters.

'Let it be assumed then that shame is a kind of pain or disturbance (of one's equanimity, or the even balance of the mind, which is upset for the nonce by the emotion) belonging to' (*περὶ, arising or manifested in*) 'that class of evils which seem to tend to discredit' (loss of reputation—*φόβος τῆς ἀδοξίας*, the *popular* definition, in Eth. N. IV 15, init.)—'present past or future' (this marks the confusion or identification of *αἰδώς* and *αἰσχύνη*, see above), 'and shamelessness a kind of slight regard of, con-

αἰσχύνη λύπη τις ἡ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν, ἡ παρόντων ἡ γεγονότων ἡ μελλόντων, ἡ δ' ἀναισχυντία ὀλιγωρία τις καὶ ἀπάθεια περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. εἰ δή ἐστιν αἰσχύνη 3 ἡ ὄρισθεῖσα, ἀνάγκη αἰσχύνεσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ ᾧν φροντίζει· τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα ἀπὸ κακίας ἔργα ἐστίν, οἷον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν ἀσπίδα ἡ φυγεῖν· ἀπὸ δειλίας γάρ. καὶ τὸ ἀποστερῆσαι παρακαταθήκην· ἀπ' ἀδικίας γάρ. καὶ τὸ συγγενέσθαι οἷς οὐ δεῖ ἡ ὅπου οὐ 5 δεῖ ἡ ὅτε μὴ δεῖ· ἀπ' ἀκολασίας γάρ. καὶ τὸ κερ-

temptuous indifference to' (on ὀλιγωρία, note on II 2. 1, comp. II 2. 3), 'and an insensibility to these same things'. On the connexion of ἀναισχυντία and ὀλιγωρία, comp. Demosth. de F. L. § 228, *tίνα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει φῆσαι* ἀν βθελυράτατον εἶναι καὶ πλείστης ἀναιδείας καὶ ὀλιγωρίας μεστόν (see Shilleto's note); adv. Conon. 1268 and 9, §§ 38, 39, ὁ τοίνυν πάντων ἀναιδεύστατον...τὴν δὲ τούτον πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτά ὀλιγωρίαν κ.τ.λ.

§ 3. 'From this definition of shame it follows of necessity that we are ashamed of all evils which are of such a kind as are thought to bring disgrace either on ourselves, or those we care for: and of this kind are all deeds or acts that proceed from any form of vice, throwing away one's shield for instance, or running away; for these proceed from cowardice. Or to defraud (a friend) of a deposit, for this proceeds from injustice'.

ἀποστερέειν, as distinguished from other varieties of the confusion of *meum* and *tuum*, is applied to the meaner vices of cheating and defrauding, as opposed to robbery and theft accompanied with violence. It is particularly appropriate to withholding a deposit, from the preposition with which the verb is compounded: you not only deprive your friend of his loan, but you keep back from him something which is his due: as ἀπό in ἀπαιτεῖν, ἀποδίδοναι, ἀπονέμειν, et sim. Comp. I 7.5 and note (1). Cic. Tusc. Q. III 8, *Sed quia nec qui propter metum praesidium reliquit, quod est ignaviae; nec qui propter avaritiam clam depositum non reddidit, quod est iniustitiae...* Victorius.

§ 4. 'And sexual intercourse with forbidden (improper) persons, or in forbidden places (as a consecrated building), or at forbidden times; for this proceeds from licentiousness'. ὅπον οὐ δεῖ, ὅτε μὴ δεῖ. This variation of the negative, where no difference is intended, is by no means unusual. If translated strictly, οὐ denotes *particular* places, and μὴ times *in general*, any indefinite or hypothetical times; lit. 'at times, if any, when it is forbidden'.

§ 5. 'And to make a profit of mean and trifling things, or of things base and vile, or from the helpless and impotent, as the poor or the dead; whence the proverb *to rob (even) a corpse of its winding-sheet*;

δαίνειν ἀπὸ μικρῶν ἡ ἀπ'. αἰσχρῶν ἡ ἀπ' ἀδυνάτων, p. 68.
οἶν πενήτων ἡ τεθνεώτων· ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ
κὰν ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φέρειν· ἀπὸ αἰσχροκερδείας γὰρ καὶ

for this arises from sordid greediness and meanness'. Hor. Ep. I 1. 65,
Rem facias; rem Si possis recte; si non, quocunque modo rem.

[κερδαίνειν ἀπ' αἰσχρῶν] is illustrated by the well-known story of Vespasian, Sueton. *Vesp. c. 23, Reprehendenti filio Tito, quod etiam urinae vectigal commentus esset, pecuniam ex prima pensione admovit ad nares, sciscitans, num odore offenderetur? et illo negante, at qui, inquit, e lotio est.* Erasm. *Adag. p. 199, 'e turpibus, velut ex lenocinio quaestuque corporis.'* Another illustration of profit derived from a disgraceful source was (in the opinion of the Athenians of the 4th cent. B.C.) the practice of the λογογράφος, or δικογράφος, (δικογραφία, Isocr. ἀντίδοσις § 2,) the rhetorician who wrote speeches for the use of parties in the law-courts. The amount of discredit which this employment brought upon those who practised it may be estimated from the following passages. Antiphon commenced this practice (Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit. c. xxxiii. § 1.* Westermann, *Geschichte der Beredtsamkeit*, 40. 10), and thereby brought upon himself the assaults of the Comic poets; καθάπτεται δὲ ἡ κωμῳδία τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος ὡς...λόγους κατὰ τοῦ δικαίου συγκειμένους ἀποδιδομένους πολλῶν χρημάτων. Plat. *Phaedr. 257 C*, διὰ πάσης τῆς λοιδορίας ἐκάλει λογογράφον. Stallbaum ad loc. In Legg. XI 937 D ad fin., it is solemnly censured and denounced: a prohibitory law is enacted, and the penalty is death to the citizen, and perpetual banishment to the alien, who shall presume thus to pervert the minds of the administrators of justice. See also Stallbaum, *Praef. ad Euthydem. p. 46.* Dem. de F. L. § 274, λογογράφους τοίνυν καὶ σοφιστὰς δποκαλῶν; where Shilleto cites other examples from the Orators. Isocrates, περὶ ἀντιδόσεως, is obliged to defend himself from the imputations of his enemies and detractors, who charged him with making money by this employment, § 2, βλασφημοῦντας περὶ τῆς ἔμης διατριβῆς καὶ λέγοντας ὡς ἔστι περὶ δικογραφίαν—which is much the same, he continues, as if they were to call Phidias a dollmaker, or Zeuxis and Parrhasius signpainters. And again § 31, ἐκ δὲ τῆς περὶ δικαστήρια πραγματείας εἰς ὄργην καὶ μῖσος ὑμᾶς καταστῆσειν. Lastly, the author of the Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), 33, has this topic, for meeting a *calumnious charge*, ἐὰν δὲ διαβάλλοσιν ὑμᾶς ὡς γεγραμμένους λόγους λέγομεν ἡ λέγειν μελετῶμεν ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ μισθῷ τοὺς συνηγοροῦμεν κ.τ.λ. I will only add that this sense of the word is not to be confounded with the other and earlier one of prose writers and especially of the early 'chroniclers', antecedent to and contemporaries of Herodotus; in which it is employed by Thucyd. I 21 and Rhet. II 11. 7, III 7. 7, 12. 2.

[κὰν ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φέρειν] Prov. "contra avaros ac sordidas artes exercentes dicebatur." Victorius.

Other proverbs of the same tendency are quoted by Erasmus, *Adagia*, p. 199. *Avaritia et rapacitas.* ἀπὸ νεκροῦ φορολογεῖν 'to take tribute of the dead'. αἰτεῖν τοὺς ἀνδρῶντας ἀλφίτα, 'to beg of the very statues', κναμότρωξ, Aristoph. *Equit. 41*, 'a skinflint'. And Appendix to *Adagia*, s. v. *avaritia*, p. 1891.

6 ἀνελευθερίας. καὶ τὸ μὴ βοηθεῖν δυνάμενον εἰς χρήματα, ἢ ἡττον βοηθεῖν. καὶ τὸ βοηθεῖσθαι παρὰ 7 τῶν ἡττον εὐπόρων. καὶ δανείζεσθαι ὅτε δόξει αἰτεῖν, καὶ αἰτεῖν ὅτε ἀπαιτεῖν, καὶ ἀπαιτεῖν ὅτε αἰτεῖν, καὶ 8 ἐπαινεῖν ἵνα δόξῃ αἰτεῖν, καὶ τὸ ἀποτετυχηκότα μηδὲν ἡττον πάντα γὰρ ἀνελευθερίας ταῦτα σημεῖα. τὸ

αἰσχροκερδεῖας...ἀνελευθερίας] Eth. N. IV 3, 122 a 2, 8, 12; *ἀνελευθερία*, Ib. c. 3, is the extreme, in defect, of the mean or virtue in the expenditure of the money, the excess being *ἀσωτία*, reckless prodigality: it is therefore undue parsimony, meanness, stinginess in expense. *αἰσχροκερδεῖα* is one of Theophrastus' Characters, λ.

§ 6. ‘And either to lend no assistance at all when you have the power or too little’. (*ἡττον* sc. *τοῦ δέοντος*). ‘Or to receive assistance from those who can less afford it’.

§ 7. ‘And borrowing when it will look like begging, to ask a favour under the guise of a loan (begging is a sign of impudence); or begging when it will bear the appearance of asking for a return’ (of a favour: the shamelessness of this consists in the pretence that you have a *claim* upon the person from whom you are in reality begging: a favour, even supposing that your claim is well founded, ought never to be conferred from any expectation of a return: comp. I 9. 16, and 19, also II 4. 2, on the unselfishness of friendship), ‘and asking for a return (repayment or compensation) when it will have the appearance of begging’. (If you have really done the other a favour, and so have a claim to compensation, still you must not put it in such a way as to *seem* to beg for it; begging is a sign of impudence.) The ‘borrowing’ propensities of the *ἀναισχυντος*. appear in Theophr. Char. θ, δν ἀποστέρει, πρὸς τοῦτον ἀπελθὼν δανείζεσθαι: and also near the end. Victorius interprets the three cases differently. He understands the *δόξει* of *the other party* in the transaction; the first case is ‘to anticipate the other by asking for a loan, when *you* fancy he is going to beg of *you*'; the second is that of the poorer party who begs when the other is going to demand repayment, and so stops his mouth; the third is that of the richer of the two, who has often assisted the other on former occasions, and being tired of lending him money, when the other comes to renew his solicitations stops *his* mouth by asking for repayment. This I allow to be just as good, perhaps better, in point of sense, certainly more amusing, than my own interpretation: but as far as I am able to judge, the latter is more naturally suggested by the Greek, and more in accordance with precedent, as collected from the language of the previous topics of these chapters on the *πάθη*. The first of these three, according to Victorius's interpretation, is well illustrated by Timon of Athens, III 2. 49, *What a wicked beast was I to disfurnish myself against such a good time...I was sending to use Lord Timon myself, &c.*

‘And to praise (your friend, from whom you want to get money) in order to induce him to suppose that you are begging, and after a failure, repulse, rebuff, to go on all the same’—this is the shamelessness of *impotency*—‘for all these are signs of illiberality or meanness’.

δ' ἔπαινεῖν παρόντα [κολακείας]¹, καὶ τὸ τάγαθὰ μὲν ὑπερεπαινεῖν τὰ δὲ φαῦλα συναλείφειν, καὶ τὸ ὑπερ-
αλγεῖν ἀλγοῦντι παρόντα, καὶ τὰλλα πάντα ὅσα
τοιαῦτα· κολακείας γὰρ σημεῖα. καὶ τὸ μὴ ὑπο-
μένειν πόνους οὓς οἱ πρεσβύτεροι ἢ οἱ τρυφῶντες ἢ P. 1384.
οἱ ἐν ἔξουσίᾳ μᾶλλον ὄντες ἢ ὄλως οἱ ἀδυνατώτεροι·
πάντα γὰρ μαλακίας σημεῖα. καὶ τὸ ὑφ' ἔτερου εὐ-
πάσχειν, καὶ τὸ πολλάκις, καὶ ἡ εὖ ἐποίησεν ὄνει-
δίζειν· μικροψυχίας γὰρ πάντα καὶ ταπεινότητος ση-

¹ κολακεῖας sine uncinis, Bekk. ed. Berol. 1831, et ed. Oxon. 1837; item Spengel ed. 1867.

§ 8. ‘To praise a man to his face is flattery’ (*subaudi σημεῖον*)—Terent. Adelph. II 4. 6, *Ah vereor coram in os te laudare amplius, ne id assentandi magis quam quod gratum habeam facere existimes* (Victorius)—‘as is also overpraising a man’s good qualities, and disguising (by smearing over and so obscuring, as a writing, or blotting out) all his bad points (all his peccadilloes and weaknesses); and excessive sympathy with his distress (exhibited) in his presence, and everything else of the same kind ; for they are all signs of flattery’. *οἱ ταπεινὸὶ κόλακες*, Eth. N. IV 8, 1125 a 2, Ib. VIII 9, 1159 a 14, ὑπερχόμενος γὰρ φίλος ὁ κόλαξ, ἢ προσποιεῖται τοιούτος εἶναι καὶ μᾶλλον φίλειν ἢ φιλεῖσθαι. A distinction is taken between ἄρεσκος and κόλαξ in Eth. Nic. IV 12, sub fin., which is here disregarded. The ἄρεσκος, the ‘over-complaisant’, is what we usually understand by κόλαξ or flatterer; but κόλαξ is here confined to *interested* flattery; *εἰς χρήματα καὶ ὅσα διὰ χρημάτων*, and is in fact equivalent to the ordinary παράσιτος. Theophrastus, Char. β, ε', maintains the distinction. One of the characteristics of κολακεία is καὶ ἔπαινέσαι δὲ ἀκούοντος : this appears also in the ἄρεσκος, Ch. ε'.

§ 9. ‘And the refusal to undergo labours which older men (than ourselves are willing to endure); or men brought up in the lap of luxury, in luxurious habits (which engender tenderness, and delicacy, and effeminacy, and in general tastes and habits averse to labour); or those who are in higher authority’ (if they condescend to undertake them, we are *a fortiori* bound to do so: or rather perhaps, in consideration of the μαλακία which seems intended to include all the preceding, for the same reason as the last mentioned, that they have not been *inured* to labour); ‘or in general, those who are weaker, less capable of undertaking them, than ourselves ; for all these are signs of softness, delicacy, or effeminacy’. The *οἱ ἐν ἔξουσίᾳ μᾶλλον* may be illustrated by the case of a commanding officer on a march dismounting from his horse, and walking on foot by the side of his men. Such an example would certainly *shame* any of the men who complained of fatigue. [Xen. Anab. III 4. 46—49.]

§ 10. ‘And receiving favours from another, either once or frequently, and *then* reproaching him with the service he has done: all signs of a mean spirit and a low, grovelling, mind and temper’. On μικροψυχία ‘littleness of mind’, see Eth. N. IV 9.

11 μεῖα· καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτοῦ πάντα λέγειν καὶ ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι, καὶ τὸ τάλλοτρια αὐτοῦ φάσκειν· ἀλαζονείας γάρ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἐκάστης τῶν τοῦ ἥθους κακιῶν τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰ 12 ὄμοια· αἰσχρὰ γὰρ καὶ αἰσχυντικά. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸ τῶν καλῶν ὅν πάντες μετέχουσιν ἢ οἱ ὄμοιοι πάντες ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι, μὴ μετέχειν. ὁμοίους δὲ λέγω ὄμοεθνεῖς, πολίτας, ἥλικας, συγγενεῖς, ὅλως τοὺς ἐξ ἴσου· αἰσχρὸν γὰρ ἥδη τὸ μὴ μετέχειν, οἷον παιδεύσεως ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄμοιως. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα μᾶλλον, ὃν δι' ἑαυτὸν φαίνηται· οὕτω γὰρ

§ 11. ‘And saying *any* thing about yourself, making any kind of boast or profession about yourself,—no expression, however exaggerated, of self-laudation that you abstain from; no profession of any art or science that you do not lay claim to—‘and taking the credit of, appropriating, other people’s merits and advantages’, symptomatic of quackery, undue and unfounded pretension or assumption. *The worthiness of praise distains his worth, If that the prais’d himself bring the praise forth.* Troilus and Cressida, I 3. 241.

ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι] to announce or proclaim—to the world in the way of profession in general, or especially the profession of any art, science, or practice; and almost technically (by Plato) applied to the magnificent profession—without corresponding performance—of the Sophists. Rhet. II 24. 11, of Protagoras’ profession, what he undertook to do, viz. τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν.—On ἀλαζονεία see note on I 2. 7.

‘And in like manner the products or results of each of all the various vices of the character, and the outward signs of these (inward vices) and every thing that resembles them; for they are disgraceful (base and therefore to be shunned, in themselves), and provocative of shame (in us)’.

§ 12. ‘And besides all these, the want (absence) of any of these estimable things of which all our peers, or most of them, have a share. By ‘peers’ I mean clansmen (members of the same race or tribe), fellow-citizens, equals in age, relatives, or, in general terms, those who are on an equality (on a level) with us; for now (that we have reached this stage, not perhaps before), it is shameful not to participate in advantages, such as education, or anything else in the same way, to so high a degree as they do. And all these disadvantages are still more disgraceful if they appear to be due to ourselves, and our own fault; for by this it does appear that they result rather from (internal) vice’ (of character, the bad προύρεος which stamps them with the vicious character), ‘if we ourselves be to blame for the introduction (pre-existence), the actual (present) existence, or future growth of them’.

ηδη ἀπὸ κακίας μᾶλλον, ἀν αὐτὸς ἡ αἴτιος τῶν ὑπαρ-
 13 ξάντων ἡ ὑπαρχόντων ἡ μελλόντων, πάσχοντες δὲ ἡ
 πεπονθότες ἡ πεισόμενοι τὰ τοιαῦτα αἰσχύνονται
 ὅσα εἰς ἀτιμίαν φέρει καὶ ὄνειδος ταῦτα δὲ ἐστὶ τὰ
 εἰς ὑπηρετήσεις ἡ σώματος ἡ ἔργων αἰσχρῶν, ὥν ἐστὶ
 τὸ ὑβρίζεσθαι. καὶ τὰ μὲν εἰς ἀκολασίαν καὶ ἐκόντα
 καὶ ἄκοντα, τὰ δὲ εἰς βίᾳν ἄκοντα.¹ ἀπὸ ἀνανδρίας
 γὰρ ἡ δειλίας ἡ ὑπομονή καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀμύνεσθαι.

14 ἀ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνονται, ταῦτη ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ τοι-^{p. 19.}
 (14) αῦτα· ἐπει δὲ περὶ ἀδοξίας φαντασία ἐστὶν ἡ αἰσχύνη,
¹ ἄκοντα (τὰ δὲ εἰς βίᾳν ἄκοντα)

§ 13. ‘And the endurance, present, past, or future (in the anticipation) of any such things as tend to dishonour and reproach, men are ashamed of; and these are all acts of service or subservience of person or shameful deeds, under which head comes wanton outrage’ (meaning here that particular kind of *ὑβρίς* which lies in an outrage on or violation of the person; *ὑπηρετεῖν* is equivalent to *χαρίζεσθαι, sui copiam facere*, the surrender of the person to the service or gratification of another).

τὰ εἰς ἀκολασίαν] sc. φέροντα, συντείνοντα; quae spectant ad incontinentiam. ‘Turpe est ea pati quae ab intemperantia alterius profiscuntur’. Schrader. ‘And of these, all that have a tendency or reference to (all that subserve) licentiousness (the reckless and indiscriminate indulgence of the appetites) are disgraceful, whether voluntary or involuntary; the involuntary being such as are done under compulsion (*forza maggiore*); (even these are disgraceful) because the submission to, tame endurance of, them, and the non-resistance (not defending oneself against the violence), proceed from unmanliness or cowardice’. Inordinary cases, compulsion, any superior external force which cannot be controlled, absolves a man from responsibility for his actions—Eth. Nic. III 1, on the voluntary and involuntary—but in these cases if the force be not absolutely overwhelming he is bound to offer all the resistance in his power: to refrain from this shews cowardice or an unmanly spirit, and therefore such acts are still disgraceful, though not for the same reason as the voluntary. τὰ δὲ εἰς βίᾳν ἄκοντα is added as an explanatory note to ἄκοντα: it interrupts the reasoning, and should therefore be separated from the context by some mark of a parenthesis.

§ 14. This concludes the first branch of the analysis of shame and its opposite, *ποῖα αἰσχύνονται καὶ ἀνασχυντοῦσι*, § 1, shameful things. We now proceed to consider the second, *πρὸς τίνας*, the *persons*, namely, before whom, in whose presence, this feeling is especially excited (*lit. to whom the feeling is, as it were, addressed*). These two divisions exhibit the two πάθη in their objective aspect, *things* and *persons*. The third, commencing at § 24, gives the subjective view of them, shewing how the persons who feel shame and the reverse are themselves affected by them, and what in them are the signs of its manifestation.

καὶ ταύτης αὐτῆς χάριν ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων,
οὐδεὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης φροντίζει ἀλλ' ἢ διὰ τὸν δοξά-
ζοντας, ἀνάγκη τούτους αἰσχύνεσθαι ὥν λόγον ἔχει.
15 λόγον δὲ ἔχει τῶν θαυμάζοντων, καὶ οὓς θαυμάζει,
καὶ ύφ' ὧν βούλεται θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλο-
16 τιμεῖται, καὶ ὧν μὴ καταφρονεῖ τῆς δόξης. θαυμά-
ζεσθαι μὲν οὖν βούλονται ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ θαυμά-
ζουσι τούτους ὅσοι τι ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τῶν τιμών,
ἢ παρ' ὧν τυγχάνουσι δεόμενοι σφόδρα τινὸς ὧν
17 ἐκεῖνοι κύριοι, οἵον οἱ ἐρῶντες· φιλοτιμοῦνται δὲ πρὸς
τὸν ὄμοιον, φροντίζουσι δὲ ὡς ἀληθεύοντων τῶν
φρονίμων, τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἵ τε πρεσβύτεροι καὶ οἱ πεπαι-
18 δευμένοι. καὶ τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς καὶ τὰ ἐν φανερῷ

'Such and such like are the things that men are ashamed of. And as shame is a fancy or mental impression about discredit or loss of reputation (def. § 2), and this on its own account, with no reference to any ulterior results or consequences (of the loss of it), and no one cares for the opinion except on account of those who entertain it, it follows of necessity that the persons to whom shame is addressed are those whom we hold in account (take account of, regard and esteem)'.

§ 15. 'We take account of those that admire and look up to *us*, and those whom *we* admire and look up to (comp. I 6. 29), and by whom we wish to be admired, and those whom we are ambitious of rivalling (II 2. 24, note, 4. 24), and those whose opinion we *don't despise*'.

§§ 16, 17. 'Now the persons whom we wish to be admired by, and whom we ourselves look up to, are those who are in possession of any good of that class which is highly valued (which confers distinction), or those from whom we have an excessive desire to obtain something that they are masters of, as lovers; those that we vie with, or strive to rival, are our equals; and those that we look up to as *authorities* on any question (regard as likely to speak, or rather see, the truth in any disputed question on which their opinion is asked) are the men of practical wisdom; and such are men advanced in life and the well educated'.

§ 18. In the first clause of this section, as Schrader has noticed, there is a momentary transition from the *persons* who feel shame to the *things* which produce it; in the second, a return is made to the masculine. Supply *αἰσχύνονται*. 'And of things that take place, of acts done, under our very eyes, and openly (in broad daylight, or very prominent and conspicuous *in position*) men are more ashamed: whence also the proverb, *the seat of shame is in the eyes*. And the shame is deeper in the presence of those who will be always with us (constantly in our society, as members of our family, intimate friends; and the closer the intimacy the deeper the shame), and those who pay attention to, take particular

μᾶλλον ὅθεν καὶ ἡ παροιμία, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς ἀεὶ παρεσομένους μᾶλλον αἰσχύνονται καὶ τοὺς προσέχοντας αὐτοῖς, διὰ τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ἀμφότερα. καὶ τοὺς μὴ περὶ ταύτα ἐνό- P. 1384 b.
19 χους· δῆλον γάρ ὅτι τάναντία δοκεῖ τούτοις. καὶ

notice of us (study our character and actions); because both these are cases of special observation'.

[*ἀμφότερα*] the abstract neuter; 'both the preceding *things*, or *cases*'; these two facts, or observations on the manifestation of shame, that it is more felt in the presence (1) of intimate associates and (2) curious observers, are confirmed by the proverb that *the seat of shame is in the eyes*; —when we are very much ashamed of anything we turn away our eyes, and dare not look our friend in the face. So Sappho to Alcaeus, *supra* I 9. 20—whatever the true reading may be—directly expresses this in the phrase *αἰδὼς ἔχει ὅμματα*.

The principal organ by which the emotion is expressed or manifested is naturally regarded as the *seat* of that emotion: and this is by no means confined to *shame*, but is extended not only to other emotions, but even to *justice* by Eurip. Med. 219, *δίκη γὰρ οὐκ ἔνεστ' ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς βροτῶν*: the eyes are in this case represented as the organs of injustice, not *discerning* right and wrong. So Eur. Hippol. 246, καὶ ἐπ' αἰσχύνην ὅμμα τέτραπται. Id. Cresph. Fr. xviii (Dind.), αἰδὼς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι γίγνεται τέκνον (apud Sto- baecum). Arist. Vesp. 446, ἀλλὰ τούτοις γ' οὐκ ἔνι οὐδὲ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι αἰδὼς —τῶν παλαιῶν ἐμβάδων. Athen. XIII 564 B (Gaisford), καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἔφη τὸν ἑραστὰς εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο τοῦ σώματος τῶν ἐρωμένων ἀποβλέπειν ἢ τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, ἐν οἷς τὴν αἰδῶ κατοικεῖν. Theogn. 85, οἵσιν ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ τε καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἔπεστιν αἰδός. Theocr. xxvii 69, ὅμμασιν αἰδομένη. (Paley ad Suppl. 195, Latin ed.) Apollon. Rhod. III 92 (Victorius). Suidas s. v. αἰδώς, καὶ ἔτέρα παροιμία “αἰδὼς ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς,” παρ’ ὅσον οἱ κεκακωμένοι τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς οὐκ αἰδοῦνται, ἢ ὅτι τὸν παρόντας ὀρῶντες αἰδοῦνται μᾶλλον οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἢ τὸν ἀπόντας. Eustath. ad Il. N 923. 18 (Gaisford), Ἀριστοτέλους γὰρ φιλοσοφώτα παραδομένον οἰκητήριον αἰδόνις εἶναι τὸν ὀφθαλμούς. Id. ad Odys. § 1754. 39, Ἀριστοτέλους φαμένου τὴν αἰδῶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι,οἴα τῶν αἰδημόνων καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς ὅψεως χαρακτηριζομένων, οἱ ἐφ' οἷς αἰδεῖσθαι χρὴ χαλώσι τὰ βλέφαρα καὶ βλέπειν ἀτενὲς ὄκοντιν. In Probl. XXXI 3, 957 b II, this is directly stated as a matter of fact without any reference to the proverb or to vulgar opinion, ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς γὰρ αἰδώς, as an explanation of something else.

So of love, the eye is the medium or channel by which it is conveyed; Eur. Hippol. 527, ἔρως, ἔρως, ὁ κατ’ ὅμμάτων στάζεις πόθον. Aesch. Agam. 419, ὅμμάτων δὲ ἐν ἀχηνίαις ἔρρει πᾶσι' Ἀφροδίτα, on which see Donaldson, *New Crat.* § 478. Ib. 742 (Dind.) μαλθακὸν ὅμμάτων βέλος δηξίθυμον ἔρωτος ἄνθος. Plat. Phaedr. 251 B, τοῦ κάλλους τὴν ἀποβρόθην διὰ τῶν ὅμμάτων—the Emanation theory—which is afterwards *explained*, ib. 251 C, Cratyl. 420 B, ἔρως δέ, ὅτι ἐστρεῖ ἔξωθεν...ἐπείσακτος διὰ τῶν ὅμμάτων ...ἔκαλεῖτο. Arist. Eth. Nic. IX 12, init. ὥσπερ τοῖς ἔρωσι τὸ ὄρāν ἀγαπητοτάτον ἐστι καὶ μᾶλλον αἰροῦνται ταύτην τὴν αἰσθησιν ἢ τὰς λοιπὰς ὡς κατὰ

τοὺς μὴ συγγνωμονικοὺς τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀμαρτάνειν· ἀλλὰ γάρ τις αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, ταῦτα λέγεται τοῖς πτέλας οὐ νεμεσᾶν, ὡστε ἀλλὰ μὴ ποιεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι 20 νεμεσᾶ. καὶ τοὺς ἐξαγγελτικοὺς πολλοῖς· οὐδὲν γάρ διαφέρει μὴ δοκεῖν ἢ μὴ ἐξαγγέλλειν. ἐξαγ-

ταντην μάλιστα τοῦ ἔρωτος ὄντος καὶ γενομένου κ.τ.λ. Heliodorus III 8, quoted by King, *Gnostic Gems*, p. 113—4, on βασκανίᾳ ‘the envious’ or ‘evil eye’. In the same passage love is described as a kind of ophthalmia, or infection by the eye. Similarly φθόνος, ‘the evil eye’, Aesch. Agam. 947 (Dind.), μή τις πρόσωθεν ὄμμάτων βάλοι φθόνος—where Paley quotes Eur. Inūs Fragm. 11, ἐν χερσίν, ἡ σπλάγχνοισιν, ἡ παρ' ὄμματα ἔσθ ήμιν (ό φθόνος).—φύβος, Aesch. Pers. 168 (Dind.), ἀρφὶ δὲ ὀφθαλμοῖς φύβος. ἄλλος, Soph. Aj. 706, ἔλυσεν αἰνὸν ἄλος ἀπ' ὄμμάτων”Αρης. S. Petri Ep. II ii. 14, ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχοντες μεστοὺς μοιχαλίδος, S. Joh. Ep. I ii. 16, ἡ ἐπιθυμίᾳ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. χαρά, ‘tears of joy’, Soph. Electr. 894, 1304, 1231, γεγηθός ἔρπει δάκρυν ὄμμάτων ἄπο. Aesch. Agam. 261, χαρά μὲν ὑφέρπει δάκρυν ἔκκαλον μένη. Ib. 527. Prov. vi. 17, *haughty eyes are an abomination to the Lord*. Isaiah v. 15, *the eyes (i. e. pride) of the lofty shall be humbled*. Ezekiel v. 11, *neither shall mine eyes (i. e. either mercy or justice) spare*. Habak. i. 13, *thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil*. All these various examples shew, what may also be inferred from our own ordinary language, in which we speak indifferently of the *eye* of mercy and of pity on the one hand, and of the *eye* of anger, of envy, of scorn, of hatred, of jealousy on the other, that *the eye may be taken to represent in language any emotion whatsoever, good or bad, of which it is in nature the most prominent organ of expression*.

§ 19. ‘Again, in the presence of those who are not liable to the same imputations (as we lie under for some shameful act); for it is plain that (in this matter) their feelings and opinions must be contrary to our own. And of those who are not inclined to be indulgent, to make allowance for, apparent faults; for things which a man does himself he is generally supposed not to find fault with in others, and therefore (the converse must be true) what he does not do himself he is plainly likely to condemn in others’. Such as—according to Hudibras—*Compound for sins they are inclined to, by damning those they have no mind to* [I i. 215].

νέμεσις is *righteous indignation*, moral disapprobation or reprobation; the opposite of *ἔλεος* and *συγγνώμη*, which take the indulgent and merciful view of human frailty. Infr. cc. 8, 9. Comp. 9. 1.

§ 20. ‘And of those who are inclined to *telling tales*, betraying secrets, publishing, divulging them to their acquaintance in general: because there is no difference (in regard of the effect upon the other) between not thinking (a thing wrong) and not publishing it to the world’. That is, as far as the effect upon the person who has done something wrong is concerned, and the amount of shame which it causes him, it makes no difference whether the other really thinks it wrong, or merely *says so*, to the world. In no other sense are ‘not thinking’ and ‘not telling’ the same. ‘*Tell-tales* are, such as have received an injury,—for

γελτικοὶ δὲ οἵ τε ἡδικημένοι διὰ τὸ παρατηρεῖν καὶ οἱ κακολόγοι εἴπερ γάρ καὶ τοὺς μὴ ἀμαρτάνοντας, ἔτι μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας. καὶ οἵς ἡ διατριβὴ ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πέλασ ἀμαρτίαις, οἷον χλευασταῖς καὶ κωμῳδοποιοῖς· κακολόγοι γάρ πως οὗτοι καὶ ἔξαγ-γελτικοί. καὶ ἐν οἷς μηδὲν ἀποτετυχήκασιν· ὥσπερ γάρ θαυμαζόμενοι διάκεινται. διὸ καὶ τοὺς πρώτουν

these are always on the watch, lying in wait (*παρά* lurking in the neighbourhood) (for an opportunity of retaliation)—and those who are censorious and inclined to evil-speaking in general: for the latter, (supply *κακολογοῦσι*, or *κακῶς λέγουσι*), if they speak evil of the inoffensive or innocent, *a fortiori* are likely to do so of the offenders or guilty.

παρατηρεῖν] *infra*. III 2. 15. Xen. Mem. III 14. 4, with an evil design, ‘to lie in wait for’, Polyb. XVII 3. 2, ap. Liddell and Scott. Add Arist. Top. Θ 11, 161 a 23, ὅταν ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος τἀνταία τῷ ἐρωτῶντι παρατηρῇ προσ-επηρέαζων, of one, who in a dialectical discussion ‘wantonly’ (*πρός*, in addition to his proper functions, as a work of supererogation) ‘and spitefully or vexatiously (*ἐπηρεάζων*) lies in wait to catch his opponent’ in some logical trap or other.

‘And those whose occupation or amusement (*διατριβή, passe-temps*) lies in finding fault with their neighbours, such as the habitually sarcastic (*busy mockers*, Ps. xxxv. 16), and comic poets or satirists in general: for these are in a sense (in some sort may be considered as) professional evil-speakers, and libellers of their neighbours’. To the readers of Aristophanes, and indeed of Comedy—especially ancient Comedy—in general, this satirical and libellous character, which has become identified with their art (*κωμῳδεῖν*, Aristoph., Plato, &c.), needs no illustration. Hor. A. P. 281—4.

χλευασταῖς] See II 2. 12, and note. II 3. 9.

‘And those with whom we have never before met with a failure (incurred reproach or damage, sustained a repulse, lost credit—explained by *ἡδεγότες infra*); for we are to them as it were objects of admiration and respect’ (*διάκεινται, lit.* we are to them in such a disposition, or position, attitude, posture)—they have never yet had occasion to find fault with us, we have hitherto not lost caste in their estimation—‘and this is why we feel ashamed in the presence of (are reluctant to refuse) those who ask a favour for the first time, because (on the supposition that) we have never yet lost credit in their eyes (and this respect which they have for us we should be loth to impair)’.

ώσπερ θαυμαζόμενοι] Objects of shame (*οὓς αἰσχύνονται*) are those before whom men feel ashamed of any offence against virtue or propriety: comp. ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ ὥν φροντίζει, § 3: also §§ 15, 24.

‘And these are either such as have recently conceived the wish to be friends with us—for they have hitherto seen only the best of us—and hence the merit of Euripides’ answer to the Syracusans—or, of acquaintances of long standing, such as know nothing against, know no ill of us’,

δεηθέντας τι αἰσχύνονται ὡς οὐδέν πω ἡδοξηκότες ἐν
αὐτοῖς· τοιοῦτοι δ' οἵ τε ἄρτι βουλόμενοι φίλοι εἶναι
(τὰ γὰρ βέλτιστα τεθέανται, διὸ εὖ ἔχει ἡ τοῦ Εὐ-
ριπίδου ἀπόκρισις πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους) καὶ τῶν
21 πάλαι γνωρίμων οἱ μηδὲν συνειδότες. αἰσχύνονται δ'
οὐ μόνον αὐτὰ τὰ ῥηθέντα αἰσχυντηλὰ ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ^{p. 70.}
σημεῖα, οἷον οὐ μόνον ἀφροδισιάζοντες ἀλλὰ καὶ
τὰ σημεῖα αὐτοῦ. καὶ οὐ μόνον ποιοῦντες τὰ αἰσχρά,

(are privy to, conscious of, no vice or misconduct in us,) whose good opinion of us is unimpaired.

The answer of Euripides to the Syracusans is given—*invented say some*—by the Scholiast, in these words: Εὐριπίδης πρὸς τοὺς Συρακοσίους πρέσβυτος ἀποσταλεῖς καὶ περὶ εἰρήνης καὶ φίλιας δεόμενος, ὡς ἔκεινοι ἀνένενον, εἶπεν ἔδει, ἄνδρες Συρακόσιοι, εἴ καὶ διὰ μηδὲν ἄλλο, ἀλλά γε διὰ τὸ ἄρτι ὑπῶν δέεσθαι, αἰσχύνεσθαι ἡμᾶς ὡς θαυμάζοντας. We know nothing from any other source of Euripides having ever been employed on any other occasion in any public capacity; but as Aeschylus fought at Marathon, and Sophocles was one of the ten generals who conducted the exhibition against Samos under Pericles, there seems to be no *a priori* objection to the employment of another tragic poet in a similar public service. That Euripides could speak in public we learn from a reference of Aristotle to another answer of his, Rhet. III 15. 8. Nevertheless the objection has been held fatal to the soundness of the reading, and Ruhnken, *Hist. Crit.* (ap. Buhle), has proposed to substitute ‘Υπερίδον for Εὐριπίδον in our text, the one name being constantly confounded by transcribers with the other. Sauppe *Orat. Att.* Vol. III. p. 216, *Fragm. Oratt.* xv argues the question, and decides (rightly, I think) in favour of the vulgate. There is in fact no reason whatsoever, except our ignorance, for denying that Euripides could have been sent ambassador to Syracuse. Sauppe thinks that the occasion probably was the negotiations carried on between Athens and Sicily from 427—415, previous to the Sicilian expedition. His note ends with an inquiry whether another Euripides, Xenophon's father, Thuc. II 70, 79, may possibly be meant here. The extreme appropriateness of the answer to Aristotle's topic, which seems to have suggested the suspicion of manufacture for the special occasion, tells in reality at least as much in favour of its genuineness; it is because it is so appropriate, that Aristotle remembers and quotes it.

§ 21. ‘And not only the *things* already mentioned cause shame, but also the signs and outward tokens and indications of it’ (α σημεῖον is, in logic, the *ordinary* accompaniment of something the existence of which it *indicates*; the *invariable* accompaniment, a *certain* proof of the existence of it, is a *τεκμήριον*), ‘as in the case of sexual intercourse, not merely the act itself, but the signs of it. And similarly, people are ashamed not merely of shameful acts, but also of shameful words, foul language’. *Quod factu foedum est, idem est et dictu turpe.* Soph. Oed. R. 1409, δλλ'

22 ἀλλὰ καὶ λέγοντες. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐ τὸν εἰρημένους μόνον αἰσχύνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν δηλώσοντας αὐτοῖς, οἷον θεράποντας καὶ φίλους τούτων. ὅλως δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνονται οὕθ' ὡν πολὺ καταφρονοῦσι τῆς δόξης τοῦ ἀληθεύειν (οὐδεὶς γὰρ παιδία καὶ θηρία αἰσχύνεται) οὔτε ταῦτα τὸν γνωρίμους καὶ τὸν ἀγνῶτας, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν γνωρίμους τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν δοκοῦντα τὸν δὲ ἄπωθεν τὰ πρὸς τὸν νόμον.

24 αὐτοὶ δὲ ὡδε διακείμενοι αἰσχυνθεῖεν ἀν, πρῶτον μὲν εἰ ύπάρχοιεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔχοντες οὕτω τινὲς οἵους ἔφαμεν εἶναι οὓς αἰσχύνονται. ἥσαν δὲ οὗτοι ἡ θαυμὸν γὰρ αὐδᾶν ἔσθ' ἡ μηδὲ δρᾶν καλόν. Isocr. ad Demon. § 15, ἡ ποιεῖν αἰσχρὸν, ταῦτα νόμιμε μηδὲ λέγεν εἶναι καλόν.

§ 22. ‘And in like manner we are ashamed (of any disgraceful action) before those who will reveal or betray it to them’ (viz. the before-mentioned *τοῖς θαυμάζονται* and the rest: *αὐτοῖς* is due to Victorius for *varia lectio αὐτοῖς*); ‘as servants, and their friends’.

§ 23. ‘And in general, people are not ashamed in the presence of those for whose opinion, in respect of perceiving the truth and forming a sound judgment on it, they have a very great contempt—for no one feels shame in the presence of children or brutes—nor of the same things’ (*ταῦτα cogn. accus. after αἰσχύνονται* understood) ‘in the presence of persons well known to them and of strangers; but in the presence of intimates they are ashamed of things which are considered (δοκοῦντα) really and essentially, in that of the remote (from them in connexion), of what is only conventionally, disgraceful’. On this distinction of *πρὸς ἀλήθειαν* and *πρὸς δόξαν=πρὸς τὸν νόμον*, see note on II 4. 23: and on ἄπωθεν (the termination) note on I 11. 16.

§ 24. This section is the commencement of the third division of the analysis of shame and its opposite; the subjective view of them, shewing how they appear in the persons themselves who are affected by them.

‘The likely subjects of shame themselves are, first of all men of such a disposition, or in such a state of mind, as if they had certain others standing to them in the same relation as those of whom we said they stand in awe’. Such are persons whom they respect and admire, whom they regard as authorities, whose judgment and opinions they look up to. A somewhat complicated assemblage of words to express this simple meaning, that the disposition to shame is the same state of mind as that which has been before described as felt in the presence of certain classes of persons of whom we stand in awe; which are immediately specified. ‘These were (i. e. are, as we described them, ὡν τις τῆς δόξης φοριζει, τῶν θαυμάζοντων, καὶ οὓς θαυμάζει κ.τ.λ. ante §§ 14, 15) either those that we admire, or that admire us, or by whom we wish to be admired, or those from whom we require any aid or service which we shall not obtain if we

μαζόμενοι ἡ θαυμάζοντες ἡ ύφ' ᾧν βούλονται θαυμά-
ζεσθαι, ἡ ᾧν δέονται τινα χρείαν ᾧν μὴ τεύξονται
ἀδόξοι ὄντες, καὶ οὐτοὶ ἡ ὁρῶντες, ὡσπερ Κυδίας περὶ^{P. 1385.}
τῆς Σάμου κληρουχίας ἐδημηγόρησεν (ἥξιον γὰρ ὑπο-
λαβεῖν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους περιεστάναι κύκλῳ τοὺς Ἑλ-
ληνας, ὡς ὁρῶντας καὶ μὴ μόνον ἀκουσομένους ἢ ἀν
ψηφίσωνται), ἡ ἀν πλησίον ὥστιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἡ μέλ-
λωσιν αἰσθήσεσθαι. διὸ καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι ἀτυχοῦντες ὑπὸ^{P. 1385.}
τῶν ζηλούντων ποτὲ οὐ βούλονται θαυμασταὶ γὰρ
25 οἱ ζηλωταί. καὶ ὅταν ἔχωσιν ἢ καταισχυνοῦσιν

lose our credit with them; and these either as actually looking on, actual spectators (of what we say or do), of which Cydias' harangue on the allotment of Samos furnishes an example—for he required them to imagine the entire Greek people to be standing round the Athenians in a circle, as actual spectators, and not mere (future or expectant) listeners, of the decree they are about to make—or if such be near at hand, or likely to be listeners' (to what we have to say: this especially for the *deliberative speaker*).

The *Σάμου κληρουχία* here referred to is not the allotment of the Samian lands amongst Athenian citizens after the revolt of the island and its subsequent reduction by Pericles in 440 B.C. Thucydides, who gives an account of the treatment of the Samians after their defeat, I 117, makes no mention of any such allotment. It is referred by Ruhnken, *Hist. Crit.*, and by Grote, *Hist. of Gr.* x 407 and note, 408, to Timotheus' conquest of Samos in 366, and the subsequent Athenian settlement there in 352; of the former of which Cornelius Nepos speaks, Vit. Timoth. c. I, ap. Clinton *F. H.* sub anno 440. It was against this allotment of Samos that Cydias (of whom nothing seems to be known beyond this notice, his name does not even occur in Baiter and Sauppe's list of Orators,) made his appeal to the Athenian assembly, and invited them to decide the question of spoliation, as though all Greece were standing round them looking on. Isocrates, *Paneg.* § 107, is obliged to defend his countrymen from the reproach (*ὄνειδίζειν*) of this and similar practices, not specially named, by the plea that the appropriation of the territory was not due to rapacity, but solely to the desire of securing the safety of the desolated properties by planting a colony to defend them.

'And therefore also men in misfortune don't like (are ashamed) to be seen by their *quondam* rivals or emulators, because these are admirers'; and therefore, by the rule previously laid down, they are ashamed to appear before them in this undignified and melancholy condition.

§ 25. And men are disposed to feel shame, 'whenever they have attached to them any disgraceful deeds or belongings, derived either from themselves or their ancestors, or any others with whom they are in near relation'. *ἀγχιστεία*, 'nearness of kin', gives the right of succession

έργα καὶ πράγματα ἡ αὐτῶν ἡ προγόνων ἡ ἄλλων τινῶν πρὸς οὓς ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς ἀγχιστεία τις. καὶ ὅλως ὑπὲρ ὥν αἰσχύνονται αὐτοί· εἰσὶ δὲ οὗτοι οἱ εἰρημένοι καὶ οἱ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἀναφερόμενοι, ὥν διδάσκαλοι ἡ σύμβουλοι γεγόνασιν, ἡ ἐὰν ὅστιν ἔτεροι ὅμοιοι, 26 πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται· πολλὰ γὰρ αἰσχυνόμενοι διὰ 27 τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ οὐ ποιοῦσιν. καὶ μέλλοντες ὀρᾶσθαι καὶ ἐν φανερῷ ἀναστρέφεσθαι τοῖς συνειδόσιν αἰσχυντηλοὶ μᾶλλον εἰσίν. ὅθεν καὶ Ἀντιφῶν ὁ ποιητὴς μέλλων ἀποτυμπανίζεσθαι ὑπὸ Διονυσίου εἶπεν, ἵδων τοὺς συναποθνήσκειν μέλλοντας

under the Attic law. Victorius quotes Eur. Hippol. 424, δονοῦι γὰρ ἄνδρα, καν θραυστπλαγχνός τις ἦ, ὅταν συνειδῇ μητρὸς ἡ πατρὸς κακά.

ἀ κατασχνοῦσιν ἔργα] The subject of the neut. plur. with verb singular, and the exceptions, is well treated in Jelf's *Gr. Gr.* §§ 384, 385. Porson, *Addenda ad Eur. Hec.* 1149, had restricted the exceptions to persons or animate objects: Hermann, *ad Soph. Electr.* 430, corrects this too limited statement. Lobeck, *Phrynicus*, p. 425. On Aristotle's use of this licence, see Zell *ad Eth. Nic.* vol. II. p. 4, Waitz *ad Organ.* vol. I. p. 535.

'And, as a general rule, those on whose behalf (account) we ourselves feel ashamed (when they are guilty of any shameful act). These are such as have been just named (sc. πρόγονοι ἡ ἄλλοι τινὲς κ.τ.λ.) as well as all such as fall back upon us (ἀναφερόμενοι, re-lati, who refer to us, as patrons or authorities), those, that is, to whom we have stood in the relation of instructors or admirers; or indeed if there be any others, like ourselves, to whom we look up as competitors for distinction: for there are many things which out of consideration for such we either do or avoid doing from a feeling of shame'.

§ 27. 'And when we are likely to be seen, and thrown together' (ἀναστρέφεσθαι, versari, conversari; of converse, conversation, in its earlier application) 'in public with those who are privy to (our disgrace), we are more inclined to feel ashamed'. Comp. Thucyd. I 37.4, καν τούτῳ τὸ εὐπρεπὲς ἀσπονδον οὐχ ἵνα μὴ ἔνναδικήσωσιν ἑτέροις προβέβληται, ἀλλ' ὅπως κατὰ μόνας ἀδικώσῃ, καὶ ὅπως ἐν φιλοτιμοῦνται, οὐδὲ ὅτι λάθωσι πλέον ἔχωσιν, ἵνα δέ ποι τι προσλάβωσιν ἀνασχυντῶσιν. "May be spared their blushes, as there are none to witness them." According to the proverb, *Pudor in oculis habitat*. Arnold *ad loc.*

'To which also Antiphon the poet referred (*ὅθεν, from which principle he derived his remark*) when, on the point of being flogged to death by Dionysius, he said, as he saw those who were to die with him (his fellow-sufferers) covering their faces as they passed through the gates (at the city gates, where a crowd was gathered to look at them), "Why hide your faces? Is it not for fear that any one of these should see you to-morrow?"'

ἐγκαλυπτομένους ὡς ἥεσαν διὰ τῶν πυλῶν, “τί ἐγκαλύπτεσθε” ἔφη· “ἢ μὴ αὐριόν τις ύμᾶς ἴδη τούτων;”

περὶ μὲν οὖν αἰσχύνης ταῦτα· περὶ δὲ ἀναισχυν- p. 71.
I τίας δῆλον ὡς ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων εὐπορήσομεν. τίσι CHAP. VII.

On Antiphon the tragic poet, see II 2. 19; and on ἀποτυμπανίζεσθαι, c. 5. 14.

ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι, ‘to hide the face’ especially for *shame*. Plat. Phaedr. 243 B, γυμνὴ τῇ κεφαλῇ, καὶ οὐχ ὁσπερ τότε ὑπ’ αἰσχύνης ἐγκεκαλυμμένος. In Phaedo 117 C, Phaedo covers his face to hide his tears, ἀστακὶ ἔχώρει τὰ δάκρυα, ὅστε ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἀπέκλαον ἐμαντόν. Stallbaum refers to Dorville ad Charit. p. 274. Aesch. c. Tim. § 26, (Timarchus) γυμνὸς ἐπαγκρατιαῖεν ...οὗτῳ κακῷ καὶ αἰσχρῷ διακείμενος τὸ σῶμα ὑπὸ μέθης καὶ βδελυρίας, ὅστε τούς γε εὐ φρονοῦντας ἐγκαλύψασθαι, αἰσχυνθέντας ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως κ.τ.λ. In the 3rd of the letters attributed to Demosthenes, 1485. 9, τῆς Ἀριστογείτονος κρίσεως ἀναμησθέντες ἐγκαλύψασθε (hide your faces for shame).

Also for *fear*, Arist. Plut. 707, μετὰ ταῦτ’ ἐγὼ μὲν εὐθὺς ἐνεκαλυψάμην δείσας, Ib. 714.

Plutarch, x Orat. Vit., *Ἀντιφῶν*, relates this story of Antiphon the *orator*. He was sent on an embassy to Dionysius tyrant of Syracuse; and, at a drinking party, the question arising, which was the ‘best bronze’ in the world, τίς ἀριστός ἐστι χαλκός; Antiphon said that was the best of which the statues of Harmodius and Aristogiton were made. Dionysius interpreting this as implying a similar design upon himself ordered him to be executed. Others say that the order was given in a fit of passion brought on by Antiphon’s criticism of his tragedies.

[ἢ μὴ τις ἔτι] The alternative *ἢ* prefixed to the interrogative sentence, expresses the opinion of the writer or speaker, ‘It is so—isn’t it?’ ‘You do think so, don’t you?’ and is most familiar in the Platonic dialogues; also very frequent in our author. The *alternative*, which conveys this, refers to a suppressed clause or clauses, ‘Is it so and so, or so and so,—or rather, as I myself think and suppose that you do also, is it not thus?’ In order to express this, in translating we supply the negative. Socrates’ *ἢ οὐ*; ‘You think so, don’t you?’, which occurs so constantly (in Plato) at the end of his arguments, may seem to contradict this. But it really amounts to the same thing. Socrates, meaning to imply that he expects the other’s assent, says (literally) ‘or not?'; which is, being interpreted, ‘You surely don’t think otherwise?’ Dionysius’ *ἢ μὴ* consequently mean when expressed at full length ‘Is it anything else, or is it not rather as I suppose, lest’...

‘So much for shame: of shamelessness, the topics may plainly be derived from the opposites of these.’

CHAP. VII.

χάρις, the *πάθος*, or instinctive emotion, of which this Chapter treats, represents the tendency or inclination to benevolence, to do a grace, favour, or service, spontaneous and disinterested (§§ 2, 5) to another, or to our fellow-man. It also includes the feeling of gratitude, the instinctive inclination to *return* favours received.

δὲ χάριν ἔχουσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσιν ἡ πῶς αὐτοὶ ἔχοντες, 2 ὁρισαμένοις τὴν χάριν δῆλον ἔσται. ἔστω δὴ χάρις, καθ' ἥν ὁ ἔχων λέγεται χάριν ὑπουργεῖν δεομένῳ μὴ αντί τινος, μηδὲ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ τῷ ὑπουργοῦντι ἀλλ' ἵν'

§ 1. ‘The objects of benevolence, the circumstances and occasions (on which it is exercised), and the dispositions, characters, and moods of mind (of those who exercise it), will be evident when we have defined benevolence’.

§ 2. ‘Let us then assume benevolence to be that, in accordance with (under the influence of) which he who has the feeling is said to do a service to one who is in want of it, not in return for anything (as a compensation or payment)—it must be spontaneous as an instinct—nor for his own benefit, but for the advantage of the other party (to the transaction, *ἔκείνῳ*): the favour is great if it be (conferred on) one who is in extreme need of it, or if (the benefit it confers) be of great value or difficult (of attainment), on occasions of the like kind (*μεγάλοις καὶ χαλεποῖς*), or if it be unique’ (a solitary instance of such a service, the only time it ever was conferred: supply *ἡ ἀνόμονος ὁ ὑπουργῶν ὑπουργήση* or simply *χαρίσται*), ‘or the first of its kind or the most important of its kind (*lit. more than any one else has ever done*)’.

A passage of Cicero, *de Invent. XXXVIII. 112*, will serve as a commentary on this. *Beneficia ex sua vi, ex tempore, ex animo eius qui facit, ex casu, considerantur.* (The character of acts of benevolence is gathered or determined from these four considerations.) *Ex sua vi quaerentur hoc modo: magna an parva, facilia an difficilia, singularia sint an vulgaria, vera an falsa, quanam exornatione honestentur: ex tempore autem, si tum quum indigeremus, quum ceteri non possent, aut nollent, opitulari, si tum quum spes deseruisset: ex animo, si non sui commodi causa, si eo consilio fecit omnia ut hoc confidere posset: ex casu, si non fortuna sed industria factum videbitur aut si industria fortuna obstituisse.* From this close resemblance I should infer, not that Cicero had Aristotle's work before him when he wrote the *de Inventione*, but rather that it had been handed down, perhaps from him in the first instance, as a common-place in the ordinary books of Rhetoric.

It was a disputed question, says Ar. again, Eth. Nic. VIII 15, 1163 a 9, seq., whether the magnitude of a favour or benefit is to be measured by the amount of service to the recipient, or by the beneficence¹ of the doer of it: the former being always inclined in the estimate of its value to underrate, the latter to overrate it. οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τουαῦτα φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἡ μικρὰ ἥν ἔκείνοις καὶ ἔξην παρ' ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες· οἱ δ' ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡ παρ' ἄλλων οὐκ ἥν, καὶ ἐν κυδύνοις ἡ τουαύταις χρείας.

¹ τῇ τοῦ δράσαντος εὐεργεσίᾳ. The amount of pains, labour, risk, or sacrifice incurred by the conferrer of the benefit here seems to be regarded as the *measure* of his ‘beneficence’.

ἐκείνω τι μεγάλη δ' ἀν ἡ σφόδρα δεομένω, ἡ μεγάλων καὶ χαλεπῶν, ἡ ἐν καιροῖς τοιούτοις, ἡ μόνος ἡ πρῶτος ἡ μάλιστα. δεήσεις δ' εἰσὶν αἱ ὄρέξεις, καὶ τούτων μάλιστα αἱ μετὰ λύπης τοῦ μὴ γιγνομένου τοιαῦται δὲ οἱ ἐπιθυμίαι, οἷον ὁ ἔρως. καὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κακώσεσι καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ

μὴ ἀντί τυπος] This might seem at first sight to exclude *gratitude* from the notion of *χάρις*; but this I believe cannot be intended; though gratitude and ingratitude are not distinctly noticed in the chapter. The case is this. *χάρις* in this chapter is employed exclusively in its *subjective* sense (see the Lexx.), to denote one of the instinctive feelings: when therefore it is applied to express *gratitude*, it is the feeling only, and not the actual return of the favour, which is taken into account. This is expressed by the words *μὴ ἀντί τυπος*, which signify that it is ‘independent of the actual requital of the benefit conferred’: and, indeed, gratitude may be equally felt when the receiver of the favour has no means of repaying it in kind. This independent or subjective feeling of gratitude is therefore opposed in the words *μὴ ἀντί τυπος* to the notion of a *μισθός*, the ‘payment’ or wages which a workman receives in fulfilment of an implied contract; where there is no feeling of gratitude or obligation remaining on either side after the work is done and paid for. Whereas gratitude is a permanent feeling, and the sense of obligation still remains after the requital or repayment of the service. The opposite to this is *ὅτι διέδωκαν δὲλλ' οὐκ ἔδωκαν*, § 5. It may be argued in certain cases that what appears to proceed from gratitude or spontaneous benevolence, is in reality nothing but the repayment of an obligation, with which *χάρις* is not concerned.

§ 3. ‘All our natural impulses are *wants*, and of these those especially which are accompanied by pain at the non-attainment (*μὴ γιγνομένου*) of their object: such are the appetites and desires, as love’. On *ὄρεξις* see p. 9, note on II 2. 1. The connexion of this remark is with the *δεομένῳ* of the preceding definition. The feeling (and the consequent act) of benevolence always implies the satisfaction of some want in the recipient of the favour; if he did not *want* it, it would be no favour. And besides this, the magnitude of the want is a measure of the magnitude of the favour and of the benevolence that prompts it. Aristotle therefore proceeds to notice some of the principal wants, in the satisfaction of which *χάρις* is manifested in the highest degree. *All* our natural impulses imply wants—the *ὄρέξεις*, the ‘conative’ or striving faculties, all aim at some object which they desire to attain. To the ‘impulsive’ element of our nature, *τὸ ὀρεκτικόν*, belong the appetites and desires such as love (the animal passion). (Besides these the *ὄρεξις* includes *θυμός*, and *βούλησις* ‘the will’.) These appetites and desires, being always accompanied with pain when thwarted or failing to attain their object, are for this reason ‘wants in the highest degree’, *μάλιστα δεήσεις*.

καὶ αἱ (ἐπιθυμίαι) ἐν ταῖς τοῦ σώματος κακώσεσι καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις (μάλιστα δεήσεις εἰσὶν)] ‘Also those (desires) that occur in (belong to) bodily

κινδυνεύων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ὁ λυπούμενος. διὸ οἱ ἐν πενίᾳ παριστάμενοι καὶ φυγαῖς, κανὸν μικρὰ ὑπηρετήσωσιν, διὰ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς δεήσεως καὶ τὸν καιρὸν κεχαρισμένοι, οἷον ὁ ἐν Λυκείῳ τὸν φορμὸν δούς. ἀνάγκη οὖν μάλιστα μὲν εἰς ταῦτα ἔχειν τὴν ὑπουργίαν, εἰ δὲ μή, εἰς ἵσα ἡ μείζω. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ φανερὸν καὶ ὅτε καὶ ἐφ' οἷς γίγνεται χάρις καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι, δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τούτων παρασκευαστέον, τοὺς μὲν δεικύντας ἡ ὄντας

sufferings or injuries (are wants of a high degree): for in fact (this a *note* on the preceding) every one that is in danger or in pain feels desire'. For ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ λυπούμενος compare *supra* c. 4 § 3, γιγνομένων ὡν βούλονται χαίρονται πάντες, τῶν ἐναντίων δὲ λυποῦνται, ὥστε τῆς βούλήσεως σημείον αἱ λύπαι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναί.

κάκωσις, in its ordinary use, and especially in its legal application, denotes a particular kind of injury or suffering, viz. ill-treatment. It also however bears the more general sense, at least three times in Thucydides, II 43, where *κάκωσις* is a repetition of *κακοπραγοῦντες*, and implies ill-fortune, disaster, suffering: VII 4, and 82, *τοῖς τε τραύμασι καὶ τῇ ἀλλῃ κακόσει*, where the sense is unmistakable, and coincides exactly with the use of it here.

'And therefore it is, that those who stand by (assist or succour, *παριστάμενοι*) a man in poverty or exile, however slight the service they render, by reason of the magnitude of the want and the occasion, confer a great favour' (or, 'are very agreeable, acceptable'. The word seems to include both senses); 'like the man who lent the mat *ἐν Λυκείῳ*'. *A friend in need is a friend indeed.*

I have not attempted to translate the word *Λυκείῳ*. We do not even know whether it is the name of a man or a place: it might also be the title of a play or a speech, from which the instance was borrowed. Victorius says, 'historia ignota mihi est'; Schrader, 'quis, cui, quando dederit, incertum (rather *ignotum*) est.' The meaning is plain enough: it is a case like that of Sir Philip Sidney's cup of cold water, in which circumstances of time and place enormously enhance the value and importance of something which in ordinary circumstances is trifling and worthless [cf. Vol. I. pp. 84, 144].

§ 4. 'Accordingly, the service that is received' (by the recipients, which seems to be the subject of *ἔχειν*) 'must be especially directed to these same things' (viz. the satisfaction of the more urgent wants and desires. I have followed Bekker in retaining *ταῦτα*. MS A^c has *ταῦτα*, and Q, Y^b, Z^b *τοιαῦτα*, which is adopted by Victorius), 'or if not, to things equal or greater. And therefore, now that the times, circumstances, and dispositions of mind, which give rise to benevolent feeling, have been pointed out, it is plain that it is from these sources that we must provide our materials (for producing it in our audience), by shewing that the one party (the recipient in the transaction) either is

ἢ γεγενημένους ἐν τοιαύτῃ δεῖσει καὶ λύπῃ, τοὺς δὲ ὑπηρετηκότας ἐν τοιαύτῃ χρείᾳ τοιοῦτον τι ἢ ὑπηρετοῦντας. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅθεν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι ἐνδέχεται τὴν χάριν καὶ ποιεῖν ἀχαρίστους· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι P. 1385 b. αὐτῶν ἔνεκα ὑπηρετοῦσιν ἢ ὑπηρέτησαν (τοῦτο δ' οὐκ

or has been¹ in want or pain such (as has been described), and the other either has done or is doing a service in a case of need, the service and the need being each of the kind mentioned².

§ 5. ‘It is plain too from what sources (or topics) may be derived the materials for depriving (those who have conferred a favour) of (the credit of) this kindly and benevolent feeling, and making them (and their act appear, representing them as) devoid of all such feeling and intention’. This is Victorius’ interpretation, and I think more consistent with what follows than that of Schrader, who understands it of the audience, and not of the benefactor; and explains it, “*facere ut affectu illo, qui ad gratiam habendam referendam fertur, vacui fiant auditores.*” *ἀχάριστος* and *ἀχάριτος*, ‘without grace’, stand in the first instance for ‘unpleasing, disagreeable’—so in Homer, Theognis, Herodotus—and express the opposite of *κεχαρισμένος*, *supra* § 3: and this, with the substitution of the special sense of *χάρις* as a *πάθος* for the general sense of grace, beauty, favour, is the meaning given to the words by Aristotle here: ‘without grace’ is here to be understood ‘without this kindly feeling’. The ordinary use of the word for ‘ungrateful’ is founded upon a third sense of *χάρις*, viz. gratitude.

‘For (we may argue) either that the (boasted) service is, or was, done from motives of self-interest, and this, as we said, (*ἢν*, by definition, § 2,) is not benevolent feeling, or that the service was an accident of coincidence, or done under constraint, or that it was a payment and not a free gift, whether the party was aware (of his obligation to the other, so Victorius) or not²: for in both cases (whether conscious or unconscious) it was a mere barter or exchange, and therefore again in this respect no benevolence’.

¹ *γεγενημένους*. There seems to be no intelligible distinction here made between *εἶναι* and *γέγενεσθαι*; at least, none that is worth expressing in the translation. What again is the difference intended between the two verbs in this passage, *γενόμενα ἢ ἐσόμενα*, II. 8. 13? It may be supposed that Aristotle has only used the latter verb in default of a perfect of the former. And it is certain that the Greek writers do occasionally employ forms of *γέγενεσθαι* where our idiom requires the substitution of the simple ‘to be’. If the word here be translated literally, the notion of ‘becoming’ must be rendered by ‘having come to be in, or fallen into, such want’.

² If I understand Aristotle aright, I cannot see how the alternative *ἢ τε μὴ εἰδότες* can be fairly and properly included in this topic; though it might of course be employed by an unscrupulous speaker to delude an unintelligent audience. It seems to me that the forgetfulness or ignorance that anything is due to the person who receives the favour does alter the character of the transaction; that the gift in such a case may be a free gift, and the feeling that prompts it *χάρις*, disinterested benevolence, and that the *τι ἀντι τούτος* does not here fairly apply.

ἢν χάρις), ἢ ὅτι ἀπὸ τύχης συνέπεσεν ἢ συνηναγκάσθησαν, ἢ ὅτι ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔδωκαν, εἴτ’ εἰδότες εἴτε μὴ ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ τὶ ἀντί τινος, ὥστ’ οὐδὲ 6 οὕτως ἀν εἴη χάρις. καὶ περὶ ἀπάσας τὰς κατηγορίας σκεπτέον· ἡ γὰρ χάρις ἐστὶν ἢ ὅτι τοδὶ ἢ τοσονδὶ ἢ τοιονδὶ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ ποῦ. σημεῖον δέ, εἰ ἐλαττον μὴ

[*συνέπεσεν*] σύν, as in *σύμπτωμα* and *συμφόρα*, marks the ‘coincidence.’

συνηναγκάσθησαν] The *σύν* in this compound—compare Lat. *cogere*, *compellere*—conveys the notion of bringing close together, squeezing, crowding, and hence of *compression*, *constraint*; and thus enforces the ἀνάγκη of the verb with which it is combined. Compare *συμπίέσειν* and *συμπιλεῖν* (Plat. Tim.).

In illustration of the topic *ἀπέδωκαν ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔδωκαν*, Victorius very appositely cites the case of Demosthenes and Halonnesus referred to by Aeschines *κατὰ Κτηναφῶντος* § 83. ‘Ἀλόννησον ἐδίδουν (Philip offered to give, make us a present of Halonnesus), ὁ δ’ (Demosthenes) ἀπηγόρευε μὴ λαμβάνειν, εἰ δίδωσιν ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀποδίδωσιν (if the offer is to be regarded as a free gift instead of a repayment), περὶ συλλαβῶν διαφερόμενος: and (in Athenaeus VI 223 D—224 B) by the orator Cothocides; and the Comic Poets, Antiphanes (*ἐν Νεοττίδι*), Alexis (*ἐν Στρατιώτῃ* and *ἐν Ἀδελφοῖς*), Anaxilas (*ἐν Εὐανδρίᾳ*), and Timocles (*ἐν Ἡρωσι*), who ridicule the objection as a mere verbal quibble. The phrase seems to have passed almost into a proverb. Victorius truly observes, “maioris tamen ponderis res erat quam videbatur, ut ex hoc quoque loco intelligitur.” Demosthenes seems to have advised his Athenians to refuse the offer as a *gift*, and only to accept it as a *repayment* of an outstanding obligation. The argument derived from Aristotle’s topic when applied to the case would be different. This offer is prompted by no *χάρις* or kindly feeling, as Philip represents it; for it is no free gift but the mere payment of a debt. Consequently he is *ἀχάριστος*, and we owe him no *χάρις*, or gratitude, in return.

οὐδὲ οὕτως] ‘neither in this way’. ‘*Neither in this way*’ (i.e. in the two last cases of intentional or even unintentional repayment, included as one under the head of *repayment*), is it true *χάρις, any more than* in the two preceding, where the act is (1) not disinterested, or (2) accidental or compulsory.

§ 6. ‘And (in estimating the value of the feeling or act of benevolence) we must examine it under all the Categories; for *χάρις* may be referred to that of substance (the fact) or quantity, or quality, or time, or place’. Schrader has illustrated the first three of these, but examples are hardly necessary where they so readily suggest themselves. Brandis, in the tract so often cited [*Philologus* IV i], p. 26, observes on this passage, that though there can be no doubt that when Aristotle wrote this he had the list of categories lying before him, whether or no the *book* was then written cannot be decided.

‘And it is a sign (of the *ἀχαριστία*, the absence of benevolent feeling, that there was no intention of obliging us, and that we therefore owe

ὑπηρέτησαν, καὶ εἰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς ἢ ταῦτὰ ἢ ἵστα ἢ
μείζω· δῆλον γάρ ὅτι οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἡμῶν ἔνεκα. ἢ εἰ
φαῦλα εἰδώς· οὐδεὶς γάρ ὀμολογεῖ δεῖσθαι φαύλων.

καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ ἀχαριστεῖν εἴρη-
ται· ποῖα δ' ἐλεεινὰ καὶ τίνας ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ πῶς αὐτοὶ
2 ἔχοντες, λέγωμεν. ἔστω δὴ ἐλεός λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαι-
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p. 72.

νομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχά-
them no thanks), if people have previously refused a smaller service¹,
because it is clear that they must have had some interested motive in
conferring the greater, which destroys the favour: ‘or if they have done the
same or equal or greater to our enemies; for it is plain that here again
the service was not disinterested’, was not done for our sake. ‘Or if the
service was worthless, and the doer of it knew it to be so’;—(like the
'Calabrian host' and his peers, *porcis comedenda*, which he tries to force
upon his unwilling guest; Hor. Epist. I 7. 14 seq. *Prodigus et stultus donat
quae spernit et odit*)—‘for no one will admit that he wants things worthless’.

Having thus dispatched the subject of favours bestowed from feelings of benevolence and the reverse, let us now pass on to things pitiable, the objects of pity, and the states of mind or dispositions in which it resides’.

CHAP. VIII.

§ 2. Pity, according to the popular definition, which is all that Rhetoric requires, is a feeling of pain that arises on the occasion of any evil, or suffering, manifest, evident (*apparent*, to the eye or ear), deadly or (short of that) painful, when unmerited; and also of such a kind as we may expect to happen either to ourselves or to those near and dear to us, and that when it seems to be near at hand: for it is plain that any one who is capable of feeling (*lit.* is to feel) the emotion of pity must be such as to suppose himself liable to suffer evil of some kind or other, himself or his friends; and evil of that kind which has been stated in the definition, or like it, or nearly like it.

On *φαινομένῳ* = *φανερῷ*, evident, unmistakable, see note on p. 10 (II 2. 1). Victorius understands it to mean “quod nobis malum videatur: possemus enim in hoc falli, atque eam miseriam esse iudicare quae minime sit.” But this surely would be expressed by *δοκεῖν*, not *φανεροθαί*: and to say nothing of the numerous examples by which the other interpretation is supported, (some of which are given in the note above referred to,) this seems to be more appropriate to what follows, and to the nature of the *πάθος* itself: for the feeling of pity is strong in proportion to the vividness with which the suffering is brought home to us². The actual sight of it, when we *see* the effect of the injury (and perhaps also a graphic description of it from an eye-witness), gives it a reality and a force which

¹ Toup, quoted by Gaisford, very unnecessarily conjectures *εἰ τὸ θλίττον μὲν,
si minus dederint quam par esset.*

² A remark of Lessing, at the end of the first section of his *Laokoon*, will serve as a commentary on Aristotle's *φαινομένῳ*. “Alles stoische ist untheatralisch;

νειν, ὁ κὰν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειν ἀν παθεῖν ή τῶν
 intensify our sympathy. That this is Aristotle's meaning appears most clearly from a subsequent passage, § 8, where these painful things are enumerated, and are found to be all of them bodily affections: and still more perhaps from § 14, where the effect of *πρὸ δημάτων ποιέin* is described. Aristotle has omitted, designedly or not, all mention of mental suffering: perhaps he thought that not being actually *visible* it was incapable of exciting pity. See further on this in note on II 8.8.

Again, this view of the meaning of the word is in exact agreement with a preceding observation upon pain, II 4.31, that 'all painful things are objects of sense, (that is, all feelings which can properly be called painful are excited by sensible objects,)'¹ and the greatest evils, as wickedness and folly, are the least sensible; for the presence of vice causes no pain'. Victorius, who however does not refer to this passage, has pointed out that the kind of evil which excites pity is distinguished and limited by the epithets *φθαρτικός καὶ λυπηρός*; which upon the principle laid down in c. 4.31 excludes the greatest evils, moral and intellectual, as objects of pity.

With *τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν* comp. II 9.1, ἀντίκειται τῷ ἐλεεῖν...² καλοῦσι *νεμεσᾶν* τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακοπραγίαις κ.τ.λ. When a bad man suffers we look upon it as a deserved punishment, and feel no pity, unless we deem the punishment to be excessive. 'Alas', says Carlyle, of the end of the Girondins, 'whatever quarrel we had with them, has not cruel fate abolished it? Pity only survives.' *French Revolution*, Pt. III. Bk. IV. c. 8, ult.

The last clause of the definition, ὁ κὰν αὐτὸς κ.τ.λ., expresses the compassion, sympathy with the sufferer, the fellow-feeling, implied in pity. *Haud ignara mali miseris succurrere disco.* It is only in this form, as 'compassion', that the emotion enters into Mr Bain's list; *Emotions and Will*, p. 112, [chap. VII § 22, ed. 1875]. Compassion, according to him, is one of the benevolent affections, a group subordinate to the family of Tender Emotions. This appears to be a juster view of the nature and connexion of the feeling than the account given by Aristotle. The fact is, as I have elsewhere stated², that the conception of general benevolence and love and duty to our fellow-creatures, is of modern and Christian origin, and finds no place in Aristotle's Ethical System: the *χάρις* of the preceding chapter includes but *und unser mitleiden ist allezeit dem leiden gleichmässig welches der interessirende gegenstand äussert. Sieht man ihn sein elend mit grosser seele ertragen, so wird diese grosse seele zwar unsere bewunderung erwecken, aber die bewunderung ist ein kalter affekt, dessen unthätiges staunen jede andere wärmere leidenschaft, so wie jede andere deutliche vorstellung, ausschliesset.*"

¹ This however seems to require some qualification: it is true of course of all bodily pain; but are not certain mental states, as doubt, suspense, uncertainty, disappointment, also painful? In the case of *Ἐλεός*, Ar. probably means that at least some sensible image, a mental representative, or *φαντασία*, proceeding from some object of sense, is required to excite the painful feeling. But surely we can pity the mental as well as the bodily sufferings of a friend, provided he makes them sufficiently distinct and intelligible to us.

² *Review of Aristotle's System of Ethics*, 1867, p. 52.

αὐτοῦ τινά, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται· δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἀνάγκη τὸν μέλλοντα ἐλεήσειν ὑπάρχειν τοιούτον οἶον οἴεσθαι παθεῖν ἄν τι κακὸν ἢ αὐτὸν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά, καὶ τοιοῦτο κακὸν οἶον εἴρηται ἐν τῷ ὅρῳ 3 ἢ ὅμοιον ἢ παραπλήσιον. διὸ οὔτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες ἐλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄν ἔτι παθεῖν οἴονται πεπόνθασι γάρ) οὔτε οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἰόμενοι, ἀλλ' ὑβρίζουσιν· εἰ γὰρ ἄπαντα οἴονται ὑπάρχειν τάγαθά,

a small part of it, being in fact confined to doing a service to a friend in need. Again the limitation of pity to those sufferings to which we ourselves or our friends are exposed, ascribes a selfishness to the emotion which seems not necessarily to belong to it. In fact if this were true, the God of the Christian, and the gods of the heathen would be alike incapable of it. Hobbes, in accordance with his theory of universal selfishness, goes beyond Aristotle in attributing the feeling solely to self-love. *Leviathan*, Pt. I. c. 6, ‘Grief for the calamity of another is Pity; and arises from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also Compassion, and in the phrase of this present time a Fellow-feeling. And therefore’ (he continues, another point of contact with Aristotle,) ‘for calamity arising from great wickedness the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity those have pity that think themselves least obnoxious to the same.’ [Hobbes, as is well known, analysed Aristotle’s treatise in his *Brief of the Art of Rhetorick*, first printed with date in 1681. The *Leviathan* was published in 1651. s.]

The Stoic definition, quoted by Victorius from Diog. Laert., Zeno, VII 1, is in partial agreement with that of Aristotle, but omits the last clause; ἔλεος ἔστι λύπη ὡς ἐπὶ ἀναξίᾳ κακοπαθούντι. Whence Cicero, Tusc. Disp. IV 8. 18, *misericordia est aegritudo ex miseria alterius iniuria laborantis*. But the Stoics, though they thus defined pity, nevertheless condemned the exercise of it: Diog. Laert., u. s., § 123, ἐλεήμονας μὴ εἴναι συγγνώμην τὸ ἔχειν μῆδεν· μὴ γὰρ παρίεναι τὰς ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἐπιβαλλούσας κολάσεις, ἐπεὶ τὸ γέ εἴκειν καὶ ὁ ἔλεος αὐτῇ θέντι ἐπιείκεια οὐδένειά ἔστι ψυχῆς πρὸς κολάσεις προσποιούμενή χρηστότητα· μηδὲ οἴεσθαι σκληροτέρας αὐτὰς εἴναι. “Pity, anger, love—all the most powerful social impulses of our nature—are ignored by the Stoics, or at least recognised only to be crushed.” Lightfoot, Dissert. II on Ep. to Philip. p. 320.

§ 3. ‘And therefore, neither are those who are utterly lost and ruined inclined to pity—for they suppose themselves to be no more liable to suffering, seeing that their sufferings are all over (their cup of suffering has been drained to the dregs)—nor those who deem themselves transcendentally happy; on the contrary, they wax wanton in insolence. For, supposing themselves to be in possession of every kind of good, it is plain that they must assume also their exemption from all liability to evil; which in fact is included in the class total of goods’.

πεπόνθασι] See note on *εἰρήσθω*, I II. 29, and the examples of the

δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι παθεῖν μηδὲν κακόν·
4 καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν ἀγαθῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ τοιοῦτοι οἱοι
νομίζειν παθεῖν ἀν οὐ τε πεπονθότες ἥδη καὶ διαπεφευ-
χότες, καὶ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ δι’
ἐμπειρίαν, καὶ οἱ ἀσθενεῖς, καὶ οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον,

indicative perfect there collected. Cf. *Troia fuit. Fuit Ilium et ingens gloria Teucrorum.*

§ 4. ‘Persons inclined to think themselves (especially) liable to suffering are such as the following; those who have already suffered some disaster from which they have made their escape (i. e. were not *παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες*, completely ruined by it), and men advanced in years, by reason of the prudence (or wisdom) and experience¹ (which belong to advanced age), and the weak (in *body*; who are powerless to protect themselves against aggression and injury), and those who are of a *rather* more timid disposition than ordinary (this is weakness of *mind*), and men of study and cultivation, for these are men who can accurately calculate’ (the chances of human life; by the experience and knowledge which their studies have taught them. So Victorius).

[καὶ διαπεφευγότες] This is a remarkable exemplification of that rule of Rhetoric, that every question has two sides, of which either may be maintained indifferently according to circumstances, and that all its materials and reasonings are confined to the sphere of the probable. Here we have a flat contradiction of the statement in the chapter on *φόβος* and *θάρσος*, II 5. 18, where we are told that repeated escape from danger is a ground of confidence. The fact is that it may give rise to *either*, according to the temper and turn of mind of this or that individual: the sanguine will derive confidence from repeated escapes; the anxious and timorous, and the student or philosopher, the Solon, who has learnt by bitter experience that no one can be accounted happy until the end has come,—the second class, the *πεπαιδευμένοι*, [will be affected in exactly the opposite manner], for the reason given by Aristotle himself, *εὐλόγιστοι γάρ*. There can be no doubt that he had two different kinds of characters in his mind when he made the opposite statements.

[οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον] It is quite possible to find a distinct meaning for both these comparatives and not regard them as mere tautology. The comparative in Greek, Latin, English, when it stands alone, with the object of comparison suppressed, has two distinguishable significations; *μᾶλλον*, for example, is either (1) *μᾶλλον τοῦ δέοντος*, ‘*too much*’, (*ne quid nimis*), more than it ought to be; or (2), what we express by ‘*rather*’, (itself a comparative of *rathe* ‘*early*’—comp. Ital. *piuttosto*,

¹ By these they have been taught the instability of all human fortunes; *τὰν θράψιν*, their constant liability to accident and calamity and ‘all the ills that flesh is heir to.’ *βέβαια δὲ οὐδεὶς θυητὸς εὐτυχεῖ γεγώς.* Eur. Fragn. ap. Stob. p. 562 (Fr. incert. 44 Dind. [fr. 1059, ed. 5]). *θυητὸς γὰρ ᾧ καὶ θυητὰ πελεσθαι δόκει θεοὺς βλού ἔχειν ἀξιοῦς ἀνθρώπος ᾧ;* Ibid. p. 568 (No. 45 Dind. [fr. 1060, ed. 5]).

5 καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι εὐλόγιστοι γάρ. καὶ οἱ ὑπάρχουσι γονεῖς ἢ τέκνα ἢ γυναῖκες αὐτοῦ τε γὰρ 6 ταῦτα, καὶ οἵα παθεῖν τὰ εἰρημένα. καὶ οἱ μήτε ἐν ἀνδρίας πάθει ὄντες, οἵον ἐν ὄργῃ ἢ θάρρει (ἀλόγιστα γὰρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταῦτα), μήτ' ἐν ὑβριστικῇ διαθέσει (καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ἀλύγιστοι τοῦ πείσεσθαι τι), ἀλλ' οἱ μεταξὺ τούτων. μήτ' αὖ φοβούμενοι σφόδρα· οὐ γὰρ ἐλεοῦσιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ

piuttosto grasso ‘rather fat’), i.e. more than ordinary, μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰωθότος, a little in excess, rather more than usual. Hence οἱ δειλότεροι μᾶλλον may be rendered ‘rather too timid’, more in a slight degree than men usually are, and also ‘unduly timid’, more so than they ought to be. Examples of this ‘double comparative’—it being assumed apparently that it is *in all cases* a mere tautological reduplication—are given by Victorius ad I 7. 18, and by Waitz (from Aristotle) on Top. Γ I, 116 b 4, Vol. II p. 465. I have shewn on I 7.18, that μᾶλλον κάλλιον there is not a case in point, both of the words having each its own meaning. Of the reduplicated comparative and superlative, some examples are given in Matth. Gr. Gr. §§ 458, 461, and of the latter, by Monk, Hippol. 487.

εὐλόγιστος, opposed to ἀλόγιστος § 5, means one that εὖ λογίζεται, is good or ready at calculating, or reasoning in general: and marks the reflecting, thoughtful man, as opposed to the careless and unreflecting, who does not look forward or take forethought at all.

§ 5. ‘And those who have parents or children or wives (are inclined to pity), because these are one’s own (part and parcel of oneself) and at the same time liable to the accidents before mentioned’.

§ 6. ‘And those who are neither in a state of feeling implying courage, as anger or confidence,—for these (ταῦτα, τὰ πάθη) take no thought for’ (‘are devoid of calculation or reflexion’, as before) ‘the future —nor in a temper of insolence and wantonness—for these also never reflect upon the possibility of future disaster, but those who are in a state of mind intermediate to these. Nor again those who are in excessive terror, for people who are startled (frightened out of their wits) have no pity for others because they are absorbed by their *own* emotion (or suffering). οἰκεῖῳ ‘that which is *their own*’, or proper to them at the moment, and so does not allow them to think of the suffering of *others*, opposed to τῷ ἀλλοτρίῳ. Comp. *infra* § 11, τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν ἔτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ, καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου κ.τ.λ., and King Lear, v 3. 230. Albany. *Produce their bodies, be they alive or dead. This judgment of the heavens, that makes us tremble, touches us not with pity.* Compare also, I 14. 5, ὁ οἱ ἀκούοντες φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν, and Cic. Tusc. Disp. III 27, quoted by Victorius on that passage.

πρὸς τῷ οἰκείῳ πάθει.] From the primary, *physical*, sense of πρός with the dative ‘at, by, upon’, (βάλλειν πότι γαῖη, Hom. Il. A 245,) and so ‘resting upon’, is immediately derived, by an obvious metaphor, that

γ πάθει. καν οίωνται τινας είναι ἐπιεικῆς· ὁ γὰρ μηδένα οίόμενος πάντας οίησεται ἀξίους είναι κακοῦ. καὶ ὅλως P. 1386.
 διὸ ὅταν ἔχῃ ούτως ὥστ' ἀναμνησθῆναι τοιαῦτα συμ-
 of ‘mentally resting upon, fixed upon, devoted to, busily engaged in (as a
 pursuit)’, or as here, ‘absorbed in’; generally with *εἶναι* but also with other
 verbs signifying a state of rest. The usage is very inadequately illustrated,
 in fact, hardly noticed, in most of the grammars and lexicons that I
 have consulted, with the exception of that of Rost and Palm: I will
 therefore add a few examples that I have noted, though some of these
 are to be found in the lexicon above named. Wytttenbach, on Plut.
 de ser. num. vind. 549 D (Op. VII p. 328), and on Plat. Phaedo 84 C
 (p. 223), has supplied instances chiefly from Plutarch and still later writers,
 to which Heindorf refers in his note on a passage of the Phaedo. Plat.
 Rep. VI 500 B, πρὸς τοῖς οὐσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι (with the mind, i. e. the
 attention fixed upon), Ib. VIII 567 A, πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν (βίῳ i. e. τροφῇ)
 ἀναγκάζονται εἶναι, Ib. IX 585 A, πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ γίγνεσθαι.
 Critias, 109 E, Parmen. 126 C, πρὸς ἴππική τὰ πολλὰ διατρίβει. Phaedo 84 C,
 Phaedr. 249 C, πρὸς ἑκείνους δὲ ἔστι μνήμη, D, πρὸς τῷ θείῳ γιγνόμενος.
 Demosth. de Cor. § 176, ἦν...πρὸς τῷ σκοπεῖν...γένησθε (seriously occupy
 yourselves in the consideration...give your serious attention to it). Id.
 de Fals. Leg. § 139, ὅλος πρὸς τῷ λήματι ἦν. Aesch. c. Timarch. § 74,
 πρὸς τῇ ἀνάγκῃ ταύτη γίγνεσθαι. Ib. adv. Ctes. § 192, πρὸς ἐτέρῳ τωὶ¹
 τὴν γνώμην ἔχειν. Arist. Pol. VIII (v) 8, ter. 1308 δ 36, πρὸς τοῖς ἰδίοις
 σχολάζειν (to have leisure to attend to their private affairs), 1309 α 5, πρὸς
 τοῖς ἰδίοις εἶναι, Ib. line 8, διατρίβειν πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις. Ib. c. II, 1313 δ 20,
 πρὸς τῷ καθ' ἡμέραν ὄντες ἀσχολοῦ ὅστιν ἐπιβούλευειν. Ib. VII (vi) 4,
 1318 δ 13, πρὸς τοῖς ἔργοις διατρίβειν. Similarly in Latin: Cic. de Or.
 I 8.34, *studium in quo estis*. Hor. Sat. I 9. 2, *totus in illis*. Epist. I
 I. II, *omnis in hoc sum*.

§ 7. ‘We pity also any of those that we deem men of worth: for if there be any one who thinks that there are none, such will believe that every one deserves to suffer’.

ὁ γὰρ μηδένα οίόμενος (*εἶναι ἐπιεικῆς*) κ.τ.λ.] Such as Timon ‘of Athens’, ὁ μισάνθρωπος, Vict. and Schrad.; of Timon, see Arist. Av. 1549, Lysistr. 808 seq., Phryn. Com. Μονότροπος, Fr. I., Lucian, Tim. Hemsterh. ad Luc. I p. 99. Plut. vit. Anton. c. 69 ult., 70. Meineke, Hist. Com. Gr. I p. 327. Cic. Tusc. Disp. IV II. 25, (*odium*) *in hominum universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone, qui μισάνθρωπος appellatur*. Id. de Amic. XXIII. 87. Schrader cites also Mamerlus, in Martial. Ep. V 28, which concludes thus; *Hominem malignum forsan esse tunc credas: ego esse miserum credo cui placet nemo.*

‘And indeed in general, (a man is inclined to pity) whosoever he is in such a mood as to call to mind things similar that have happened either to himself or to one of those he loves, or to anticipate the possibility’ (*γενέσθαι without ἄν*) ‘of their happening either to himself or his friends’. On the ellipse in *τῶν αὐτῶν* see the note on the parallel case, II 2. I, ἡ τῶν αὐτῶν.

ἀναμνησθῆναι] Victorius quotes Virgil’s Dido, *haud ignara mali miseris succurrere disco*; and Theseus, Soph. Oed. Col. 562.

βεβηκότα ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἡ ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι
ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

8 ὡς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἐλεοῦσιν, εἴρηται, ἀ δ' ἐλε-
οῦσιν, ἐκ τοῦ ὅρισμοῦ δῆλον· ὅσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυ-
πηρῶν καὶ ὁδυηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἐλεεινά, καὶ

ἐλπίσαι] *ἐλπίς* and *ἐλπίζειν*, like *ὅνειδος*, *συμφορά*, *τοσοῦτος* (which is sometimes used for ‘so little’) and others, are *voices mediae*, i.e. have in themselves a *middle* or indifferent sense, to be determined either way by the context. *εἰ πίσ* is ‘expectation’ or ‘anticipation’, and becomes either hope or fear, according as the expectation is of good or evil. Pind. Nem. I 32 (48), *κοιναὶ γὰρ ἔρχοντ' ἐλπίδες πολυπόνων ἀνθρά-πων* (Dissen ad loc.). Plat. Legg. I 644 C, *δόξα μελλόντων, οὖν κοινὸν μὲν ὄνομα ἐλπίς, ἴδιον δὲ φόβος μὲν ἡ πρὸ λύπης ἐλπίς, θάρρος δὲ ἡ πρὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου* (Stallbaum ad loc.). It occurs in the sense of simple expectation, and of anticipation of evil, two or three times in Sophocles. In the former, Trach. 721, *τὴν ἐλπίδα—τῆς τύχης κρίνειν πάρος*, Aj. 600, *κακάν ἐλπίδ' ἔχων*. In the latter, Oed. R. 771 (quoted by Victorius), *κού μὴ στερηθῆσ' γ', ἐσ τοσοῦτον ἐλπίδων ἔμοι βεβώτος*. Ib. 1432, *ἐλπίδος μ' ἀπέ-σπασας* (the expectation of *evil*). So *spes* and *sperare*. Virg. Aen. IV 419, *hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem* (apud Victorium), Cic. de Or. III 13. 51, *quoniam haec satis spero vobis...molesta et putida videri*. Juv. Sat. IV 57, *iam quartanam sperantibus aegris*: with which Ruperti, in his note on the passage, compares the German, *Ich will nicht hoffen dass dieses geschehe*. Sallust, Cat. 20, *mala res, spes multo asperior*.

ἐλπίσαι γενέσθαι] See note on I 4. 9, Vol. I. p. 65.

§ 8. ‘We have now stated the moods of mind in which men are inclined to pity; what the objects of pity are, is plain to be seen from the definition: that is, of things which cause pain and suffering all are pitiable that are also destructive, and (in fact) everything that is destructive and ruinous; and all evils of which chance is the cause, provided they be of sufficient magnitude’.

On *λυπηρὰ καὶ ὁδυηρά*, Victorius and Schrader are agreed, that *λυπηρός* represents *mental*, and *ὁδυηρός* *bodily*, *pain or suffering*. But it is certain that in ordinary usage either of them can be applied to both. That *λύπη* and *λυπηρός* include bodily pain appears from the regular opposition of *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* expressing pleasure and pain *in general*: equally so in Aristotle’s psychology, where *ἡδονή* and *λύπη* are the necessary accompaniments of sensation *in all animals*; and in Plato’s moral philosophy (*Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, *Philebus*, &c.), where they most unmistakably include all kinds of pleasures and pains. *ὁδύνη* and *ὁδυηρός*, though most frequently perhaps applied to pain of body (as especially in Homer, also in Plato and in Soph. Phil. 827, *ὁδύνη bodily*, opposed to *ἄλγος mental*, *pain*), can also be used to express *mental* suffering, as may be seen by consulting Rost and Palm’s Lexicon. ‘*Οδύνη*, proprie corporis.....transfertur ad animi dolorem (Ellendt, *Lex. Soph.* s. v.). The derivation of *ὁδύνη* from a root *ed* ‘eat’, *ἔδω*, *ἔσθιω edo*, and of *λύπη* from a root *lup* ‘to break’, (*Curtius, Grundz. der Gr. Etym.* I. pp. 218, 240,) throws no light upon

ὅσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὅσων η τύχη αἰτία κακῶν μέ-
9 γεθος ἔχοντων. ἔστι δὲ ὁδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ φθαρτικὰ
θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γῆ-
ιορας καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια, ὥν δὲ η τύχη αἰτία
κακῶν, ἀφίλια, ὀλιγοφιλία (διὸ καὶ τὸ διεσπάσθαι
ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων καὶ συνήθων ἐλεεινόν), αἰσχος, ἀσθέ- p. 73.

the distinction between them: both, according to the natural growth of language, have a physical origin, and are transferred by metaphor to the expression of mental affections. But, read by the light of the explanatory § 8, the difficulty is at once cleared up. Only ὁδυνηρά is repeated, which shews that the difference between this and λυπηρά is—here at all events—one of expression merely and not of conception. This is confirmed by the details of things painful which are enumerated in § 8, all of them evils affecting the body alone. And this is in fact an explanation of the meaning of φαινομένῳ κακῷ in the definition, that being most evident or palpable which is presented immediately to the sense. Comp. note on φαινομένῳ § 1.

Of *dvaipetiká* Victorius says that it is not in itself precisely distinguishable in sense from *φθαρτικά*, but (as I have expressed in the translation) the latter term applies only to some particular cases of λυπηρά and ὁδυνηρά, whilst *ἀναιρετικά* is extended to *all things destructive*.

§ 9. ‘Painful and destructive are, death’ (in its various forms, plur. *sundry kinds of death*) ‘and personal injuries’ (such as wounds or blows inflicted in an *assault*—δίκη αἰκίας is an action of ‘assault and battery’ under the Athenian law) ‘and all bodily suffering or damage’ (of any kind, see *ante* II 7. 3, and note), ‘and old age, and disease, and want of food’.

§ 10. ‘The evils which are due to chance (accident or fortune) are the entire lack, or scarcity, of friends—and therefore also to be severed’ (parted, divorced, torn away, *divelli, distrahi, ab aliquo*, Cicero,) ‘from friends and familiars is pitiable—personal ugliness or deformity, weakness of body, mutilation’ (or any maimed crippled condition of body, which prevents a man from taking an active part in the service of the state, and discharging his duties as a citizen).

The three last of the evils mentioned, *aἰσχος, ἀσθένεια, ἀναπηρία*, occur again, as Victorius notes (without the reference, which is also omitted by Gaisford who quotes him), Eth. N. III 7, 1114 a 22, seq., in a passage (which will serve as a partial commentary on the text of the Rhetoric) in which the distinction is drawn between defects and injuries bodily and mental as *misfortunes*, due to nature or accident, and the same when we have brought them on ourselves by carelessness or vice. Thus *αἰσχρότης* or *αἰσχος* may be due to nature, διὰ φύσιν, or to the neglect of athletic exercises, *ἀγυρίασίαν*, or carelessness in general, *ἀμέλειαν*: in the former case it is the object not of censure but of pity; in the latter it is to be blamed. The same may be said of *ἀσθένεια*, and *πτίρωσις*, the equivalent of *ἀναπηρία* in the Rhetoric; the instance of the mutilation or crippled condition there given is *blindness*; ‘no one would reproach a man blinded either by nature or disease or a blow, but would rather pity him; but if

*νεια, ἀναπηρία. καὶ τὸ ὅθεν προσῆκεν ἀγαθόν τι πρᾶξαι, κακόν τι συμβῆναι. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τοι-
ι οὐτον.* καὶ τὸ πεπονθότος γενέσθαι τι ἀγαθόν, οἶον

the blindness proceeded from drunkenness or any other form of licentiousness every one would condemn it'. We have here the necessary qualification supplied which limits and distinguishes the cases in which ugliness, weakness and mutilation are really pitiable.

'And when an ill result follows from what might naturally have been expected to lead to good', i. e. when in any enterprise or course of action, we have done everything that seemed likely to ensure success, and yet fail (or 'come to grief') in spite of all our endeavours, this again is a misfortune, or piece of *ill-luck*: 'and the frequent repetition of accidents of this kind'.

With *ἀγαθόν τι πρᾶξαι* comp. *χρηστόν τι πράττων*, Arist. Plut. 341. Victorius refers in illustration of this disappointed expectation to Ariadne's complaint in Catullus, Epith. Pel. et Thet. 139, *certe ego te in medio versantem turbine leti eripui*, et seq.

§ 11. 'And the occurrence or accession of some piece of good fortune after a calamity (or disaster which prevents one from enjoying it; as when a man succeeds to an estate in his last illness), as the present from the 'Great King' did not reach Diopeithes till after his death'. This is illustrated by Schrader from Vell. Paterc. II 70, *Deciderat Cassii caput cum evocatus advenit nuncians Brutum esse victorem*.

[*πεπονθότος γενέσθαι*] for *πεπονθότι*, the genitive absolute being substituted for the proper case after the verb. This irregularity occurs more frequently in Aristotle than elsewhere. Comp. Rhet. II 23.7 (this is a doubtful instance), Ib. § 24, *ὑποβεβλημένης τενός...έδόκει*. Ib. § 30, *ἄμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν*. Polit. II 11, 1273 b 7, *βελτιον δέ...ἄλλ' ἀρχόντων γε ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς σχολῆς*. Ib. c. 2, 1261 b 5, *ἀρχόντων ἔτερον ἔτέρας ἄρχουσιν ἀρχάς*. De Anima I 5, 410 b 29, *φοῖσι γάρ την ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὅλου εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων* (for the ordinary *ἀναπνέοντι*). Ib. II 8, 420 b 26, *ἀναγκαῖον εἴσω ἀναπνεομένου εἰσιέναι τὸν δέρα*. Phys. VI 9.7, 240 a 9, *συμβάλειν δὴ τὸ Β εἴναι καὶ τὸ Γ....παρ' ἄλληλα κινούμενων* (for *κινούμενα*). De Gen. Anim. II 2.8, 735 b 34, *ἔξελθότος δὲ ὅταν ἀποπνεύσῃ τὸ θερμόν κ.τ.λ.* In Rhet. I 3.5, *ώς χείρον*, an absolute case, nomin. or accus., is probably an example of the same irregularity. The same usage occurs not unfrequently in Plato, but generally with the addition of *ώς*. See Phaedo 77 E, 94 E, *διανούμενον ώς ἀρμονίας οὖσης*. Rep. I 327 E, *ώς μὴ ἀκονσύμενον οὔτω διανοείσθε*. V 470 E, VII 523 C, *ώς λέγοντός μον διανοῦν*. Cratyl. 439 C. Theaet. 175 B, *γελά οὐ διαμένων λογίζεσθαι*. This is further illustrated by Matth., *Gr. Gr.* § 569.

Somewhat similar is the very common transition from dative to accusative, and especially when the adjective or participle is joined with an infinitive mood as the subject; in which case it may be considered as a kind of attraction: so Sympos. 176 D, *οὕτε αὐτὸς ἔθελήσαιμι ἀν πιεῖν, οὕτε ἄλλω συμβούλεύσαιμι, ἄλλως τε καὶ κραιπαλῶντα ἔτι ἐκ τῆς προτεραιᾶς*; where the participle is attracted back to *πιεῖν*. Ib. 188 D, where *διναμένους* is similarly attracted to *ὅμιλεῖν* from

Διοπείθει τὰ παρὰ βασιλέως τεθνεῶτι κατεπέμφθη.
καὶ τὸ ἡ μηδὲν γεγενῆσθαι ἀγαθόν, ἢ γενομένων μὴ
εἶναι ἀπόλαυσιν.

έφ' οἷς μὲν οὖν ἐλεοῦσι, ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα

the preceding *ἡμῖν*, with which it ought strictly to agree. Instances of a change (without such attraction expressed, but apparently derived from it by analogy,) from dative (or genitive) to accusative may be found in Elmsley's note on Eur. Heracl. 693. Two of these are, Aesch. Choeph. 408, *μοὶ κλύνουσαν*, and Soph. El. 479, *ὑπεστὶ μοὶ θράσος...κλύνουσαν*. Add Plat. Rep. III 414 A, *τιμᾶς δοτέον ζῶντι...λαγχάνοντα*, V 453 D, *ἡμῖν νευστέον καὶ πειρατέον...Δλπίζοντας*. The opposite change occurs in Rhet. I 5. 13, where *μείζον* is substituted for *μείζονα* after *ὑπερέχειν*.

Διοπείθει] This reference to the death of Diopeithes, commander of the Athenian troops who defended the Thracian Chersonese against the incursions of Philip, B.C. 342—341, see Grote, *Hist. of Gr.* [Chap. 90] Vol. XI p. 622 seq., furnishes one additional item of evidence, hitherto I believe unnoticed, as to the date of publication of the Rhetoric. Demoſthenes defended Diopeithes and his conduct against the Philippizing party at Athens in the speeches *περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ* and the third Philippic, both spoken in the last half of 341. Grote, u. s., p. 624. The earliest date assignable to the death of Diopeithes is consequently 340 B.C. This may be added to the passages, which go to fix the date of this work, cited in the Introd. p. 37 seq. Little more is known of Diopeithes: the references to him in Demosthenes are collected by Baiter and Sauppe, *Oratores Attici* III. *Ind. Nom.* p. 40. Most of them occur in the two speeches above mentioned: he is referred to again in the letter attributed to Philip (Orat. 12), and de Cor. § 70, as the author of a certain *ψήφισμα* together with Eubulus and Aristophon. In the Schol. on Demosth. (Baiter and Sauppe, u. s., III p. 72 b 17) *περὶ τῶν ἐν Χερρονήσῳ*, we have the following notice, *οὗτος ὁ Διοπείθης* (there are three others named in the Orators) *πατὴρ ἦν Μενάνδρου τοῦ κωμικοῦ ὁ δὲ Μένανδρος φίλος ἦν Δημοσθένεος, δι' ὃν ὑπέρ Διοπείθους βουλεύεται.* [See however A. Schaefer's *Demosthenes* II 422, where the father of Menander is identified with Diopeithes of Cephisia and not with Diopeithes of Sunium, the general referred to in the text.] Compare also Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici* II 144.

παρὰ βασιλέως] The 'Great King', the king of Persia, as unique amongst sovereigns, and standing alone, far above all the rest who bore the title, appears consequently as *βασιλεύς*, without the definite article. Being thus distinguished from all other kings, his title, like proper names, and some of the great objects of nature where there is only one of the kind, requires no additional distinction, and consequently the article is omitted.—The reigning king of Persia was at this time Ochus, who took the name of Artaxerxes (Artax. III.). Diodorus apud Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, p. 315: on Ochus, ib. p. 316.

'And (it is pitiable) either never to have attained to any good at all (i. e. desired good or success) or after having attained to lose the enjoyment of it.'

12 ἐστίν· ἐλεοῦσι δὲ τούς τε γνωρίμους, ἐὰν μὴ σφόδρα ἐγγὺς ὥστιν οἰκειότητι· περὶ δὲ τούτους ὥσπερ περὶ αὐτοὺς μέλλοντας ἔχουσιν. διὸ καὶ Ἀμασίς ἐπὶ μὲν τῷ νιεῖ ἀγομένῳ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν οὐκ ἐδάκρυσεν, ὡς φασίν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῷ φίλῳ προσαιτοῦντι· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐλεεινόν, ἐκεῖνο δὲ δεινόν· τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν ἔτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου καὶ πολλάκις τῷ

§ 12. ‘These and the like are the things (the ills or sufferings) that we pity: the objects of pity (persons) are our friends and acquaintance—provided they are not very closely connected with us; for in regard of the latter we are in the same state of mind’ (have the same feelings, i. e. in this case the feeling of anxiety and alarm) ‘as we are about ourselves when threatened with (the like disaster)’, *μέλλοντας (ταῦτα πείσεσθαι)*. ‘And for this reason it was that Amasis, as is reported, wept, not at the sight of his son led away to death, but of his friend begging: for this is a spectacle of pity, that of terror: for the terrible is distinct from the pitiable, nay, it is exclusive of pity, and often serviceable for the excitement of the opposite feeling’.

The king of Egypt, here by an oversight called Amasis, was in reality Psammenitus, his successor on the throne. The horrible story of Cambyses' ferocious cruelty here alluded to is told by Herodotus III 14, with his accustomed naïveté, as if there was nothing in it at all extraordinary or unusual. It will be sufficient to quote in the way of illustration Psammenitus' answer to Cambyses' inquiry, why he acted as Aristotle describes, which will likewise serve as a commentary on *οἰκειότητι* in our text. ὁ πᾶι Κύρου, τὰ μὲν οἰκήια ἦν μέζω κακὰ ἢ ὅστε ἀνακλαίειν, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ἑταίρου πένθος ἄξιον ἦν δακρύων ὃς ἐκ πολλῶν καὶ εὐδαμόνων ἐκπεσὼν εἰ πτωχῆτην ἀπίκται ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδὲ. τὰ οἰκήια are, his son's death, and his daughter's humiliation. As to the substitution of Amasis for Psammenitus, Victorius and Buhle think it may be explained either by a slip of memory on Aristotle's part, or by a variation in the story in the account given by other authorities. I have no doubt myself that the true explanation is the former. We have already seen that our author is very liable to misquotation, as I believe to be the case with all or most of those who, having a wide range of reading and an unusually retentive memory, are accustomed to rely too confidently upon the latter faculty. The vague *ὡς φασίν* confirms this view. If Aristotle had remembered as he set down his example that he had it from Herodotus, it seems to me quite certain that he would have mentioned his name.

ἐκκρουστικόν] prop. ‘expulsive’, inclined to strike or drive out (having that *nature* or *tendency*), the metaphor being taken, according to Victorius, from two nails, one of which being driven in after the other forces it out, or expels it. He quotes Eth. Nic. III 15, sub fin., (*αι ἐπιθυμίαι*) ἀν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ὁσιν, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. Plut. p. 1088 A, non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum c. 3, (*πόνος*) ὑπ' ἄλλων πόνων, ὥσπερ ἥλων σφοδροτέρων, ἐκκρούμενος ἀπαλλάττεται, and

13 ἐναντίω χρήσιμον. ἔτι ἐλεοῦσιν ἐγγὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ δεινοῦ ὄντος. καὶ τοὺς ὄμοιούς ἐλεοῦσι κατὰ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἥθη, κατὰ ἔξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη· ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τούτοις μᾶλλον φαίνεται καὶ αὐτῷ ἀνύπάρξαι· ὅλως γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι, ὅτα

Cic. Tusc. Disp. IV 35. 75, *etiam novo quidem amore veterem amorem, tanquam clavo clavum, eiciendum putant.* ἥλον ἥλῳ ἐκκρούειν is a proverb, occurring three times in Lucian, de merc. cond. c. 9, Vol. I. p. 716, ed. Hemst., pro lapsu inter salut. c. 7, I 733, Philopseudes, c. 24, III 39. ἥλῳ, φασίν, ἐκκρούεις τὸν ἥλον.—ἐναντίο] sc. πάθει.

χρήσιμον] seems to refer to the rhetorical *use* of the topic, rather than to the promotion of the feeling itself, to which the word is less appropriate. On the mutual exclusiveness of terror and pity compare I 14. 5 (note), and § 5 of this chapter. The pity and terror therefore, which it is the object of tragedy to excite and purify, Poet. VI 2, can never be simultaneous.

I will just observe here in passing that these two emotions are appealed to in that branch of Rhetoric which was collectively called *affectus* and divided into *indignatio* and *miseratio*, technically *δεῖνωσις* and *ἔλεος*; *δεῖνωσις* is otherwise called *σχετλιασμός* (Rhet. II 21. 10). Though they might be scattered over the whole speech, the proper place for them is the conclusion, the *ἐπίλογος* or *peroratio*, because the impression is then most vivid and intense, and is ‘left behind’, like the bee’s sting, in the minds of the audience, τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις (Eupolis, of Pericles).

The importance of these to the rhetorician may be estimated by the fact that Thrasymachus, one of the most celebrated of the early writers on Rhetoric, gave his work the title of *ἔλεοι* (Cicero, *miserationes*) referred to by Aristotle, Rhet. III 1. 7, and ridiculed by Plato, Phaedr. 267 C. The *ἔλεοι* certainly ‘had a wider scope than their name would indicate’ (Thompson’s note ad loc.), for Aristotle expressly mentions in the passage quoted that they included remarks upon language and style. See further on this subject, Introd. p. 367, and 368 note 3.

§ 13. ‘Further’ (returning to the last term of the definition, *καὶ τοῦτο ὅτα πλήγου φαίνεται*) ‘men are pitied when danger or suffering is impending and close at hand’. (*δεινόν* is any object of *δέος* or dread; derived from *δέος* as *ἔλεεινός* from *ἔλεος*, *κλεινός* from *κλέος*.) ‘We pity also those who are like us, in age, or character, or habits of mind (moods, states of mind, moral and intellectual, virtuous and vicious), in reputation (of various kinds, expressed by the plural), or in blood (race and family): for in all these cases there seems to be a greater likelihood of the same misfortune occurring to oneself as well as the others (*καὶ αὐτῷ*): for here again’ (*ἐνταῦθα, καὶ* as well as in the case of fear, referring to II 5. 12, “the same things that we dread for ourselves, we pity in others”) ‘in a general way we must suppose’ (*λαβεῖν* ‘to take up, receive’, an opinion; to assume or believe; or perhaps ‘to gather’ as the result of observation, and so form an opinion of conclusion) ‘that all things

ἔφ' αὐτῶν φοβοῦνται, ταῦτα ἐπ' ἄλλων γιγνόμενα
 14 ἐλεοῦσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔγγὺς φαινόμενα τὰ πάθη ἐλεεινά
 ἔστι, τὰ δὲ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γενόμενα ἢ ἐσόμενα οὐτ'
 ἐλπίζοντες οὔτε μεμνημένοι ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἐλεοῦσιν ἢ
 οὐχ ὁμοίως, ἀνάγκη τοὺς συναπεργαζόμενους σχήμασι
 καὶ φωναῖς καὶ ἐσθῆσι καὶ ὅλως τῇ ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινο-
 τέρους εἶναι· ἔγγὺς γὰρ ποιοῦσι φαίνεσθαι τὸ κακὸν
 πρὸ ὄμμάτων ποιοῦντες, ἢ ὡς μέλλον ἢ ὡς γεγονός.

that we dread in our own case, the same we pity when they happen to others'.

§ 14. ‘And seeing that all calamities and sufferings are (especially) objects of pity when they appear close at hand, and yet things that either have happened ten thousand years ago, or will happen ten thousand years hence, neither in expectation or recollection do we ever pity equally, if at all, (ὅμοίως, as we do things close at hand, whether past or to come,) it necessarily follows from this (that pity is heightened when the object is brought near us) that those (orators) who aid the effect of their descriptions (*lit. join with the other arts of Rhetoric in producing ἔλεος*) by attitude (gestures, action in general), by the voice, and dress, and the art of acting in general, are more pitiable (i.e. more successful in exciting pity): because, by setting the mischief before our very eyes (by their graphic representation of it) they make it appear close to us whether as future or past’.

πρὸ ὄμμάτων] which is almost technical in Rhetoric, is again used to denote a vivid, graphic, striking representation, III 2. 13, Ib. 10. 6, and in III II. 1, seq. is explained and illustrated. Comp. Poet. c. XVII 1, δεῖ δὲ τὸν μύθον συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξῃ συναπεργάζεσθαι (aid the effect by the language) ὅτι μάλιστα πρὸ ὄμμάτων τιθέμενον οὖτω γὰρ ἀν ἐναργέστατα ὄρῶν, ὥσπερ παρ' αὐτοῖς γιγνομένοις τοῖς πραττομένοις, εὑρίσκει τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἡκιστ' ἀν λανθάνοντο τὰ ὑπεναντία. Ib. § 3 we have the same phrase that occurs here, τοῖς σχήμασι συναπεργαζόμενον. Compare also Poet. XIV 1, τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὄψεως γίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ., de Anima III 3, 427 b 18, πρὸ ὄμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες¹. Cicero expresses this

¹ Referring to mental pictures, in aid of the memory as a kind of *memoria technica*, such as that of a large house-front with various windows, or the plan of a building, or any other divisions, occurring in a regular order, in which the topics of a speech or argument may be lodged as it were; the plan of this is retained in the mind, and will suggest the topics in their proper order. These ‘mnemonic’ artifices—τὰ μνημονικά, “mnemonics”—are described in Auct. ad Heren. III. xvi. 29, seq. Such aids to the memory are of two kinds, *loci* and *imagines*; the former are ‘the places’, or compartments, the sequence of which suggests the order or arrangement of the *imagines*, which are the “forms, marks, images, of the particular things which we wish to remember, such as horse, lion, eagle, &c.” The same subject is treated by Cicero, de Orat. II 86. 351—360, from whom the author of the other treatise has manifestly borrowed. The invention of this

15 καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἡ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεει- P. 1386 b.
 16 νότερα διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ τὰ σημεῖα καὶ τὰς πράξεις,
 οἵον ἐσθῆτάς τε τῶν πεπονθότων καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα,
 καὶ λόγους καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἐν τῷ πάθει ὄντων,
 οἵον ἥδη τελευτώντων. καὶ μάλιστα τὸ σπουδαίους
 εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς ὄντας ἐλεεινόν· ἀπαντά

by the equivalent phrase, *subicere oculis*, *Orat. XL* 139. *Auct. ad Heren. IV* 47.60, *ante oculos ponere (de similitudine)*; *hoc simile...sub aspectum omnium rem subiecit*. *Quint. VIII* 6. 19, *translatio...signandis rebus ac sub oculos subiciendis reperta est*. *Ern. Lex. Techn. Gr. s.v. ὅμηρος*.

§ 15. ‘And things that have happened recently, or are about to happen speedily, excite more pity for the same reason’; i. e. because the recent occurrence or immediate anticipation makes almost the same impression upon us as if the suffering or disaster were actually present, and enacted as it were before our eyes.

§ 16. ‘And all signs (of any tragic event), and acts (of the sufferer, represented in narrative or description), (the exhibition) for example (of) the dress of the sufferer and everything else of the same kind, or his (last) words, or anything else connected with those who are in the very act of suffering, for instance such as are actually dying’ (*in articulo mortis*). It is hardly necessary to mention the use that is made by Mark Antony of this ‘sign’ in exciting the people after the murder of Caesar by the exhibition of his ‘mantle’,—“you all do know this mantle”—pierced by the dagger of his assassins, in Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar*, III 2. 174, since it must be fresh in every one’s recollection. The incident and accompanying circumstances and the effect of Antonius’ speech are related by Plut., Vit. Anton. c. 14, from whom Shakespeare may have derived it; and referred to by Quint., VI 1. 31. Suetonius, Jul. Caes. c. 84, gives a very different account of what passed on this occasion. See also Appian, Bell. Civ. II 146 (Schrader). Another example occurs in Aesch. Choeph. 980, where Orestes after the death of Clytemnestra holds up to the spectators the bathing robe in which his father was murdered, *ἴδεσθε...τὸ μηχάνημα, δεσμὸν ἀθλίῳ πατρὶ κ.τ.λ.* 982, *ἐκτείνατ’ αὐτὸν*, which is also referred by Hermann to the display of the robe.

‘And most pitiable of all is the case when men have borne themselves bravely (worthily), at such critical moments, because all these things intensify our commiseration (in three ways), by the appearance they have of being close upon us, and by the suggestion (or impression, *ώσις*) of *unmerited* suffering and by the vivid representation of it (as though it took place before our eyes)’. The gender and construction of *ἀναξίους*

ars memoriae is there attributed to Simonides, §§ 351—353. The theory of the art and practice is, that as of all mental impressions those derived from the senses, of which the sight is the keenest and most powerful, are the most distinct, vivid and intense; *quare facillime animo teneri posse ea quae perciperentur auribus aut cogitatione, si etiam oculorum commendatione animis traderentur.*

γὰρ ταῦτα διὰ τὸ ἔγγυς φαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔλεον, καὶ ὡς ἀναξίου ὄντος καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινομένου τοῦ πάθους.

I ἀντίκειται δὲ τῷ ἐλεεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ὁ καλοῦσι<sup>P. 74.
CHAP. IX.</sup>

are both uncertain ; it may be either masc. or neut. ; and may be made to agree either with *πάθους* if neut., or, as I rather think, used as masc. and construed thus ; καὶ ὡς τοῦ πάθους ὄντος ἀναξίου ('being that of one who did not deserve it') ; whose sufferings were unmerited because he was *σπονδαῖος*) καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινομένου : and so I have rendered it. Or again, if *ἀναξίου* be considered as neut., it may be interpreted with *τοῦ πάθους ὄντος*, 'unworthy' of the sufferer, in the sense of undeserved by him—though this is rather a non-natural explanation of the word. Or thirdly, a comma may be placed after *ὄντος*, and *ἀναξίου* will then be masculine with *τοῦ παθόντος* understood.

CHAP. IX.

The subject of the following chapter, *νέμεσις*, is briefly noticed by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. II 7 sub fin., together with *αἰδώς*, as a *πάθος*, an instinctive emotion, which approaches nearly to a virtue, and may therefore be included in a list of virtues. The detailed description of it, which ought to have followed that of *αἰδώς* in IV 15, is lost, together probably with some concluding observations leading up to the separate discussion of justice in Bk. V., and justifying its connexion with the other virtues and conformity to the law of the 'mean', which is barely mentioned in the fifth book as it stands at present. *νέμεσις* is defined in Eth. N. II 7, as here, ὁ *νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὐ πράττοντιν*, and is placed in the scheme as a mean, or virtuous state of feeling, between *φθόνος* the excess, and *ἐπιχαιρεκαίᾳ* the defect, of indignation. Of this we shall have to speak further in the explanation of §§ 2—5, which reads like a criticism and retraction of the misstatement of the Ethics, and very much strengthens the evidence of the later composition, as well as publication, of the Rhetoric. See Introd. p. 48. A definition of *νέμεσις* and *φθόνος* is found likewise in Top. B 2, 109 b 36, *φθόνος ἐστὶ λύπη ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ εὐπραγίᾳ τῶν ἐπιεικῶν τινός*, and again, p. 110 a 1, *φθονερὸς ὁ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ἀγαθῶν εὐπραγίαις, νεμεσητικὸς δὲ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν κακῶν εὐπραγίαις*. Fuller and better than all these is that of Eudemus, Eth. Eud. III 7. 2, ὁ *νεμεσητικός*, καὶ ὁ *ἐκάλονν οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τὴν νέμεσιν, τὸ λυπεῖσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς παρὰ τὴν δξίαν κακοπραγίαις καὶ εὐπραγίαις, χαίρειν δὲ ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀξίαις* διὸ καὶ θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ *νεμεσῆν*. Comp. § 2 of this chapter, διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ *νεμεσῆν*.

Of the earlier notion of *νέμεσις*, alluded to in the foregoing passage, viz. that of divine vengeance or retribution, or the power that exercises it, a good description is found in a fragment of Euripides, Fr. Inc. 181 (Dind.), ὅταν δὲ ἴδης πρὸς ὑψος ἡρμένον τινά, λαμπρῷ τε πλούτῳ καὶ γένει γαυρούμενον, ὀφρύν τε μείζω τῆς τύχης ἐπηρκότα τούτον ταχεῖαν νέμεσιν εὐθὺς προσδόκα· ἐπαίρεται γὰρ μεῖζον ἵνα μεῖζον πέσῃ [tolluntur in altum, ut lapsu graviore ruant. Claudio, in Rufinum, I 22.]

This doctrine of the *ἀρχαῖοι* is well illustrated by two stories in Herodotus, that of the interview between Solon and Croesus, I 29—33, and

νεμεσᾶν· τῷ γὰρ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις κακο-

what followed it c. 34, μετὰ δὲ Σόλωνα οἰχόμενον, ἔλαβε ἐκ θεοῦ νέμεσις μεγάλη Κροῖσον ὡς εἰκάσαι, ὅτι ἐνόμιζε ἑωντὸν εἶναι ἀνθράπων ἀπάντων ὀλβιώτατον: and the story of Polycrates, III 39—43. On these two stories see the remarks in Grote's *Hist. of Gr.* IV 263, and 325 [Chap. XI and XXXIII].

Compare also Hom. Od. XIV 283, Διὸς δ' ὥπίσετο μῆνιν ξενίου, δοτε μᾶλιστα νεμεσᾶται κακὰ ἔργα. Herodotus says in another place, VII 10, οὐ γὰρ ἐξ φρονείν ἄλλον μέγα ὁ Θεὸς ή ἑωντόν. Aeschylus (Fr. Inc. 281, Dind.) has presented νέμεσις in its human aspect as the natural indignation which is felt at undeserved good fortune, κακοὶ γὰρ εὐ πράσσοντες οὐκ ἀγαπήσετοι. Fr. Inc. 243, line 3, ήμῶν γε μέντοι Νέμεσις ἔσθ' ὑπερτέρα, καὶ τοῦ θανόντος η δίκη πράσσει κότον.

According to Aristotle's definition of νέμεσις 'a feeling of pain at undeserved good fortune', it represents the 'righteous indignation', arising from a sense of the claims of justice and desert, which is aroused in us by the contemplation of success without merit, and a consequent pleasure in the punishment of one who is thus undeservedly prosperous. It is no selfish feeling, § 3; if it had any reference to oneself and one's own interests it would be *fear* of evil consequences arising to us from the other's prosperity, and not *indignation*. It implies also its opposite, the feeling of pleasure at deserved success or prosperity. In this narrow sense it is treated in the present chapter. It is in fact one form in which 'moral disapprobation', founded upon the distinction of right and wrong, shews itself in our nature. Aristotle, in classing it with the πάθη, makes it *instinctive*; not therefore a virtue, nor necessarily requiring moral cultivation. Of moral approbation and disapprobation see the account given by Butler, at the commencement of his *Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue*. He also seems to regard these two as natural instincts, when he says of them, "we naturally and unavoidably approve of some actions under the peculiar view of their being virtuous and of good desert; and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert." See also Serm. VIII. 'On deliberate anger or resentment.' Prof. Bain, *Emotions and Will*, p. 321, [Chap. XV § 22, ed. 1875], in treating of 'moral disapprobation', expresses himself thus; "the feeling that rises up towards that person (a guilty agent) is a strong feeling of displeasure or dislike, proportioned to the strength of our regard to the violated duty. There arises a moral resentment, or a disposition to inflict punishment upon the offender," &c. But such an instinctive sense of right and wrong has a much wider scope and sphere of action than Aristotle's νέμεσις, which is confined to one particular class of cases upon which this moral instinct or faculty operates.

§ 1. 'The nearest opposite to pity is what is called righteous indignation; for to the feeling of pain at undeserved misfortunes is opposed in some sort (or sense), and proceeding from the same temperament, the feeling of pain at undeserved good fortune'.

μᾶλιστα μέν] seems to have for its correlative δόξεις δέ, § 3, and the sense is this:—Pity is *most* opposite to righteous indignation¹, though

¹ I find, on looking through a very long note of Victorius, after writing the above, that he has so far anticipated me in this observation.

*πραγίαis ἀντικείμενόν ἔστι τρόπον τινὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἥθους τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναξίαις εὐπράγίαις. καὶ ἀμφω τὰ πάθη ἥθους χρηστοῦ· δεῖ γὰρ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἀναξίως πράττονσι κακῶς συνάχθεσθαι καὶ ἐλεεῖν, τοῖς δὲ εὖ νεμεσᾶν· ἄδικον γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γιγνόμενον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀποδίδομεν τὸ νεμεσᾶν. δόξειε δὲ ἀν καὶ ὁ φθόνος τῷ ἐλεεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι τρόπον ὡς σύνεγγυς ὥν καὶ ταῦτὸν envy seems to be as much so, but is not. I have therefore substituted a period after τὸ νεμεσᾶν for the comma of [Bekker's *Oxford* edition of 1837. The punctuation given in the text is also found in Bekker's *Berlin* editions and in Spengel's].*

§ 2. ‘And both of these feelings are indicative of good character (i.e. of a good disposition of mind shewing itself outwardly in the character): for it is our duty to sympathise with unmerited misfortune and pity it, and to feel indignant at unmerited prosperity: because all that happens to a man’ (*τὸ γιγνόμενον*, Victorius, ‘*quod fit*’, ‘all that is done’; meaning I suppose ‘whenever the rule of justice is violated’, in any case, generally. But I think ‘happens’, which includes the injustices of nature and fortune, as well as those of man, is more to the purpose here) ‘not in conformity with his deserts is unjust, and this is why we ascribe (or assign, render as a due; see note on I 1.7) righteous indignation to the gods as well as to men (*καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς*)’.

παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν] i.e. in violation of the principles of distributive justice. *ἀξία* is the ‘value’ of anything, by which its worth or merits or deserts are measured. It is the principle and basis of distributive justice, and should determine the assignment of power and property in the state. It does in fact regulate the distribution of them; only the standard of a citizen’s value, his *ἀξία*, varies with the constitution under which he lives; for in a democracy the principle of distribution is founded upon liberty, in an oligarchy upon wealth or birth, in an aristocracy upon virtue. See the passage of Eth. N. v 6, 1131 a 24 seq. from which I have been quoting. Quarrels and factions and complaints always arise out of the undue apportionment of civil rights and power in the state, *ὅταν ἡ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἡ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ νέμωνται*. But the true standard by which the share of the individual citizen should be measured is virtue or merit and the power of doing the state service, Pol. III 9 ult. Justice in this sense is a proportion. *Ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ’ ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὅμολογονσι πάντες κατ’ ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγοντο πάντες ὑπάρχειν*. Compare Ib. VIII 12 on the three forms of constitution, 1160 b 13, the change from aristocracy to oligarchy is due *κακίᾳ τῶν ἀρχόντων*, οἱ νέμοντοι τὰ τῆς πόλεως παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν; and in family life *κατ’ ἀξίαν ὁ ἀνήρ ἀρχεῖ, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ᾧ δεῖ τὸν ἄνδρα*. If he encroaches on his wife’s rights his government becomes an oligarchy, *παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν γὰρ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἀμείνων*. On the same subject of political justice see Pol. III 9, from the beginning.

§ 3. ‘But it may be thought that envy as well (as *νέμεσις*, καὶ) is

τῷ νεμεσᾶν, ἔστι δ' ἔτερον λύπη μὲν γὰρ ταραχώδης καὶ ὁ φθόνος ἔστι καὶ εἰς εὐπραγίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ἀναξίου ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἵσου καὶ ὅμοίου. τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβήσεται ἔτερον, ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, απασιν ὅμοίως δεῖ ύπάρχειν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ μὲν νέμεσις τὸ δὲ φθόνος, ἀλλὰ φόβος, ἐὰν διὰ τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ύπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ ταραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φαῦλον ἀπὸ τῆς ἑκείνου εὐπραξίας. φανερὸν δ' ὅτι ἀκολουθήσει καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πάθη τούτοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λυπούμενος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως κακοπραγοῦσιν ἡσθίσεται ἥ

4

opposed in the same way to pity, on the ground that it is very closely connected, or indeed identical, with righteous indignation, though it is in fact different; for though it be true that envy is also (*καὶ* as before) a pain causing perturbation of mind and directed against good fortune, yet the good fortune is not that of the undeserving, but that of an equal and one like himself'. Compare with this Poet. XIII 1453 a 4, of pity and fear, ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον ἔστι δυστυχῶντα, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον. With ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἵσου καὶ ὅμοιον comp. c. 10 § 1, φθόνος, λύπη περὶ τοὺς ὅμοιους.

'The absence of all selfish, interested motive, distinct from (independent of) the feelings themselves, (and their *direct* objects, supply *τῶν παθῶν*,) these emotions, on the contrary (ἀλλὰ), being entirely on our neighbour's account, must be common to them all (common to all *men* who have the feeling); for they are *now* no longer the one righteous indignation and the other envy, but (both of them) fear—on the supposition namely that the pain and perturbation are due to the expectation that some evil consequence to ourselves will follow from the other's good fortune.'

τὸ μὴ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] The grammar of this sentence is to be explained by regarding all the words *ὅτι αὐτῷ—τὸν πλήσιον* as one collective abstract notion, which would be commonly expressed by a verb in the infinitive mood, and therefore neut., *τό*; this notion being negated by *μή* 'the non-existence, want, absence of it'. The usage is by no means uncommon, but occurs generally in much shorter phrases, from which this differs only in the number of words included. Matth., *Gr. Gr.* § 272 c, and Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 457. 1, 2, 3, will supply sufficient examples. Aristotle's formula descriptive of the *λόγος* or *εἶδος* 'the formal cause', *τὸ τι ἦν εἴναι*, 'the—what it was (designed) to be', is a good illustration.

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι] On *ἔτι* in a negative=ἢδη in an affirmative sentence, see note on *ἢδη*, I 1. 7.

§ 4. 'Plainly too these will be accompanied by the opposite feelings also (in addition, *καὶ*); for one who feels pain at unmerited ill fortune, will feel either pleasure or no pain at the misfortunes of those who *do* deserve them (*ἐναρτίως=δέξιως*); for example, no man of worth would feel pain at the punishment of parricides or murderers, when it befalls them, for at the sufferings of such we should rejoice, as in like manner

ἀλυπος ἔσται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίως κακοπραγοῦσιν· οἶν
 τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαιφόνους, ὅταν τύχωσι τιμω-
 ρίας, οὐδεὶς ἀν λυπηθείη χρηστός· δεῖ γὰρ χαίρειν ἐπὶ⁵
 τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὡς δὲ αὐτῶς καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς εὖ πράττουσι
 κατ' ἀξίαν ἄμφω γὰρ δίκαια, καὶ ποιεῖ χαίρειν τὸν
 ἐπιεικῆ· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐλπίζειν ὑπάρξαι ἀν, ἀπέρ τῷ
 ὄμοιώ, καὶ αὐτῷ. καὶ ἔστι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ήθους ἀπαντα
 ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ ἐναντία τοῦ ἐναντίου· ὁ γὰρ αὐτός

at the prosperity of such as deserve it: for both (the sufferings of the one and the prosperity of the other) are agreeable to justice and give joy to the good man' (*ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπανοῦμεν...καὶ...μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, Eth. Nic. v. 14, 1137 b 1), 'because (being a good man himself) he must needs hope that what has fallen to the lot of his like, may fall also to his own'.

τοὺς πατραλοίας καὶ μιαιφόνους λυπηθείη] Vater explains the accus. after the passive verb by supposing a change of construction, Ar. having intended to write, *οὐδεὶς ἀν ἐλεγήσει* (sic) *χρηστός*. This is quite unnecessary. The accus. after passive and neuter verbs, indicative of the local seat of any affection, an extension of the cognate accus., is common enough fully to justify the construction of the text. At the same time there is a difference between such an expression as this, and the ordinary case of the local accus., such as *ἀλγεῖν τὴν κεφαλήν*. The accus. *κεφαλήν* directly and properly expresses the seat of the affection as in the subject who himself feels the pain: and this is the ordinary case. But in our text the seat of the pain¹ is transferred from subject to object, the feeling migrating, as it were, and taking up its temporary residence in the parricides and murderers who are the *objects* of it. But whatever the true explanation may be, there are at all events several precisely parallel instances—some of which may be found in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 414, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 549 c—quite sufficient to defend this particular use of the accus. Comp. for instance Soph. Aj. 136, *σὲ μὲν εὖ πράσσοντ' ἐπιχαίρω*. Eur. Hippol. 1355, *τοὺς γὰρ εὐτεβεῖς θεοὶ θνήσκοντας οὐ χαίροντας*, where the dying are just as much the objects of the joy (or the absence of it) as the murderers are of the pain in the passage before us. Similarly *αἰσχύνεσθαι*, (frequent in the Rhet. and elsewhere,) as in Eur. Ion 1074, where *αἰσχύνομαι τὸν πολύνυμον θεόν*, is to feel awe *in the presence of* the god; who is the object of this feeling of shame, just as the murderers are of the painful feeling. Victorius thinks that the prepos. *διά* is *understood*, 'as it often is in the Attic writers, such as Thucydides, Lysias, Aristophanes'! He contents himself however with the general assertion, and quotes no example.

§ 5. 'And all these (*ταῦτα* is explained by *ὁ γάρ*, 'nämlich', κ.τ.λ.) belong to the same kind of character (or disposition), and their opposites

¹ It is in fact not the pain, but the absence of it, that is here in question: but as this would make nonsense of the illustration, nonentities having no local habitation, I must be allowed to substitute the positive for the negative conception.

ἐστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός· ἐφ' ὃ γάρ τις P. 1387.
λυπεῖται γιγνομένῳ καὶ ὑπάρχοντι, ἀναγκαῖον τοῦτο
ἐπὶ τῇ στερήσει καὶ τῇ φθορᾷ τῇ τούτου χαίρειν.
διὸ κωλυτικὰ μὲν ἐλέου πάντα ταῦτα ἔστι, διαφέρει

to the opposite temper; that is to say, it is the same sort of man that takes a malicious pleasure in mischief and that is given to envy; for whenever the acquisition or possession of anything (by another) is painful to a man (envy), he must needs feel pleasure at the privation or destruction of the same (*ἐπιχαιρεκακία*)¹.

στέρησις, Categ. 10, is one of the four kinds of opposites, relative opposites, contraries (as black and white), state and privation (*ἔξις, στέρησις*), affirmation and negation. *στέρησις* is defined ib. 12 a 26 seq. It is the absence or want of a state which is *natural* and usual to that in which the state resides, as sight to the eye: *τυφλὸν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν οὐτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν*. A man's blindness is a *στέρησις*, because with him sight is natural: the term is not applicable to animals born without eyes, *ἐκ γένετης οὐκ ὄψιν ἔχοντα*: these cannot properly be said to be deprived of sight, which they never had. *στέρησις* therefore in the present passage implies a loss of some good which had been previously gained or possessed, and is distinguished from *φθορᾷ*, as privation or loss from ruin or destruction. Victorius understands *φθορᾷ* of destruction, decay, as opposed to *γενέσει* which is implied in *γιγνομένῳ*; a man may be deprived of or lose a *possession*, that which grows may decay and come to nothing, 'Interitus manifesto generationi alicuius rei contrarius est.' I cannot think this interpretation as appropriate as the other: *γίγνεσθαι*, to come to the possession of something, to gain or acquire it, is properly opposed to *ὑπάρχειν*, to have it already in possession, long-standing and settled.

'And therefore all these feelings (*νέμεσις, φθόνος, ἐπιχαιρεκακία*) are obstructive of pity, but different (in other respects) for the reasons already stated; so that they are all alike serviceable for making things appear not pitiable'.

The introduction of these episodical remarks, §§ 3—5, upon the connexion and distinctions of the three *πάθη* above mentioned, otherwise not easy to explain, may possibly be accounted for, as I have already suggested, by referring them to the statements of Eth. Nic. II 7, 1108 b 4, which Ar. now sees must be retracted. There they are reduced to the law of the mean by making *νέμεσις* the mean state of the pleasure and pain felt at our neighbour's good or ill fortune; of which *φθόνος* is the excess, the pain being felt at all good fortune deserved or undeserved, and *ἐπιχαιρεκακία* the defect 'because the feeling falls so short of pain that it is actually pleasure'. The words of § 5, *καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ήθου...ό γὰρ αὐτὸς ἔστιν ἐπιχαιρέκακος καὶ φθονερός, κ.τ.λ.* are, whether they are intended for it or not, a correction of the blunder made in the Ethics. It is plain enough, as we are here told in the Rhetoric, that the two *πάθη* in question are but two different phases of the same *ἥθος* or mental disposition: the same man who feels pain at his neighbour's good fortune

δὲ διὰ τὰς εἰρημένας αἰτίας· ὥστε πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἐλεεινὰ ποιεῖν ἄπαντα ὁμοίως χρήσιμα.

6 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ τοῦ νεμεσᾶν λέγωμεν, τίσι τε νεμεσῶσι καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες αὐτοί, εἴτα 7 μετὰ ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν p. 75. εἰρημένων εἰ γάρ ἐστι τὸ νεμεσᾶν λυπεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῷ φαινομένῳ ἀναξίῳ εὐπραγεῖν, πρῶτον μὲν δῆλον ὅτι 8 οὐχ οἶόν τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς νεμεσᾶν οὐ γάρ

will feel pleasure at his misfortunes, and the two cannot be opposed as extremes. Again, the description of *ἐπιχαρεκαλί* as a defect of *νέμεσις* and opposite of *φθόνος* cannot be sustained: the objects of the two feelings are different: *envy* is directed against the *good fortune* of another, the *malicious pleasure* of the other is excited by his *ill fortune*. See also Grant's note on the above passage of the Ethics.

After this digression we return to the analysis of *νέμεσις*.

§ 6. ‘Let us begin then with an account of righteous indignation, who, that is, are the objects of it, the occasions that give rise to it, and the states of mind of the subjects of it, and then pass on to the rest (of the *πάθη*, to what remains to be said of them)’.

§ 7. ‘The first of these is plain from what has been already said, for if righteous indignation is (as it has been defined) a feeling of pain which is roused against any one who appears to enjoy unmerited prosperity, it is clear first of all that this indignation cannot possibly be applied (directed) to every kind of good’; (virtue for example and the virtues are exceptions.)

§ 8. ‘For no one is likely to feel indignant with one who becomes just, or brave, or acquires any virtue in general’, (that is, one who by exercise and cultivation attains to any special virtue, or to a virtuous character in general)—‘nor indeed is compassion’ (the plur. *ἔλεος* indicates the various acts, states, moments of the feeling) ‘bestowed upon (applied to) the opposites of these’ (vices, namely, which ought to be the case, if the others were true)—‘but to wealth and power and such like, all such things, namely, to speak in general terms (without mentioning possible exceptions, *ἀπλῶς* opposed to *καθ' ἔκαστον*), as the good (alone) deserve’.

So far the meaning is clear; the good as a general rule are entitled to the enjoyment of wealth and power and the like, and when they do acquire them we feel no indignation because we know they deserve them; it is upon the undeserving that our indignation is bestowed. But as the text stands, and as far as I can see there is no other way of understanding it, there is another class of persons, viz. those who are endowed with natural or personal advantages, such as birth or beauty, which, being independent of themselves and mere gifts of nature, cannot be objects of moral indignation, though they may be of envy, who are coupled with the morally good as deserving

εἰ δίκαιος ἢ ἀνδρεῖος, οὐδὲ εἰ ἀρετὴν λήψεται, νεμεσῆσει τούτῳ (οὐδὲ γάρ οἱ ἔλεοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τούτων εἰσίν), ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ πλούτῳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὅσων ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἄξιοι εἰσιν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ οἱ τὰ φύσει ἔχοντες ἀγαθά, οἷον εὐγένειαν καὶ κάλλος καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἐγγύς τι φαίνεται τοῦ φύσει, ἀνάγκη τοῖς ταῦτὸι ἔχουσιν ἀγαθόν, ἐὰν νεωστὶ ἔχοντες τυγχάνωσι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὐπραγῶσι, μᾶλλον νεμεσᾶν· μᾶλλον γάρ λυποῦσιν οἱ νεωστὶ πλουτοῦντες τῶν πάλαι καὶ διὰ γένος· δύοις δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντες καὶ δυνάμενοι καὶ πολύφιλοι καὶ εὔτεκνοι καὶ ὅτιον τῶν τοιούτων. καν διὰ ταῦτ’

of wealth and power. This however cannot possibly be Aristotle's meaning: birth and beauty certainly have no claim *per se* to any other advantages. When a bad man makes his way to wealth or power, we infer that they have been acquired by fraud or injustice, and thence that he is undeserving of them, which excites our indignation; but no such inference can be drawn from the possession of birth or beauty, there is no such thing as illicit, or undeserved possession of them. Aristotle seems to have meant, what Victorius attributes to him, that, besides moral excellence, *natural* gifts and excellences are also exempt from righteous indignation, for the reason above given—that they *are* gifts of nature, and the possessors are in no way responsible for them: and this is fully confirmed by the connexion of what immediately follows. Bekker, Spengel, Buhle and the rest are alike silent upon the difficulty, and Victorius, though he puts what is probably the right interpretation upon the passage, has not one word to shew how such interpretation can be extracted from the received text.

§ 9. 'And seeing that antiquity (possession of long standing) appears to be a near approach to a natural gift or endowment' (i. e. to carry with it a claim or right, nearly approaching to that conferred by nature), 'of two parties, that have possession of the same good, the one that has come by it recently, and thereby attained his prosperity, provokes the higher degree of indignation: for the *nouveaux riches* give more offence than those whose wealth is transmitted from olden time and by right of family (or inheritance): and the like may be said of magistracies (offices of state), of power (in general), of abundance of friends, of happiness in children (a fair and virtuous family), and anything else of the same sort. Or again, any other good that accrues to them, due to the same causes; for in fact in this case again the newly enriched who have obtained office by their wealth (been promoted in consequence of their wealth) give more pain (or offence) than those whose wealth is hereditary. And the like in all similar cases'. Comp. II 16. 4. *ἀρχαιόπλοντος*,

ἄλλο τι ἀγαθὸν γίγνηται αὐτοῖς, ὡσαύτως· καὶ γὰρ ἐνταῦθα μᾶλλον λυποῦσιν οἱ νεόπλουτοι ἀρχοντες διὰ τὸν πλοῦτον ἢ οἱ ἀρχαιόπλουτοι. ὅμοιως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ 10 τῶν ἄλλων. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι οἱ μὲν δοκοῦσι τὰ αὐτῶν ἔχειν οἱ δὲ οὐ· τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ οὕτω φαινόμενον ἔχειν 11 ἀληθὲς δοκεῖ, ὥστε οἱ ἔτεροι οὐ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔχειν. καὶ ἐπεὶ ἔκαστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἀξιον,

ἀρτίπλουτος, νεόπλουτος, all occur in other authors. The first in Aesch. Agam. 1043, Blomf. Gloss. 1010, Soph. El. 1393, and Lysias [Or. 19 § 49] ap. Blf. Gl. *ἀρτίπλουτος* as a synonym of the third is found in Eur. Suppl. 742, and *νεόπλουτος* twice in Rhet. II 16. 4; as a term of contempt, Demosth. περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν § 23, p. 218¹; Arist. Vesp. 1309, *νεοπλούτῳ τρυγίᾳ*.

§ 10. ‘The reason of this is, that the one seems to have what is his own (that which *naturally* and properly belongs to him), the other not; for that which constantly presents the same appearance (shews itself in the same light) is thought to be a truth (or substantial reality), and therefore it is supposed that the others (*οἱ ἔτεροι δοκοῦσιν*) have what does *not* really belong to them. Here we have a good example of the distinction between *φαίνεσθαι* and *δοκεῖν*. The former expresses a sensible presentation, a *φαντασία*, an appeal to the eye or other senses: *δοκεῖν* is an act of the understanding, an operation and result of the judgment, a *δόξα* an opinion or judgment, appealing to the reasoning faculty or *intellect*, consequently *τὸ φαίνεσθαι* represents a lower degree of certainty and authority than *δοκεῖν*. Eth. Eud. VII 2, 1235 b 27, *τοῖς μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ, τοῖς δὲ φαίνεται κάνει μὴ δοκῆ*: οὐ γὰρ ἐν ταῦτῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ δόξα. The distinction appears again in περὶ ἑννπνίων c. 3, 461 δ 5, *φαίνεται μὲν οὖν πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φανόμενον, ἀλλ’ ἔαν τὸ ἐπικρίνον κατέχηται ἡ μὴ κινήται τὴν οἰκείαν κίνησιν*. Ib. 462 a 1, οὐ μόνον φανεῖται, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξει εἶναι δύο τὸ ἔν, ἀν δὲ μὴ λανθάνῃ, φανεῖται μὲν οὐ δόξει δὲ, κ.τ.λ. See also Waitz ad Anal. Post. 76 δ 17, II p. 327.

§ 11. ‘And whereas every kind of good is not to be indiscriminately assigned to *any one* at random, but a certain proportion and fitness (appropriateness) is (to be observed in the distribution or assignment of the one to the other)—as for instance arms of peculiar beauty (high finish) are not appropriate to the just man but to the brave, and distinguished marriages’ (i.e. the hand of a lady distinguished for beauty, virtue, accomplishments, high birth and so forth, *τὴν ἀξίαν δεῖ γαμεῖν τὸν ἀξιον*, III II. 12) ‘should not be contracted with men recently enriched, but with members of noble houses—then as I say (*οὐν*) if a man being worthy fails to obtain what suits him’ (is appropriate to his particular sort of excellence) ‘it is a case for indignation’.

τοῦ τυχόντος ἀξιον] The good that is ‘worthy of’ a man, here seems to

¹ The use of the word *νεόπλουτος* is assigned to the author of the argument as one of the reasons for ascribing the speech rather to Hyperides than Demosthenes.

ἀλλά τις ἔστιν ἀναλογία καὶ τὸ ἄρμόττον, οἷον
ὅπλων κάλλος οὐ τῷ δικαίῳ ἄρμόττει ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀν-
δρείῳ, καὶ γάμοι διαφέροντες οὐ τοῖς νεωστὶ πλου-
τοῦσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς εὐγενέσιν¹. ἐὰν οὖν ἀγαθὸς ὁν μὴ
τοῦ ἄρμόττοντος τυγχάνῃ, νεμεσητόν. καὶ τὸν ἥττω
τῷ κρείττονι ἀμφισβητεῖν, μάλιστα μὲν οὖν τοὺς ἐν

¹ εὐγενέσιν,—

mean that which suits, befits, is appropriate to him: *non omne bonum cuivis homini congruit*, Victorius. Similarly *ἄξιον* with a dat. of the person is used to signify ‘worth his while’, ‘meet’, ‘fit’, as Arist. *Ach.* 8, *ἄξιον γάρ Ἑλλάδi*, ib. 205, *τῇ πόλει γάρ ἄξιον ἔντλαβεῖν τὸν ἄνδρα*, and Equit. 616, *ἄξιον γε πᾶσιν ἐπολούξαται*.

ἐὰν οὖν κ.τ.λ. after καὶ ἐπεῑ ἔκαστον is an Aristotelian irregularity of construction. The apodosis of ἐπεῑ is *νεμεσητόν* at the end of the second paragraph. The unnecessary οὖν has crept in like the apodotic δέ, in the *resumption* of a previous statement, (on which see I I. II, note on δῆλον δέ, Vol. I. p. 20)—after the parenthetical illustrations; the protasis is forgotten, or overlooked in the writer's haste, and a new sentence introduced by οὖν terminates with the apodosis. I have collected a number of examples of similar irregularities from our author's writings. I will here only quote those that illustrate this particular form of oversight. ἐπεῑ δέ... τὰ μὲν οὖν, Top. Θ 8, 160 a 35. ἐπεῑ ἀναγκῶν ... and after five lines, τῆς μὲν οὖν θύραθεν, de Somn. et Vig. c. 3, sub init. ἐπεῑ δέ... ἀνάγκη οὖν... Rhet. II 11. I. εἰ γάρ, ... ἀνάγκη δή, Phys. VI 4 init., 234 b 10, 15. ἐπεῑ δέ... ὅπου μὲν οὖν, Pol. VII (VI), 5, 1320 a 17, 22. The remainder are cases of εἰ δή—ῶστε, ἐπεῑ—ῶστε, εἰ οὖν—ῶστε, ἐπεῑ δέ—διό (!), ἐπεῑ—δῆλον δέ, which may be reserved for a future occasion. Meanwhile see Zell on Eth. Nic. VII 14, II p. 324. Spengel in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 34. Bonitz, *Arist. Stud.* Pt. II. p. 129 seq. One example cited by Bonitz, p. 131, from de Anima III 3, has a parenthesis of nearly 20 lines between its ἐπεῑ δέ and ὅτι μὲν οὖν. On οὖν in resumption, after a parenthesis, ‘well then, as I was saying’, see Klotz on *Dévar. de Partic.* p. 718. Hartung, *Partikellehre*, II 22 seq.

‘It is matter of indignation also (*subaudi νεμεσητόν* from the foregoing clause) for the inferior to compete with the superior, nay and especially where the inferiority and superiority lie (or manifest themselves) in the same department, province, study or pursuit’. With *τοὺς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ* must be understood *ἥττονας καὶ κρείττονας* from the preceding. The case here described is that of an indifferent artist, painter or sculptor, setting himself up as the rival of Apelles or Phidias; of Marsyas and Apollo; of the frog and the ox in the fable.

μάλιστα μὲν οὖν] The μέν in this phrase is the ordinary correlative of δέ in the next sentence, εἰ δέ μή¹. The other particle, οὖν, though its

¹ I will venture here to express my conviction that Dr Donaldson is right in the account he gives of these two particles, *New Crat.* §§ 154, 155; that μέν viz.

precise meaning in this context may not be quite certain, and it is somewhat unusual in this collocation, is nevertheless fully justified by similar examples to be quoted immediately. The origin of the particle is, as it seems to me, as yet unexplained. It has been traced to various roots, as may be seen by consulting Donaldson, *New Cratylus* § 189, Klotz on Devar. *de Partic.* p. 717 seq., Hartung, *Partikell.* II 8, Doderlein, and Rost, in Rost and Palm's *Lex.*, but in none of these derivations have I been able to find any intelligible connexion with the actual senses of the word. Yet until we know the root of the word and its affinities, we shall hardly be able to trace historically the various senses which diverge from its primary meaning. It is a connective particle, which draws an inference or conclusion from something preceding, 'then, accordingly', (1) logically in an argument, and (2) in the continuation of a narrative, the consequence primarily implied having passed into the mere notion of what is *subsequent*, 'that which follows', in both its senses. Hence in all Greek authors *μὲν οὖν* is habitually employed in this second sense, like the French 'or', and our 'now' or 'then', to impart a slight degree of liveliness and animation to a continuous narrative or discussion. From the first or inferential signification, it acquires this intermediate sense of, 'so then', 'well then', 'accordingly', which lies halfway between the logical and the temporal application; just like our 'then', which has both these senses, only derived in the reverse order, the particle of time in the English 'then', passing from the temporal to the logical use. For this *μὲν οὖν* at the commencement of a new paragraph the orators—Demosthenes in particular, with whom *μὲν οὖν* is comparatively rare, Aeschines in a less degree—often substitute *τοινῦν* or *μὲν τοινῦν*, which is used precisely in the same way. "μὲν οὖν, in continuando sermone cum quadam *conclusionis* significacione usurpatur." Hermann ad Viger. note 342.

The other prevailing signification of *μὲν οὖν* when used in combination, which, though by no means confined to them, is found chiefly in dialogues as those of Plato and Aristophanes—in the former most frequently in the familiar *πάνυ μὲν οὖν*—has a negative corrective sense conveying an emphatic assertion, sometimes to be rendered by a negative; being employed to correct, in the way of strengthening or heightening, a previous statement or assertion; and while it assents to a proposition indicates an advance beyond it. Dem. de Cor. § 316, δὰ τὰς εὐεργεσίας, οὗσας ὑπερμεγέθεις, οὐ μὲν οὖν εἴποι τις ἀνὴλίκας. Ib. § 130, δὲ γάρ ποτε—δὲψε λέγω; χθες μὲν οὖν καὶ πρόην κτλ. Aesch. Eum. 38, δείσασα γάρ γραῦς οὐδέν, ἀντίπαις μὲν οὖν. Eur. Hippol. 1012, ματαῖος ἀρ' ἦν, οὐδαμοῦ μὲν οὖν φρεῶν. In all these cases it may be translated 'nay more', or 'nay rather'. Similarly in answers it expresses a strong assent, *πάνυ μὲν οὖν*, *μάλιστα μὲν οὖν*, *κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν*, 'just so', 'quite so', 'exactly so'. In all these cases it may be rendered 'immo', 'nay rather'. Herm. ad Vig. n. 343. In the same

is the neut. of an older form *μελ*, *μλα*, *μέν*, of which *μλα* alone remains in the language, the numeral 'one'; and *δέ* connected with *δύο* 'two'; though as far as I know he stands alone in the opinion; the origin usually assigned to it being that it is a weaker form of *δή*. Donaldson's view of the primary meaning and derivation of these particles is so completely in accordance with all their actual usages, and is so simple and natural, that it seems to me to carry with it its own evidence, and to need no further proof of its truth.

τῷ αὐτῷ· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ' εἴρηται,

P. 1387 b.

Αἴαντος δ' ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο·

Ζεὺς γάρ οἱ νεμέσαςχ', ὅτ' ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο.

εἰ δὲ μή, κὰν ὁπωσοῦν ὁ ἥττων τῷ κρέίττονι, οἶον εἰ
ὅ μουσικὸς τῷ δικαίῳ· βέλτιον γάρ ή δικαιοσύνη τῆς
μουσικῆς.

οἵς μὲν οὖν νεμεσῶσι καὶ δι' ἄ, ἐκ τούτων δῆλον·

sense it appears in the Aristophanic ἐμοῦ μὲν οὖν, ἐμοῦ μὲν οὖν, ‘no, mine; no mine’, in answer to Cleon’s nauseous offer to the Demus, Equit. 911; and elsewhere. πάνυ μὲν οὖν is to be explained thus; I not only assent to what you say, but I go farther, I am absolutely convinced of it; ‘nay more (or nay rather), absolutely so’. The οὖν in all these instances, and others like them, conveying thus a strong emphasis, at the same time may be considered to retain its consequential sense, ‘conclusionis significacionem’, indicative of what follows, something else, ‘accordingly’, which is contained in the assent to the preceding statement, and thus the two usages of it are connected. The μέν in the combination of the two particles is explained by Dr Donaldson, *New Cratylus* § 154—rightly I think—by a tacit reference to some suppressed sentence with the correlative δέ, μέν being always opposed to δέ expressed or understood. πάνυ μὲν οὖν would imply ἀλλως δὲ οὐ. (Donaldson supplies τί δ’ ἔπειτα; ‘but what then?’) Following this explanation we may render μάλιστα μὲν οὖν in our text ‘nay more, most of all, in the highest degree’.

I will now conclude this long note on a phrase which I have never seen fully explained, with a few examples parallel to that of our text. Soph. Ant. 925, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν οὖν τάδ' ἔστιν ἐν θεοῖς καλά.....εἰ δ' οἵδ' ἀμαρτάνοντις κ.τ.λ. Plato, Phaedo 90 E, ἀνδριστέον καὶ προθυμητέον ὑγίως ἔχειν, σὺ μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοῖς κ.τ.λ., on which Stallbaum, not. crit. observes, οὖν utpote de vitio suspectum seclusimus. With what reason, we have seen. Eth. Nic. VI 7, init. ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν, where οὐκ, as here, seems to be superfluous, and is certainly unusual. Ib. VII 9, 1151 a 14, ἐκείνος μὲν οὖν εὐμετάπειστος, οὐδὲ οὐ. Polit. I 2, 1252 δ 29, γυνομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἔνεκεν, οὖσα δὲ τοῦ εὐ ζῆν. Ib. IV (VII) 10, sub init., τὰ μέν οὖν περὶ Αἴγυπτον Σεσώστριος, ὡς φασίν, οὗτοι νομοθετήσαντος, Μίνω δὲ τὰ περὶ Κρήτην. De Soph. El. 6, 169 a 19, οἱ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν...οἱ δ' ἀλλοι κ.τ.λ. Hist. Anim. V 16, 548 a 25, αἱ μὲν οὖν...αἱ δέ κ.τ.λ. De part. Anim. IV 11. 10, 691 a 28, ἄνθρωπος μὲν οὖν...οἱ δ' ἵχθυες καὶ ὅρνιθες... Magn. Mor. II 3, 1199 δ 1, ὡς δ' αὐτῶς ὁ ἀδικο...οἰδεν· ἀλλ' εἰ αὐτῷ... Ib. c. 6, 1203 a 16, τοῦ μὲν οὖν ἀκρατοῦν...τοῦ δὲ ἀκολάστου κακῶς.

‘Whence also this saying’. Here follow two hexameter lines as an illustration of the foregoing topic; Cebriones, who knew that the divine vengeance falls upon those who attack their superiors, ‘avoided the encounter of Ajax son of Telamon’. Il. XI 542. This is followed by a line which is rejected by the recent editors from the text of Homer, but appears again in the Life of Homer, attributed to Plutarch. See Paley’s note ad loc. ‘(Chiefly in the same art, profession, or pursuit),

12 ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔστιν. αὐτοὶ δὲ νεμεση- p. 76.

τικοὶ εἰσιν, ἐὰν ἀξιοὶ τυγχάνωσιν ὄντες τῶν μεγίστων
ἀγαθῶν καὶ ταῦτα κεκτημένοι τὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων

13 ἡξιώσθαι τοὺς μὴ ὁμοίους οὐ δίκαιον. δεύτερον δ', ἂν
ὄντες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ σπουδαῖοι τυγχάνωσιν· κρίνουσί τε

or if not in the same, any case whatsoever of competition of inferior with superior (understand ἀμφισβητή); of a musician, for instance, with a just man ("ut si musicus cum iusto viro de dignitate contendat." Victorius); because justice is better than music'. The claims of the two are unequal, of which the inferior ought to be sensible. 'So now from all this it is clear what are the objects and occasions of righteous indignation; such they are (as we have described them) and such-like'.

οἷς καὶ δι' αὐτοὺς [There is an inaccuracy here in the language, δῆλον should be δῆλος or δῆλα in agreement with one or other of the antecedents to the relatives; or else οἷς should be τίσιν, and δι' αὐτοῖς διὰ τίνα or ποῖα. Aristotle, when he wrote δῆλον, seems to have had in his mind his usual formula for designating these two departments of inquiry, in the πάθη, viz. τίσιν καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις. The same oversight occurs again c. 2 § 27, where οἷς &c. is followed by εὑρηται, which is impersonal, and cannot supply an antecedent to οἷς. The mistake is again repeated, c. 10 § 5, and, reading οἷς, in c. 10 § 11.]

§ 12. We now pass to the third division of the analysis of νέμεσις; the subjects of it, the characters, tempers, states of mind which are especially liable to it. 'Those who are inclined to this kind of indignation in themselves are, first, such as happen to be deserving of the greatest blessings and at the same time in possession of them; because it is unjust that those who are unlike us should have been deemed worthy of (should have been enabled to attain to) the like advantages'. This is against the principle of distributive justice above described, which assigns honours and rewards, &c. καὶ δέξιαν. See on § 2, above. The actual possession, as well as the right or claim to these good things, is necessary to the excitement of the indignation provoked by this comparison. The mere claim without the satisfaction of it would be rather provocative of envy or anger than of righteous (disinterested) indignation: when a man is satisfied himself, he is then ready to take a dispassionate view of the successes and advantages of his neighbour. When under the influence of personal feeling he is not in a state of mind fit to measure the comparative claims of himself and the other.

§ 13. 'And secondly, such as chance (have the luck) to be good and worthy men, because they both decide aright, and hate all injustice'. They have both the faculty and the feeling necessary for the occasion; the intellectual faculty of discernment, and the hatred of all that is wrong, which are both essential to the excitement of righteous indignation. On σπουδαῖος and its opposite φαῦλος, see note on I 5. 8.

§ 14. 'Or again, such as are of an ambitious temper, and eagerly striving after certain actions' (*πράξεις*, modes of activity, such as public employments in the service of the state; these are also objects of

14 γάρ εὖ, καὶ τὰ ἄδικα μισοῦσιν. καὶ ἐὰν φιλότιμοι,
 φυγόντες καὶ ὀρεγόμενοι τινῶν πράξεων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ¹
 ταῦτα φιλότιμοι ὡσιν ὥν ἔτεροι ἀνάξιοι ὄντες τυγ-
 15 χάνουσιν. καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἀξιοῦντες αὐτὸι αὐτοὺς ὥν
 ἔτέρους μὴ ἀξιοῦσι, νεμεσητικοὶ τούτοις καὶ τούτων.
 διὸ καὶ οἱ ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ φαῦλοι καὶ ἀφιλότιμοι
 οὐ νεμεσητικοί· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐ ἑαυτοὺς οἴονται
 ἀξίους εἶναι.

16 Φανερὸν δ' ἐκ τούτων ἐπὶ ποίοις ἀτυχοῦσι καὶ
 κακοπραγοῦσιν ἢ μὴ τυγχάνουσι χαίρειν ἢ ἀλύπτως
 ἔχειν δεῖ· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων τὰ ἀντικείμενά ἐστι

ambition, as giving scope for the exercise of special excellences, for the attainment of distinction, of honours, and the like); and especially when their ambition is directed to such objects as the others happen to be unworthy of'. The greater a man's ambition, and the stronger his desire of the honours and distinctions which he feels to be due to himself, the deeper his resentment at the unfairness of their attainment by those whom he knows, by comparison with himself, to be undeserving of them.

§ 15. 'And in general, *all* such (besides the really meritorious) as *think themselves* deserving of things (honours, rewards, emoluments), of which they deem others undeserving, are inclined to feel indignant with them and for (on account of) them (*for the honours, &c. which they have unworthily obtained*). And this also is the reason why the servile, and mean-spirited, and unambitious, are not inclined to feel indignation; because, that is, there is nothing which they *do* deserve'.

§ 16. 'From all this it is plain what sort of men those are at whose misfortunes, and calamities, and failures, we are bound to rejoice, or (at any rate) to feel no pain: for from the statements already made, the opposites' (i. e. opposite cases and circumstances) 'are manifest: and therefore if the speech put those that have to decide (*κρίνειν* applicable to all three branches of Rhetoric) in such and such a frame of mind (namely, such as have been described), and shew that those who claim, appeal to, our compassion—as well as the things (the occasions and circumstances) for which they claim it—are unworthy to meet with it (in the particular case), or of such a character and reputation in general as to repel it altogether, it is impossible (for the judges or other audience) to feel it'. The persons here meant are, according to Victorius, *rei et adversarii*, the prisoner under trial, in a criminal, the opponent in a civil case: but besides these the other *κριταί*, the audiences of public as well as panegyrical orations, must be included, who are equally liable with the judges in a court of law to be unduly influenced by an appeal to the feelings on the part of an unscrupulous advocate or disclaimer.

δῆλα, ὡστ' ἐὰν τούς τε κριτὰς τοιούτους παρασκευάσῃ
οὐ λόγος, καὶ τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας ἐλεεῖσθαι, καὶ ἐφ' οἷς
ἐλεεῖσθαι, δείξη ἀναξίους μὲν ὄντας τυγχάνειν ἀξίους
δὲ μὴ τυγχάνειν, ἀδύνατον ἐλεεῖν.

I δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τίσι φθονοῦσι καὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς CHAP. X.
ἔχοντες, εἴπερ ἔστιν ὁ φθόνος λύπη τις ἐπὶ εὐπραγίᾳ

CHAP. X.

Envy, the next of the *πάθη* that comes under consideration, is here defined ‘a painful feeling occasioned by any apparent’ (i. e. *palpable, conspicuous*) ‘good fortune, the possession, namely, (or acquisition) of any of the good things before mentioned’—most likely the ‘good things’ enumerated in c. 5, 6—‘which falls to the lot of’ (*περὶ, lit.* in respect of, in the case of,) those who are like us’, (in various ways, detailed in the next section) ‘not for any personal consequences to oneself (understand γένηται or συνβαίνη), but solely on their account’, because *they are* prosperous or successful, and it pains us to see it; usually (not always) because some comparison, some feeling of rivalry or competition, is involved in it, when we contrast our own condition with theirs—(“rival-hating envy”, Shakesp. *Richard II.* Act 1. sc. 3. 131)—and therefore it is *περὶ τὸν ὄμοιον*; commonly has reference to, i. e. is directed against, ‘those like us’, with whom, that is, we come into competition in anything. δι' ἔκεινος is further explained in c. II. I. ὁ δὲ (φθονερὸς) παρασκευάζει τὸν πλήσιον μὴ ἔχειν (τὰ ἀγαθὰ) διὰ τὸν φθόνον. Such seems to be the meaning of the definition. [For a consecutive translation of § 1, see p. 123.]

Victorius, here as before, and again on c. II. I, renders *φανομένη* ‘or that which appears to be so’ in the more ordinary sense of the word. But here at all events it cannot have this meaning, for there is no alternative in Aristotle’s text; and without it he is made to say, that it is *only* ‘seeming’ prosperity that gives rise to the feeling. See note on II 2. I. Again he and Schrader both understand *μὴ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ* [*sic!*], ‘not from any dread of loss or danger, or prospect of advantage to oneself, from the other’s good fortune’, the second of which only is contained in *ἵνα τι αὐτῷ*; the first would require *μὴ* instead of *ἵνα*; and also is contradictory to what was said in c. 9 § 3, *τὸ δὲ μὴ ὅτι αὐτῷ τι συμβῆσται ἔτερον*,—οὐ γάρ ἔτι ἔσται τὸ μὲν νέμεσος τὸ δὲ φθόνος, ἀλλὰ φόβος, ἐὰν διὰ τοῦτο ἡ λύπη ὑπάρχῃ καὶ ἡ παραχή, ὅτι αὐτῷ τι ἔσται φᾶλον ἀπὸ τῆς ἔκεινον εὐπραξίας.

The definition *limits* the objects of the pain, and is thus a *second* correction, in addition to the criticism of c. 9 §§ 3—5 (on which see note), of the erroneous language applied to *φθόνος* Eth. Nic. II 7, sub fin., ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς...ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται.

Envy seems to have been regarded by the ancients as the worst and most distressing of all the painful emotions. *Invidia Siculi non invenere tyranni maius tormentum*, says Horace, Epist. I 2. 58. Σωκράτης τὸν φθόνον ἔφη ψυχῆς εἶναι πρώτα; and Menander, ὁ δὲ τὸ κάκιστον τὸν κακῶν πάντων φθόνος, Men. Fr. Inc. XII 6, ap. Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* IV 235 (quoted by Orelli ad loc. Hor.). “Of all other affections (envy) is the most importune and continual.....It is also the vilest affection and the most

φαινομένη τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν περὶ τοὺς ὄμοίους, μὴ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δὲ ἐκείνους· φθονήσουσι μὲν

depraved; for which cause it is the proper attribute of the devil," &c. Bacon, *Essays*, Of Envy, sub fin.

Φθόνος δὲ σκοπῶν (ό Σωκράτης) δὴ τὸ εἶη, λύπην μὲν τινα ἔξερισκεν αὐτὸν ὅντα, οὔτε μέντοι τὴν ἐπὶ φίλων ἀνυχίας οὔτε τὴν ἐπὶ ἔχθρῶν εὐτυχίας γιγνομένην ἀλλὰ μόνον τὴν φθονεῖν τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν φίλων εὐπραξίαις ἀνιωμένους. Xen. Mem. III 9. 8 (quoted by Gaisford). Socrates defends this view of envy in the next sentence against the charge of paradox, by asserting that the fact is true, however paradoxical it may appear: still none but simpletons, ἡλιθίους, are liable to the feeling, no wise man, φρόνιμος, is capable of it. This is in accordance with the doctrine that virtue is nothing but knowledge. However it is plain that it is a mistake to confine the feeling to the good fortune of friends or those we love; and Aristotle has doubtless improved upon it by substituting his τοὺς ὄμοίους. The so-called Platonic ὄρος runs thus, following Socrates, λύπη ἐπὶ φίλων ἀγαθοῖς η ὀνσιν ἡ γεγενημένοις. "Oros, 416 D.

The Stoic definition, λύπην ἐπὶ ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς, Diog. Laert., Zeno, VII 111, which does not define the objects of the feeling, seems to have been the prevailing form of it. It is repeated by Cicero as Zeno's with additions, Tusc. Disp. IV 8. 17, *Invidentiam esse dicunt (Stoici) aegritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti. Nam si quis doleat eius rebus secundis a quo ipse laedatur, non recte dicatur invidere; ut si Hectori Agamemno: qui autem cui alterius commoda nihil noceant tamen eum doleat his frui, is invidet profecto.* This leaves the objects of the πάθος unlimited, which seems to be the true account of it. So Horace, Ep. I 2. 57, *Invidus alterius macrescit rebus optimis.*

I will conclude this note with two or three more modern definitions. "Grief for the success of a competitor in wealth, honour, or other good, if it be joined with endeavour to enforce our own abilities to equal or exceed him, is called Emulation: but joined with endeavour to supplant or hinder a competitor, Envy." Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Of the Passions, Pt. I, ch. 6. Envy and Emulation, ξῆλος, *aemulatio*, usually go together in a classification of the πάθη, being evidently closely connected. See the passages in Diog. Laert. and Cic. above quoted; and so also Aristotle. This definition very nearly approaches to that of Ar., only omitting the μὴ ἵνα τι αὐτῷ.

"Envy", says Locke, *Essay*, &c., Bk. II. Ch. 20, *Of modes of pleasure and pain*, "is an uneasiness of the mind, caused by the consideration of a good we desire, obtained by one we think should not have had it before us." Here again the notion of 'competition' enfers into the definition.

Lastly, Bain, *Emotions and Will*, Ch. VII, classes this under the general head of emotions of self, and connects it, like his predecessors, with Emulation, § 9 [p. 105, ed. 2, 1865]. Comparison and the desire of Superiority, lie at the bottom of both Emotions. "The feeling of Envy is much more general in its application. Referring to everything that is desirable in the condition of some more fortunate personage, there is

γάρ οι τοιοῦτοι οἷς εἰσὶ τινες ὄμοιοι ἢ φαίνονται.
2 ὄμοίους δὲ λέγω κατὰ γένος, κατὰ συγγένειαν, καθ'
ηλικίαν, καθ' ἔξιν, κατὰ δόξαν, κατὰ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα.

combined a strong wish for the like good to self, with an element of malevolence towards the favoured party." This differs from Aristotle in the introduction of the selfish and the malevolent elements, and removes the unnecessary restriction to cases of competition, by which he has limited its objects and scope. It is I believe a much truer and more philosophical account of the Emotion.

Bacon's *Essay, Of Envy*, has some points in common with Aristotle. Bacon places the sting of envy in the want of something which another possesses. "A man that hath no virtue in himself, ever envieth virtue in others. For men's minds will either feed upon their own good or upon others' evil; and who *wanteth* the one will prey upon the other; and whoso is out of hope to attain to another's virtue will seek to come at even hand by depressing another's fortune." This introduces Aristotle's principle of rivalry and competition as the foundation of envy. Again, with §§ 2 and 5, may be compared, "Lastly, near kinsfolk and fellows in office and those that have been bred together, are more apt to envy their equals when they are raised. For it doth upbraid unto them their own fortunes; and pointeth at them, and cometh oftener into their remembrance, and incurrith likewise more into the note of others: and envy ever redoubleth from speech and fame." This arises from their constant association, which gives frequent occasion to envy. "Again, envy is ever joined with the comparing of a man's self; and where there is no comparison, no envy; and therefore kings are not envied but by kings;" compared with the end of § 5.

§ 1. 'The occasions, objects, and mental dispositions, that give rise to envy may be clearly gathered from the definition of it; that it is, viz. a feeling of pain occasioned by manifest or conspicuous good fortune, the accession, that is, of any one of the good things previously mentioned, (chiefly) in the case of any one of those like us, for no personal advantage or gain to ourselves that is likely to accrue from it, but simply on their account: for such as have, or think they have, any like them, i. e. persons similar to themselves, in such things as are likely to bring them into rivalry and competition, will be most subject to the feeling of envy'.

§ 2. 'By *like* or *similar* I mean, those who are of the same race (or are alike in stock), of the same family (relatives), alike in age, in states', mental and bodily (virtues of all kinds, accomplishments, acquirements, and excellences of mind and body, when developed, confirmed and permanent are *ἴσεις*: *qui artibus scientiis et huiusmodi rebus pares sunt*, Victorius: this may be included in the other, more general, meaning), 'in reputation, in property or possessions' (of any kind, *patrimonio ac re familiari*, Victorius). This is well illustrated by a passage of Cic. Brutus, c. XLII § 156, quoted by Victorius on § 5. *Simul illud gandeo, quod et aequalitas vestra, et pares honorum gradus, et artium studiorumque finitima vicinitas, tantum abest ab obtrectatione invidiae, quae solet*

*καὶ οἱ μικροῦ ἐλλείπει τὸ μὴ πάντα ὑπάρχειν. διὸ
οἱ μεγάλα πράττοντες καὶ οἱ εὐτυχοῦντες φθονεροί
ζεῖσιν· πάντας γὰρ οἴονται τὰ αὐτῶν φέρειν. καὶ οἱ*

*lacerare plerosque, uti ea non modo exulcerare vestram gratiam sed etiam
conciliare videatur.*

In reality envy is not *confined*, as Aristotle seems to say, to these classes of people as objects; nor even to those with whom we are likely to come into competition; it seems rather that there is no limit, within the circle of humanity, to the objects on which it may be exercised. A man may envy a baby its innocence, its health, its rosy cheeks, or the poorest and meanest his health and strength: the feeling of pain which belongs to envy no doubt proceeds from an involuntary comparison of oneself with another, who *has* some valuable possession which we happen to *want*; and the unsatisfied desire, contrasted with the gratification of it in some one else, friend or foe, good or bad, high or low, in a malevolent disposition—not in the *wise* man, as Socrates has it—breeds the feeling of pain. Aristotle's definition may be thus summed up: envy is a feeling of pain, excited, usually if not always, by the successful competition of a real or supposed rival. 'Those also' are disposed to it 'who (have nearly attained to) want but little of complete satisfaction (of possessing every thing desirable)'. A long and uninterrupted course of success and prosperity, and the attainment of *nearly all* that is desirable, seems to give them a *right* to what still remains deficient; and the envy which they would in any case feel of the possession of it by another, gains strength by the contrast with their own deficiency. Here again it is the competition and the comparison of our own condition with that of another, the want and the inferiority, that add a sting to envy.

μικροῦ] like *διάγου*, adv. 'nearly', 'within a trifling distance of', is a genitive with *δέον* understood.

τὸ (μὴ) if *ἐλλείπει* is impersonal, as it usually is, is redundant as far as the sense is concerned; if not, *τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν* is its subject. In illustration of the former case, see Hermann ad Aj. 114, ἐπειδὴ τέρψις ἔστι σοι τὸ δρᾶν, who (unnecessarily, I think¹) distinguishes two senses of the phrase, and exemplifies it by several instances all taken from Sophocles the great storehouse of Greek idiom. Add these two from prose authors, Dem. de F. L. § 180, p. 392, οὐκ ἄρνησις ἔστιν αὐτοῖς...τὸ μὴ πράττειν, Plat. Tim. 20 c, πρόφασις τὸ μὴ δρᾶν (vid. Stallbaum ad loc.), and the present passage. Examples from Thucydides are to be found in Shilleto's note, ad Dem. de F. L. § 92. See also Matth. Gr. Gr. §§ 541, 542.

'And this is the reason why those who undertake great enterprises—engage in great actions—and the successful are envious: because they think that all such are carrying off what properly belong to themselves', i.e. the profits, honours, and distinctions to which they are entitled. The difference between this feeling and that of *νέμεσις* is confined to this, that the latter distinguishes between the deserving and undeserving, the former does not. Comp. II 9. 3.

¹ Indeed he allows it himself, *qui usus, specie magis quam re, a priore illo diversus est.*

τιμώμενοι ἐπί τινι διαφερόντως, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι φθονερώτεροι τῶν ἀφιλοτίμων. καὶ οἱ δοξόσοφοι· φιλότιμοι γὰρ ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ· καὶ ὅλως οἱ φιλόδοξοι περὶ τι φθονεροὶ περὶ τοῦτο. καὶ οἱ μικρόψυχοι· πάντα γὰρ μεγάλα 4 δοκεῖ αὐτοῖς εἶναι. ἐφ' οἷς δὲ φθονοῦσιν, τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ εἰρηται· ἐφ' ὅσοις γὰρ φιλοδοξοῦσι καὶ φιλο-

P. 1388.
p. 77.

§ 3. ‘And those who have a pre-eminent reputation for anything, and especially for wisdom or happiness’. The latter, says Victorius, on account of its extreme rarity. These three classes, desiring to engross all the success, credit, good fortune, themselves, grudge the acquisition or possession of them by their competitors, or any others. ‘And the ambitious are more prone to envy than the unambitious’: because they set a higher value upon honours and distinctions. ‘And the pretenders to wisdom and learning’ (like the Sophists, ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας ἀλλ’ οὐκ οὖσης, de Soph. El. 1, 165 a 21), ‘owing to their ambition of this kind of reputation, because they are ambitious of the credit of wisdom’. Plat. Phaedr. 275 B; δοξόσοφοι γεγονότες ἀντὶ σοφῶν (“the conceit of wisdom instead of the reality.” Thompson). ‘And as a general rule, all those who are covetous of distinction in anything (art, study, pursuit, accomplishment, acquirement), are in this envious (of the distinction of others). Also the little-minded (mean-souled), because to them everything appears great (by comparison)’; and therefore an object of desire, which when unsatisfied breeds envy. μικροψυχία, opposed to μεγαλοψυχία, is defined in Eth. Nic. II 7, 1007 b 22, περὶ τίμην καὶ ἀτιμίαν ἔλλειψις: again IV 7, 1123 b 10, the μικρόψυχος is described as ὁ ἐλαττόνων ἡ ἄξιος ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν, one who rates his claims to honour and distinction too low: and further, Ib. c. 9, sub init. ὁ μικρόψυχος ἄξιος ὡν ἀγαθῶν ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὡν ἄξιος ἔστι. Having this mean opinion of himself and his own merits and deserts, and no power of appreciating what is really great, he is of course likely to over-estimate in others the gifts and advantages which he supposes himself to want, and so becomes indiscriminate in his envy. In I 9. 11, 12, μικροψυχία occurs in a somewhat different sense, that of meanness in general, and especially in the use of money. Some Latin equivalents of μικροψυχία and μεγαλοψυχία are cited by Heindorf on Hor. Sat. I 2. 10, *Sordidus atque animi quod parvi nolit haberi*. Schrader quotes from a little treatise, περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, attributed (most improbably) to Aristotle, which gives a very different account of μικροψυχία from that which we find in his genuine works. It occurs c. 7, 1251 b 16, but is not worth transcribing.

§ 4. ‘The kinds of good things which give occasion to envy have been already mentioned’ (that is, they may be inferred from the preceding enumeration of the classes of persons who are most liable to envy).

τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά] according to Donaldson’s rule, *New. Crat.* § 154 (see note

τιμούνται ἔργοις ἢ κτήμασι καὶ ὄρέγονται δόξῃς, καὶ
ὅσα εὐτυχήματά ἐστι, σχεδὸν περὶ πάντα φθόνος
ἐστί, καὶ μάλιστα ὡν αὐτοὶ ἢ ὄρέγονται ἢ οἴονται
δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἔχειν, ἢ ὡν τῇ κτήσει μικρῷ υπερέχουσιν
5 ἢ μικρῷ ἐλλείπουσιν. Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ οἱς φθονοῦσιν
ἄμα γὰρ εἴρηται· τοῖς γὰρ ἐγγὺς καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ

on μὲν οὖν, II 9. 11), tacitly refers to a correlative clause τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κ.τ.λ., on the other occasions of envy, which has been forgotten and omitted.

'For everything of which men covet the reputation, or of which they are ambitious—be they deeds done or possessions acquired—striving after fame (the credit of the achievements and acquirements), and every kind of good fortune (successes and acquirements due to fortune, and not, like the others, to a man's own exertions),—with all these, as one may say, envy is concerned; and most of all, the objects of our own aspirations, or whatever we think we have a right to ourselves, or things of which the acquisition confers a slight superiority or a slight inferiority'. A very great superiority or inferiority places a man beyond the reach of envy. It is when the competition is close, and the difference between the competitors small, that the apparent value of the good competed for is greatly enhanced, and the envy excited by the success of the opponent proportionately strong.

σχεδόν] (1) 'near at hand', (2) 'pretty nearly', is familiarly used, especially by Plato and Aristotle, to modify too general an assertion: signifying, that your words in the general expression that you have, inadvertently as it were, let fall, are not to be construed strictly and literally, but room must be left for possible exceptions; that the statement is pretty nearly exact, but not quite. Hence it becomes equivalent to *ὡς εἰπεῖν*, *ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν*, 'as one may say', 'so to speak', which similarly qualifies what may be an over-statement of the case, demanding a fair latitude of construction. Plato sometimes writes *σχεδόν τι*, Aristotle (I believe) rarely or never. ['*σχεδὸν δέ τι, Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις*, Θ 3, 253 b 6, sed *τι* om. codd. E F H K.' *Index Aristotelicus.*]

§ 5. *φανερὸν οἱς*] See note on II 9. 11, at the end.

'It is plain too who are the objects of envy, from the mention that has been already made of them incidentally' (*ἅπα* simultaneously; with something else, another subject, to which it did not properly belong: in § 2, namely, as an appendix to the definitions); 'those, namely, who are near to us in time, and place, and age, and reputation, are the ordinary objects of envy'.

τοῖς ἐγγὺς...ἥλικίᾳ...φθονοῦσιν] Victorius illustrates *ἥλικίᾳ* by the instance of Fabius Maximus' defence of himself against the suspicion of having opposed himself to Publius Scipio out of envy: *docuit enim si nullae aliae res ab ea culpa ipsum vindicarent, aetatem saltem liberare debere; quod nulla aemulatio senti cum P. Scipione esse posset, qui ne filio quidem ipsius aequalis foret* [paraphrased from Livy XXVIII. 40, where the defence is given in *oratio recta*].

τόπῳ καὶ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ δόξῃ φθονοῦσιν. ὅθεν εἴρηται
τὸ συγγενὲς γὰρ καὶ φθονεῖν ἐπίσταται.

καὶ πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται· φιλοτιμοῦνται μὲν γὰρ
πρὸς τοὺς εἰρημένους, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μυριοστὸν ἔτος
ὅντας ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐσομένους ἢ τεθνεῶτας οὐδεὶς, οὐδὲ
πρὸς τοὺς ἐφ' Ἡρακλείας στήλαις. οὐδὲ ὥν πολὺ⁶
οἴονται παρ' αὐτοῖς ἢ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις λείπεσθαι,
οὐδὲ ὥν πολὺ ὑπερέχειν, ὡσαύτως καὶ πρὸς τούτους
καὶ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνταγω-
νιστὰς καὶ ἀντεραστὰς καὶ ὅλως τοὺς τῶν αὐτῶν

'Whence the saying', (of doubtful authorship : attributed by the Scholiast to Aeschylus, apud Spengel) "Kinship is well acquainted with envy too." And those whom we are ambitious of rivalling' (on πρὸς οὓς φιλοτιμοῦνται, see note on II 2. 22); 'which occurs towards those just mentioned (*τοῖς ἔγγὺς κ.τ.λ.* opposed to the following, who are all πόρρω, ἀπωθεν, 'far off' in place or time); but towards those who were alive ten thousand years ago' (*lit.* to whom it is now the 10,000th year since they were, from the time of their existence), 'or those who are yet to be (yet unborn), or already dead', (differs from the first in the length of time—the *dead* may be *recently dead*), 'never: nor towards those who are at the world's end'.

[τοὺς ἐφ' Ἡρακλείας στήλαις] The 'columns of Hercules', the limits of the *known* world, stand in the place of our 'antipodes' to express extreme remoteness—all beyond them being a mystery. Arist., Meteor. II 1. 10, assigns it as the extreme boundary of the Mediterranean sea, ἢ ἐντὸς Ἡρακλείων στηλῶν (θάλασσα); the Mediterranean itself being ἢ ἔσω, ἢ ἐντὸς, θάλασσα, *mare internum, intestinum*. See the article in Smith's *Dict. of Geogr.* Vol. II. p. 57, *Internum Mare*: and Vol. I. p. 1054, *Herculis Columnae*. With Aristotle's metaphor in the Rhet. comp. Pind. Ol. III 79, Θῆρων ἀπτεται Ἡρακλέος σταλᾶν. τὸ πόρσω δ' ἔστι σοφοῖς ἀβατον ἀβατον κάσσοφοις, and again, Nem. III 35, οὐκέτι πρόσω ἀβάταν ἀλλα κιόνων ὑπὲρ Ἡρακλέος περᾶν εὑμάρες. Isthm. IV 20. In Nem. IV 112, Γάδειρα takes its place.

'Nor (do we attempt to rival) those to whom, either by our own judgment, or that of everybody else, we are brought to the opinion that we are far inferior', (this is the *general* case of superiority and inferiority, *dignitate atque opibus*, Victorius), 'or superior; and the same is true with regard to similar things as to these persons', i. e. the same that has been said of these persons, may be applied equally to the corresponding things for which men compete (this is the *special* case of competition in some particular art, pursuit, or excellence; the case for example of an ordinary mathematician and Sir Isaac Newton, or in any other art or profession the distinguished and the undistinguished practitioner).

§ 6. 'And seeing that this ambition of rivalry is (especially) directed

έφιεμένους φιλοτιμοῦνται, ἀνάγκη μάλιστα τούτοις φθονεῖν· ὅθεν εἴρηται

καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ.

7 καὶ τοῖς ταχὺ οἱ ἡ μόλις τυχόντες ἡ μὴ τυχόντες
8 φθονοῦσιν. καὶ ὥν ἡ κεκτημένων ἡ κατορθοῦντων
9 ὄνειδος αὐτοῖς· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οὗτοι ἐγγὺς καὶ ὅμοιοι·
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι παρ' αὐτοὺς οὐ τυγχάνουσι τοῦ ἀγα-
θοῦ, ὥστε τοῦτο λυποῦν ποιεῖ τὸν φθόνον. καὶ τοῖς
ἡ ἔχουσι ταῦτα ἡ κεκτημένοις ὅσα αὐτοῖς προσήκεν

against (pointed at) our competitors in some struggle or encounter (i.e. any ἀγών, in which there are ἀγωνισταί or ‘combatants’: law-suits, battles, games, and such like), or in love (*rivalry proper*), or generally against those who are aiming at the same things, these must necessarily be the chief objects of envy: whence the saying “two of a trade”. See *supra* II 4. 21, I 11. 25. Hesiod. Op. et D. 25, καὶ κεραμεὺς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων.

§ 7. ‘Such as have attained a rapid success are objects of envy to those who have either succeeded with difficulty, or not at all’.

§ 8. ‘And those whose possession (of any coveted object), or success, is a reproach to ourselves: and these too are *near us* and *like us*’ (in the senses defined in §§ 5 and 2. The meaning is, the attainment of something which is the object of competition, or success, on the part of a rival is a reproach to us, when the other is not greatly our superior, but nearly on the same level, and in our own sphere, ἐγγὺς καὶ ὅμοιος; we argue that if *he* could attain to it, it ought to have been within *our* reach); ‘for it is plainly our own fault that we fail to obtain the good thing, and so the pain of this produces the envy’.

παρ' αὐτούς] ‘along of’ ourselves, see Arnold on Thuc. I 141. 9 and Dem. Phil. I § 11, p. 43 (quoted by Arnold) where it occurs twice, *παρὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ ρώμην*, *παρὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀμέλειαν*, in both, ‘by’ the agency, or cause, of... so that the prepos. with the accus., is used in two diametrically opposite senses. Arnold’s parallel English vulgarism seems to explain very well this meaning of the word; the notion of travelling alongside of, readily suggests the notion of constant accompaniment, and *that* of consequence, as in the two logical usages of *ἐπεσθαι* and *ἀκολουθεῖν*, to ‘accompany’ as well as to ‘follow’. Otherwise, the sense of constant companionship may give rise to the notion of friendly aid in producing some effect or consequence, and so it passes into the signification of *διά*, or nearly so.

§ 9. ‘And we are apt to envy those who either have now in their possession, or have once possessed’, (so I distinguish *ἔχοντας* and *κεκτημένους*, which however ordinarily express the same thing. Victorius translates *habent possidentque*; which not only conveys no distinction at all, but mistranslates the alternative *ἢ*, which clearly shews that

ιο ἡ κέκτηντο ποτέ· διὸ πρεσβύτεροι νεωτέροις. καὶ
οἱ πολλὰ δαπανήσαντες εἰς ταύτὸ τοῖς ὀλίγα φθο-
νοῦσιν. δῆλον δὲ καὶ οἵ¹ χαίρουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ
ἐπὶ τίσι καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες· ὡς γάρ(οὐκ)ἔχοντες λυ-
¹ ἐφ' oīs infra.

Aristotle did mean two different things,) ‘anything to which we ourselves had a natural claim or had once possessed (*subaudi ὅσα αὐτοὶ κέκτηραι*) ; and this is why seniors are prone to envy their juniors’. Victorius recurs here to the case of Q. Fabius Maximus and Scipio, already cited on § 5. Maximus in his old age was naturally suspected of envy in the opposition he offered to Scipio’s command in Africa: people thought he was jealous (this is nearer to jealousy than envy) of the reputation that the young general was rapidly acquiring, which interfered with his own earlier claims to similar distinction. The case of a similar jealousy of a younger rival, in any science, art, or profession, is too notorious to need special illustration.

§ 10. ‘And those that have laid out large sums (for the attainment of any object) envy those who have obtained the same success at a small expense’. Here again the envy arises from having been beaten in the competition. *τοῖς ὀλίγα* (*δαπανήσατι*).

§ 11. In this last section there are two or three points requiring consideration which it will be as well to dispatch before proceeding to the translation. The first is, whether we are to read *ἐφ' oīs* or *oīs* without the prepos.; and then, what do *ἐφ' oīs* or *oīs* and *ἐνὶ τίσι*, severally represent. Spengel, following MS A° retains *ἐφ' oīs*; Bekker in his third ed., for once departs from that MS and reads *oīs*, although, as it seems, none of the MSS give any various reading. It seems therefore on this ground preferable to retain *ἐφ' oīs* if we can; and we have next to consider how it is to be interpreted, and how distinguished from *ἐνὶ τίσι*. *ἐφ' oīs* and *oīs* are equally irregular after *δῆλον* (see note on II 9. II, at the end), and the grammar therefore throws no light upon the reading. As far as the grammar and interpretation are concerned there seems to be no objection to retaining *ἐπὶ*.

We have then to decide whether *oīs* or *τίσι* stands for persons or things; either of which is possible. However if the choice is to be made between them, *τίσι* seems the more natural representative of persons, and *oīs* of things; and so in general, throughout these analyses of the feelings, Aristotle is accustomed to designate the *persons* who are the objects of them by the pronoun *τίves*.

Thirdly, there is no objection to *ἐπὶ τίσι χαίρουσιν* in the sense of ‘at’ or ‘by whom they are pleased’ (lit. *upon* whom their pleasure is bestowed or directed), ‘in whom they find pleasure’, though the bare *τίσι* is more usual (possibly this may be Bekker’s reason for his alteration [of *ἐφ' oīs*]); and if there were any doubt about it, it would be sufficiently supported by *ἐνὶ ποιοῖς* (what sort of *persons*) *χαίρειν*, c. 9. 16. Consequently, as I can see no sufficient reason for altering the text contrary to all manuscript authority, I have retained *ἐφ' oīs*, understanding it of *things*, the occasions of joy or delight; and *ἐνὶ τίσι* of the *persons* who excite the feeling in us.

ποῦνται, οὐτως ἔχοντες ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις ησθήσον-

The next clause, *ὡς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχοντες λυποῦνται*, κ.τ.λ. presents some difficulty, and Muretus and the *Vetus Translatio*, followed by Schrader and Wolf, reject the negative *οὐκ* (or *μή* as it stood in the MSS employed in the older editions). This however would make the two opposite feelings of pleasure and pain the *same* state or disposition of mind, which I think could not possibly have been Aristotle's meaning. Victorius takes what I believe to be the right view on the point. The meaning will then be, that the negative, the contradictory, of pain, i. e. pleasure (the two never co-existing), is excited by the opposite circumstances to those which are productive of the pain of envy; if pain under particular circumstances is excited by the sight of the good fortune of another, substitute the opposite, ill fortune for good fortune in each case, and you will have the appropriate topics for giving rise to the feeling of pleasure in your audience. This, says Victorius, is *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*, wanton malice, malevolent pleasure in the misfortunes of others. The above interpretation is at all events free from the objection to which Schrader's is liable, namely that it makes Aristotle say that the same mental state or disposition is painful and pleasurable. The choice between the two depends mainly upon the interpretation of *οἱ τοιοῦτοι* and *πῶς ἔχοντες*. I understand by the former the *φθονεροί*, the common character of all the classes distinguished in the analysis; Schrader of the members of the several classes, the ambitious, the prosperous and successful; and in his view these classes must fall under the several 'states of mind' designated by *πῶς*, *ὡς*, *οὐτως*, *ἔχοντες*, such as ambition; though how it can be applied to others, such as 'the prosperous and successful', his second instance, he does not inform us. If by the 'state of mind' the *πάθος* or emotion is meant¹ (which seems to be Spengel's view), it is quite impossible that two such states, one pleasurable and the other painful, can be the same. Schrader, however, appears to take the *πῶς ἔχειν* in a different sense, for the character or habit of mind, the mental constitution, which tends to produce such and such feelings; and in this point of view, though ambition (his first instance) may fairly enough be called a disposition of mind, yet I cannot see how the second, the prosperous and successful men, or prosperity and success, can well be included in the designation.

In conclusion I will transcribe part of his note, that the reader may have the opportunity of deciding for himself; merely adding that manuscript and editorial authority is against his omission of the negative, and that though his interpretation is very plausible at first sight, I doubt whether it can be right, for the reasons stated. "Veritas autem huius lectionis e re ipsa quoque fiet manifesta, si per προράσεις a § 2 ad 9 transeas, et hoc illas applies. Ambitiosi e. g. dolent honore alterius, iidem, sive eodem modo affecti, gaudent alterius opprobrio. Qui res magnas gerunt, et fortuna utuntur prosperrima, dolent

¹ This is certainly so. Take, for instance, the first words of the following chapter, *πῶς δ' ἔχοντες γῆλοῦσι*, the state of mind in which *γῆλος* is shewn, or resides: which identifies *γῆλος* with the *state* in question.

*ταῖς ὥστε ἀν αὐτοὶ μὲν παρασκευασθῶσιν οὕτως
ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ ἐλεεῖσθαι ἢ τυγχάνειν τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἀξι-
ούμενοι ὥστιν οἷοι οἱ εἰρημένοι, δῆλον ὡς οὐ τεύξονται
ἐλέου παρὰ τῶν κυρίων.*

I πῶς δὲ ἔχοντες ζηλοῦσι καὶ τὰ ποῖα καὶ ἐπὶ CHAP. XI.
τίσιν, ἐνθένδ' ἔστι δῆλον εἰ γάρ ἔστι ζῆλος λύπη
τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ παρουσίᾳ ἀγαθῶν ἐντίμων καὶ ἐν-
si alium ad eundem fortunae gradum cernant enectum: iisdem vero illi
gaudent cum alios longe infra se relinqu conspiciunt."

And now to proceed with the translation:—

'It is plain too what are the occasions, the objects, and the states of mind of such (the envious); that is to say, that the same state of mind which is absent in the painful feeling, will be present in the joy that is excited by the opposite occasions' (or thus, 'whatever may be the state of mind the absence of which manifests itself in, or is accompanied by, pain, the same by its presence on the opposite occasions will give rise to pleasure'). 'Consequently, if we ourselves (i. e. any audience) are brought into that state of mind (envy or jealousy), and those who lay claim to (think themselves deserving of) compassion from us, or any good that they want to obtain from us' (as *kritai*, judges of any kind, in a disputed claim; but it is equally true of men in general), 'be such as the above described (i. e. objects of envy), 'it is plain that they will never meet with compassion' (which will apply to *τυγχάνειν τινὸς ἀγαθοῦ* as well as to *ἐλεεῖσθαι*) 'from the masters of the situation' (those who have the power to bestow either of them, those with whom the matter rests).

παρασκευάζειν, 'to prepare the minds of' the judges or audience, said of the speaker who puts them into such and such a state of mind or feeling, is rendered by *κατασκευάζειν*, *supra* II I. 2 (see note ad loc.) and § 7, where it is applied in two somewhat different senses.

CHAP. XI.

With envy, as we have seen, is closely connected *ζῆλος* or emulation; both of them originating in the desire of superiority, which manifests itself in rivalry and competition with those who so far, and in that sense, resemble us (*περὶ τὸν ὄμοιον*), that we are necessarily brought into comparison with them. Both of them are painful emotions—the pain arises from the unsatisfied want which they equally imply—and the difference between them is this, that envy is malevolent; what the envious man *wants* is to deprive his neighbour of some advantage or superiority, and do him harm by reducing him to his own level; the pain of emulation springs from the sense of our own deficiencies and the desire of rising to a higher level of virtue or honour: consequently the one is a virtuous, the other a vicious, feeling; emulation leads to self-improvement, and the practice of virtue; the object of envy is nothing but the degradation or injury of another: or, as Aristotle expresses it, emulation aims at the acquisition of good things, envy at

δεχομένων αὐτῷ λαβεῖν περὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους τῇ φύσει,
οὐχ ὅτι ἄλλῳ ἄλλ' ὅτι οὐχὶ καὶ αὐτῷ ἐστίν· διὸ καὶ
ἐπιεικές ἐστιν ὁ ζῆλος καὶ ἐπιεικῶν, τὸ δὲ φθονεῖν
the deprivation of them in another, the infliction of harm and loss on
one's neighbour.

Such is Aristotle's account of emulation; according to him the feeling is one, and that virtuous. The Stoics however, as interpreted by Cicero, Tusc. Disp. IV 8. 17, distinguished two kinds of *aemulatio*:—*ut et in laude et in vicio nomen hoc sit*. *Nam et imitatio virtutis aemulatio dicitur: et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo quod concupierit aliis potiatur ipse caret*. And again, c. 26. 56, *aemulantis, angi alieno bono quod ipse non habeat*. The two definitions differ also in this, that in Ar.'s all emulation is painful and all virtuous; in that of the Stoics, one form of it is virtuous but not painful, the other painful but not virtuous; and in fact it is difficult to distinguish the latter form of it from envy.

The Stoic definition of Zeno and (apparently) Chrysippus, Diog. Laert., Zeno, VII 111, gives only the painful and vicious form of *ζῆλος*, *λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ παρεῖναι ὃν αὐτὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ*. Cicero attributes his double definition also to Zeno.

Hobbes' and Bain's definitions of the affection I have already quoted in the introductory note to Ch. X. Locke, in the chapter there referred to, does not include emulation in his list of 'Passions', or 'Modes of pleasure and pain'.

Stewart, *Outlines of Moral Philosophy*, Pt. II. Sect. III. 5, has some remarks upon emulation, which he classes with the desires, and not (as Aristotle and others) with the affections. "It is the desire of superiority which is the active principle; and the malevolent affection is only a concomitant circumstance." Here he is in accordance with Aristotle. "When emulation is accompanied with malevolent affection, it assumes the name of envy."

"Emulation," says Butler, *Sermon I.*, On Human Nature, note 4, "is merely the desire and hope of equality with, or superiority over others, with whom we compare ourselves. There does not appear to be *any other grief* in the natural passion, but only *that want* which is implied in desire. However, this may be so strong as to be the occasion of great *grief*. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority by the *particular means* of others being brought down to our own level or below it, is, I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see that the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlawful one, envy, aims at, is exactly the same; namely that equality or superiority; and consequently, that to do mischief is not the object of envy, but merely the means it makes use of to attain its end." At all events, the malevolent *feeling* is a constituent element of the emotion of envy, without which it would not be what it is: though the actual *doing mischief* may not be essential to it.

I. 'The dispositions of emulation (the states of mind which exhibit it, in which it resides), its occasions and objects, will be clear from what follows'. *τὰ ποῖα* here stands for 'the sort of things' which excite emu-

φαῦλον καὶ φαύλων· ὃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸν παρασκευάζει διὰ τὸν ζῆλον τυγχάνει τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὃ δὲ τὸν πλησίον μὴ ἔχειν διὰ τὸν φθόνον· ἀνάγκη δὴ ζηλωτικὸν μὲν εἶναι τοὺς ἀξιοῦντας αὐτοὺς ἀγαθῶν ὅν μὴ ἔχου-^{P. 1388b.} σιν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀξιοῖ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀδύνατα. διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι τοιοῦτοι. καὶ οἵς υπάρχει

lation, usually expressed in these analyses by *ἐπὶ ποίου*: *ἐπὶ τίσι* for the ‘persons’ or ‘objects’, *πρὸν* whom it lights, i.e. against whom it is directed, which again is more usually conveyed by the simple *τίσι*. See however c. 10 § 11, *ἐπὶ τίσι*, and the note there; and *ἐπὶ ποίου χαρέων* c. 9 § 16. ‘If, namely, emulation is a feeling of pain on the occasion of the manifest (unmistakable) presence of good things, highly valued and possible for ourselves to acquire, (*περὶ* in respect of, in the case of, i.e.) belonging to, or acquired by, those who have a natural resemblance to ourselves (in temper, faculties, powers, gifts and accomplishments natural or acquired, or anything which brings them *into contrast* with us); not because another has them (which is envy) but because we ourselves have them not (and so, feeling the *want*, are anxious to obtain them, in order to raise ourselves to the level of our assumed rival)—and accordingly, (the latter,) emulation is virtuous and a property of virtuous men, envy on the other hand vicious and of the vicious: for whilst the one is led by his emulation to procure (contrive, manage) for himself the attainment of these goods, the other is led by his envy to manage merely that his neighbour shall *not* have them’:—(This is mere malevolence, the desire of harm or loss to another, without any corresponding advantage to oneself. The sentence from *διό* to *φθόνον*, is a note on the distinction of *ζῆλος* and *φθόνος*: the argument is now resumed, and the apodosis commences with the irregular *δή*, introduced unnecessarily, *more Aristotelio*, after the parenthesis as correlative to the *εἰ* of the *πρότασις*, see note on II 9. II, I I. II)—‘then, I say (if emulation be such as it has been described), those must be inclined to emulation who think themselves deserving of good things which they do not possess’; (sc. δυνατῶν *αὐτοῖς ὄντων*, provided they are possible for them to attain. This connecting link, omitted by Aristotle, is supplied by Muretus and Victorius, and doubtless explains the connexion of the reasoning,) ‘for no one lays claim to things manifestly impossible’.

§ 2. ‘And this is why the young and the high-minded are of this character’. With *οἱ νέοι* comp. c. 12. 6 and 11. The latter of these two passages gives the reason why the young are inclined to emulation, it is *διὰ τὸ ἀξιοῦν αὐτοὺς μεγάλων*; which also makes them *μεγαλόψυχοι*. Emulation in the *μεγαλόψυχοι* must be confined to rivalry in *great things*, if it is to be consistent with the character assigned to them in Eth. Nic. IV 8, 1124 b 24, *καὶ εἴς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἴέναι, ἡ οὖν πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλ’ ἡ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλῃ ἡ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστών*. In fact self-sufficiency is characteristic of the *μεγαλόψυχος*, ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀξιος ὢν, who therefore is devoid of all *vulgar* ambition, *διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν*.

τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἢ τῶν ἐντίμων ἀξιά ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν· ἔστι γὰρ ταῦτα πλοῦτος καὶ πολυφιλία καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· ως γὰρ προσῆκον αὐτοῖς ἀγαθοῖς

'Also, those who are in possession (*themselves*, opposed to *οὓς οἱ ἄλλοι ἀξιοῦσιν*, in the following sentence) of such good things as are worthy of men that are held in honour: such are, namely (*γάρ*)¹, wealth, abundance of friends (an extensive and powerful connexion), state offices, and all the like. For, on the supposition that they have a natural claim to goodness, because the good *have* a natural right to these things [*ὅτι προσῆκε τοῖς ἀγαθῶς ἔχοντι*], good things of this kind they emulously strive after'. That is to say, they start with the assumption that their natural character is virtuous, and then, because wealth and power and such like have a natural connexion with, i.e. are the proper rewards of, virtue, they are eager to obtain them, and vie with their competitors in the pursuit of them². The meaning of this sentence is further elucidated by comparison with what is said in § 7. We are there informed that some kinds of good things, such as those that are due to fortune, or mere good luck, without merit, may be the objects not of emulation but of contempt. *ἀγαθὰ ἢ τῶν ἐντίμων ἀξιά ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν* are consequently confined to those good things the acquisition of which implies merit.

προσῆκε] imperf. is properly 'had a natural claim'. The past tense, precisely as in the familiar use of the imperf., 'so and so is as I said', referring back to a past statement, here signifies, 'has a claim, as they were in the habit of believing'. I have not thought it worth while to express this in the transl., as the phraseology is Greek and not English. Muretus, approved by Vater, writes *προσήκει*, overlooking the force of the imperfect.

In *ἀγαθῶς ἔχοντι*, *ἀγαθῶς* for *εὖ* is as abnormal as 'goodly' would be, used as an *adverb* for 'well'. It occurs once again, Top. E 7, 136 δ 28, *οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ δικαίως ἕδων τὸ ἀγαθῶς*. Amongst the Classical Greek writers, Aristotle appears to enjoy the monopoly of it [but the present passage and the parallel just quoted from the Topics are the only instances given in the *Index Aristotelicus*]: it is found also in the Septuagint (Stephens' *Thesaurus s.v.*), and apparently nowhere else.

'And also (opposed to the preceding), those whom everybody else

¹ Here and elsewhere I have followed Schleiermacher, who in his Translation of Plato, invariably renders *γάρ* 'nämlich.' The same word in English, though not so usual as in the other language, is perhaps the nearest equivalent to the Greek *γάρ*. It is used thus in a specification of particulars, *videlicet*, that is to say, in confirmation of, assigning a *sort of reason* for, a previous statement.

² Brandis, in the tract on the Rhet. in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, IV i. p. 46, following apparently the opinion of Muretus and Vater, calls the passage a *verderbte Stelle*, for which I can see no foundation whatsoever. The sense and connexion are perfectly intelligible, the imperf. *προσῆκε* has been explained, and *ἀγαθῶς* defended by the use of it in the Topics. Bekker, Ed. III., retains the v. l. The version of the *Anonymous* (apud Brandis) *ἵηλοντος γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ διδ τὸ οἰσθαι αὐτοὺς ἀγαθῶς εἶναι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἔχειν τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἢ προσῆκει ἔχειν τοὺς ἀγαθούς*, seems to me to be sufficiently close to the *received text* to be intended for a paraphrase of *it*, and not (as Brandis thinks) to suggest a different reading.

εἶναι, ὅτι ἀπροσῆκε τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἔχουσι¹, ζηλοῦσι τὰ
 (2) τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν. καὶ οὐς οἱ ἄλλοι ἀξιοῦσιν.
 3 καὶ ὡν πρόγονοι ἢ συγγενεῖς ἢ οἰκεῖοι ἢ τὸ ἔθνος ἢ ἡ
 πόλις ἔντιμοι, ζηλωτικοὶ περὶ ταῦτα οἰκεῖα γὰρ
 4 οἴονται αὐτοῖς εἶναι, καὶ ἀξιοὶ τούτων. εἰ δὲ ἐστὶ²
 ζηλωτὰ τὰ ἔντιμα ἀγαθά, ἀνάγκη τάς τε ἀρετὰς
 εἶναι τοιαῦτας, καὶ ὅσα τοῖς ἄλλοις ὠφέλιμα καὶ εὐερ-
 γετικά· τιμῶσι γὰρ τοὺς εὐεργετοῦντας καὶ τοὺς
 ἀγαθούς. καὶ ὅσων ἀγαθῶν ἀπόλαυσις τοῖς πλησίον
 5 ἐστίν, οἷον πλοῦτος καὶ κάλλος μᾶλλον ὑγιείας. φα-
 νερὸν δὲ καὶ οἱ ζηλωτοὶ τίνες· οἱ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ

¹ Coniecit Vahlen. Ότι προσῆκε τοῖς ἀγαθῶς ἔχουσι, MSS.

thinks worthy of them'. They are stimulated to exertion by the praises, and exhortations, and encouragement of their friends.

§ 3. 'Any distinction acquired or enjoyed by one's ancestors, or kinsmen, or intimate friends, or race, or nation' (the *city* in Greece is represented by the *nation* in modern language), 'has a tendency to excite emulation in those same things (in which the distinction has previously manifested itself); the reason being, that in these cases people think that (these distinctions) are their own (properly belonging, appropriate, to them), and that they deserve them'. Supply, καὶ (*οἴονται αὐτοὶ εἶναι*) ἀξιοὶ τούτων. On πρόγονοι, Victorius aptly quotes Cicero, de Off. I 35, *quorum vero patres aut maiores aliqua gloria praestiterunt, ii student plerumque eodem in genere laudis excellere; et seq.*

§ 4. 'And if all good things that are held in honour are objects of emulation (i. e. of emulous exertion, what we vie with others in trying to acquire), all the virtuous must needs be of this same kind (*ἐντίμους*), and everything that is profitable and productive of benefit to the rest of the world, because all benefactors and good men in general are held in honour. And especially those good things of which the enjoyment' (particularly *sensual* enjoyment: see the account of the three kinds of lives, the ἀπολαυστικός, πρακτικός, and θεωρητικός, Eth. Nic. I 3: compare III 13, 1118 α 31, τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἡ γίνεται πάσα διὸ ἀφῆς καὶ ἐν στίσι καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδιτίοις λεγομένοις, VII 6, 1148 α 5, σωματικῷ ἀπολαύσεις) 'can be shared by one's neighbours, wealth for instance, and personal beauty, more than health'. The enjoyment of beauty may no doubt be 'shared by one's neighbours', because the sight of it is always agreeable; but how it, or health, can be called 'an object of emulation', I own I am at a loss to see. No help is given by the Commentators. Did Aristotle, absorbed in his distinction, forget for a moment that the instances selected were inappropriate to the topic he was employed in illustrating?

§ 5. 'It is plain too who the persons are, that are the objects of emulation: they are, namely, those who possess these and similar

τοιαῦτα κεκτημένοι ζηλωτοί. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα τὰ εἰρημένα, οἷον ἀνδρία σοφία ἀρχή· οἱ γὰρ ἄρχοντες πολλοὺς δύνανται εὖ ποιεῖν, στρατηγοί, ρήτορες, πάντες οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα δυνάμενοι. καὶ οἵ πολλοὶ ὅμοιοι βούλονται εἶναι, ἢ πολλοὶ γνώριμοι, ἢ φίλοι πολλοί. ἢ οὓς πολλοὶ θαυμάζουσιν, ἢ οὓς αὐτοὶ θαυμάζουσιν. γαὶ ὧν ἔπαινοι καὶ ἐγκώμια λέγονται ἢ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν ἢ λογογράφων. καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐνα-

advantages. These are those already mentioned, such as courage, wisdom, power: the last class, men in power, are objects of emulation in virtue of their frequent opportunities of doing service, conferring benefits; examples are generals, orators, and all that have the like power or influence'. The power that orators have of doing service is exemplified in Crassus' eulogium on Rhetoric, Cic. de Orat. I 8. 32, (referred to by Victorius): *Quid tam porro regium, tam liberale, tam munificum, quam opem ferre supplicibus, excitare afflictos, dare salutem, liberare periculis, retinere homines in civitate?*

§ 6. 'And again, those whom many desire to resemble, or to be acquainted with, or their friends'. These, according to Victorius, are three classes of possessors of an ἀγαθὸν ἔντιμον which makes them objects of emulation. 'Or those who are admired by many, or by ourselves'.

§ 7. 'And those whose praises and panegyrics are pronounced either by poets or speech-writers' (i.e. especially, writers of panegyrical speeches). On the distinction of ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον see Introd., Appendix B, to Bk. I. c. 9, p. 212 seq.

λογογράφου. This word is used in two distinct senses. In its earlier signification it is applied to the *Chroniclers*, the earliest historians and prose writers, predecessors and contemporaries of Herodotus; of whom an account may be found in Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. XVIII, and Mure, *Hist. of Gk. Lit.* Bk. IV. ch. 2, 3, Vol. IV, and Dahlmann, *Life of Herodotus*, Ch. VI. sect. 2, and foll. In this sense it occurs in Thuc. I 21, upon which Poppe has this note: "Aut solitae orationis scriptores universi, aut historici vel etiam μνησογράφοι" (this early history was often of a mythical and legendary character), "denique orationum panegyricarum auctores hoc ambiguo vocabulo significantur." (The later, and most usual, meaning of the word is here omitted.) As this was for some time the only prose literature in existence, the *λογογράφοι* might well be contrasted with the poets, so as to signify 'prose writers' in general. And this, according to Ernesti, *Lex. Technologiae Graecae* s.v., is the sense that it bears here, *Dichter und prosaische Schriftsteller*. Isocrates also, Phil. § 109, has the same contrast, οὗτε τῶν ποιητῶν οὗτε τῶν λογοποιῶν.

The later and commoner signification, which appears so frequently in the Orators (see examples in Shilleto's note on Dem. de F. L. § 274), dates from the time of Antiphon, who commenced the practice, which

became common, and was pursued for instance by Isocrates and Demosthenes, of *writing speeches*, for which he received remuneration, for the use of parties in the law-courts. Public feeling at Athens was very much against this supposed prostitution of a man's talents and special knowledge (which may be compared with Plato's horror, expressed in the Phaedrus, of making a trade of teaching), and *λογογράφος* became a term of reproach. Perhaps the earliest example of this application is the passage of the Phaedrus, 257 C, where Lysias is said to have been taunted with it by a political opponent, διὰ πάσης τῆς λοιδορίας ἐκάλει λογογράφον. Aeschines applied it very freely to his rival Demosthenes. On this import of the word Gaisford (ad hunc locum) quotes Schol. Plat. p. 63, *λογογράφους ἐκάλουν οἱ παλαιοὶ τοὺς ἐπὶ μισθῷ λόγους γράφοντας, καὶ πιπράσκοντας αὐτοὺς εἰς δικαστήρια· ρήτορας δὲ τοὺς διὰ ἑαυτῶν λέγοντας.*

But besides this special sense, *λογογραφία* and *λογογράφος* are said of speech-writing and speech-writers in general (so Pl. Phaedr. 257 E, 258 B), and especially of panegyrical speeches, like those of Isocrates, and of speeches written to be read in the closet, and not orally delivered in the law-court or public assembly: and as this is the most appropriate to the present passage of Aristotle, who is speaking of *eulogies* in poetry and prose; and is likewise the sense in which it is used in two other passages of the Rhetoric, III 7.7, 12.2, I have little doubt that it is to be so understood here. Hermogenes περὶ ἴδεων, β, chap. 10, περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ λόγου, *Rhetores Graeci*, Vol. II. p. 405, 6, and again chap. 12, περὶ τοῦ ἀπλῶς πανηγυρικοῦ, ib. p. 417, in treating of the *πανηγυρικὸς λόγος*, the name by which he designates Aristotle's *ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος*, seems to divide all literature into three branches, poetry, spoken and written speeches; distinguishing *ρήτορες* and *λογογράφοι*, and both of them from *ποιηταί*; ἄριστος οὖν κατὰ πάντων λόγων ἔιδη καὶ ποιητῶν ἀπάντων καὶ ρήτορων καὶ λογογράφων Ὁμηρος (p. 406, 9, and elsewhere). And (in the second passage above referred to) he includes *ιστορία* under the general head of *λογογραφία*, οὐδὲ μὴν ἡ λογογραφία ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ιστορία, p. 417, and still more expressly *ιστορίας τε καὶ τῆς ἀλλῆς λογογραφίας*, p. 418. Rhetoric, when treated as the art of *composition*, *λέξις*, may no doubt be considered to embrace all *prose literature*, which will so fall into two divisions (1) public and forensic speeches, orally delivered, and (2) all written compositions. [“The relation between ancient oratory and ancient prose, philosophical, historical or literary, is necessarily of the closest kind.” Jebb's *Attic Orators* I. p. lxxi.] In Rhet. III 12.2, the written style, *λέξις γραφική*, is opposed to the *ἀγωνιστική*, which has to be employed in actual encounter, spoken and acted, not (necessarily) written; and the *συμβουλευτική* and *δικαινική* to the *ἐπιδεικτική*. The art of composition therefore, and prose composition in general, may properly be referred to this third branch of Rhetoric, the declamatory or panegyrical, as Hermogenes expressly, and Aristotle tacitly, do refer it: and so *λογογράφος* may mean either a speech-writer (as opposed to *ρήτωρ*), or a writer of *prose* (as opposed to poetry).

‘The opposites of all these (the foregoing classes of persons) are objects of contempt: for contempt is the opposite of emulation, and the notion of the one to the notion of the other’ (the substantive in -ις denotes the *process*, or operation of the feeling; the infin. with τό the *abstract conception* of it). ‘And those who are so constituted as to emulate others,

τίον γὰρ ζήλω καταφρόνησίς ἐστι, καὶ τῷ ζηλοῦν τὸ καταφρονεῖν. ἀνάγκη δὲ τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας ὥστε ζηλῶσαι τινας ἢ ζηλοῦσθαι, καταφρονητικοὺς εἶναι p. 79 τούτων τε καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις ὅσοι τὰ ἐναντία κακὰ ἔχουσι τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ζηλωτῶν. διὸ πολλάκις καταφρονοῦσι τῶν εὐτυχούντων, ὅταν ἄνευ τῶν ἐντίμων ἀγαθῶν ὑπάρχῃ αὐτοῖς ἢ τύχη.

δι’ ὧν μὲν οὖν τὰ πάθη ἐγγίγνεται καὶ διαλύεται,
I ἐξ ὧν αἱ πίστεις γίγνονται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἴρηται· τὰ CHAP.

or *themselves* to be the objects of emulation, must necessarily be inclined to feel contempt for all such persons—and on such occasions (an unnecessary parenthetical *note*, which interrupts the construction)—as lie under the defects and disadvantages opposite to the good things which are the objects of emulation. Hence contempt is often felt for the fortunate, when their luck comes to them without those good things which are really valuable (i. e. which depend in some degree upon merit for their acquisition).

‘Here ends the account of the means (*lit. channels, media*) by which the several emotions are engendered and dissolved, (furnishing topics or premisses) from which the arguments (modes of persuasion) that belong to them may be derived’.

διαλύεται] is here applied to the dissolution, breaking up, and so bringing to an end, of the *πάθη* themselves. In a former passage on a similar subject, c. 4 § 32, it seems rather to have its logical sense of breaking up, or refuting an argument.

εἴρηται] it has been stated, and is now over [Vol. I. p. 225, note].

CHAP. XII.

We now enter upon the consideration of the second kind of *ἡθη*, which may be employed as a subsidiary proof or instrument of persuasion, to assist the cogency of the logical arguments. This occupies the six following chapters from 12 to 17; in which the salient features or characteristics of the three ages, youth, old age, and manhood or the prime of life; and of the three social conditions of noble birth or family, wealth, and power, are set forth in detail. The import of these chapters, and their connexion with the main subject of the entire work, which explains and justifies their position here, has been already treated in the Introduction, pp. 110—112, to which the reader is referred. The study of these ‘characters’ will enable the speaker to accommodate his language and arguments to their several tastes and dispositions.

The four stages of human life, as described by Horace, Epist. ad Pis. 156 seq., have much more in common with Shakespeare’s ‘seven ages’, (*As you like it*, Act II. sc. 7 [lines 143—166],) than with Aristotle’s analysis. Horace writes with a view to the use of the *poet*, and describes them as they should appear in the drama or the Epic poem: his cha-

racters are the *dramatic characters*: Aristotle writing for the rhetorician applies his analysis to the purposes of *argument*; reserving the dramatic expression of character for the third book, where it naturally falls under the treatment of style and expression. Horace's object appears in the lines, *Ne forte seniles mandentur iuveni partes puerisque viriles, semper in adiunctis aequo morabimur aptis* [176].

Bacon's *Essay*, Of Youth and Age [XLII], is too well known to need more than a mere reference. Two such observers as Aristotle and Bacon must of course agree in the general outline of the two contrasted characters; but Bacon's is a brief sketch, presenting the leading features of both more particularly as they exhibit themselves in the conduct and management of business, and in public life: Aristotle fills in the details of the picture in a much more complete and comprehensive analysis.

Plutarch, in the treatise *de virtute moralis*, c. XI, discussing the moral constitution of the human subject, illustrates his material theory of the origin of the πάθη by reference to the characters of the young and old, which he thus describes; διὸ νέοι μὲν καὶ ὀξεῖς καὶ ἴταμοι (headlong, hasty, precipitate,) περὶ τε τὰς ὁρέεις διάπυροι καὶ οἰστρώδεις αἷματος πλήθει καὶ θερμότητι· τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτῶν ἡ πρὸς τὸ ἥπαρ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ κατασθέννυται, καὶ γίνεται μικρὰ καὶ ἀσθενῆς· ἵσχει δὲ μᾶλλον ὁ λόγος τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῷ σώματι συνυπομαρανομένου. Compare with this Rhet. II 12.8, ὅπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνώμενοι, οὕτω διάθερμοι εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως: and 13. 7, οἱ πρεσβύτεροι ἔναντις διάκεινται τοῖς νέοις· κατεψυγμένοι γάρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί. ὅπερ πρωδοποίηκε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλᾳ· καὶ γάρ ὁ φόβος κατάψυξις τίς ἔστι. The curious correspondence of the metaphors in the two authors' description of the hot impetuosity of the one and the cold phlegmatic temper of the other, is accounted for by similarity of theory as to the origin of the πάθη. With both the explanation is physiological, and in the spirit of modern inquiries in the same department. Aristotle's views may be gathered from the de Anima I 1, 403 a 3, seq. He there describes them as inseparable from the body and its matter and functions; with the possible exception of τὸ νοεῖν 'thought and intelligence', which is there included with the πάθη as a property of 'life'; and they are ranked with sensation in general: φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων—the independent existence of the intellect, or part of it, being left an open question—οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὄργιζεσθαι, θαρρέειν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, δλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. See further, ib. line 16: and ib. line 31, a 'physical' definition of anger (which he seems to accept as correct as far as it goes) is given, ζέσις τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἷματος καὶ θερμοῦ: this is the definition of the ὕλη of the πάθος. Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 14, σωματικὰ δῆ φαίνεται πῶς εἶναι ἀμφότερα (αἰδῶ καὶ νέμεσιν) ὅπερ δοκεῖ πάθους μᾶλλον ἢ ἔξεις εἶναι. Near the end of the 12th chapter Plutarch further assigns as the πάθη τῶν νέων, αἰσχύνη (comp. Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 16 seq.), ἐπιθυμία (Aristotle, ἐπιθυμητικοί, c. 12. 3), μετάνοια (Ar. εὐμετάβολαι, c. 12. 4), ἡδονή, λύπη (meaning of course that they are excessively susceptible of these two feelings), φιλοτιμία. (Ar. ib. § 6.)

Against Spengel's view of these ἥθη—viz. that they are the analysis of the ἥθος proper, ἐν τῷ λέγοντι, taken by Aristotle out of the order of treatment, which he had originally laid down for the three great divi-

δὲ ἡθη ποιοί τινες κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἔξεις καὶ τὰς ηλικίας καὶ τὰς τύχας, διέλθωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα.

sions of rhetorical proof, *πίστεις*, *ἡθος*, *πάθος*; and placed after, instead of before, the *πάθη*—I will here add to what I have already said in the Introd. p. 112 (and p. 110 on the real difference between the two kinds of *ἡθος* described in II 1 and here), that, whereas in II 1 reference is made for details to the analysis of the virtues in I 9, the *political* characters of I 8, and the characters of the three ages and conditions of life, are not noticed at all; and for the best of reasons; because they in fact belong to a different class of *ἡθος*; the object of the first, *ἡθος* proper, being to impress the audience favourably as to your own character and good intentions; that of the second to adapt your tone, sentiments and language, to the tastes and feelings of certain special classes whom you may have to address; you study their ‘characters’ for the purpose of introducing into your speech what you know will be acceptable to each of them. And precisely the same thing may be said of the *political* characters.

§ 1. ‘The varieties of men’s characters in respect of their instinctive feelings and developed states and of their several ages and fortunes (conditions of life), let us next proceed to describe’. § 2. ‘By feelings or emotions I mean anger, desire, and such like of which we have spoken before (II 2—II), and by settled states, virtues and vices: these too have been discussed before, as well as the objects of individual choice, and of individual action (what sort of things they are inclined to do, or capable of doing, *πράκτικαι*)’. The second reference is to I 9, and probably also to I 5 and 6, on good absolute and comparative, as the object of human aspiration.

On *πάθη*, *δυνάμεις*, *ἔξεις*, see Eth. Nic. II 4; and on the import of *ἡθος* and its relation to *ἦθος*, Introd. p. 228, Appendix C, to Bk. I. c. 10.

Vater raises a difficulty about the connexion of the above passage with the concluding sentence of the last chapter, which he says he cannot understand. “How could Aristotle after stating that he had concluded the description of the *πάθη* immediately add, as though nothing had been said about them, *nunc autem qui mores aut animorum motus — explicemus?*” My answer is that he does not say so: the two sentences have reference to two totally different things: at the end of c. 11, he tells us that he has now finished the analysis of the *πάθη*, and shews by the analysis how they can be applied to the purposes of the rhetorician, how to excite and allay them. What he says at the opening of c. 12, is that he is now going to treat of the application of these *πάθη* and the *ἔξεις* which grow out of them to the characters of certain ages and conditions of life. The Latin words quoted are a mere mistranslation: the *κατά* is overlooked, and the sentence rendered as if it were *τὰ δὲ ἡθη καὶ τὰ πάθη ... διέλθωμεν*. Vater accordingly on this ground, and also on that of the passage of Quintilian (immediately to be noticed), supposes that something is lost here.

The passage of Quintilian, v 10. 17, presents a *real* difficulty. In referring to Aristotle *in secundo de Arte Rhetorica libro*—which can only

- 2 λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ὄργὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα,
περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν πρότερον, ἔξεις δὲ ἀρετὰς καὶ
κακίας· εἴρηται δὲ περὶ τούτων πρότερον, καὶ ποῖα
προαιροῦνται ἔκαστοι, καὶ ποίων πρακτικοί. ἡλικίαι
δὲ εἰσὶ νεότης καὶ ἀκμὴ καὶ γῆρας. τύχην δὲ λέγω ^{P. 1389.}
εὐγένειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ τάναντία τού-
τοις καὶ ὅλως εύτυχίαν καὶ δυστυχίαν.
- 3 οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἥθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οὗτοι
ποιεῖν ὧν ἀν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν. καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα ἀκολουθητικοί εἰσι ταῖς περὶ τὰ
4 ἀφροδίσια, καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης. εὑμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ

mean this place—he adds to what we actually find in Aristotle several other ‘characters’ of which no trace is now to be found in his text, “*ut divitias quid sequatur, aut ambitum, aut superstitionem; quid boni probent, quid mali petant, quid milites, quid rustici; quo quaeque modo res vitari vel appeti soleat.*” Both Victorius (Comm. ad II 17. 6, p. 358, ed. 1548), and Spalding (ad loc. Quint.), attribute the discrepancy to a lapse of memory on Quintilian’s part, who was here quoting without book. The former, in a sarcastic note, thinks that it is much more probable to suppose that Quintilian, without referring to the text of his author, added *de suo* what he thought *ought* to be there, than that anything has been lost in a book which presents no trace of any hiatus. To which Spalding adds, “*non uno quidem loco vidimus videbimusque Quintilianum memoriae vitio e libris afferentem, quae in iis non plane eadem legerentur. Cf. IV 2. 132.*” In this explanation I think we must acquiesce. Spengel also, in his tract *über die Rhet. des Ar.* (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851) p. 43, attributes this want of coincidence to a ‘mistake’ of Quintilian.

§ 2. ἡλικίαι, κ.τ.λ.] ‘The *ages* are youth, prime of life (manhood), and old age. By “fortune” I mean, birth, and wealth, and power of various kinds (*plural*), and their opposites, and in general good and bad fortune’.

§ 3. ‘Now the youthful in character are prone to desire, and inclined to do (to carry out, put in practice or execution) anything they may have set their hearts upon. And of the bodily appetites lust is that which they are most disposed to follow (to give way to, or obey), and in this (sc. *τῆς ἐπιθυμίας*, this particular appetite) they are incontinent’. If *ταῖς* is right (some MSS have *τῆς*), ταύτης is a piece of careless grammar, denoting lust as a single appetite, of which the plural preceding represents the varieties, or moments. Comp. Eth. Nic. I I, 1095 a 5, seq. *Ἐτ* δὲ (ό νέος) *τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς* ὁν—it will be in vain and unprofitable for him to study moral philosophy, which is a *practical* science, whereas he has as yet no sufficient control over his own actions—οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον η Ἑλλείψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἔκαστα.

ἀψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι ταχέως δὲ παύονται· ὅξεῖαι γὰρ αἱ βουλήσεις καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι

§ 4. ‘Changeable too and fickle are they in respect of their desires and appetites, and these are violent but soon subside: for their wishes and volitions (*βούλησις* includes both) are sharp (keen, eager) and not strong or enduring (*non firma, non perdurantia*, Victorius), like the hunger and thirst of the sick’ (the plural of the abstract nouns, here, as usual, the various or successive moments, accesses of the two appetites). Comp. Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 16, οὐ πάσῃ δὲ ιῆλικια τὸ πάθος ἀρμόσει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέῃ οἰόμεθα γὰρ δεῖν τοὺς τηλικούτους αἰδήμονας εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάθει ζῶντας πολλὰ ἀμαρτάνειν, ὑπὸ τῆς αἰδοῦς δὲ κωλύεσθαι. Horace, A. P. 160, (puer) *mutatur in horas* (εὐμετάβολος); 165, *et amata relinquere pernix* (ἀψίκορος); 163, *cereus in vitium flecti*.

ἀψίκορος. As this word is not explained nor sufficiently illustrated in the Lexicons, it will be well to supply the deficiency by a few examples. This appears to be its earliest appearance in the extant Greek literature. It does not become at all common till Plutarch's time. Hesychius and Suidas supply the derivation. ἀψίκορον ἀπλησμὸν. ἡ ἄμα τῷ ἀψασθαι κορεννύμενον ταχέως. ἀψίκορος καμπανός (καμπτόρος, Salmasius), ταχέως ὀλιγωρῶν, καὶ κόρον λαμβάνων. ἀψικόρως εὐμεταβλήτως (Hesychius s. v.). ἀψίκορος εὐμετάβλητος· ἡ ὁ ταχέως καὶ ἄμα τῷ ἀψασθαι κορεννύμενος. “διά τε τὴν φυσικὴν τῶν Νομάδων ἀψικοῖαν” (fickleness) κ.τ.λ. (Polyb. XIV 1. 4; but the quotation in Suidas is inexact), καὶ αἴθις (M. Anton. I 16, Bekker ad loc.) “συντηρητικὸν δεῖ εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς φίλους καὶ μηδαμοῦ ἀψίκορον” (Suidas, s. v.). Thus the primary meaning of the word is, one that is satiated by a mere touch, ἀψει κεκορεσμένος, κορεσθείς, easily satisfied with anything, soon tired of it; fickle, changeable, fastidious; fastidiosus, ad mutationem proclivis (Ast's *Lex. Plat.* s. v.); “quem cito omnis rei fastidium capit, ac simul atque attigit satiatus illa expletusque est” (Victorius ad hunc locum). It is found in the Pseudo-Plat. *Axiochus*, 369 A, as an epithet of the δῆμος. Once in Lucian, *Calumniae* non temere credendum, c. 21, πρώτον μὲν τὸ φιλόκαινον, δὲ φύσει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ ἀψίκορον. Once in Polybius, the passage quoted by Suidas. More frequently in Plutarch, περὶ παιδῶν ἀγωγῆς, c. 9, p. 7 B, τὸν μονόκωλον λόγον...πρὸς τὴν ἀσκησιν ἀψίκορον (tiresome, speedily producing weariness or disgust) καὶ πάντῃ ἀνεπίμονον. Id. πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν c. 4, p. 20 B, it is coupled in the same sense with ἔφήμερον and ἀβέβαιον, with which it is almost synonymous. Id. περὶ πολυνφίλιας, c. 2, p. 93 D, διὰ τὸ φιλόκαινον καὶ ἀψίκορον (*praeſentium fastidio*, Lat. Transl. ap. Wytténbach). περὶ ἀδολεσχίας, c. 5, p. 504 D, μόνος “Ομηρος τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀψικορίας περιγέγονεν.” Ἐρωτικός, c. 5, 752 B, “Ἐρως χωρὶς Ἀφροδίτης...καὶ πλήσμοιν καὶ ἀψίκορον.” Ib. c. 16, 759 F, “Οτι οὐδὲ ξῆν ἔστιν ηδέως κατ' Ἐπίκουρον, c. 3, p. 1088 B, τὸ σῶμα...ἐν ταύταις (ταῖς ἡδοναῖς) δοθενές τι καὶ ἀψίκορον (satiety, fastidio obnoxium).

σφόδρα ἐπιθυμοῦσιν] Victorius refers in illustration to Caesar's saying of Brutus, *quidquid vult valde vult* [Cicero, ad Att. XIV 1. 2]; which Plutarch renders, *πᾶν δὲ βούλεται σφόδρα βούλεται* [Brutus, c. 6].

5 καὶ πεῖναι. καὶ θυμικοὶ καὶ ὀξύθυμοι καὶ οἱοὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ ὁρμῇ. καὶ ἵππους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ. διὰ γάρ φιλοτιμίαν οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὀλιγωρούμενοι, ἀλλ' 6 ἀγανακτοῦσιν ἀν οἴωνται ἀδικεῖσθαι. καὶ φιλότιμοι μέν εἰσι, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνικοι· ὑπεροχῆς γάρ ἐπιθυμεῖ 7 η νεότης, η δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχή τις. καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα μᾶλλον η φιλοχρήματοι· φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἡκιστα διὰ τὸ μήπω ἐνδείας πεπειράσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ Πιτ-
7 τακοῦ ἔχει ἀπόφθεγμα εἰς Ἀμφιάραον. καὶ οὐ κακοήθεις ἀλλ' εὐήθεις διὰ τὸ μήπω τεθεωρηκέναι πολλὰς

§ 5. ‘And passionate and quick-tempered (hasty), and apt to give way to their impulses. And under the dominion of (slaves to) their passion’ (θυμός, here the angry passions: on the more technical sense of θυμός, as one of the three divisions of the ὄρέξεις in a psychological classification, see in note on II 2. 1); ‘for by reason of their love of honour they cannot brook (put up with) a slight, but always resent any thing which they suppose to be a wrong’. Hor. A. P. 159, puer...iram colligit ac ponit temere et mutatur in horas.

§ 6. ‘And fond as they are of honour, they are still fonder of victory: for youth is desirous of superiority, and victory is a kind of superiority’. The φιλοτιμία of youth seems to be represented in Horace’s *cupidus*, A. P. 165, ‘desirous’, that is, of honour and glory; not, of course of money, covetous or avaricious. Comp. II 2. 6; and I 11. 14, 15, on the pleasures of victory in competitions of all kinds, founded on the natural desire of superiority which is an instinct of humanity. Victorius quotes Cic. de Fin. v 22. 61, (de pueris) *Quanta studia decertantium sunt: quanta ipsa certamina: ut illi efferuntur laetitia cum vicerint, ut pudet victos:...quos illi labores non perferunt ut aequalium principes sint.* ‘And both of these they are fonder of than of money: in fact for money they have no fondness at all (lit. in the very least degree), owing to their never yet having had experience of want; to which Pittacus’ pithy saying (or ἀπόφθεγμα II 21. 8) of Amphiaraus is in point’. Until we know what the saying was—*dictum hoc Pittaci intercidit*, says Buhle—we cannot decide whether *eis* is to be interpreted ‘against’ Amphiaraus or merely applied or addressed ‘to’ him; [perhaps simply ‘on’; with ἀπόφθεγμα *eis* ‘Αμφιάραον, compare in this sense Pindar, Ol. VI. 13, *aios, ὃν* “Αδραστος ἐσ Αμφιάρον φθέγξατο.]

§ 7. ‘And not ill-natured but good-natured, because they have as yet had but few opportunities of observing the (prevalent) wickedness (of society). *πονηρίας*, plural, the acts or cases of villainy which meet us so frequently in the experience of life.

The meaning of εὐήθεις here may be determined by its opposite κακοήθεις, which is thus defined in c. 13. 3; κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαβάνειν πάντα. It therefore denotes the simple, innocent, artless, candid turn of mind which ‘thinketh no evil’, and puts a favourable interpretation upon any doubtful act or expression. This is of course the primary

πονηρίας. καὶ εὐπιστοι διὰ τὸ μήπω πολλὰ ἔξηπα-
γτησθαι. καὶ εὐέλπιδες· ὡσπερ γάρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, οὕτω
διάθερμοι εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως· ἀμα δὲ καὶ
and proper sense of the word, and so it is employed by Thucyd. III 83,
καὶ τὸ εὐηθεῖς, οὐ τὸ γενναῖον πλείστου μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἡφανίσθη, ‘sim-
plicity, the chiefest ingredient of a noble temper, was laughed to scorn
and disappeared’; namely, in that degeneration of character, and conse-
quent perversion of language, which are ascribed by the author to the
factious quarrels then prevailing in Greece.

In Herod. III 140, there is a doubtful instance, δ' εὐηθίην, which Schweighäuser explains by *animi bonitas*, though the more unfavourable signification is equally probable. And in Demosth. c. Timocr. 717. 2, τῆς ἴμετέρας εὐηθείας certainly bears the same sense as Aristotle gives to the word here. But in its ordinary application—even in Herodotus and the tragedians; in Plato, with whom it is very frequent, almost invariably—‘simplicity’ has degenerated into silliness or absurdity, by that process of deterioration, common in language, which Trench, *Study of Words*, Lect. II. ‘On the morality in words’, has abundantly illustrated. He refers to εὐήθης without naming it, p. 46. Bonhomie and Einfalt have precisely the same double sense. [Cf. Vol. I. p. 175.]

I must however add that it is equally possible that Ar. may have meant here that youth are ‘simple-minded’, i.e. prone to a simple and literal interpretation of everything *as they see it*, without penetrating beneath the surface, ‘inclined to think well of everything’—and so Victorius, *ingenii simplicis et fatui, bene de omnibus existimantes*—especially as Ar. himself has twice used the word in the disparaging sense, III 1. 9; 12. 2. Comp. Plat. Rep. III 409 A (quoted by Victorius), διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐήθεις νέοι ὄντες οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς φάνονται, καὶ εὐεξανάτητοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδίκων, ἄτε οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐν ἑαυτοῖς παραδείγματα ὄμοιοπαθῆ τοῖς πονηροῖς. [Martial, XII. 51, *Tam saepe nostrum decipi Fabullinum Miraris, Aule? Semper homo bonus tiro est.*]

καὶ εὐπιστοι, κ.τ.λ.] ‘And credulous (easy of persuasion), owing to their having been hitherto seldom exposed to deceit’.

§ 8. ‘And sanguine; for youths, like men when in a state of drunkenness, are pervaded by a heat due to their nature (i. e. their physical structure); and also at the same time because they have not as yet had much experience of failure’. The first is the physical, the second the intellectual or logical, explanation of the phenomenon.

οἰνώμενοι] This is one of the verbs beginning with *οι* which “seldom or never receive the augment”, as *οἰστρᾶν* p. p. *οἰστρημένος*, “compounds of *οἴαξ* and *οἴωνός*, *οἴχωκα* Aesch. Pers. 13, Soph. Aj. 896.” Matth. Gr. Gr. § 168 obs. “This seems,” he adds, “to have originated from the old orthography, in which *ω* was as yet unknown.” *οἰμωγμένον*, Eur. Bacch. 1284. Similarly, *ευ* for *ην*, in *εὐρέιν*, *εὐρηκέναι*, *καθεῦδε*, *εὐλόγησα*. See Ellendt’s *Lex. Soph.* s. v. *οἰνών*, Elmsley ad Bacch. 686, who (following Porson) writes *ἀναρμένος*, though the manuscript authority is against him. See his note ad loc., and on *εἰρένην* see Lobeck ad Phrynicum, p. 140. *οἰνώμενος* occurs no less than five times in Eth. N. VII, from c. 5 to 15.

With *διάθερμος*, as a compound, ‘hot or heated all through’, pervaded.

διὰ τὸ μῆπω πολλὰ ἀποτετυχηκέναι. καὶ ζῶσι τὰ πλεῖστα ἐλπίδι· ή μὲν γάρ ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντός p. 80.
ἐστιν ή δὲ μνήμη τοῦ παροιχομένου, τοῖς δὲ νέοις τὸ μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς βραχύ· τῇ γάρ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ μεμνήσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἶόν τε, ἐλπίζειν

saturated, with heat, compare *διάλευκος* Ar. Probl. xxiii 6. 2, *διάλεπτος* Arist. Nub. 160, Hermann (*διὰ λεπτοῦ*, Dindorf and Meineke), *διαμελαίνειν* Plut., *διαμυδαλέος* Aesch. Pers. 538, Porson, *διάξηρος*, *διαπρύσιος*, *διάπνηρος* Plutarch, *de virtute moralis*, xi (p. 403) [quoted *supra* on p. 139], Xenoph., Eurip., &c.

With the statement comp. Plutarch (already referred to), and the rest of the preliminary note on c. xii. The heat in youth is supposed to be caused by the boiling of the blood, this being the physical origin of the *πάθη*, (as anger, de Anima i 1, 403 a 31, already cited,) which are specially characteristic of the young, see note *supra* § 3. The young are again compared to drunken men, Eth. Nic. vii 15, 1154 b 10, *ὅμοιως δὲ μὲν τῇ νεότητι διὰ τὴν αὐξησιν ὥσπερ οἱ οἰνώμενοι διάκενται, καὶ ηὖν ἡ νεότης*. The physical explanation of both these comparisons is given in Probl. xxx 1. 27, *τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὸ περὶ τὸν τόπον φρονοῦμεν καὶ ἐλπίζομεν ποιεῖ εὐθύμους* καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ πίνειν εἰς μέθην πάντες ἔχουσι προθύμους, *ὅτι πάντας ὁ οἶνος ὁ πολὺς εὐέλπιδας ποιεῖ, καθάπερ ἡ νεότης τὸν παῖδας* (cited by Zell): which not only serves as a commentary on the present passage, but also proves that Zell's, and not Fritzsche's (ad Eth. Eudem. Z 15, 1154 b 9—11), interpretation of the second is the true one. “Inde igitur iuventutis et ebrietatis affinitas, quia utraque corpori calorem impertit.” (Fritzsche in alia omnia abit: q. v. si tanti est.) That *διάθεμα* here and *θερμοί* c. 13. 7, are to be interpreted literally as well as metaphorically will further appear by a comparison of the passage referred to in the note on II 13. 7 [p. 154].

‘And their lives are passed chiefly in hope (“eam sibi propositam habent in vita ac sequuntur ut omnium suarum actionum ducem.” Victorius); for hope is of the future, but memory of the past, whilst to youth the future is long but the past short; for in their earliest years’ (so Victorius; comp. τῇ τελενταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ, c. 13. 8) ‘it is impossible for them to remember anything (i. e. they have nothing or hardly anything to remember), whilst everything is to be hoped for’. I have adopted (as also Spengel) Bekker’s conjecture *οἴονται τε* for *οἴονται*, which has little or no meaning. *τῇ πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ* may also very well be interpreted literally ‘on the first day of their existence’, the extreme case being taken for the purpose of illustration. With this interpretation *οἴονται* may be retained; for it now will have the meaning, that on the very first day of their existence, even then, they suppose they can’t be sure—that they remember nothing, &c.

The phrase *ζῶσιν ἐλπίδι*, which recurs in § 12, τῷ ηθεὶ ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἡ τῷ λογισμῷ, and c. 13. 12, expresses the same thing, viz. ‘living in the exercise or practice of’, as *ζῆν κατὰ πάθος* and *τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικοῖ*,

δὲ πάντα. καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοί εἰσι διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον·
 9 ἐλπίζουσι γὰρ ράδιως. καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι θυμώδεις
 γὰρ καὶ εὐέλπιδες, ὥν τὸ μὲν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ
 θαρρεῖν ποιεῖ· οὐτέ γὰρ ὄργιζόμενος οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται,
 10 τὸ τε ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθόν τι θαρραλέον ἔστιν. καὶ
 αἰσχυντηλοί· οὐ γάρ πω καλὰ ἔτερα ὑπολαμβάνου-
 11 σιν, ἀλλὰ πεπαιδευνται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου μόνου. καὶ
 μεγαλόψυχοι· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου πω τεταπεί-

Eth. Nic. I 1, 1095 a 5 and 9, comp. *infra* 13. 14, and ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀκολουθη-
 τικοί, *supra* § 3. It is otherwise rendered by ζῆν πρὸς τι, c. 13. 9; 14. 2,
 3, πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες κ.τ.λ. Victorius quotes Probl. XXX (11), ὃ μὲν
 οὖν ἄνθρωπος τῷ νῷ τὰ πλείστα ζῇ, τὰ δὲ θηρία δρέξει καὶ θυμῷ καὶ ἐπιθυμίᾳ.

‘And easy to deceive for the reason already mentioned, that is, the readiness with which their hopes are excited’.

§ 9. ‘And rather inclined to courage (*ἀνδρειότεροι τοῦ εἰαθήτος*, or *τῶν ἀλλων*); for they are passionate and sanguine, of which the one produces the absence of (or freedom from) fear, the other *positive* confidence: because on the one hand fear and anger are incompatible (II 3. 10, *ἀδύνατον ἄμα φοβεῖσθαι καὶ ὄργιζεσθαι*, 5. 21, *θαρραλέον γὰρ οὐ ὄργη*), and on the other hope is a sort of good thing that inspires confidence’.

§ 10. ‘And bashful, sensitive to shame; because they have not yet acquired the notion of (*ὑπολαμβάνειν*) any other standard of honour and right, but have been trained (schooled) by the conventional law alone’. *ὁ νόμος* is here the *law established by society*, the conventional usages in respect of honour and conduct, the traditions and customary observances of good breeding, any violation of these calls a blush to the cheek of youth. Old age, the opposite, has lost this quick sense of shame; *διὰ γάρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν ὄμοιώς τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὀλιγωροῦτε τὸν δοκεῖν*, c. 13. 10. *πρεσβύτεροι* δ' οὐδεὶς ἀν ἐπαινέστειν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός, Eth. N. IV 15, II 28 b 20. *Νόμος* in this sense is opposed to *φύσις*, as in the famous antithesis, the abuse of which is one of the principal sources of paradox and sophistry (*πλείστος τόπος τοῦ ποιεῖν παράδοξα λέγειν*), τὸ κατὰ *φύσιν* καὶ κατὰ τὸν νόμον. ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ φύσιν αὐτοῖς τὸ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ κατὰ νόμον τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκοῦν. Topic. IX (de Soph. El.) 12, 173 a 7 seq. In this more comprehensive application of the term, however, the positive laws, of human origin, enacted in the various states and cities, are included amongst the ‘social conventions’. On the similar antithesis of *πρὸς δόξαν* and *πρὸς ἀλήθειαν*, see note on II 4. 23, comp. c. 6. 23. In the former case truth or reality is opposed to popular opinion and its results; in the latter reality and right are represented as the ‘natural’ law or order of things. In this passage the *ἀλήθεια* has a moral character; *τὸ καλόν*, the ‘true’ is here the ‘right’ or ‘noble’, the ultimate end of the moral action. On this sense of *καλόν*, see my *Review of Aristotle's System of Ethics*, 1867, p. 14.

§ 11. ‘And high-minded (having lofty thoughts and aspirations) for

νωνται, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἅπειροί εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ
ἀξιοῦν αὐτὸν μεγάλων μεγαλόψυχία· τοῦτο δ' εὐέλ-
12 πιδος. καὶ μᾶλλον αἴροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν
συμφερόντων· τῷ γὰρ ἔθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λο-

two reasons: first, because they have not yet been humiliated by (the experience of) life—their thoughts and aspirations have not yet been checked and lowered by the experience which life gives of the impossibility of realising them—but are as yet without experience of the force of circumstances' (*τὰ ἀναγκάζοντα*, things that constrain and compel us against our will, control our actions, and thereby check and prevent the carrying out of lofty designs, of high and generous purposes: 'enforced actions', says the Rhet. ad Alex. c. I § 10, *τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, τὰ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ὄντα πράττειν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐξ ἀνάγκης θέλεις η̄ ἀνθρωπίνης οὐτως ὄντα*); and secondly, because highmindedness is characterised by the consciousness of high desert (thinking oneself deserving of great rewards and successes), and this belongs to the *sanguine temper*: and therefore may be inferred from § 8. The definition of *μεγαλόψυχος*, Eth. N. IV 7, sub init., is ὁ *μεγάλων αὐτὸν δέξιῶν ἀξιος ὅν*. The two last words, essential to the definition (as may be seen from what immediately follows), are omitted in the Rhetoric as not required for the occasion. The consciousness of exalted merit, which does form a part of the definition, is sufficient here for the purpose aimed at, namely to connect highmindedness with the sanguine temperament, Hor. A. P. 165, *sublimis*, full of high thoughts and aspirations.

§ 12. 'And in action they prefer honour to profit'—*utilium tardus provisor*, Hor. A. P. 164—'for their conduct in life is rather due to the impulses of their character, than guided by reasoning and calculation; the latter being directed to profit, whereas honour and the right are the aim of virtue'. The intellect and its calculations are here distinctly excluded from any participation in virtue, which is assigned solely to the moral character; the impulses, *ὄρέξεις* and *πάθη*, duly cultivated and regulated, pass into virtues. This is in direct contradiction to the doctrines of the Ethics, which give to the two virtues of the intellect, *σοφία* and *φρόνησις*, 'wisdom, speculative and practical', even the pre-eminence over the moral virtues; identifying true happiness with the exercise of the former. But our author is here departing from his Eudaemonistic ethical system, which makes happiness (in a transcendental sense no doubt) the end of all human action; and substituting for it the more popular and higher view of the *τέλος*, which represents it as the abstract *good* and *noble*, or the *right*, *τὸ καλόν*; a standard and an end of action independent of all sordid and selfish motives or calculation, with which it is here brought into contrast. This view of the *τέλος* appears incidentally, as an excrescence upon the systems (to which it is opposed), in the Nic. Ethics, as III 7, sub init. Ib. c. 10, 1115 b 24, and especially IX 8, p. 1169 a 4, et seq. With what is said in our text, comp. Eth. N. IX 8, 1168 a 34, ὁ δ' ἐπιεικῆς (πράττει) διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἀν βελτιών γὰρ μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν.

γισμῷ, ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος η̄ δὲ
 13 ἀρετὴ τοῦ καλοῦ. καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλοίκειοι καὶ
 φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν ἀλλων ηλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν P. 1389 b
 τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν,
 14 ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους. καὶ ἄπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον
 καὶ σφοδότερον ἀμαρτάνουσι παρὰ τὸ Χιλώνειον.

On λογισμός, the discursive, reasoning or calculating faculty or process, opposed to the νόης, and identical with διάνοια in its lower and limited sense, see Eth. Nic. VI 2, 1139 a 6 seq.; where the entire intellect is divided into two faculties, (1) the νόης, or pure reason, $\delta\acute{o}$ θεωροῦμεν, the organ of speculation, and of a priori truth, τὸ ἐπιστημονικόν, and (2) the διάνοια (in its special sense) the understanding, the organ of reasoning, and of deliberation or calculation in practical matters, τὸ λογιστικόν.

The exact opposite of all this [§§ 8—12] appears in the character of old age, c. 13 §§ 5, 9, 10, 11, 14. Old men are δυσέλπιες, ἀναίσχυτοι, μικρόψυχοι, $\zeta\sigma\omega\tau$ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον and κατὰ λογισμὸν.

§ 13. ‘And they are more fond of their friends and companions than the other ages (prime of life, and old age), owing to the pleasure they take in social intercourse (‘their liking for company’), and to their not yet having learnt to measure everything by the standard of profit or self-interest, and therefore not their friends (either)’. Of the three kinds of friendship, Eth. N. VIII 2, 3, 4, founded severally upon (1) good (i.e. real, moral, good, the only basis of perfect friendship or love), (2) pleasure, and (3) profit or utility, that of young men belongs to the second. Of these it is said, c. 3, 1156 a 13, δρόιως δὲ καὶ οἱ δὲ ήδονήν οὐ γάρ τῷ ποιόν τινας εἶναι (by reason of their moral character) ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ οἵ τι ηδεῖς αὐτοῖς.

§ 14. ‘And all their errors are in the way of excess and undue vehemence, contrary to Chilon’s maxim (μηδὲν ἄγαν, ne quid nimis); for everything that they do is in excess; for their love is in excess, and their hatred in excess, and everything else in the same way. And they think they know everything, and therefore are given to positive assertion, which (this confidence in their own knowledge and judgment) in fact accounts for their tendency to excess in everything’. μηδὲν ἄγαν σπεύδειν καρὸς δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἄριστος ἔργυμασιν ἀνθρώπων (Theognis, 401, Bergk). “Cum enim omnia sibi nota esse putent, nec se labi posse credant, nihil timide tractant,” Victorius, who also quotes, in illustration of a ‘positive assertion’, Hist. Anim. VI (21. 3), ἔνοι δὲ δισχυρίζονται δέκα μῆνας κύειν ἡμερολεγόν (to the very day—counting the days throughout the month till you come to the very end). The word occurs again in the same sense Ib. c. 37. 5, and indeed is common enough in other authors.

Of Chilon, to whom is ascribed the famous proverb which inculcates moderation in all things—the earliest hint of the doctrine of ‘the mean’—an account may be found in Diog. Laert. I 3. 63, seq., and in Mure’s *Hist. of Gk. Lit.*, Bk. III, c. 6 § 16, Vol. III, p. 392. He was a native of Lacedaemon, and his *floruit* is placed in 596 B.C. “Dubitatur quis sapientum

πάντα γὰρ ἄγαν πράττουσιν φιλοῦσί τε γὰρ ἄγαν καὶ μισοῦσιν ἄγαν καὶ τάλλα πάντα δμοίως. καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα οἴονται καὶ δισχυρίζονται· τοῦτο γὰρ 15 αἰτιόν ἔστι καὶ τοῦ πάντα ἄγαν. καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὑβριν καὶ οὐ κακουργίαν. καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ βελτίους ὑπολαμβάνειν· τῇ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀκακίᾳ τοὺς πέλας μετροῦσιν, ὥστ' 16 ἀνάξια πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτούς. καὶ φιλο-

auctor esset sententiae, μηδὲν ἄγαν. Palladas in Anthol. II 48. 1, μηδὲν ἄγαν τῶν ἐπτὰ σοφῶν ὁ σοφώτατος εἶπεν. Alii tribuunt Chiloni, alii Sodamo, teste Scholiasta nostro, qui epigramma laudat quod in Tegea exstabat, ταῦτ' ἔλεγεν Σώδαμος Ἐπηράτου, ὃς μ' ἀνέθηκεν, μηδὲν ἄγαν, καιρῷ πάντα πρόσεστι καλά." Monk, ad Eur. Hippol. 265. See also Valckenaer on the same passage. Diog. Laert., I 41, quotes the following epigram: ἦν Δακεδαιμόνιος Χειλῶν σοφός, ὃς τάδ' ἔλεξε· μηδὲν ἄγαν· καιρῷ πάντα πρόσεστι καλά. Chilon and Sodamus are alike omitted in Smith's *Dictionary of Biography*.

§ 15. 'The offences they commit incline to insolence or wanton outrage, not to mean or petty crimes and mischief'. Their crimes, when they commit them, are rather those of open violence, outrage of personal dignity, wanton aggression and the like, than of that mean and low form of wrong-doing manifesting itself in all underhand dealings, as fraud, cheating, calumny, and other similar offences, which work their mischief secretly and insidiously, as it were underground, or in the dark: the former being directed more especially against the person, *ὑβρεως ἀτιμία*, II 2.6: the latter against a man's property, fortune, character. Compare II 2.6, which gives the reason for this distinction, διὸ οἱ νέοι καὶ οἱ πλούσιοι ὑβρισταὶ ὑπερέχειν γὰρ οἴονται (they think to shew their superiority) ὑβρίζοντες. Of *ὑβρις*, *αἰκία* is given as an instance II 16.4, where this kind of offence is again attributed to the *πλούσιοι*: as it is also in Polit. VI (IV) 11, 1295 b 9. Excess in personal beauty, or strength, or birth, or wealth, and their opposites, weakness and poverty and meanness of condition, give rise severally to two different orders of offences: γίνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπόνηροι λίαν· τῶν δ' ἀδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίνεται διὰ ὑβριν τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν. Compare Plat. Legg. V 728 E, ὡς δ' αὕτως ἡ τῶν χρημάτων καὶ κτημάτων κτῆσις κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν ῥυθμὸν ἔχει· τὰ μὲν ὑπέρογκα γὰρ ἔκαστων τούτων ἔχθρας καὶ στάσεις ἀπεργάζεται ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ ἰδίᾳ, τὰ δὲ ἐλλείποντα δουλειας ὡς τὸ πολύ.

'And disposed to compassion, because they suppose every one to be good (*absolutely*) or better (*comparatively*, than they really are; so Victorius); for they measure their neighbours by their own harmlessness (or freedom from malice and the love of mischief), and therefore assume that their sufferings are unmerited': which is the occasion of *ἔλεος*, II 8. 1.

§ 16. 'They are also fond of laughing (mirth, fun), and therefore disposed to pleasantry or facetiousness; for pleasantry is wantonness

γέλωτες, διὸ καὶ εὐτράπελοι· ή γὰρ εὐτραπελία πε-
παιδευμένη ὑβρις ἐστίν.

I τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν νέων τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ὥθος, οἱ δὲ CHAP. XIII.
πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναν-

schooled by good breeding'. From the description of *eu given in Eth. Nic. II 7, 1108 a 23, and IV 14, ab init., it results that it is 'easy, well-bred (*τοῦ πεπαιδευμένου, τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκούειν οὐα τῷ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ ἀλευθερῷ ἀρμόττει*)' pleasantry in conversation, of which it is the 'agreeable mean', lying between *βωμολοχία*, 'buffoonery' the excess, and *ἀγροκία*, 'rusticity, boorishness', the inability to see or give or take a joke. It is a social virtue (one of three), and one of the accomplishments of a gentleman. It forms part of the relaxation of life, *ἀγαπαῖσεως ἐν τῷ βιῳ*, which includes *διαγωγῆς μετὰ παιδίας*, all the lighter occupations of which amusement or relaxation is the object and accompaniment, opposed to the serious business of life, and corresponds exactly to the French *passe-temps*; (on *διαγωγή*, which may include even literary pursuits, or studies, anything in fact that is not *business*, compare *σχολή*, and is so in some sense opposed to *παιδία*, which is therefore inserted here to qualify it, see Bonitz ad Metaph. A 1, 981 b 18). 1128 a 10, οἱ δὲ ἐμελῶς παίζοντες *εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται*, οἷοι *εὐτρόποι* (from their versatility). The two terms are exactly represented by Cicero's *facetus* and *facetiae*. Wit, *sales*, takes two forms, *dicacitas* and *facetiae*; the first, raillery, pungent and personal, *σκώμμα, σκώπτειν*; the second, easy and agreeable, giving grace and liveliness to conversation or writing. *Utetur utroque; sed altero in narrando aliquid venuste, altero in iaciendo mittendoque ridiculo*, et seq., Orat. XXVI 87. Compare de Orat. II 54. 219, where the distinction is somewhat different, or at all events expressed by different terms. de Off. I 30. 104, *genus iocandi elegans, urbanum, ingeniosum, facetum*, et passim. Cowper's *John Gilpin* furnishes a good specimen of *εὐτραπελία*: *Now Gilpin had a pleasant wit, and loved a timely joke.**

'Such then is the character of the young.'

CHAP. XIII.

The character of age we have already seen, and shall further find, to be in almost all points the exact opposite of that of youth. Victorius thinks that the desire of bringing out this contrast was Aristotle's reason for departing from the natural order in his treatment of the three ages. The authors quoted at the commencement of the last chapter will again serve for illustrations of the topics of the present. Aristotle, as well as Horace, confines himself almost exclusively to the delineation of the unfavourable side of the character of old age, suppressing its redeeming features. Horace represents his opinion at the opening of his sketch (A. P. line 169), *Multa senem circumveniunt incommoda* which he proceeds to describe.

§ 1. 'Elderly men, and those who have passed their prime, have most of their characters (formed) of the elements opposite to these; for from their long experience of life, its frequent errors and failures

τίων τούτοις τὰ πλεῖστα ἔχουσιν ἥθη διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι καὶ πλείω ἐξηπατῆσθαι καὶ ἡμαρτηκέναι, καὶ τὰ πλείω φαῦλα εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὕτε διαβεβαιοῦνται οὐδέν, ἡττόν τε ἄγαν
ἀπαντα ἢ δεῖ. καὶ οἴονται, ἵσασι δ' οὐδέν, καὶ ἀμ-^{p. 81.}
 φισβητοῦντες προστιθέασιν αἱ τὸ ἵσως καὶ τάχα,
 3 καὶ πάντα λέγουσιν οὕτω, παγίως δ' οὐδέν. καὶ κα-
 κούθεις εἰσίν· ἔστι γὰρ κακοίθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον
 ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα. ἔτι δὲ καχύποπτοί εἰσι διὰ
 4 τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἀπιστοὶ δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν. καὶ οὕτε

(from having lived many years and often been deceived or imposed upon by others, and fallen into error by their own fault), and from their observation of the inherent vice of all human things (everything turns out ill, nothing can be depended upon, and so they lose all confidence, and), they refrain from all positive assertion and are in excess in the undue remissness shewn in whatever they do'. Muretus, *et sunt in omnibus rebus remissiores*. As the young carry everything they do to excess, *ἄγαν*, so on the contrary the old are in excess too (*ἄγαν...ἢ δεῖ*) but this is manifested in *want* of spirit and energy and activity in all that they *do* undertake; supply *πράττουσιν*. It is doubtful whether *ἄγαν* should be taken before or after *ἡττον*. If *ἡττον* *ἄγαν*, as the order is in the text, it will be 'everything they do is "less in excess" (referring to the proverb, and the application of it to the young in the preceding chapter) than it ought to be'. If the order is *ἄγαν ἡττον*, the meaning is, 'everything they do is excessively too little (inferior in vigour and energy) to what it ought to be'.

§ 2. 'And they only say they *think*, never "*I know*". And when in doubt (or, when they are arguing or disputing a point), they always add "perhaps" and "possibly", constantly expressing themselves in this way (doubtfully), never with certainty' (or decidedly. *πάγιος*, fixed, firm, solid, and hence certain. *παγίως λέγειν*, *certo affirmare*, Plat. Rep. IV 434 D, *παγίως νοῆσαι*, Ib. v 479 C, Theat. 157 A).

§ 3. 'And they are ill-natured, for ill-nature is the tendency to put an unfavourable construction upon everything' (to attribute, for example, every indifferent act to a bad motive, *in deterius*, *in peius*, *interpretari*. Comp. c. 12. 7, of youth). 'And prone to suspicion by reason of their incredulity, and incredulous from their experience'. *καχύποπτος* is otherwise written *καχυπότοπος* in Plat. Phaedr. 240 E (Zurich Editors, and Thompson ad loc.), though in Rep. III 409 C, it appears as Aristotle writes it, and according to the Zurich Editors without *varia lectio*. *ἴποτοπεῖν* and *-εῖσθαι* occur in Herod., Thucyd., Aristoph. and Lysias.

§ 4. 'And for the same reason neither their love nor their hatred is ever deep, but according to the precept of Bias, their love is such as may hereafter become hatred, and their hatred love'. This famous and often

φιλοῦσι σφόδρα ούτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Βίαντος ὑποθήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ 5 μισοῦσιν ὡς φιλήσοντες. καὶ μικρόψυχοι διὰ τὸ

quoted saying of Bias of Priene, the last of the seven sages (585—540 B.C.) —on whom see Diog. Laert. I 5, 82 seq. and Mure, *Gk. Lit.* III 393,—is again referred to, without the author's name, II 21. 13. I will give two or three of the most important references. Soph. Aj. 678 (Lobeck's Ed.), a well-known passage of six lines, concluding with the *reason* or explanation of the precept, *τοῖς πολλοῖσι γὰρ βροτῶν ἄπιστός ἐσθ' ἔταιρειας λιμῆν*. Comp. Lobeck ad loc., and to the same effect Oed. Col. 614, *τοῖς μὲν γὰρ οἷδη, τοῖς δὲ ἐν υστέρῳ χρόνῳ, τὰ τερπνὰ πικρὰ γίγνεται καθίσι φίλα*. Diogenes, u. s., § 87 (in the same chapter several more of his apophthegms are quoted), *Ἐλεγέ τε τὸν βίον οὐτῷ μετρεῖν ὡς καὶ πολὺν καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον βιωσομένους, καὶ φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας τοὺς γὰρ πλείστους εἶναι κακούς*, and again § 88, *διπεφθέγξατο οἱ πλείστοι κακοί*, which gives *his* reason for the rule. A similar sentiment is found in Eurip. Hippol. 253, *χρῆν γὰρ μετρίας εἰς ἀλλήλους φίλας θνητούς ἀνακίνασθαι κ.τ.λ.* Cic. de Amic. XVI. 59, *Negabat (Scipio) ullam vocem inimiciorem amicitiae potuisse reperiri, quam eius, qui dixisset ita amare oportere ut si aliquando esset osurus: nec vero se adduci posse ut hoc, quemadmodum putaretur, a Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens habitus est unus e septem, sed impuri cuiusdam aut ambitiosi, aut omnia ad suam potentiam revocantis, esse sententiam. Publius Syrus apud Gell. Noct. Att. XVII 14 (ap. Schneidewin ad loc. Aj.), *Ita amicum habeas, posse ut fieri hunc inimicum putas. Bacon de Augm. Scient. VIII c. 2, Works, Ellis and Sped. ed., Vol. I. p. 788, "Septimum praeceptum est antiquum illud Biantis; modo non ad perfidiam, sed ad cautionem et moderationem, adhibeatur: et ames tanquam inimicus futurus, et oderis tanquam amaturus. Nam utilitates quasque mirum in modum prodit et corrumpit si quis nimium se immerserit amicitias infelibus, molestis et turbidis odiis, aut puerilibus et futilebus aemulationibus."* Comp. *Adv. of Learning*, II xxiii. 42. La Bruyère, *Caract.* c. 4 (in Ellis' note), *"Vivre avec nos ennemis comme s'ils devoient un jour être nos amis, et vivre avec nos amis comme s'ils pouvoient devenir nos ennemis, n'est ni selon la nature de la haine, ni selon les règles de l'amitié: ce n'est point une maxime morale mais politique. On ne doit pas se faire des ennemis de ceux qui mieux connus pourroient avoir rang entre nos amis. On doit faire choix d'amis si surs et d'une si exacte probité que venant à cesser de l'être ils ne veuillent pas abuser de notre confiance, ni se faire craindre comme nos ennemis,"* (on which Mr Spedding has another commentary, too long to quote). Finally, Demosthenes, c. Aristocr. § 122, p. 660 (quoted by Gaisford), expresses his approbation of the maxim as a rule of action. He refers to it as a current precept, without naming the author, and sums up in conclusion, *ἀλλ' ἀχρὶ τούτου καὶ φιλεῖν, οἷμα, χρῆ καὶ μισεῖν, μηδετέρου τὸν καιρὸν ὑπερβάλλοντας*, that is, neither friendship nor enmity should be carried too far, and so interpreted, as to exclude the possibility of a subsequent change of feeling.*

§ 5. 'And they are little-minded, because their spirit has been humbled by life (the experience which they have had of life and its

τεταπεινῶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου· οὐδενὸς γάρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμούσιν.
6 καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· ἐν γάρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ή οὐσίᾳ,
άμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἵστασιν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ
7 κτήσασθαι καὶ ῥάδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν. καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ
πάντα προφοβητικοί· ἔναντίως γάρ διάκεινται τοῖς

delusions and disappointments has taught them how little they can do, and thereby lowered their aims and aspirations, and deprived them of all spirit of enterprise and high endeavour); for they (now) desire nothing great or extraordinary (standing out from and above all others of the same class, *περιττοῦ*, singular, striking, extra-ordinary, above the common herd, and the ordinary level; note on I 6.8), but only what tends to (the uses, or the ease and comfort of) their life'. This again is in direct opposition to the character of youth, c. 12. II.

§ 6. 'And (for similar reasons) illiberal' (in money matters; mean, parsimonious: this is because they *have* known want; whereas their opposites, the young, who have never known it, are inclined to liberality, *ἡκιώτα φιλοχρήματοι*, c. 12 § 6); 'for property is one of the necessities of life; and at the same time they know by (their) experience how hard it is to get, and how easy to lose'. *ὡς*, of course, may also be 'that'; and the *literal* translation is 'that gain or acquisition is hard, and loss easy'. Hor. A. P. 170, *Quaerit et inventis miser abstinet et timet uti*. Comp. Eth. Nic. IV 3, 1121 b 13, *δοκεῖ γὰρ τὸ γῆρας καὶ πᾶσα ἀδυναμία ἀνελεύθερος ποιεῖν*. Pericles (in the funeral oration, Thuc. II 44, ult.) disputes this, though he allows that it is a prevailing opinion; *ὅστι δ' αὐτὸν παρηβήκατε...καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἀχρεώ τῆς ἡλικίας τὸ κερδάνειν, ὥσπερ τινές φασι, μᾶλλον τέρπει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τιμάσθαι*. Byron, on the other hand accepts the Aristotelian view. *So for a good old-gentlemanly vice I think I'll e'en take up with avarice* (Don Juan).

§ 7. 'And cowardly, and in everything (always) inclined to dread, in anticipation of coming danger (or, always inclined to anticipate danger and evil), their disposition being the reverse of that of the young: for they are cooled down (chilled by age), the others hot'. Hor. A. P. 171, *res omnes timide gelideque ministrat*, the *gelide* being manifestly taken from Aristotle. On *ἀνελεύθεροι*, Gaisford cites Bacon on this topic. The passage which he refers to in the Engl. Vers. occurs in *de Augm. Scient. Lib. VII c. 3*, Vol. I p. 734, Ellis and Spedding's ed., "Videmus enim Plautum miraculi loco habere, quod senex quis sit beneficus; *Benignitas huius ut adolescentuli est*" (Mil. Glor. III 1. 40). Bacon has misquoted: the line runs, *Nam benignitas quidem huius oppido adolescentulist* (Ritschl). Bentley on Hor. A. P. 172 has made use of this characteristic, *προφοβητικοί*, in support of his emendation *pavidus* for *avidus*. Orelli observes on this that it contradicts *spe longus* which occurs just before. But the two are not absolutely contradictory; a man may look far forward in his hope of a long life, and yet be fearful and anxious about what that future may bring. This physical theory of heating and cooling as

νέοις· κατεψυγμένοι γάρ είσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί, ὥστε πρωδοποίηκε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ φόβος 8 κατάψυξίς τις ἐστίν. καὶ φιλόζωοι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπόντος εἶναι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὐδὲ ἐνδεεῖς, τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ φίλαυτοι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ· μικροψυχία γάρ

applied to human character and passions is illustrated by Probl. XXX I. 22, ὥστε φοβερόν τι σταν εἰσαγγελθῆ, ἔαν μὲν ψυχροτέρας οὖσης τῆς κράσεως τύχῃ, δειλὸν ποιεῖ πρωδοπεποίηκε γάρ τῷ φόβῳ, καὶ ὁ φόβος καταψύχει. Δηλούσι δὲ οἱ περίφοβοι τρέμουστε γάρ. See the same, §§ 29, 30. Διὸ καὶ οἱ μὲν πάθεις εὐθυμότεροι, οἱ δὲ γέροντες δυσθυμότεροι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ θερμοί, οἱ δὲ ψυχροί· τὸ γὰρ γῆρας κατάψυξίς τις. § 32, ἡθοποιὸν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν μάλιστα τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστίν. Victorius refers to de Part. Animi. II 4, 650 b 27, ὁ γὰρ φόβος καταψύχει· πρωδοποίηται οὖν τῷ πάθει τὰ τοιαύτην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ κράσιν (of the blood). On this physical or physiological account of the πάθη, and their connexion with the condition of the blood and muscles, and their different degrees of heat and cold, see further in the remainder of the same chapter. Θερμότητος γὰρ ποιητικὸν ὁ θυμός (passion produces heat as well as heat passion), τὰ δὲ στερεὰ θερμανθέντα μᾶλλον θερμαίνει τῶν ὑγρῶν αἱ δὲ λεῖς (the muscles) στερεόν καὶ γεώδεις, ὥστε γίνονται οἷον πυρίαι (vapour-baths) ἐν τῷ αἵματι καὶ ζέσιν ποιοῦντι ἐν τοῖς θυμοῖς. Ib. 650 b 35, πολλῶν δὲ ἐστὶν αἴτια ἡ τοῦ αἵματος φύσις καὶ κατὰ τὸ ήθος τοῖς ζῷοις καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν, κ.τ.λ. 651 a 12.

'And therefore old age prepares the way for cowardice (on προδοποιεῖν, see note on I 1. 2); in fact fear is a kind of cooling down'. Comp. Horace's *gelide*, A. P. 171, already quoted. "Virg. Aen. I 69, *extemplo Aeneae solvuntur frigore membra*. Servius, *frigore*, i. e. *timore*, et est reciproca translatio, nam et timor pro frigore, et frigus pro timore ponitur." Schrader.

§ 8. 'And fond of life, and more than ever in their last days' (not, 'their very latest day'. Victorius ad c. 12. 8, τῇ πράτῃ ἡμέρᾳ. So also Bentley, in note on A. P. 172, translates, 'sub supremo vitiae die'), 'because all desire is of the absent, and therefore what they (most) want (are deficient in), that they most desire'. Orelli, on Hor. A. P. 170—178, compares φιλόζωοι with *avidus futuri*, which he retains; (also Bentley, on verse 172). He also quotes Soph. Fragn. 64 (Dind.), τοῦ ζῆν γὰρ οὐδεῖς ὡς ὁ γηράσκων ἐρᾶ.

§ 9. 'And they exceed the due measure in self-love, this again (as well as illiberality and cowardice) being a kind of little-mindedness' (which is characteristic of them, *supra* § 5). The connexion of μικροψυχία and φιλαυτία [a word used in late Greek only] seems to be this: Little-mindedness (Eth. N. IV 9, init.) is the undervaluing of oneself, and one's own advantages. This narrows and cramps the mind, which is consequently incapable of lofty aims and aspirations. A form of this is selfishness, or self-love, which is thus described, Eth. N IX 8,

τις καὶ αὕτη. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοι εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν

10 ἀπλῶς. καὶ ἀναίσχυντοι μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχυντηλοί· διὰ P. 1390.

γὰρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν ὄμοιώς τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμ-
11 φέροντος ὀλιγωροῦσι τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ δυσέλπιδες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· τὰ γὰρ πλείω τῶν γιγνομένων φαῦλά

sub init. ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσιν, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἀν μοχθηρότερος ἢ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἔγκαλουσι δὴ αὐτῷ ὅτι οὐθὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ (“away from himself”, without reference to himself, and his own interests) πράττει. But when all a man's aims and desires are centred in himself, they must of course be very mean and confined as compared with the lofty aspirations of the *μεγαλόψυχος*, or even of the average man, and the wide sphere in which they range; and therefore self-love when excessive is one form in which narrow-mindedness shews itself.

'Their rule in life is profit, not honour, more than it ought to be, which arises from their selfishness: for profit, self-interest, is a man's *own* good, whereas honour (or the right) is good absolutely'. Orelli quotes this, and ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ κέρδος, in illustration of Horace's *quaerit et inventis miser abstinet et timet uti*, A. P. 170. On the distinction of αὐτῷ the individual, and ἀπλῶς the general notion or the absolute, see note on τὸ αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπλῶς, I 7. 35.

On τὸ καλόν in its two aspects, see I 7. 24, and I 9. 3, and notes. We are here presented with the two opposing views of good, the ideal and practical. The ideal form represents good as the fair and right, the aim and end of our hopes and aspirations, and the rule of life, in the shape (it may be) of honour or glory (*la Gloire*), or some immaterial, high and noble object, apart from all considerations of self, and one's own interest. The practical view of good regards it as something useful and serviceable for the uses and purposes of life, and for one's own interest and advancement; it is τὸ χρήσιμον and τὸ ἕνυμφέρον, the useful and profitable. Socrates in Xenophon's Memorabilia argues in favour of this view of 'good'.

§ 10. 'And they are rather inclined to insensibility than to sensibility to shame (comp. 12. 10); for in consequence of their caring little for honour as compared with profit, they pay slight regard to (treat with contempt) other people's opinions of them (how they seem to others). They only care for solid and substantial advantages, and disregard all mere empty 'seeming' and 'opinion'. πρεσβύτερον δὲ οὐδεὶς ἀν ἐπανέστειν ὅτι αἰσχυντηλός (Eth. N. IV 15, 1128 b 20). If he were keenly sensitive to shame, he would get no credit for it; οὐθὲν γὰρ οἰόμεθα δεῖν αὐτὸν πράττειν οἷς ἔστιν αἰσχύνη.

§ 11. 'Also they are given to despondency, in consequence of their (unfavourable) experience (of life and its fortunes);—for most things that

ἐστιν· ἀποβαίνει γοῦν τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ
 12 ἔτι διὰ τὴν δειλίαν καὶ ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ
 ἐλπίδι· τοῦ γάρ βίου τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν ὀλίγον τὸ δὲ
 παρεληλυθὸς πολύ, ἔστι δὲ η μὲν ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλον-
 τος η δὲ μνήμη τῶν παροιχομένων. ὅ περ αἴτιον καὶ
 τῆς ἀδολεσχίας αὐτοῖς· διατελοῦσι γάρ τὰ γενόμενα
 13 λέγοντες· ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι γάρ ἥδονται. καὶ οἱ
 θυμοὶ ὁξεῖς μέν εἰσιν ἀσθενεῖς δέ, καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ
 μὲν ἐκλελοίπασιν αἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσίν, ὡστε οὕτ' ἐπι-
 θυμητικοὶ οὔτε πρακτικοὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ

happen are bad (full of defects)—at all events the results are mostly disappointing (things mostly turn out for the worse);—and besides this, owing to their cowardice.’ Aesch. c. Timarch. § 24, οὐκ ἡγνόει ὁ νομοθέτης ὅτι οἱ πρεσβύτεροι τῷ μὲν εὐ φρονῶν ἀκράζουσιν, η δὲ τόλμα ἥδη αὐτοὺς ἄρχεται ἐπιλείπειν διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν τῶν πραγμάτων.

§ 12. ‘And they live by (their) memory rather than by hope’ (comp. c. 12. 8, and the note there, on *ζῶσιν ἐλπίδι*), ‘for what remains to them of their life is short, but that which is past long; and hope is of the future, but memory of the past. Which is also the reason of their garrulity (habit of chattering or prattling¹); for they are continually talking about what has happened, their delight being in recollection’. The aged Cephalus says of himself, Plat. Rep. I 328 D, εὐ ισθι ὅτι ἔμοιγε ὅσον αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἥδοναι ἀπομαραίνονται, τοσοῦτον αὖξονται αἱ περὶ τὸν λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι τε καὶ ἥδοναι (Gaisford). “With seats beneath the shade For talking age and whispering lovers made.” Goldsmith, *Deserted Village*.

§ 13. ‘And their fits of passion (*θυμός*, as before, the passionate, angry impulses; one of the three *δρέξεις*, with *ἐπιθυμία* and *βούλησις*) are sharp, but feeble, (neither strong nor lasting,) and of their appetites, some have failed altogether, others become enfeebled, so that they are not prone either to the feeling of desire or to act under its impulses, but only according to the dictates of self-interest. Accordingly men at this time of life are thought to have the disposition to temperance, or self-control, *besides* (sc. the preceding); not only because their appetites are relaxed (slackened, *ἀνιεσθαι* contrasted with *ἐπιτείνεσθαι*, met. from stringing the lyre, note on I 4.12), ‘but also because they are slaves to their own interest’. *σωφροσύνη* being the *acquired and fixed habit*, or *virtue*, of self-control, *σώφρων* the possessor of the virtue, and *σωφρονικοί* those who are inclined or have a tendency to it; those men, whose desires and passions are so feeble as to *require no control*, gain credit in the eyes of the world for the *disposition to* (termination -ικός) the virtue itself.

¹ ἀδολεσχία. Eth. N. III 13, 1117 δ 35, τοὺς περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας...καλοῦμεν.

κατὰ τὸ κέρδος. διὸ καὶ σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ p. 82.
 τηλικοῦτοι· αἱ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκαστι, καὶ δουλεύ-
 14 ουσι τῷ κέρδει. καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ
 κατὰ τὸ ἥθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος
 τὸ δὲ ἥθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἔστιν. καὶ τἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦ-
 15 σιν εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν. ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ
 γέροντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ διὰ ταύτη τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν
 γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι’ ἀσθένειαν· πάντα
 γὰρ οἴονται ἐγγὺς εἶναι αὐτοῖς παθεῖν, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν
 ἐλεητικόν. ὅθεν ὁδυρτικοὶ εἰσι, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι querelous
 οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ ὁδυρτικὸν τῷ
 φιλογέλωτι.

16 τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἥθη
 τοιαῦτα· ὡστ’ ἐπεὶ ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ

σωφρονικοὶ recurs in Eth. N. VI 13, II 44 δ 5, and is found in Xenophon and Plato, and the adverb in Aristophanes.

§ 14. ‘And their course of life is directed rather by calculation than character: for calculation is directed to one’s own interest, whereas character is indicative of virtue’. The opposite of this, c. 12. 12.

[ἥθος] is ‘the impulse of character’, as before. Virtuous ‘dispositions’ or ‘characters’ are natural to us, Eth. N. VI 13, u. s. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἔκαστα τῶν ἥθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τἄλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς. These however are not virtues—Eth. N. II 1, sub init., οὐδεμίᾳ τῶν ἥθειῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται—but dispositions or tendencies to virtue, δυνάμεις, which may be developed into ἔξεις, of which σωφρονικός (having a tendency to σωφροσύνη) is an individual instance.

‘And the offences which they commit incline rather to petty knavery and mischief than to insolence and wanton outrage’. See c. 12. 15, and the passages there referred to.

§ 15. ‘Old men also (as well as young, c. 12. 15) are inclined to compassion, but not for the same reason as the young; in the one it is from humanity, in the other from weakness; for all calamities that happen to others seem to be near at hand, impending over, themselves (near at hand to themselves to suffer, ὡστε αὐτοὺς παθεῖν αὐτά), and this is what was said (ἥν, viz. c. 8 § 1) to incline men to pity. And hence it is that they are querulous (*difficilis, querulus*, Hor. A. P. 173) and not given to pleasantry nor fond of mirth; for a querulous disposition (habit of complaining, bemoaning oneself) is opposite to love of mirth’.

§ 16. ‘Such are the characters of the youthful and elderly; accordingly, since language conformable to their own character, as well as persons similar to themselves, are acceptable to every one, it is plain

σφετέρῳ ἥθει λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τὸν ὄμοίους, οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς χρώμενοι τοὺς λόγους τοιοῦτοι φανοῦνται Ι καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι. οἱ δὲ ἀκμάζοντες φανερὸν ὅτι μεταξὺ τούτων τὸ ἥθος ἔσονται, ἐκατέρων ἀφαιροῦν-

enough how we are to use our words in order that we and our speeches may assume such and such a character'. The study of the tempers, and manners and habits and modes of thought of these two ages and the rest, will enable us without difficulty to assume the tone and language which are in conformity with the taste of any particular kind of audience which we have to persuade: everybody likes to be addressed in his own style, to hear the sentiments and language which are habitual to himself.

τὸν τῷ σφετέρῳ ἥθει λεγομένους λόγους] Orationes quae dicuntur ad proprios mores, Vetus Translatio;—Quae ingenio moribusque ipsorum convenientes habentur, Victorius;—Quae suis ipsorum moribus convenientes habentur orationes, Riccobon. No notice has been taken of the difficulty of explaining the force of the dative *ἥθει* after *λεγόμενους*. In the above translations the first evidently understands it in the sense of *spoken to, addressed to*, the direct dative. But although *λέγειν τινι*, to say unto, tell, or bid anyone is allowable Greek, I doubt if that use of it is applicable here. Surely to *address to* must be rendered by *πρὸς τῷ σφέτερον ἥθος*, and not by the dative. The other two translations are mere evasions of the difficulty, giving the sense, but not explaining the construction. The only other possible sense of the dative which suggests itself to me, is the *instrumental 'by'*: but 'by the aid of their character' is I think not a probable, though a possible, mode of expressing the *conformity* which is here required. The meaning is plain; speeches which express, or are in conformity with, the characters and manners of certain classes, whom we may have to address. As a last resource I venture to propose *ὅμολογομένους* as a substitute for *λεγόμενους*; there is no variation of MSS; but it certainly seems possible that the three first letters in the long word in question may have been accidentally decapitated in the course of transcription, and then the remainder *λογομένους* would naturally have been converted into *λεγόμενους*.

CHAP. XIV.

§ 1. 'The character of men in the prime of life will plainly lie between the other two, by subtraction of the excess of each, (so that) they are neither excessively confident—for that kind of disposition is rashness—nor overmuch given to fear, but in a right state of mind as to both, neither implicitly trusting nor altogether distrusting everyone indiscriminately, but rather with a due distinction according to the real facts of the case'.

ἀφαιρεῖν, properly opposed to *προστιθέναι*, as in a numerical calculation to *add* and *subtract*. Hence *withdraw, remove, et sim.* For example, Plat. Cratyl. 431 C, *προστιθείσις ἡ ἀφαιρῶν γράμματα*. Ib. 432 A. Phaedo 95 E, bis, et alibi. Xen. de Rep. Ath. III 8 and 9, *κατὰ μικρόν τι προσθέντα ἡ ἀφελόντα*, 'by slight and gradual addition or subtraction' (said of the changes of political constitutions).

τες τὴν ὑπερβολήν, καὶ οὕτε σφόδρα θαρροῦντες (θρα-
2 σύτης γάρ τὸ τοιοῦτον) οὕτε λίαν φοβούμενοι, καλῶς
δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχοντες, οὕτε πᾶσι πιστεύοντες οὕτε
πᾶσιν ἀπιστοῦντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς κρίνοντες
μᾶλλον, καὶ οὕτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον οὕτε ^{P. 1390 b.}
πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄμφω, καὶ οὕτε πρὸς
φειδὼ οὕτε πρὸς ἀσωτίαν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἀρμόττον·
3 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς θυμὸν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ
σώφρονες μετ' ἀνδρίας καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι μετὰ σωφροσύνης.
ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νέοις καὶ τοῖς γέροντι διῆρηται ταῦτα·
εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν νέοι ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι, οἱ δὲ
πρεσβύτεροι σώφρονες καὶ δειλοί. ὡς δὲ καθόλου
εἰπεῖν, ὅσα μὲν διῆρηται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας τῶν
ἀφελίμων, ταῦτα ἄμφω ἔχοντιν, ὅσα δ' ὑπερβάλ-

θαρροῦντες and θρασύτης here preserve their proper distinction, θάρσος, true courage, θράσος, reckless audacity or impudence, though these senses are often interchanged. The verb θαρσέν or θαρρέειν, as Plato, Aristotle, and the later Greeks write it, has never the unfavourable sense.

§ 2. ‘And the conduct of their life will be directed neither to honour alone, nor to self-interest, but to both’. Compare 12. 12; 13. 9. ‘And neither to parsimony nor to profligate extravagance, but to what is fit and proper’, i.e. the mean, *ἐλευθερίης*; Eth. N. II 7, 1107 δ 10, IV 1, 1120 α 1, seq.

§ 3. ‘And similarly in respect of passion and appetite. And they will be temperate (sober-minded, under self-control) with courage, and courageous with self-control: for in the young and old these two are separated (or distinguished), the young being brave and licentious (devoid of self-control), and the elders sober and temperate but cowardly’. ‘Self-control’ is the form in which the virtue appears especially in Plato’s Gorgias and Republic, where it is described as a regulating principle which guides the whole man, ordering and harmonising his entire moral constitution.

‘And, speaking in general terms, all the advantages (good qualities, elements of good character) that youth and old age have divided between them (= *ἔχει διηρημένα*), both of these the others enjoy; and whereinsoever (the two first) are excessive or defective, in these (they observe, *subaudiοι ἀκράζοντες ἔχοντιν*) a due moderation (or mean) and a fitness or propriety of conduct’.

ὅσα διῆρηται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας] I think διαιρεῖσθαι must be here middle, said of those who divide amongst themselves, have *shares* in any joint work or possession. Thuc. VII 19, διελόμενοι τὸ ἔργον. An objection might be taken to this, that διῆρηται is singular and not plural, and

λουσιν ἡ ἐλλείπουσι, τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἄρ-
4 μόττον. ἀκμάζει δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα
ἐτῶν μέχρι τῶν πεντεκαιτριάκοντα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ περὶ
τὰ ἐνὸς δεῖν πεντήκοντα.

that no one can share a thing with himself. But although the verb is singular in form, being connected grammatically with *νεότης* alone, which stands next to it, yet it is evident that *γῆρας* is meant to be included in the distribution as well as the other. It is accordingly equivalent to *διγραμένα ἔχοντων*. I think it cannot be passive; the analogy of *πιστεύεσθαι τι* ‘to be trusted with something’, *ἐπιτετράφθαι τι*, and the like, cannot be applied to this case.

τὸ μέτριον] is Plato's *summum bonum*, the highest in the scale of goods, in the Philebus; also the Horatian *aurea mediocritas*: it may also stand for the Aristotelian *μέσον*, which at all events is the sense in which it is employed here.

τὸ ἄρμοττον] that which fits, the fitting; derived by metaphor from the carpenter's, joiner's and builder's trades; is nearly equivalent to *τὸ πρέπον*, and like it refers us to the fitness of things, as a standard of good, to a harmonious organisation or order of the universe, a system physical or moral which has all its parts dove-tailed, as it were, together, arranged in due order and subordination, carefully and exactly fitted together; Cicero's *apta compositio (membrorum, of the human figure [de officiis I 28.98])*.

§ 4. ‘The body is in its prime from 30 to 35 (years of age), the soul (i. e. the intellectual and moral faculties) about nine and forty’ (50 minus one: *δεῖν* is *δέον*, wanting so much).

Two of the numbers here mentioned are multiples of seven. The stages of life are determined by a septenary theory, the earliest record of which is an elegiac fragment of doubtful genuineness (Porson), attributed to Solon (ap. Clemen. Alexandr. Strom., Bergk, *Lyr. Gr.* p. 332 [346, ed. 2], Sol. Frigm. 25), in which the seventy years allotted to human life, and its successive stages of growth, development and decay, are divided into ten periods of seven years each. The dates here given by Aristotle for the prime of body and mind, agree tolerably well with the verses of the fragment. *τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ τᾶς τις ἐν ἑβδομάδι μέγ' ἄριστος ἵσχυν ἥν τ' ἄνδρες σήματ' ἔχοντο ἀρετῆς*. The fifth septenary is the marriageable age. In the seventh the intellect and powers of speech have reached their prime. *ἔπτα δὲ (49) νοῦν καὶ γλώσσαν ἐν ἑβδομάσιν μέγ' ἄριστος κ.τ.λ.*

The same theory, whether derived from Solon or not, which seems to have been generally current, reappears in Polit. IV (VII) 16, 1335 b 32, *κατὰ τὴν τῆς διαινοίας ἀκμὴν* αὐτῇ δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις ἡντερ τῶν ποιητῶν τινὲς εἰρήκασιν οἱ μετροῦντες τὰς ἑβδομάσι τὴν ἡλικίαν, περὶ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῶν πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν (i.e. $7 \times 7 = 49$): and again Polit. ib. c. 17, 1336 b 37, δύο δὲ εἰσιν ἡλικιαὶ πρὸς ἃς ἀναγκαῖον διηρῆσθαι τὴν παιδείαν, μετὰ τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔπτα μεχρὶ ἥβης καὶ πάλιν μετὰ τὴν ἀφ' ἥβης μεχρὶ τῶν ἐνὸς καὶ εἴκοσιν ἐτῶν. οἱ γὰρ τὰς ἑβδομάσιν διαιροῦντες τὰς ἡλικίας ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λέγουσιν οὐ

περὶ μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίων
I ἡθῶν ἔκαστόν ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα· περὶ δὲ τῶν ^{CHAP. XV.}
ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνομένων ἀγαθῶν, δι' ὅσα αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ^{p. 83.}

καλῶς (leg. κακῶς, Spengel), δεῖ δὲ τὴν διαιρέσει τῆς φύσεως ἐπακολουθεῖν. ***
Nevertheless the theory is departed from in assigning the proper age of
marriage in the two sexes; ib. c. 16, 1335 a 28, the woman is to marry at
18, the man at 37 'or thereabouts'; neither of them divisible by seven; ἐν
τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσι τε τοῖς σώμασι σύζευξις ἔσται κ.τ.λ. And in line 35,
the term of human life is again fixed at 70 years. So the Psalmist [xc. 10],
"The days of our years are threescore years and ten."

And to the same theory (the number seven, marking a crisis, or stage
of growth, in the life of an animal,) reference is frequently made, in the
Hist. Anim., as VII 1.2, 16, 18, c. 12.2, and elsewhere: from all which it
may be concluded that Aristotle was a believer in it. Plato, Rep. v 460 E,
fixes the prime of life in a woman at the age of 20, in a man at 30: in
Legg. IV 721 A, and in three other places, the age of marriage is fixed
from 30 to 35, though in one of them (VI 772 E) 25 is also named.
Compare on this subject Hes. Opp. et D. 695 seq. Xenoph. de Rep.
Lac. I 6, (Stallbaum's note on Plato 1 c.).

But the theory of the virtues of the number seven was carried to a far
greater extent, as may be seen in I 6 of Macrobius' Commentary on
Cicero's *Somnium Scipionis*, of which the sum is given in a quotation
from the *Somnium Scipionis*:—Cicero de septenario dicit, *Qui numerus*
rerum omnium fere nodus est. Everything in nature is determined by
the number seven. Near the end of the chapter, we are told, in con-
formity with Aristotle's statement, *Notandum vero quod, cum numerus*
se multiplicat (at the age of 49, 7×7), *facit aetatem quae proprie perfecta*
et habetur et dicitur: adeo ut illius aetatis homo, utpote qui perfectionem
et attigerit iam, et necdum praeterierit, et consilio aptus sit, nec ab exer-
citio virium alienus habeatur. This is the prime of mind and body
together. *Quinta (hebdomas) omne virium* (strength and powers of body
alone), *quanta esse unicuique, possunt, complet augmentum*. All this
came no doubt originally from the Pythagoreans; as may be inferred
from Arist. Met. N 6, 1093 a 13, where this number seven, is said to be
assigned by them as the cause of everything that happened to have this
number of members; *seven* vowels, *seven* chords or harmonies, *seven*
Pleiads; animals shed their teeth in *seven* years—yes, says Ar., *some* do,
but some don't—and *seven* champions against Thebes. And from this
and similar considerations they inferred some mysterious virtue in the
number; and identified it with *vōs* and *καιρός*. (Ritter and Preller,
Hist. Phil. c. 2, Pythag. § 102, note a.)

'So for youth and age and prime of life, the kind of characters, that
is to say, that belong to each, let thus much suffice' (to have been said).

CHAP. XV.

A γνώμη of Phocylides may serve as a motto of this chapter. καὶ
τόδε Φωκυλίδεω· τί πλέον γένος εὐγενὲς εἶναι οἷς οὐτ' ἐν μίθοις ἔπειται χάρις,

ἥθη ποί' ἀττα συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, λέγωμεν
2 ἐφεξῆς. εὐγενείας μὲν οὖν ἥθος ἔστι τὸ φιλοτιμό-
τερον εἶναι τὸν κεκτημένον αὐτήν ἀπαντες γάρ, ὅταν
ὑπάρχῃ τι, πρὸς τοῦτο σωρεύειν εἰώθασιν, ή δὲ εὐγέ-
νεια ἐντιμότης τις προγόνων ἔστιν. καὶ καταφρο-
νητικὸν καὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἔστι τοῖς προγόνοις τοῖς
αὐτῶν, διότι πόρρω ταύτα μᾶλλον ἡ ἐγγὺς γιγνόμενα

οὕτ' ἐν βονλῇ; Brunck, *Poet. Gnom.* p. 91. Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.*
p. 339 [p. 358, ed. 2].

§ 1. ‘Of the goods arising from fortune, as many of them, that is, as have an influence upon men’s characters, let us proceed to speak next in order’.

§ 2. ‘One characteristic of *noble birth* is that the ambition of the possessor of it is thereby increased. For everyone that has anything to start with, or to build upon’, (as a nucleus, focus, or centre of attraction: *ὑπάρχειν*, to underlie, to be there already, prop. as a basis or foundation for a superstructure) ‘is accustomed to make this the nucleus of his acquisitions or accumulations, and high or noble birth implies or denotes ancestral distinction’. *σωρεύειν πρὸς τι, lit.* to bring to *this*, in order to heap round it, any subsequent accumulations. The meaning is, that any new acquisitions of honour or property that a man makes, will generally take the form of an addition to some stock which he already has, whenever he *has* one ready for the purpose, *ὅταν τι ὑπάρχῃ*.

‘This condition of life is inclined to look down upon even those who resemble, are on a level with, (in condition, wealth, rank, distinction, and so forth,) their own ancestors, because their distinctions, in proportion to the degree of their remoteness, are more distinguished (than those of contemporaries) and are easier to brag of’ (more readily admit of boastful exaggeration). *Distance lends enchantment to the view.* Honours and distinctions shine with a brighter lustre in the remote ages of antiquity, and confer more dignity upon those who by right of inheritance can claim a share in them, than those of the same kind, and equal in all other respects, when acquired by contemporaries—familiarity breeds in some degree contempt for them—just as *ἀρχαιοπλούτειν* is a higher claim to consideration than *νεοπλούτειν*, II 9. 9, q. v. Antiquity of possession carries with it a prescriptive right.

[*καταφρονητικὸν*] agrees with *τὸ εὐγενές*, the abstract for the concrete, und. from the preceding *εὐγένεια*. An abstract term is often *particularised*, or expressed by the component members in detail, as in construction of antecedent and relative, such as Polit. I 2, 1252 b 13, *κοινωνία...οὓς Χαρώνδας καλεῖ...* This construction is an instance of that wide-spread and multiform grammatical ‘figure’, the *σχῆμα πρὸς τὸ σημαινόμενον*, which, in a great variety of different ways, departs from the usual *construction* of words and adapts it ‘to the thing signified’; as, in the case above given, the abstract virtually includes all the component members of the society who are *expressed* in the *plural* relative.

ἢ ἐντιμότερα καὶ εὐαλαζόνευτα. ἔστι δὲ εὐγενὲς μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀρετὴν, γενναιῶν δὲ κατὰ τὸ μὴ ἔξιστασθαι τῆς φύσεως· ὅ περ ως ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ

εὐαλαζόνευτα] On *δλαζοεία* and *δλαζών*, see note on I 2.7. Of the two significations of the word, that of ‘bragging’ is here uppermost.

§ 3. ‘The term *εὐγένες* (*well-born*, come of a good stock, of noble race, or *descent*) is applied to mark distinction (*excellence*) of race; *γενναιός* (of noble *character*) to the maintenance of the normal type of character’ (keeping up to, not degenerating from, the true family standard). The difference between *εὐγένης* and *γενναιός* lies in this; that in the former the *race* or *descent*, *γένος*, is *directly* expressed as the prominent and leading idea; it indicates that the *εὐγένης* comes of a good breed, but says nothing of the individual character: in the latter it is the *character*, conformable to the excellence of the breed or race, that is put prominently forward. The account here given of *εὐγένεια* is illustrated by the definition of it in I 5.5; it denotes in fact the excellences and distinctions of one’s ancestors, as *distinguished from* one’s own. See the passages there collected. In Hist. Anim. I 1, 488 b 18, these two words are defined and distinguished almost in the same terms; *εὐγενὲς* μὲν γάρ ἔστι τὸ ἔξ ἀγαθοῦ γένους, *γενναιῶν* δὲ τὸ μὴ ἔξισταμενον ἐκ τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως. Ar. is here characterising the dispositions of animals. Some are ἐλευθέρια καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ *εὐγενή* οἷον λέων, τὰ δὲ *γενναιότης* καὶ ἄγρια καὶ ἐπίβουλα, οἷον λύκος¹ from which it appears that *γενναιότης* is strictly and properly *only* the maintenance of a certain type of character, which need not necessarily be a good one: though in ordinary usage it is invariably applied to denote good qualities. On *εὐγένεια*, see Herm. Pol. Ant. § 57.

ἔξιστασθαι] ‘to quit a previous state’; of a change in general, especially a change *for the worse*, degeneration. Plat. Rep. II 480 A, τῆς ἑαυτοῦ *ἰδέας ἐκβαίνειν...εἴπερ τι ἔξισται τῆς αὐτοῦ ἑδεας*’ of God, changing his own proper form, and descending to a lower. Eth. Nic. VII 7, 1150 a 1, ἀλλ’ ἔξιστηκε τῆς φύσεως, ὥσπερ οἱ μανύμενοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Pol. VIII (v) 6, sub fin., αἱ δημοκρατίαι καὶ δλιγαρχίαι ἔξιστανται ἐνίοτε οὐκ εἰς τὰς ἐναρτίας πολιτειας κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 9, 1309 b 32, δλιγαρχίαιν καὶ δημοκρατίαιν...ἔξιστηκιας τῆς βελτίστης τάξεως.

On *φύσις* as the *τέλος*, the *true* nature, the normal or perfect state of anything, see Pol. I 2, 1252 b 32, ή δὲ φύσις τέλος ἔστιν οἷον γὰρ ἔκαστον ἔστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἔκαστον, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας. Grant, on Eth. Nic. II 1. 3, distinguishes five different senses of *φύσις* in Aristotle, of which this is the last.

‘Which (the maintenance of the ancestral character) for the most part is not the lot of the well-born, but most of them (the members or descendants of an illustrious family) are good-for-nothing¹ (*εὐτελῆς vilis*, cheap. *Fortes non semper creantur fortibus*); ‘for there is a kind of crop in the families of men (*φορά* here implies an alternation of *φορά* and *ἀφορά*, of good and bad crops) just as there is in the produce of the soil (*lit.* the things

¹ παῦροι γάρ τοι παῖδες δομῶν πατρὶ πέλονται· οἱ πλέοντες κακλούς, παῦροι δέ τε πατρὸς ἀρέλους. Hom. Od. β' 276.

οὐ συμβαίνει τοῖς εὐγενέσιν, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ εὐτελεῖς· φορὰ γάρ τις ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ἀνδρῶν ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τὰς χώρας γιγνομένοις, καὶ ἐνίστε ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸν τὸ γένος, ἐγγίνονται διά τινος χρόνου that grow in the country places); for a certain time (*διά* with gen., along the course or channel of, during,) remarkable men (distinguished *above* their fellows, standing *out* from among them, *περὶ*) grow up in them, and then (after an interval of unproductiveness) they begin again to produce them'. There are two ways of understanding *ἀναδίδωσιν*; either it is active, 'to send up, produce', as the earth *yields* her fruits, and this is the natural interpretation, and supported by the use of the word in other writers: or, as Rost and Palm in their Lex., *zurückgehen*, 'to go back', *relapse* into a state of barrenness, on the analogy of *ἀναχωρεῖν* et sim. ['deficit'. *Index Aristotelicus*]. In this case *διδόναι* is neut. (by the suppression of the reflexive pronoun) as indeed both itself and its compounds frequently are—and may be either 'to give (itself) back, to give way', or perhaps rather, like *ἀνέναι*, *ἀνεύσθαι*, to *relax* or *slacken* in production (*ἀνῆ*, Soph. Phil. 764). Victorius gives both renderings; I have adopted his second version [“posteaque rursus, intervallo aliquo temporis edit ac gignit industrios item atque insignes viros”], which seems to me the more natural interpretation of *ἀναδίδωσιν*.

φορά *proventus*, the produce which the earth bears, *φέρει*, is either 'a crop' simply, or 'a good crop', opposed to *ἀφορία*—fertility, abundance, to barrenness, either absolute or comparative. Plat. Rep. VIII 546 A, οὐδὲ μόνον φυτῶν ἔγειας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἐπιγείοις ζῷοις φορὰ καὶ ἀφορία *ψυχῆς τε καὶ σωμάτων γίγνονται*. Ar. Hist. Anim. V 21. 1, *ἐλαιῶν φ.*, de Gen. Anim. III 1. 15, *τῶν δένδρων τὰ πολλὰ...ξεσανάνται μετὰ τὴν φοράν* (after the crop). And metaphorically in Dem. de Cor. § 61, *φορὰν προδοτῶν καὶ δωροδόκων*. Aesch. c. Ctes. § 234, *φ. βητόρων πονηρῶν ἄμα καὶ τολμηρῶν*. Dissen ad loc. Dem. cit. Plut. Platon. Quaest. I 1, 999 E, *φ. σοφιστῶν*. Diodor. XVI. 54, *φ. προδοτῶν*. “Sic Latine *novorum proventum scelerum* dixit Lucan. Phars. II 61, et similiter *messem usurpat* Plaut. Trinum. I 1. II.” Dissen, l. c.

With the whole passage compare Pind. Nem. XI 48, *ἀρχαῖαι δ' ἀρεταὶ ἀμφέροντ' ἀλλασσόμεναι γενεᾶις ἀνδρῶν σθένος, ἐν σχέρῳ δ' οὐτ' ὧν μέλαιναι καρπὸν ἔδωκαν ἄρουραι δένδρεά τ' οὐτ' ἐθέλει πάσαις ἐτέων περ ὄδοις [al. περόδοις] ἀνθος εὐώδες φέρειν, πλούτῳ ἵστον, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀμειβοντι. καὶ θνατὸν οὗτον σθένος ἄγει Μοῦρα*. Ib. VI 14 (Gaisford).

'When clever families degenerate, their characters acquire a tendency to madness, as for instance the descendants of Alcibiades and Dionysius the elder (tyrant of Syracuse), whereas those of a steady (staid, stable) character degenerate into sluggishness or *dulness*' (of which the stubborn ass is the type; ὡς δ' ὅτ' ὅνος...*ἐβήσατο παῖδας νωθῆς*, φ. δὴ πολλὰ περὶ ρόπαλ' ἀμφὶς ἐάγη [Il. XI 559]), as in the case of those of Conon and Pericles and Socrates'. We learn from Plato, Men. 93 B—94 E, that the son of Themistocles, Cleophantus; of Aristides, Lysimachus; the sons of Pericles, Paralus and Xanthippus; of Thucydides (the statesman and general, the opponent of Pericles and his policy), Melesias and Stephanus; all de-

ἀνδρες περιπτοί, κάπειτα πάλιν ἀναδίδωσιν. ἐξίσταται δὲ τὰ μὲν εὐφυά γένη εἰς μανικώτερα ἥθη, οἷον οἱ ἀπ' Ἀλκιβιάδου καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Διονυσίου τοῦ πρότερου, τὰ δὲ στάσιμα εἰς ἀβελτερίαν καὶ νωθρότητα, οἷον οἱ ἀπὸ Κίμωνος καὶ Περικλέους καὶ Σωκράτους.

I τῷ δὲ πλούτῳ ἀ ἔπεται ἥθη, ἐπιπολῆς ἐστὶν ἵδεν CHAP. XVI.
ἀπασιν· ύβρισταὶ γὰρ καὶ ύπερήφανοι, πάσχοντές τι
ὑπὸ τῆς κτήσεως τοῦ πλούτου ὕσπερ γὰρ ἔχοντες
ἄπαντα τάγαθὰ οὕτω διάκεινται· ὁ γὰρ πλούτος οἶον P. 1391.

generated from their fathers; and in spite of the advantages of their education turned out nevertheless either quite ordinary men, or altogether bad.

The alliance of quickness of wit or cleverness and madness is marked again in Poet. XVII 4, 1455 a 32, *εὐφυοῦς ἡ ποιητική ἐστιν ἡ μανικοῦ* (the poet's 'fine frenzy'). Probl. XXX I. 18, *ὅσοις μὲν πολλὴ καὶ ψυχρὰ ἐνπάρχει (ἢ κράσις τῆς μελανῆς χολῆς) νωθροὶ καὶ μωροί, ὅσοις δὲ λίαν πολλὴ καὶ θερμὴ μανικοὶ καὶ εὐφυεῖς κ.τ.λ.* Great wits are sure to madness near allied, and thin partitions do their bounds divide. Dryden [*Absalom and Achitophel*, I 163].

στάσιμα settled, steady characters, is illustrated by Thuc. II 36, *ἐν τῇ καθεστηκίᾳ ἡλικίᾳ* ('mature and vigorous age'), Soph. Aj. 306, *ἔμφρων μόλις πως ἔνν χρόνῳ καθίσταται* ('settles down again into his senses'). Aesch. Pers. 300, *λέξον καταστάς* ('first compose thyself, and then speak'). Blomfield, Gloss. ad loc., refers to Ar. Ran. 1044, *πνέυμα καθεστηκός*, and Eurip. Orest. 1310, *πάλιν κατάστηθ' ἡσύχῳ μὲν ὅμματι*. Theophr. ap. Plut. Symp. I 5, p. 623 B, *μάλιστα δὲ ὁ ἐνθουσιασμὸς ἐξίστησι καὶ παρατρέπει τό τε σῶμα καὶ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ καθεστηκότος*. Victorius points out a similar opposition of the two characters here contrasted, in Probl. III (16. I). What is here called *ἀβελτερία* and *νωθρότης* is there designated by *τετυφωμένους*, a term of similar import. *διὰ τί ὁ οἶνος καὶ τετυφωμένους ποιεῖ καὶ μανικούς; ἐναρτίᾳ γὰρ ἡ διάθεσις.* (*τετυφώσθαι* is explained by Harpocrat. and Suidas of one who has lost his wits in the shock of a violent storm; whether by the storm itself which has confounded him, or by the accompanying thunderbolt: Hesych. s. v. *μεμηνέναι*; and *τετύφωται*, ἀπόλωλεν. *ἔμπεπτοσται*. *ἔμβεβρόντηται*. *ἐπίγρθη*. Hence, of one *stupified*, *ἔμβρόντητος*, *παράπληξ*, out of his wits; or of fatuity, dulness in general).

CHAP. XVI.

§ 1. The characters that accompany wealth (the characteristics of wealth) lie on the surface within the view of all (*ἴτι. for all to see; ἐπιπολῆς ἀπασιν ὡστ' αὐτὸς ἵδειν αὐτά' comp. I 15. 22, and note there;*) for they are insolent, inclined to violence and outrage, and arrogant (in their conduct and bearing), being affected in some degree (their nature altered, the alteration for the worse regarded as a kind of suffering or affection) by the acquisition of wealth. These dispositions originate in the supposition that (in having wealth) they have every kind of good, all goods in

τιμή τις τῆς ἀξίας τῶν ἄλλων, διὸ φαίνεται ὡνια
2 ἅπαντα εἶναι αὐτοῦ. καὶ τρυφεροὶ καὶ σαλάκωνες,
τρυφεροὶ μὲν διὰ τὴν τρυφὴν καὶ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τῆς
εὐδαιμονίας, σαλάκωνες δὲ καὶ σόλοικοι διὰ τὸ πάντας

one; for wealth is as it were a sort of standard of the value of everything else, and consequently it seems as if everything else were purchasable by it'.

§ 2. 'They are also voluptuous (dainty and effeminate, *molles et delicati*, Victorius), and prone to vulgar ostentation, the former by reason of their self-indulgence (the luxury in which they live) and the (constant) display of their wealth and prosperity (*εὐδαιμών*, as well as *ὅλθιος*, = *πλούσιος*); ostentatious and ill-bred, because they (like others) are all accustomed to spend their time and thoughts upon what they themselves love and admire (and therefore, as they think about nothing but their wealth, so they are never weary of vaunting and displaying, which makes them rude and ostentatious), and also because they suppose that everybody else admires and emulates what they do themselves'. Foolishly supposing that every one else feels the same interest in the display of wealth that they do themselves, they flaunt in their neighbours' eyes till they excite repugnance and contempt instead of admiration.

τρυφεροὶ] denotes luxury *τρυφή*, and its effects, luxurious, effeminate, voluptuous habits: Eth. N. VII 8, 1150 δ 1, ὁ δὲ ἐλλείπων πρὸς ἡ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ ἀντιτείνονται καὶ δύνανται, οὗτος μαλακὸς καὶ τρυφῶν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ μαλακία τις ἔστιν. Eth. EuDEM. II 3. 8, ὁ μὲν μηδεμίᾳν ὑπομένων λύπην, μηδὲ εἰ βέλτιον, τρυφερός.

σαλάκωνες] denotes vulgar ostentation, and is very near akin to, if not absolutely identical with, *βανασία* and *ἀπειροκαλία*; the former is the excess of *μεγαλοπρέπεια*, proper magnificence in expenditure: the *βαναστός* goes beyond this, spending extravagantly where it is *not* required: Eth. Nic. IV 6, 1123 α 21, seq., ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μικροῖς τῶν δαπανημάτων πολλὰ ἀναλίσκει καὶ λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος—of which some instances are given —καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήσει οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα, ἀλλὰ τὸν πλούτον ἐπιδεικνύμενος, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἰόμενος θαυμάζεσθαι. Ib. c. 4, 1122 α 31, ἡ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ (ἐλευθεριότητος) βανασία καὶ ἀπειροκαλία (bad taste) καὶ ὅσαι τοιαῦται,...ἐν οἷς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ως οὐ δεῖ λαμπρυνόμεναι. Comp. Eth. EuDEM. II 3. 9, ἀστωτος (spendthrift) μὲν ὁ πρὸς ἄπασαν δαπάνην ὑπερβάλλων, ἀγελεύθερος δὲ ὁ πρὸς ἄπασαν ἐλλείπων. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μικροπρεπής καὶ ὁ σαλάκων· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ πρέπον (ὁ σαλάκων), ὁ δὲ ἐλλείπει τὸν πρέποντος. Hesych. s. v. *σαλακωνία* ἡ ἐν πενίᾳ ἀλαζονεία. *σαλακωνίσται* (after a different and wrong explanation, he adds) ὁ δὲ Θεόφραστος *σαλάκωνά φησιν εἶναι*, τὸν δαπανῶντα ὃπου μὴ δεῖ; which agrees with Aristotle. Suidas, s.v. *σαλάκων* προσποιούμενος πλούσιος εἶναι, πένης ὡν (as Hesych.), καὶ *σαλακωνία* ἀλαζονεία ὑπὲρ τὸ δέον, καὶ *σαλκωνίσαι* ἀλαζονεύεσθαι. Ib. *διασαλακωνίσαι*, *διαθρύψασθαι*: “εἴτα πλουσίως ὠδὶ προβὰς τρυφερόν τι διασαλακωνίσον” (“swagger”, Arist. Vesp. 1169).

σόλοικοι] ‘rude, ill-mannered, ill-bred’; liable to make mistakes, or commit solecisms; first, in language—*σολοικίζειν*, *τῇ λέξει βαρβαρίζειν*, Top. I (de

εἰωθέναι διατρίβειν περὶ τὸ ἔρωμενον καὶ θαυμαζόμενον ύπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ τῷ οἴεσθαι ζῆλοῦν τοὺς ἄλλους ἀ καὶ αὐτοί. ἅμα δὲ καὶ εἰκότως τοῦτο πάσχουσιν· πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ δεόμενοι τῶν ἔχοντων. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ Σιμωνίδου εἴρηται περὶ τῶν σοφῶν καὶ πλουσίων

Soph. El.) 3, ult. [p. 165 δ 21]—and secondly, transferred thence to manners, conduct, breeding. Victorius cites, Xen. Cyr. VIII 3. 21, Δαιφάρωνς δέ τις ἦν σολοικύτερος ἄνθρωπος τῷ τρόπῳ, ὃς φέτο εἰ μὴ ταχὺ ὑπακούοι ἐλευθερώτερος ἦν φαίνεσθαι. Plut. Pol. Praec. p. 817 A, οὐχ ὥσπερ ἔνοι τῶν ἀπειροκάλων καὶ σολοίκων. Ib. Vit. Dion. p. 965 A, οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ διαίτῃ σόλοικον ἐπιδεικνύμενος. The word is derived from Σόλοι, a town of Cilicia (there was another place of the same name in Cyprus), πόλις ἀξιόλογες (Strabo). ‘Qui cum barbare loquerentur, inde vocabulum hoc ad omnes vitioso sermone utentes, et tandem ad illos quoque qui in actionibus suis ineptiunt, est translatum’ (Schrader). Strabo XIV c. 5, Cilicia. Diog. Laert., Solon I 51, ἐκεῖθέν τε ἀπαλλαγεῖς (ὁ Κροῖσος) ἐγένετο ἐν Κιλικίᾳ, καὶ πόλιν συνφύκισεν ἦν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ (Solon) Σόλους ἐκάλεσεν’ (others represent Soli as founded by the Argives and Lindians from Rhodes. Smith’s Dict. Geogr. Vol. III 1012 δ); δλίγους τέ τινας τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐγκατάκισεν, οἱ τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν φωνὴν ἀποξενωθέντες ἐλέχθησαν. καὶ εἰσιν οἱ μὲν ἔνθεν Σολεῖς, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ Κύπρου Σόλιοι. Schrader therefore is incorrect in saying, ‘Solis oppidum cuius incolae Soloeci’; σόλοικος is derived from Σόλοι, but is not the name of one of its inhabitants.

‘And at the same time, these affections are natural to them, for many are they who require (the aid, the services) of the wealthy’. They have an excuse for being thus affected by their wealth; the numerous claimants upon their bounty elate them with a sense of superiority, and at the same time by their servility give them frequent opportunities of exercising at their expense their ostentation and ill manners. On *οἱ ἔχοντες*, the possessors of property, *sub. χρήματα*, see Monk on Eur. Alc. 57.—‘Whence also—this also gave occasion to the saying of Simonides about the philosophers and men of wealth to Hiero’s wife, when she asked him whether it was better to get rich or wise (to acquire riches or wisdom): Rich, he replied: for, said he, I see the philosophers waiting (passing their time) at the doors of the rich’. This same story is alluded to by Plato, Rep. vi 489 C, without naming the author of the saying, who indignantly denies its truth. The Scholiast, in supplying the omission, combines the two different versions of Aristotle and Diog. Laert., and describes it as a dialogue between Socrates and Eubulus. Diog. Laert. (II 8. 4, Aristip. § 69) tells the story thus: ἐρωτηθεὶς (Aristippus) ὑπὸ Διονυσίου διὰ τί οἱ μὲν φιλόσοφοι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν πλουσίων θύρας ἔρχονται, οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν φιλοσόφων οὐκέτι, ἔφη, ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἵσασιν ὥν δεόνται, οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἵσασιν¹.

¹ The merit of another *mot* attributed to Aristippus, as it is also connected with our present subject, may excuse its insertion here. Διονυσίου ποτ' ἔρομένον (τὸν Ἀριστιππὸν) ἐπὶ τὶς ἡκοι, ἔφη... δποτε μὲν σοφίας ἔδειμην, ἷκον παρὰ τὸν Σωκράτην νῦν δε χρημάτων δεόμενος παρὰ σὲ ἡκω. Diog. Laert. u. s. § 78.

πρὸς τὴν γυναικα τὴν Ἱέρωνος ἐρομένην πότερον γε-
νέσθαι κρείττον πλούσιον ἢ σοφόν πλούσιον εἰπεῖν·
τοὺς σοφοὺς γὰρ ἔφη ὄραν ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων p. 84.
3 θύραις διατρίβοντας. καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι ἀξίους εἶναι
ἀρχειν· ἔχειν γὰρ οἴονται ὡν ἔνεκεν ἀρχειν ἀξιον.
καὶ ως ἐν κεφαλαίῳ, ἀνοήτου εὐδαίμονος ἥθους ὁ
4 πλοῦτος ἐστίν. διαφέρει δὲ τοῖς νεωστὶ κεκτημένοις
καὶ τοῖς πάλαι τὰ ἥθη τῷ ἀπαντα μᾶλλον καὶ φαν-
λότερα τὰ κακὰ ἔχειν τοὺς νεοπλούτους· ὥσπερ γὰρ

On ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν πλουσίων θύραις, see Ast ad Pl. Phaedr. 245 A, p. 376. Add to the examples there given, Plat. Symp. 183 A, 203 D, de amantibus. Θυραλέιν, Ruhnken ad Tim. p. 144, Stallbaum ad Symp. 203 D, Arist. Eccl. 963.

§ 3. καὶ τὸ οἴεσθαι (ἐπεται τῷ πλούτῳ). ‘Cum καὶ οἱ οἰόμενοι pergere oporteret, τὸ οἴεσθαι posuit.’ Vater. ‘Wealth too is accompanied (in the minds of its possessors) by the opinion of a just claim to power (office, authority); and this is due to the supposition that they have what makes power worth having (*ἀξιον*). This I think is the only way of translating the text, with *ἀξιον*: and so the *Vetus Translatio*; *habere enim putant quorum gratia principari dignum*. The version of Victorius is *quod tenere se putant ea, quae qui possident regno digni sunt*. But this seems to require *ἀξιοι*, though the sense and connexion are certainly better; *ἀξιοι* had suggested itself to me as a probable emendation. Bekker and Spengel retain *ἀξιον*. ‘And in sum, the character that belongs to wealth is that of a thriving blockhead (a prosperous fool, good luck without sense).’ Victorius very properly observes that *εὐδαιμονία* is not to be understood in its strict ethical sense of real happiness, which must exclude folly, but it is used here loosely as a synonym of *εὐτυχία*. He also quotes a parallel phrase in Cic. de Amic. (54), *nihil insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest*.

§ 4. ‘However there is a difference in the characters of the recent and the hereditary possessors of wealth, in that the newly-enriched have all the bad qualities of their condition (*τά*) in a higher degree and worse (than the others); for recently acquired wealth is a sort of want of training in wealth (in the conduct, the use and enjoyment of it)’. On the habit of the *φαρνέα*, Victorius quotes Plut. Symp. VII, p. 708 C, καὶ περὶ οἴνων διαφορᾶς καὶ μύρων ἐρωτᾶν καὶ διαπυνθάνεσθαι φορτικὸν κομιδῆ καὶ νεόπλοιον; and Gaisford, Aesch. Agam. 1009, εἰ δ' οὖν ἀνάγκη τῆσδ' ἐπιρρέποι τύχης, ἀρχαιοπλούτων δεσποτῶν πολλὴ χάρις· οἱ δ' οὐποτ' ἐλπί-
σαντες ἥμησαν καλῶς ὡμοί τε δούλοις πάντα καὶ παρὰ σταθμήν. Blomfield’s Glossary. Donaldson’s *New Crat.* § 323. *Supra* II 9.9.

‘And the crimes that the wealthy commit are not of a mean character —petty offences of fraud and mischief—but are either crimes of insolence and violence or of licentiousness, such as assault (outrage on the person) in the one case, and adultery in the other’.

ἀπαιδευσία πλούτου ἐστὶ τὸ νεόπλουτον εἶναι. καὶ ἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν οὐ κακουργικά, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὑβριστικὰ τὰ δὲ ἀκρατευτικά, οἷον εἰς αἰκίαν καὶ μοιχείαν.

I ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως σχεδὸν τὰ πλεῖστα ^{CHAP.} XVII.
φανερά ἐστιν ἥθη· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχει ἡ δύνα-
2 μις τῷ πλούτῳ τὰ δὲ βελτίω· φιλοτιμότεροι γὰρ
καὶ ἀνδρωδέστεροι εἰσὶ τὰ ἥθη οἱ δυνάμενοι τῶν
πλουσίων διὰ τὸ ἐφίεσθαι ἔργων ὅσα ἔξουσία αὐτοῖς
3 πράττειν διὰ τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σπουδαστικώτεροι
διὰ τὸ ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ εἶναι, ἀναγκαζόμενοι σκοπεῖν τὰ
4 περὶ τὴν δύναμιν. καὶ σεμνότεροι ἡ βαρύτεροι ποιεῖ

εἰς αἰκίαν κ.τ.λ.] signifies the direction or tendency, or the issue or result, of the particular *ἀδίκημα*. This distinction of crimes has already occurred twice in the delineation of the characters of Youth and Age, II 12. 15 (see note), and 13. 14. *αἰκία*, the legal crime of assault and battery, is here adduced as an illustration of *ὑβρίς*, though under the Attic law it is expressly distinguished from it; *ὑβρίς* denoting a higher class of crimes, subject to a *γραφή* or public prosecution, *αἰκία* only to a *δίκη*, private suit or action. [Isocr. Or. 20 §§ 2, 5; Dem. Or. 54 (Conon) §§ 1, 17. Comp. Jebb's *Attic Orators* II 215—6.]

CHAP. XVII.

§ 1. ‘And in like manner also of power, most of the characters are pretty clear, the characteristics of power being in some points (or particulars) the same as those of wealth’.

§ 2. ‘In others better (but still of the same *kind*); for the powerful are more ambitious and more manly (or masculine) in their characters than the wealthy, which is due to their aspiring to such deeds (achievements) as their power gives them the liberty of effecting’. *ἔστιν δὲ ὅτε τὸν φιλότιμον ἐπανοῦμεν ως ἀνδράδη* (shewing how nearly the two characters coincide), Eth. Nic. IV 10, 1125 b 11, ἀνδρώδεις ως δυναμένος ἄρχειν, Ib. c. 11, 1126 b 2. The *power* supplies the occasion of doing great deeds, and the habit of doing them forms the ambitious and masculine character: *wealth* does not confer such opportunities.

§ 3. ‘And more active and energetic, by reason of the constant attention they are obliged to pay in looking to the means of maintaining their power’; which without such close attention might probably slip from their hands.

§ 4. ‘And they are rather proud and dignified than offensive, because their distinguished rank (or position) by making them more conspicuous (than all the rest) obliges them to moderation (in their demeanour). This pride and dignity is a softened (subdued) and graceful arrogance (or assumption)’.

γὰρ ἐμφανεστέρους τὸ ἀξίωμα, διὸ μετριάζουσιν· ἔστι δὲ η σεμνότης μαλακὴ καὶ εὐσχήμων βαρύτης. καὶ ἀδικῶσιν, οὐ μικραδικηταὶ εἰσιν ἀλλὰ μεγαλάδικοι.

5 ή δ' εὐτυχία κατά τε¹ μόρια τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχει τὰ ἥθη· εἰς γὰρ ταῦτα συντείνουσιν αἱ μέγισται δοκοῦσαι εἶναι εὐτυχίαι· καὶ ἔτι εἰς εὔτεκνίαν καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθὰ παρασκευάζει η εὐτυχία πλεονεκτεῖν. ὑπερηφανώτεροι μὲν οὖν καὶ ἀλογιστότεροι P. 1391
διὰ τὴν εὐτυχίαν εἰσίν, ἐν δ' ἀκολουθεῖ βέλτιστον

¹ ‘leg. τε’ [margin of Mr Cope’s copy of Bekker’s Oxford ed. 1837].

βαρύς, heavy, burdensome, and hence offensive, the German *lästig*. βαρύτης, ‘offensiveness’ in general; Dem., de Cor. § 35, speaks of the ἀναλγορία and βαρύτης of the Thebans, where it evidently means *impunitas*. Similarly in Isocr. Panath. § 31, it belongs to the character of the πεπαιδευμένοι, to assume themselves a becoming and fair behaviour to their associates, καὶ τὰς μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἀηδίας καὶ βαρύτητας εὐκόλως καὶ ρᾳδίως φέρονται; where it seems to denote offensiveness in the form of ill manners. *Here* it is applied to a particular kind of offensiveness or bad manners, which shews itself in that excess or exaggeration of σεμνότης or pride called arrogance and assumption. ‘Whenever they do commit a crime, the criminality shews itself, not in a trifling and mean offence, but on a grand scale, in high crimes and misdemeanours’.

§ 5. ‘Now the characters of good fortune are indeed found (or exhibited, principally) in the parts (the three divisions) of those already mentioned—for all those which are considered the most important kinds of good fortune *do* in fact converge to these—but also besides these, good fortune (prosperity) provides an advantage (over a man’s neighbours) in respect of happiness of family, and all personal gifts and accomplishments’.

πλεονεκτεῖν] must here, I think, be used, not in its ordinary and popular *acquired* signification, of seeking an *undue* share, covetousness, greed, rapacity, but in the simple and literal meaning, which it sometimes bears, of having an advantage (of any kind) over others. The ordinary sense—though Victorius appears to understand it so—seems to me quite inappropriate to the passage. These other kinds of good fortune are supplied in the list given I 5.4, where εὔτεκνία and τὰ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀγαθά, are both introduced, and the particulars of the latter enumerated.

§ 6. ‘Now though good fortune makes men more arrogant, overweening and inconsiderate, thoughtless, yet good fortune is attended by one excellent characteristic, viz. that (the fortunate) are pious or lovers of the gods’ (God-fearing, we say), ‘and have a certain religious character, their trust in them being due to the good things they have derived from fortune’; they are in reality due to fortune, but are ascribed by them to the

ἥθος τῇ εὐτυχίᾳ, ὅτι φιλόθεοί εἰσι καὶ ἔχουσι πρὸς τὸ θεῖον πως, πιστεύοντες διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀγαθὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν καθ' ήλικίαν καὶ τύχην ήθῶν εἴρηται τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων φανερά ἐστιν, οἷον πένητος καὶ ἀτυχοῦς ήθος ^{CHAP.} _{XVIII.} καὶ ἀδυνάτου. ἐπεὶ δὲ η τῶν πιθανῶν λόγων χρῆσις

divine grace and favour. Lactantius, Div. Inst. II 1.8 (quoted by Gaisford), gives a truer account of this matter: *Tum (in prosperis rebus) maxime Deus ex memoria hominum elabitur, cum beneficiis eius fruentes honorem dare divinae indulgentiae deberent. At vero si qua necessitas gravis presserit, tunc Deum recordantur.* And Lucret. III 53, *multoque in rebus acerbis acrius advertunt animos ad religionem.*

'So of the characters which follow the various ages and conditions of life enough has been said ; for the opposites of those that have been described, as the character of the poor man, the unsuccessful (unfortunate), and the powerless, may be easily ascertained from their opposites', i.e. by substituting the opposites of *their* opposites, the characteristics, viz. of poverty, misfortune, powerlessness, for those of wealth, prosperity, and power.

CHAP. XVIII.

The following chapter marks a division of the general subject of the work, and a stage or landing-place, from which we look back to what has been already done, and forwards to what still remains to do. The evident intention of the writer is to give a summary statement of the entire plan, and the main division of his system of Rhetoric, contained in the first two books, which comprise all the intellectual part, τὰ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, II 26.5, all that depends on argument ; as opposed to the non-essential and ornamental part, style, action, and arrangement, treated in Bk. III. And it may fairly be supposed that it was also his intention to arrange these divisions in the same order as that which he proposed to follow in the actual treatment of the subject.

But in the text, at any rate of the first half of the chapter, to *ποιητέον*, this order is not observed ; and there is altogether so much irregularity and confusion in the structure of the sentences, and such a mixture of heterogeneous subjects, that it seems tolerably certain that we have not this portion of the chapter in the form in which Aristotle wrote it. First, the long parenthesis about the applicability of the terms *κρίσις* or decision, and *κρίτης*, judge or critic, to all the three branches of Rhetoric, has no natural connexion with the context—though at the same time it is quite true that the use of the parenthesis, *a note* inserted in the *text*, is a marked feature of Aristotle's ordinary style : still this would be an exaggeration, or abuse of the peculiarity. Spengel has pointed out (*Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 35), that the whole of this parenthesis, *ἔστι δέ—βοντενονται* [p. 175, line 2, to p. 176, last line], is nothing but an expansion of a preceding passage,

1 i. 2, the same notion being here carried out into detail. But although it is so much out of place that it is hardly conceivable that even Aristotle (whose style is not remarkable for its close connexion—is in fact often rather rambling and incoherent) should have introduced it here, as part of an enormous protasis of which the apodosis or conclusion relates to something entirely different; yet as it bears all the characteristic marks of the author's style, including the irregularity and the heaping of parenthesis upon parenthesis, though it was most probably not written for this place, there is no reason to doubt that it proceeds from the pen of Aristotle.

The parenthesis ends at *βουλεύονται*, and we ought now to resume the interrupted *πρότασις*. This appears, according to the ordinary punctuation, (with the full stop at *πρότερον*) to be carried on as far as *πρότερον*, the conclusion or apodosis being introduced by *ώστε*, as usual. The grammar *ἐπεί...ώστε* is no objection to this, since we have already seen (note on II 9. 11) that Aristotle is often guilty of this, and even greater grammatical irregularities. But the sense shews that the passage when thus read cannot be sound. There is no real conclusion; for it by no means follows that, because ‘the employment of all persuasive speeches is directed to a *decision* of some kind’, and because (second member of protasis) ‘the political characters’ have been described (in I 8), ‘therefore it has been determined how and by what means or materials speeches may be invested with an ethical character’. In fact it is a complete *non-sequitur*.

Bekker [ed. 3] and Spengel, in order to establish a connexion between protasis and apodosis, put a comma at *πρότερον*; suppose that the preceding sentence from the beginning of the chapter is left incomplete, without apodosis, at *βουλεύονται*; and that *ώστε* marks the conclusion *only* from the clause immediately preceding; the meaning then being, that the description of the ‘political characters’ in I 8 is a sufficient determination of the modes of imparting an ethical character to the speech. But this cannot be right: for not only is the fact alleged quite insufficient in itself to support the conclusion supposed to be deduced from it, but also the two kinds of characters designated are in fact different; and it could not be argued from the mere description of the characters of I 8, that the *ἥθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι* had been sufficiently discussed and determined; which is in fact done—so far as it is done at all—in II 1, and not in I 8.

Other proposed alterations and suggested difficulties in the rest of the chapter may be left for discussion to their place in the Commentary: the meaning and connexion of this part are in general perfectly intelligible, though omission, interpolation, and obscurity or error are alleged against this and that phrase; and the order of the actual contents of the work coincides essentially and in the main with that which is here followed.

I have now to state the views of two recent critics and commentators upon the whole passage, in its connexion with the order of the several divisions of the entire work.

Spengel's views upon this subject are to be found in his tract *über die Rhetorik des Arist.*, in the *Transactions of the Bav. Acad.* 1851,

pp. 32—37; a work which I have already had frequent occasion to refer to. He had previously spoken of the order contemplated and adopted by Aristotle, in the arrangement of the three main divisions of his subject; the analysis of the direct proofs, *πίστεις*, by logical argument, and the two modes of indirect confirmation of the others, the *ἡθη*, and the *πάθη*. The passages which he himself quotes in illustration of the first order in which Aristotle proposes to take them, pp. 25—27, shew that the order is *πίστεις*, *ἡθη*, *πάθη*: nevertheless Spengel inverts the two last, p. 30 et seq., omitting the actual treatment of the *ἡθος*, as a *subsidiary argument* or mode of persuasion in II 1, the true *ἡθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι*; and, as it seems to me, confounding that with a totally different set of characters, which are delineated as an appendix to the *πάθη*, and consequently *after* them in II 12—17. This I have already pointed out, and explained the real application of the six characters of II 12—17 to the purposes of Rhetoric, in the Introduction p. 110, foll. and at the commencement of c. 12 in the Commentary. Spengel notices the inconclusive *ώστε* in the apodosis, c. 18. 1 (p. 34), apparently assuming that the passage is corrupt, but throws no further light upon the interpretation or means of correcting the section. Next we have, p. 36 foll., an attempt to prove that *τὰ λοιπά*, in § 5, is to be understood of the treatment of the *πάθος* and *ἡθος* contained severally in c. 2—11 and 12—17 of Bk. II, and that consequently from the words *ὅπως τὰ λοιπὰ προσθέντες ἀποδῶμεν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν* we are to conclude that the order of treatment of the contents of the first two books was as follows; the *εἰδη*, or *πίστεις ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου* (as if the *ἡθος* and *πάθος* were not equally conveyed by the speech itself), occupying the first book; next, the four *κοινοὶ τόποι*, and the second part of the logical *πίστεις*, II 18—26; and thirdly, the *πάθος* and *ἡθος* in the first seventeen chapters of Bk. II, which originally formed the conclusion of that book, though now the order of the two parts is inverted.

Vahlen, in a paper in the *Transactions of the Vienna Acad. of Sciences*, Oct. 1861, pp. 59—148, has gone at some length into the questions that arise out of this eighteenth chapter, where it is compared with other passages in which Aristotle has indicated the order in which he meant to treat the several divisions of his subject. Op. cit. 121—132. His principal object in writing, he says, p. 122, is to defend against Brandis' criticisms Spengel's view that the original arrangement of Aristotle in treating the subjects of the second book has been subsequently inverted in the order in which they now stand; Aristotle having intended to complete the survey of the logical department of Rhetoric before he entered upon the *ἡθη* and *πάθη*. He is of opinion (p. 126) that the analysis of the *κοινοὶ τόποι* came next (in accordance with the original plan) to the *εἰδη* of the first book; and consequently that there is a gap at the opening of the second between the conclusion of the *εἰδη* and the commencement of the *ἡθη* and *πάθη*; and that as a further consequence, the words in § 2, *ἔτι δὲ ἐξ ὧν ἡθικούς—διώρισται*, are an interpolation of some editor of Aristotle's work, who introduced them, *after the κοινοὶ τόποι had been transferred to their present place*, as a necessary recognition of what had actually been done. His principal object is in fact to establish what he conceives to be the true order of the several parts of

the work; and in doing so he deals, as it seems to me, in the most arbitrary manner with Aristotle's text. He assumes a Redactor, or Editor, who has taken various liberties with the text of his author, and has interpolated various passages, chiefly relating to the $\eta\theta\eta$, to supply what he conceived to be deficient after the order had been changed. How or why the order was changed, neither he nor Spengel gives us any indication; and the supposition of these repeated interpolations has little or no foundation except his own hypothesis of the inseparable connexion of the $\epsilon\delta\eta$ and $kouoi\ r\omega\iota\omega\iota$: for my own part I cannot find in the passages which he quotes in support of this opinion, or elsewhere in Aristotle's Rhetoric, any statement of a necessary connexion between the two, such as to make it imperative that the $kouoi\ r\omega\iota\omega\iota$ should be treated immediately after the $\epsilon\delta\eta$. The order of treatment which we find in the received text appears to be sufficiently natural and regular to defend it—in default of the strongest evidence to the contrary—against the suspicion of dislocation and interpolation, though no doubt the order suggested by Vahlen may be, considered in itself, more strictly logical and consecutive. On the connexion of the clauses of the passage now under consideration (c. 18 § 1), and how and why the long inappropriate parenthesis was introduced *here*—which are, after all, the things that most require explanation—he leaves us as much in the dark as his predecessor Spengel. His interpretation of $r\alpha\ \lambda\omega\iota\pi\alpha$ (which Spengel seems to have misunderstood), and anything else that requires notice, may be left for the notes on the passages to which they belong.

I have suggested in the Introduction, p. 250, the possibility of the accidental omission of some words or sentences between *εἰργται πρότερον* and *ώστε διωρισμένου*, in order to supply some connexion between protasis and apodosis, and give some significance to the conclusion; but without any great confidence in the success of the attempt to solve the difficulty: to which I am bound to add that it leaves unexplained the introduction of the parenthesis, *ἔστι δέ—θονεύονται*, which, however and whencesoever it may have been introduced, is here most certainly out of place. And I will now proceed to give a summary of the contents of the chapter, as I understand them.

All speeches which have persuasion for their object are addressed to, or look to, a *decision* of some kind. In the two more important branches of Rhetoric, the deliberative and forensic, *ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀγώσιν*, the *decision* and the *judge* may be understood literally: in the third or epideictic branch, the audience is in some sense also a judge, in his capacity of *critic*, being called upon to *decide* or pass sentence on the merits of the composition. Still it is only in the first two that the term 'judge' can be applied to the hearer in its absolute, or strict and proper sense (*ἀπλῶς κριτής*). Then, as a second member of the protasis, comes a clause which has the appearance of being a continuation or supplement of something which has been lost—a reference, namely, to the treatment of the *ἴθος* in II 1, which might justify the conclusion that follows, that 'it has now been determined in what way and by what means speeches may be made to assume an ethical character'. Still the sentence and its statements remain incomplete: for if, as it appears, Aristotle's intention was to give an enumeration in detail of the main divisions of his Rhetoric

*πρὸς κρίσιν ἔστι (περὶ ὅν γὰρ ἵσμεν καὶ κεκρίκαμεν,
οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ λόγου), ἔστι δέ, ἀν τε πρὸς ἑνα τις τῷ p. 85.*

in the order in which he had placed them, the omission of the important department of the *πάθη* would be quite unaccountable, unless indeed—which I am myself inclined to believe—he meant to include the *πάθη* under the general head of *ἡθικοὶ λόγοι*; which, as the treatment of the *πάθη* belongs to Ethics, and the effects of the use of them by the speaker are purely ethical, he was fairly entitled to do. At the same time, if this be admitted, the *first part* of the protasis with the parenthesis appended has no sufficient connexion with the conclusive *ὅστε*: nor is it clear why the ‘political characters’, which do not come under the *ἥθος* proper, should be especially singled out as one at least of its representatives: though, if I am right in supposing something to be lost which stood before this clause, it might very likely have contained something which led to the mention of these characters, as one of the varieties of *ἥθος* which impart an ethical colour to the speech.

However, let us suppose at least, as we fairly may, that Aristotle’s intention, however frustrated by corruption of his manuscript, was to tell us what he had already done from the commencement of the second book, and what he next proposed to do in the remainder of it. He has hitherto been employed (in this book) upon the Ethical branches of the art, by which the character of the speaker himself may be displayed in a favourable light, and the emotions of the audience directed into a channel favourable to the designs of the orator, § 1.

We now take a fresh start, and from a new protasis, which states that the *εἰδη*, from which the statesman and public speaker, the pleader, and the claimer, may derive their premisses and proofs, have been analysed under these three branches of Rhetoric, and also the materials, which may serve for imparting an ethical colour (in two senses, as before) to the speech, have been already despatched and determined, we arrive at the conclusion that it is now time to enter upon the subject of the *κοινοῖ* or universal topics—three in number as they are here classified, the possible and impossible, the past and the future, and amplification or exaggeration and depreciation—which comes next in order; and is accordingly treated in the following chapter. When this has been settled, we must endeavour to find something to say about *enthymemes* in general, arguments which may be applied to all the branches of Rhetoric alike, and *examples*, the two great departments of rhetorical reasoning or proof, ‘that by the addition of what still remained to be done’ (that is, by the completion of the logical division of the subject, by the discussion of enthymemes and examples, c. 20, the enthymeme including the *γνώμη*, c. 21, the varieties of enthymeme, demonstrative and refutative, c. 22, and specimens of these, c. 23, fallacious enthymemes, c. 24, and the solution of them, c. 25, with an appendix, c. 26), ‘we may fulfil the engagement, the task, which we proposed to ourselves at the outset of this work’.

§ 1. *ἔστι δέ, ἀν τε πρὸς ἑνα κ.τ.λ.]* Comp. I 3. 2. 3, of which most of the statements of this parenthesis are a repetition, though in other words. This may help to account for the introduction of it here, where the

λόγῳ χρώμενος προτρέπη ἢ ἀποτρέπη, οἷον οἱ νουθετοῦντες ποιοῦσιν ἢ πείθοντες (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑπτον κριτής ὁ εἰς· ὃν γὰρ δεῖ πεῖσαι, οὐτός ἐστιν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἴπειν κριτής), ἔάν τε πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντα ἔάν τε πρὸς ὑπόθεσιν λέγῃ τις, ὅμοιως· τῷ γὰρ λόγῳ ἀνάγκη χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναιρεῖν τάνατία, πρὸς ἀ ὥσπερ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τὸν λόγον ποιεῖται. ὥσπαντως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν τὸν θεωρὸν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν. ὄλως δὲ μόνος ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς κριτῆς ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὁ τὰ ζητούμενα κρίνων· τά τε γὰρ ἀμφισβητούμενα ζητεῖται πῶς ἔχει, καὶ περὶ ὧν βουλεύονται. περὶ δὲ τῶν κατὰ τὰς πολι-

author is reviewing the progress of his work; the same train of reasoning recurs to his mind, and he starts again with the same topic.

κριτῆς ὁ εἰς] Comp. III 12. 5.

ἔάν τε πρὸς ἀμφισβητοῦντα κ.τ.λ.] ‘Whether you are arguing against a real antagonist (in a court of law, or the public assembly), or merely against some thesis or theory (where there is no antagonist of flesh and blood to oppose you); for the speech must be used as an instrument, and the opposite (theory or arguments) refuted, against which—as though it were an imaginary antagonist—you are directing your words’. In either case, if you want to persuade or convince any one, as an antagonist real or imaginary, you are looking for a decision or judgment in some sense or other: in the case of the defence of the thesis, the opposing argument or theory, which has to be overcome, seems to stand in the place of the antagonist in a contest of real life, who must be convinced if you are to succeed. When you want to convince anyone, you make him your judge.

ὥσπερ γὰρ πρὸς κριτὴν κ.τ.λ.] ‘the composition of the speech is directed (submitted) to the spectator (for his judgment or decision) as though he were a judge’. The spectator, the person who comes to listen to a declamation, like a spectator at a show, for amusement or criticism, stands to the *panegyric*, or declamatory show-speech, as a critic, in the same position as the judge to the parties whose case he has to decide. I 3. 2, ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἡ κριτὴν...ό δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως (κρίνων) ὁ θεωρός.

‘But as a general rule it is only the person who decides the points in question in political (public, including judicial) contests that is absolutely (strictly and properly) to be called a judge; for the inquiry is directed in the one to the points in dispute (between the two parties in the case) to see how the truth really stands, in the other to the subject of deliberation’.

τείας ἡθῶν ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον,¹
 ὥστε διωρισμένον ἀν εἴη πῶς τε καὶ διὰ τίνων τοὺς
² λόγους ἡθικοὺς ποιητέον. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἔκαστον μὲν
 γένος τῶν λόγων ἔτερον ἦν τὸ τέλος, περὶ ἀπάντων
 δ' αὐτῶν εἰλημμέναι δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις εἰσὶν ἐξ ὧν
 τὰς πίστεις φέρουσι καὶ συμβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπι-
 δεικνύμενοι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες, ἔτι δ' ἐξ ὧν ἡθικοὺς
 τοὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεται ποιεῖν, καὶ περὶ τούτων διώ-
³ ρισται, λοιπὸν ἡμῖν διελθεῖν περὶ τῶν κοινῶν· πᾶσι
 γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον τὰ περὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου
 προσχρῆσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ὡς ἔσται
⁴ τοὺς δὲ ὡς γέγονε πειρᾶσθαι δεικνύναι. ἔτι δὲ περὶ²
 μεγέθους κοινὸν ἀπάντων ἔστι τῶν λόγων· χρῶνται
 γὰρ πάντες τῷ μειοῦν καὶ αὔξειν καὶ συμβουλεύον-

¹ πρότερον. ὥστε Bekker (ed. 1831).

[ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς] The division of the work, from I 4. 7 to I 8 inclusive, in which is contained the analysis of the various *εἰδη*, or special topics, which belong to the deliberative branch of Rhetoric. The punctuation πρότερον, ὥστε, in Bekker's [later] editions and in Spengel's, making ὥστε—ποιητέον the apodosis to the preceding clause only, has been already mentioned in the introductory note to this chapter [p. 172, middle], and the arguments against it stated.

[εἴρηται πρότερον] I c. 8, see especially § 7: the notes on § 6, and Introd. p. 182, and p. 110.

§ 2. [ἔτερον ἦν τὸ τέλος] ἦν, 'is as was said', sc. I 3. 1, seq.

[δόξαι καὶ προτάσεις] δόξαι are the popular prevailing opinions which form the only materials of Rhetoric, προτάσεις the premisses of his enthymemes, which the professor of the art constructs out of them. Vahlen, *Trans. Vienna Acad.* u. s., p. 128, remarks that this combination of δόξαι and προτάσεις occurs nowhere else except here and in II 1. 1, and is an additional mark of the connexion between that passage and this chapter.

[συμβουλεύοντες] in I 4. 7, to I 8; ἐπιδεικνύμενοι in I 9; and ἀμφισβητοῦντες, I 10—15.

[ἔτι δὲ.....διώρισται] Vahlen (u. s., p. 126), in conformity with his somewhat arbitrary hypothesis, has, as already mentioned, condemned this clause as an interpolation, partly on account of the absence of the *πάθη* where they required special mention. I have already observed that in default of any other evidence of the spuriousness of the passage we may very well suppose that Ar. intended to include them in the ἡθικοὶ λόγοι [see p. 175 *init.*].

[§§ 3, 4.] The four *κοινοὶ τόποι*, common to all three branches of Rhetoric. These are illustrated in c. 19.

[προσχρῆσθαι] to employ them *in addition* to the *εἰδη*.

τεσ^ι καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες ἡ ψέγοντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες ἡ
5 ἀπολογούμενοι. τούτων δὲ διορισθέντων περὶ τε ἐνθυ- P. 139
μημάτων κοινῇ πειραθῶμεν εἰπεῖν, εἴ τι ἔχομεν, καὶ
περὶ παραδειγμάτων, ὅπως τὰ λοιπὰ προσθέντες ἀπο-
δῶμεν τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς πρόθεσιν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν κοινῶν τὸ
μὲν αὐξεῖν οἰκείότατον τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικοῖς, ὥσπερ εἴρηται,
τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς τοῖς δικανικοῖς (περὶ τούτων γὰρ ή κρί-
σις), τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐσόμενον τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς.

I πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου λέγω-

^{1+ἡ ἀποτρέποντες} Bekker (ed. 1831) A^c. καὶ προτρέποντες καὶ ἀποτρέποντες Q, Y^b, Z^b. CHAP. 86.

ἡ ἀποτρέποντες is rejected by Bekker and Spengel [ed. 1867], and is certainly suspicious. The latter had already remarked, *Trans. Bav. Acad.* [1851], p. 33, note 2, that Ar. never uses *συμβουλεύειν* for *προτρέπειν*, as he has done in this case if the text be genuine. Therefore, either *συμβουλεύοντες* must be changed into *προτρέποντες* (printed by an oversight ἀποτρέποντες) or better, ἡ ἀποτρέποντες erased: the course which he has adopted in his recent edition. Of course Arist. employs *συμβουλεύειν* as a general term including both persuasion and dissuasion; as in II 22. 5 and 8 (referred to by Spengel).

§ 5. Next to the *κοινοὶ τόποι* will follow the illustration of the *κοινοὶ πίστεις*, c. 20. I, the universal instruments of all persuasion, Example (c. 20), Enthymeme (and its varieties) cc. 21—24, with an appendix on Refutation, c. 25 (and a shorter one of a miscellaneous character, c. 26).

τὰ λοιπά] interpreted by Spengel, u. s., of the *ἥθη* and *πάθη*, which he supposes to have been treated last in this book; and by Vahlen (rightly, as I think) of the logical part of the treatise, the enthymemes and examples, ‘which still remain’ (after the analysis of the *κοινοὶ τόποι*) to be handled, u. s., p. 129). Brandis, ap. Schneidewin’s *Philologus* IV 1, p. 7, note 7, unnecessarily limits τὰ λοιπὰ to the contents of cc. 23—26. Schrader, “doctrinam de elocutione et dispositione hoc verbo innuit, quam tertio libro tradit.” Vahlen, u. s., pp. 128 and 132, contemptuously rejects this interpretation.

ἀποδῶμεν τὴν πρόθεσιν] On ἀποδίδονται, see note on I 1. 7. Here, to fulfil a purpose or intention, *lit.* to render it back, or pay it as a due, to the original undertaking.

ώσπερ εἴρηται] I 9. 40. Comp. Rhet. ad Alex. 6 (7). 2. τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς τοῖς δικανικοῖς, I 9. 40; I 3. 4 and 8. τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν...τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς, I 3. 2, and 8.

τὸ γεγονὸς.....περὶ τούτων] ‘Fact’, as an abstract conception, and therefore neut. sing., is represented in its particulars or details—the particular, individual, instances, from which the notion is generalised—in the plural *τούτων*.

CHAP. XIX.

In the following chapter the *κοινοὶ τόποι* are treated under the three heads, (1) of the possible and impossible, (2) fact, past and future, and (3)

μεν. ἀν δὴ τούναντίον ἡ δυνατὸν ἡ εἶναι ἡ γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον δόξειεν ἀν εἶναι δυνατόν, οἷον εἰ δυνατὸν ἄνθρωπον ύγιασθῆναι, καὶ νοσῆσαι· ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ² δύναμιστῶν ἐναντίων, ἡ ἐναντία. καὶ εἰ τὸ ὅμοιον

amplification and depreciation; for the topic of *degree*, of greater and less, or the comparative estimate of goods, which might be distinguished from the third, seems here, and c. 18. 3, 4, to be included in it. In the latter of the two passages, this third *tópos* is called simply *περὶ μεγέθους*, and here the two parts are included under the one phrase *περὶ μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν*, which is equivalent to *αἴξειν καὶ μειῶν*, and denotes one general topic. I wish so far to correct what I have said in the Introd. p. 129. They may also be divided into four, or six heads.

Of the importance of the first in deliberative oratory Cicero says, de Orat. II 82. 336, *Sed quid fieri possit aut non possit quidque etiam sit necesse aut non sit, in utraque re maxime querendum. Inciditur enim omnis iam deliberatio, si intelligitur non posse fieri aut si necessitas affertur; et qui id docuit non videntibus aliis, is plurimum vidit.*

Quintilian has some observations on the possible, and necessary, as *partes suadendi*, Inst. Or. III 8. 22—26.

On δύναμις, δυνατόν and the opposite, and their various senses, there is a chapter in Metaph. Δ 12.

§ 1. ‘The possibility of anything, in respect of being or coming to be, implies the possibility of the contrary: as, for example, if it be possible for a man to be cured, it is possible for him also to fall ill: for there is the same power, faculty, potentiality, i. e. possibility of affecting a subject, in the two contraries, in so far as they are contrary one to another’.

ἢ ἐναντία] i. e. solely in respect of their being contraries, and excluding all other considerations. As in the instance given, a man is equally liable to be affected by health and sickness in so far as they are contraries, without regard to any properties or qualities in himself, which may render him more or less liable to one or the other. This is Schrader’s explanation.

τάναντία] ‘contraries’ is one of the four varieties of ἀντικείμενα, ‘opposites’. These are (1) ἀντίφασις, ‘contradiction’ (or *contradicities*), καράφασις and ἀπόφασις, affirmation and negation, affirmative and negative, to be and not to be, yes and no. (2) τὰ ἐναντία, ‘contraries’ which are defined as the extreme opposites under the same genus—good and bad, black and white, long and short, quick and slow, &c.—which cannot reside in the same subject together. (3) Relative opposites, τὰ πρός τι, as double and half, master and servant, father and son, &c. And (4) opposites of state and privation, ἔχειν and στέρησις, the possession of something and the privation, absence, want, of it; as sight and blindness. (This last term, however, privation, is properly applied only to cases in which the opposite, possession or state, is natural to the possessor; in which consequently that which *wants* it, is *deprived*—defrauded, as it were—of something to which it has a natural claim: blindness can only be called a στέρησις when the individual affected by it belongs to a class

of animals which have the faculty of vision : τυφλὸν λέγομεν οὐ τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, δῆλα τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὅτε πέφυκεν ἔχειν. Categ. c. 10, 12 a 26 seq.) On ‘opposites’, see Categ. cc. 10, 11. Top. B 2, 109 b 17—23. Ib. c. 8, 113 b 15 seq. Ib. E 6. Metaph. Δ 10, 1018 a 20 seq. (where two more kinds are added, unnecessarily, see Bonitz ad loc.) and I 4, 1055 a 38, where the usual four are alone mentioned. Cicero, Topic. XI 47—49, enumerates and illustrates the same four. Of ἑavarīa he says, *Haec, quae ex eodem genere contraria sunt appellantur adversa. Contrarium* with him is Aristotle’s ἀντικείμενον, the *genus*, or general notion of *opposite*.

The argument from contraries, as employed here, is this : the possibility of anything *being* or becoming the one, implies that of being or becoming the other ; only not both at once : a virtuous man may always become (has the capacity, δύναμις, of becoming) vicious, and the converse ; but ἐνεργεῖq, when the one state is actually present, and *realised* in the subject, it excludes the other. This reciprocal possibility in contraries arises from the fact that the two contraries belong to the same *genus* or class. Black and white both fall under the *genus* colour, of which they are the extremes ; they pass from one into the other by insensible gradations of infinite variety, from which we may infer that any surface that admits of colour at all, will admit either of them indifferently apart, but not together ; two different colours cannot be shewn on the same surface and at the same time.

§ 2. Again, likeness or resemblance, τὸ ὁμοιον, between two things suggests or implies a common possibility ; if one thing can be done, the probability is that anything else *like it* can be done equally.

This is a variety of the argument from *analogy*. We have a tendency, which appears to be natural and instinctive, to infer from any manifest or apparent resemblance between two objects, that is, from certain properties or attributes which they are seen or known to possess in common, the common possession of other properties and attributes, which are not otherwise known to belong to them, whereby we are induced to refer them to the same class. So here, the likeness of two things in certain respects, is thought to imply something different, which is also common to both ; a common capacity or possibility. The argument being here applied solely to the use of Rhetoric, the things in question are rather actions and their consequences than facts and objects : if it has been found possible to effect something, to gain some political advantage for instance, in several previous cases, we argue that in the similar, parallel case which is under consideration, the like possibility may be expected.

This however, though the popular view of the argument from analogy, and the ordinary mode of applying it, is not, strictly speaking, the right application of the term. Analogy, τὸ ἀνάλογον, is arithmetical or geometrical proportion, and represents a similarity, not between objects themselves, but between the relations of them. See Sir W. Hamilton, *Lect. on Logic*, Vol. II. p. 165—174, Lect. XXXII, and on this point, p. 170. Whately (*Rhet.* p. 74, c. 1), “Analogy, being a resemblance of ratios, that should strictly be called an argument from analogy, in which the two cases (viz. the one *from* which, and the one *to* which we argue) are not themselves alike, but stand in a similar *relation* to something else ; or, in other words, that the common genus that they both fall under, consists

3 δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον. καὶ εἰ τὸ χαλεπώτερον
 4 δυνατόν, καὶ τὸ ῥάον. καὶ εἰ τὸ σπουδαῖον καὶ καλὸν
 γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ ὅλως δυνατὸν γενέσθαι χαλε-
 5 πώτερον γὰρ καλὴν οἰκίαν ἢ οἰκίαν εἶναι. καὶ οὐ
 in a relation.” This he illustrates by two examples of analogical reasoning. One of them is, the inferences that may be drawn as to mental qualities and the changes they undergo, from similar changes (i.e. relations) in the physical constitution—though of course there can be no direct resemblance between them. Hamilton’s illustration of analogy proper is derived directly from a numerical proportion: that of analogy in its popular usage is, “This disease corresponds in many symptoms with those we have observed in typhus fevers; it will therefore correspond in all, that is, it is a typhus fever,” p. 171.

Butler’s *Analogy of Natural and Revealed Religion to the constitution and course of Nature* may be regarded as an analogy of relations between them and God the author of both, in the proper sense of the word, though in his Introduction he twice appears to identify analogy with mere likeness or similarity.

Lastly, the logical description of Analogy is to be found in Thomson’s *Laws of Thought*, § 121, ‘Syllogism of Analogy’, p. 250, seq. The author’s definition is, p. 252, “the same attributes may be assigned to distinct but similar things, provided they can be shewn to accompany the points of resemblance in the things, and not the points of difference.” Or ‘when the resemblance is undoubted, and does not depend on one or two external features’, “when one thing resembles another in known particulars, it will resemble it also in the unknown.”

On the different kinds of ὄμοιος and ὄμοια, consult Metaph. Δ 11, 1018 α 15, with Bonitz’ note, and Ib. I 3, 1054 β 3, seq., also Top. A 17, on its use as a dialectical topic.

§ 3. ‘Thirdly, if the harder of two things (as any undertaking, effort, enterprise, such as the carrying out of any political measure) is possible, then also the easier’. This is by the rule, *omne maius continet in se minus*; or the *argumentum a fortiori*.

§ 4. ‘And (again *a fortiori*) the possibility of making or doing any thing *well*, necessarily carries with it the possibility of the making or doing of it in general’ (*ὅλως*, the general or abstract conception of making or doing; in any way, well or ill): ‘for to be a *good* house is a harder thing than to be a mere house’, of any kind. The same may be said of a *fine* picture, statue, literary composition, or any work of art; anything in short in which *ἀρετή*, merit, or excellence, *τὸ σπουδαῖον*, can be shewn. *ῥᾶον γὰρ ὀτιοῦν ποιῆσαι ἢ καλῶς ποιῆσαι*, Top. Z 1, 139 β 8 (cited by Schrader). Compare with this Metaph. Δ 12, 1019 α 23 (on the various acceptations of δυνατόν), ἔτι ἡ τοῦ καλῶς τοῦτ’ ἐπιτελεῖν (δύναμις) ἢ κατὰ προαιρέσιν ἐνίστε γὰρ τοὺς μόνον ἀν πορευθέντας ἢ εἰπόντας, μὴ καλῶς ἢ μὴ ὡς προειδοντο, οὐ φαμεν δύνασθαι λέγειν ἢ βαδίζειν; which may possibly have suggested the introduction of the topic here.

§ 5. ‘The possibility of the *beginning* of anything implies also that of the *end*: for nothing impossible comes into being or begins to do so,

η ἀρχὴ δύναται γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ τέλος· οὐδὲν γὰρ γίγνεται οὐδ' ἄρχεται γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἶον τὸ σύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι οὔτ' ἀν ἄρξαιτο γίγνεσθαι οὕτε γίγνεται. καὶ οὐ τὸ τέλος, καὶ η 6 ἀρχὴ δυνατή· ἄπαντα γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς γίγνεται. καὶ

as for example the commensurability of the diameter (with the side of the square) never either begins to, nor actually does, come into being. *To begin implies to end*, says Tennyson, *Two Voices* [line 339]. In interpreting a rhetorical topic which is to guide men's practice, it is plain that we must keep clear of metaphysics. The beginning and end here have nothing to do with the finite and infinite. Nor is it meant that things that can be begun necessarily admit of being finished: the Tower of Babel, as well as other recorded instances of *opera interrupta*, shew that this is not true. And though it may be true of the design or intention, of any attempt, that it always looks forward to an end, immediate or remote, still to the public speaker it is facility and expediency, rather than the mere possibility, of the measure he is recommending, that is likely to be of service in carrying his point. All that is really meant is, that if you want to know whether the end of any course of action, plan, scheme, or indeed of anything—is possible, you must look to the beginning: beginning implies end: if it can be begun, it can also be brought to an end: nothing that is known to be impossible, like squaring the circle, can ever have a beginning, or be brought into being. Schrader exemplifies it by, *Mithridates coepit vinci, ergo et debellari poterit*. Proverbs and passages on the importance of *ἀρχὴ* are cited in the note on I 7. 11.

The incommensurability of the diameter with the side of the square, or, which is the same thing, the impossibility of squaring the circle, is Aristotle's stock illustration of *the impossible*: see examples in Bonitz ad Metaph. A 2, 983 a 16. Euclid, Bk. x. Probl. ult. Trendelenburg, on de Anima III 6. 1, p. 500, explains this: the diameter of a square is represented by the root of 2, which is irrational, and therefore incommensurable with the side. He also observes that Aristotle cannot refer to the squaring of the circle; a question which was still in doubt in the time of Archimedes could not be assumed by Aristotle as an example of impossibility. The illustration, which passed into a proverb, *ἐκ διαμέτρου ἀντικεῖσθαι*, is confined to the side and diameter of the parallelogram. See also Waitz on Anal. Pr. 41 a 26.

'And when the end is possible, so also is the beginning, because everything takes its origin, is generated, from a beginning'. The end implies the beginning: everything that comes into being or is produced—everything therefore with which the orator has to deal in his sphere of practical life—has a beginning. Since the beginning is implied in the end, it is clear that if the end be attainable or possible, so likewise must the beginning be.

§ 6. 'And if it is possible for the latter, the posterior, the subsequent, of two things, either in substance and essence, or generation, to be brought into being, then also the prior, the antecedent; for instance, if a man

εἰ τὸ ὕστερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἢ τῇ γενέσει δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον, οἷον εἰ ἄνδρα γενέσθαι δυ-

can be generated, then a child ; for *that* (the child) is prior in generation (every man must have been first a boy ; this is *ἐν γενέσει*, in the order of growth, in the succession of the natural series of generation or propagation) : and if a child, then a man ; because this (the child, *ἐκείνη* being made to agree with *ἀρχή* instead of *παῖς*,) is a beginning or origin'. This latter example is by the rule that every end necessarily implies a beginning ; a child stands in the relation to mature man of beginning to end : and therefore every grown man must have passed through the period of childhood ; which is also reducible to the other rule, that the possibility of subsequent implies that of antecedent, of which the preceding example is an illustration.

τὸ ὕστερον, τὸ πρότερον] The two principal passages on the various senses in which *πρότερον* and *ὕστερον*, before and after, earlier and later, antecedent and subsequent, prior and posterior, can be applied, are Categ. c. 12, in which five varieties are distinguished, and Met. Δ 11, in which there are four. On the former passage Waitz says in his Comm. p. 316, "non premendam esse divisionem quam nostro loco tradidit : appetet enim non id agi in his ut ipsa rerum natura exploretur et per vestigetur, sed ut quae usus ferat sermonis quotidiani distinguantur alterum ab altero et explicentur."

In the Metaphysics, the divisions are four. In the first, prior and posterior refer us to a *series* and an *order*, established either by nature or by the human will, under which the *τῇ γενέσει* of the Rhetoric will naturally fall. Of this there are five varieties, (1) *κατὰ τόπον*, local (comp. Phys. IV 11, 219 *a* 14, seq.); (2) *κατὰ χρόνον*, chronological, the order of time (Phys. IV 14, 223 *a* 4, seq.); (3) *κατὰ κίνησιν*; (4) *κατὰ δύναμιν*, capacity or power; capacity a natural order, power either of nature or human choice ; (5) *κατὰ τάξιν*.

In the second the order of knowledge is referred to: only in two different applications the meaning of the two terms is inverted: in the order of *growth* the particular is prior to the universal, sense and observation to generalisation or induction: in the order of dignity, the universal is prior to the particular, as the whole to the individual parts. The one is *πρότερον πρὸς ἡμᾶς*, the other, *πρότερον ἀπλῶς*.

The third, *πρότερα λέγεται τὰ τῶν προτέρων πάθη*, the priority of the attributes of the prior (in some series), as straightness is prior to smoothness, because the line is prior to the plane or surface—the notion is that the plane is *generated from*, and so, in growth and origin, posterior to the line ; and therefore the attribute of the latter is prior to that of the former—is not, as Bonitz remarks, coordinate with the three others, "pendet enim a reliquis, quae suapte natura sunt priora, tamquam accidens a subiecto suo qui inhaeret."

The fourth, the *οὐσία* of the Rhetoric, priority and posteriority in essence or substance, *τὰ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν*; priority in this sense belongs to things *ὅσα ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων*: that is, things which are independent of others, whereas the others (the posterior) are dependent on them: the latter imply the former, the former do not necessarily imply the latter. Such is the relation of one and two; two always imply one,

νατόν, καὶ παῖδα (πρότερον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο γίγνεται), καὶ
7 εἰ παῖδα, καὶ ἄνδρα (ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἐκείνη). καὶ ὥν ἔρως ἡ
ἐπιθυμία φύσει ἐστίν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἔρα
8 οὐδὲ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ ὥν ἐπιστῆμαί εἰσι

one does not necessarily imply two. Similarly the *first category*, *οὐσία* substance, is prior to all the others, which express only properties and attributes of the first. This priority is *οὐσία*, which is evidently inserted merely because it was suggested by the opposite *γένεσις*, and being utterly useless in Rhetoric, from which all nice distinctions and subtleties of all kinds are alien, is accordingly passed over in the illustration. This division of *οὐσία* also includes priority of *δύναμις* and *ἐνέργεια*, where again the order of growth and of dignity inverts the relation of the two: *δύναμις*, the capacity, being of course prior in growth or time, the *ἐνέργεια*, *actus*, the realization, or active and perfect condition, being superior in the order of dignity and importance, or in conception, *λόγῳ*.

Another division is that of *οὐσίᾳ* substance, *λόγῳ* conception, and *χρόνῳ*. Metaph. Θ 8, 1049 *b* 11, seq.

See further on this subject, Bonitz ad Met. Δ 11, Comm. p. 249—252; Waitz ad Organ. p. 14 *a* 26 (Categ. c. 12). Trendelenburg, *Categorienlehre* p. 38, seq., 72, seq.

§ 7. ‘And things (in general) are possible which are the objects of love or desire’—these *πάθη*, being instinctive and natural, show that the objects of them are attainable, because “nature does nothing in vain”, a constantly recurring principle in our author: *οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ*, Pol. I 2, 1253 *a* 9, *εἰ οὖν ἡ φύσις μηθὲν μῆτε ἀτελὲς. ποιεῖ μῆτε μάτην*, Ib. c. 8, 1256 *b* 20, *et passim*: if the desires could not be satisfied, nature would not have implanted them in us—‘for no one either loves or desires anything impossible for the most part’: the qualification *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*, is added to allow for the exceptional cases of insane or infatuated passion as that of Pasiphae (referred to by Victorius) or of Pygmalion; or a child’s desire to have a star to play with.

§ 8. ‘And all sciences and arts imply the possibility of the existence or generation of their objects’. The sciences, as natural history, moral and political philosophy, chemistry, geology, &c., have *facts* or *phenomena*, actually existing, which are to be observed and generalized, for their objects; the *practical* arts produce, or bring into being, *their* objects, as painting, sculpture, and the fine arts in general, also the useful and mechanical arts. This I think is the distinction here intended. Moral and political philosophy come under the head of sciences which have facts, moral and social, for the objects of their study; though they belong to the *practical* department of knowledge, and have *action* for their end and object. *ἐπιστήμη* and its object *τὸ ἐπιστητέν*, are relative terms, the one necessarily implying the other, Categ. c. 10, 11 *b* 27, *καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη δὲ τῷ ἐπιστητῷ ὡς τὰ πρός τι ἀντίκειται*; and often elsewhere. This may help to establish the necessary connexion which is assumed between knowledge, science, art, and their objects. But I do not suppose that Ar. here means to assert the existence of a natural law which connects them; but only that, as a matter of fact, men never *do* choose as an

καὶ τέχναι, δυνατὸν ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γενέσθαι.
 9 καὶ ὅσων ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐν τούτοις ἔστιν ἡ
 ἡμεῖς ἀναγκάσαιμεν ἀνὴρ πείσαιμεν· ταῦτα δὲ ἔστιν
 10 ὡν κρείττους ἡ κύριοι ἡ φίλοι. καὶ ὧν τὰ μέρη
 δυνατά, καὶ τὸ ὄλον, καὶ ὧν τὸ ὄλον δυνατόν, καὶ τὰ
 μέρη ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· εἰ γὰρ πρόσχισμα καὶ κεφαλὶς
 καὶ χιτῶν δύναται γενέσθαι, καὶ υποδήματα δυνατὸν

object of study in science, or try their hand at producing by art, anything which they know in the one case to have no real existence, and in the other to be incapable of being produced.

§ 9. ‘And again, anything (that we wish to do, or to effect, in the ordinary course of life, as in our business or profession) of which the origin of generation lies in things which we would (if we wished it, opt. with *ἄν*,) influence or control either by force or persuasion (meaning by *ἐν τούτοις men* in particular, as appears from what follows; but not excluding *things*, as *circumstances, conditions* and such like, the command of which might enable us to effect our purpose); such are (persons whom we can influence or control) those whose superiors we are in *strength* and *power*, or those who are under our *authority*, or our friends’. The two first classes illustrate the *ἀναγκάζειν* the force of superior strength, and of authority natural (as that of a parent or master) or legal (the authority of the magistrate); the third, friends, who are amenable to persuasion, exemplify the *πείθειν*.

§ 10. ‘If the parts are possible, so also is the whole: and if the whole of anything, so are the parts, as a general rule: for if slit in front, toe-piece, and upper-leather, are capable of being made, then also shoes can be made; and if shoes, then front-slit, toe-piece, and upper-leather’. A whole implies its parts, and the parts a whole. Whole and part are relative terms: neither of them can stand alone, nor has any meaning except in reference to its correlative: hence of course the possibility of the one necessarily implies the possibility of the other. *ὄλον λέγεται οὐ μηθὲν ἀπεστι μέρος ἐξ ὧν λέγεται ὄλον φύσει*, Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 b 26. Ib. c. 2, 1013 b 22, the whole is said to be *τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι*, the *λόγος* or formal cause of a thing, that which makes the combination of parts what it was to be, viz. a whole, and therefore of course *inseparable* from it.

The qualification, *ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*, of the *universal* possibility of the divisibility of a whole into its parts, seems to be introduced to meet the objection which might arise from the existence or conception of *ἀδιαιρέτα*, such as a geometrical point, or an atom, or the human soul, or Parmenides’ ‘one’, *οὐλον, μονογενές...ἐν ξυνεχέσ* [Ritter and Preller, *Hist. Phil.* § 145].

Of the parts of a shoe here mentioned we have absolutely no information either in ancient or modern authorities. The explanation of the word *πρόσχισμα*, given by Photius, who refers to Aristophanes for an example of it, *εἶδος υποδήματος*; and by Hesychius, the same words with the

γενέσθαι, καὶ εἰ ὑποδήματα, καὶ πρόσχισμα καὶ κε-
11 φαλὶς καὶ χιτών. καὶ εἰ τὸ γένος ὄλον τῶν δυνατῶν P. 1392
γενέσθαι, καὶ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ εἰ τὸ εἶδος, καὶ τὸ γένος,
οἷον εἰ πλοῖον γενέσθαι δυνατόν, καὶ τρίηρη, καὶ εἰ
12 τρίηρη, καὶ πλοῖον. καὶ εἰ θάτερον τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα

addition of ἐσχισμένον ἐκ τοῦ ἐμπροσθεν, and Pollux—will not apply here at all events, nor to Ar. Probl. XXX 8, ὑπόδημα ἐκ προσχίσματος, where it is plainly, as here, a part of the shoe, and not the whole—though it is probable enough that Aristophanes in the passage referred to by Photius may have meant it by ὑπόδηματος εἶδος: and κεφαλὶς and χιτών are passed over in total silence: they appear in none of the dictionaries of antiquity that I am acquainted with, nor are the ordinary Lexicons more instructive. We are left therefore to conjecture as to the precise meaning of them, but I think the consideration of the words themselves will help us at least to understand what they represent.

πρόσχισμα is ‘a slit in front’ of the shoe, with which Aristotle’s use of the word in the Problem above quoted exactly agrees. This I think is fully confirmed by a drawing of a ὑπόδημα in Becker’s *Charicles*, p. 448 (Transl. ed. 2), which is a facsimile of a modern half-boot laced up in front. The πρόσχισμα is the slit down the front, which when the shoe is worn has to be laced up. This seems pretty certain; but of κεφαλὶς I can only conjecture from the name, that it is a head-piece, or *cap*, covering the *toes*, and distinguishing this kind of shoe from those in which the toes were left uncovered, which seems to have been the usual fashion. χιτών—guided by a very common use of the word, which extends it from a covering of the body to any covering whatsoever (in Rost and Palm’s *Lexicon*, s.v. No. 2, Vol. II. p. 2466)—I have supposed to mean the upper leather, the object of which, just like that of the tunic or *coat*, is to protect or cover the upper part of the foot, and keep out the cold. Stephens’ *Lexicon* referring to this passage translates κεφαλὶς *tegumentum capitinis!* Xen. Cyrop. VIII 2. 5, (where σχίζων and χιτώνας are used in connexion with shoes,) and Schneider’s note, throw no additional light upon the exact meaning of these three words.

§ 11. ‘The possibility of a *genus* or class implies that of any subordinate *species*, and conversely; if a vessel can be built, then triremes; and if triremes, then a vessel’.

§ 12. ‘And if the one of two things that stand in a natural relation to one another (i.e. two relative terms; see above, §§ 8 and 10) be possible, then also the other; as double implies the possibility of half, and half of double’. Categ. c. 10, 11 b 26, διπλάσιον καὶ ἡμίσιον is one of the stock examples of one kind of τὰ πρός τι, the category of relation. Of these *relative opposites* Cicero says, Top. XI 49, *nam alia quoque sunt contrariorum generata, velut ea quae cum aliquo conferuntur: ut duplum, simplum; multa, pauca; longum, brevi; maius, minus.* In de Invent. I 30. 47, the argument from these *opposites* is thus illustrated; *In iis rebus quae sub eandem rationem cadunt hoc modo probabile consideratur: Nam si Rhodiis turpe non est portorium locare, ne Hermacreonti guidem turpe*

πεφυκότων, καὶ θάτερον, οἷον εἰ διπλάσιον, καὶ ἥμισυ,
 13 καὶ εἰ ἥμισυ, καὶ διπλάσιον. καὶ εἰ ἄνευ τέχνης καὶ
 παρασκευῆς δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, μᾶλλον διὰ τέχνης καὶ
 ἐπιμελείας δυνατόν· ὅθεν καὶ Ἀγάθωνι εἴρηται
 καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε χρὴ τέχνη πράσσειν, τὰ δέ
 ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχῃ προσγίγνεται.

p. 87.

14 καὶ εἰ τοῖς χείροις καὶ ἡττοῖς καὶ ἀφρονεστέροις

est conducere. To which Quintilian (referring to this place of Cicero, and quoting the example) adds—*de suo* apparently, for it is not in the original—*Quod discere honestum, et docere* [comp. Cicero, *Orator*, § 145]. Victorius. *Ar. Rhet.* II 23. 3, *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν* τι κελεῦσαι and *πεποιηκέναι*. εἰ γὰρ μηδ' ὑμῶν αἰσχρὸν τὸ πωλεῖν, οὐδὲ ἡμῖν τὸ ὕνεισθαι.

§ 13. ‘And if a thing can be done without art or preparation (or perhaps rather, *apparatus*) it is *a fortiori* possible to do by aid of art’ (*διὰ* with gen. ‘through a channel’, *medium*, and hence, ‘by means of’), and pains (study, attention). This is not the exact converse of the topic of § 3, which implied the possibility of a thing being done *at all* from that of its being *well* done; here the use of art, study and attention, and any other artificial means by which we assist nature, is alleged as facilitating the construction of anything, or of carrying out *any* purpose or design that we may have in view: the possibility of doing anything without art implies *a fortiori* the possibility of doing it with additional help and contrivance.

In the two verses of Agathon (from an uncertain play) which follow, the old reading was *καὶ μὴν τὰ μέν γε τῇ τύχῃ πράσσειν, τὰ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη καὶ τέχνη προσγίγνεται*, but Porson’s transposition of *τύχῃ* and *τέχνη* (ad Med. 1090), which is undoubtedly right, has been adopted by Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, as it was by Elmsley, ad Med. 1062. This alteration brings them into the required correspondence with Aristotle’s text. “If”, says Aristotle, “anything can be effected without art”,—which is interpreted as it were by Agathon’s “accident, and necessity or overpowering force”. But *τῇ τέχνῃ* may be very well retained; and the translation will be: “And moreover it falls to our lot to do (effect) some things by art, others by force and mere accident”. *προσγίγνεσθαι* occurs three times in this sense, *efficior, accido*, in Sophocles, *Oed. Col.* 1200, *Electr.* 761, *Trach.* 1163 (Ellendt’s *lex*).

§ 14. ‘And anything that is possible for inferiors in capacity (and personal qualities in general), and power or position, and intelligence, is *a fortiori* possible to the opposites (those who are superior) in all these’. Schrader quotes in illustration: *Ergo haec (ferre laborem, contemnere vulnus,) veteranus miles facere poterit, doctus vir sapiensque non poterit? ille vero melius ac non paullo quidem* (Cic. *Tusc.* II 17). Galgacus, ap. Tacit. *Agric.* 31, *Brigantes semina duce exurere coloniam, expugnare castra, ac nisi felicitas in socordiam vertisset, exure iugum potuere: nos integri et indomiti primo statim congressu non ostendemus quos sibi Caledonia viros se posuerit?*

δυνατόν, καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις μᾶλλον, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη δεινὸν εἶναι εἰ ὁ μὲν Εὔθυνος ἔμαθεν, αὐτὸς 15 δὲ μὴ δυνήσεται εὑρεῖν. περὶ δὲ ἀδυνάτου δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὑπάρχει.

16 εἰ δὲ γέγονεν ἢ μὴ γέγονεν, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον.

‘As indeed Isocrates said, that it was monstrous to suppose that what an Euthynus could learn he himself should be unable to discover’. Of Euthynus Buhle says, “de Euth. nihil constat, praeterquam quod ex hoc loco colligi potest, fuisse eum stupidi et sterilis ingenii hominem.” After all it is only Isocrates’ estimate of him that we have to judge by: in comparison with himself most of Isocrates’ contemporaries were to him contemptible. The name of Euthynus does not occur in Isocrates’ extant orations. A doubtful speech, *πρὸς Εὐθύνους* (*Ready wit*), is printed with his works. This Euthynous was ἀνεψιὸς Νικίου, § 9. Of course he cannot be the person here meant. Euthynus, a wrestler, is mentioned by Demosthenes, c. Mid. § 71, who might possibly be the man for whom Isocrates expressed his contempt.

[The latter part of the speech *πρὸς Εὐθύνους*, Isocr. Or. 21, has not been preserved, and Aristotle may possibly be here referring to something in the part that is now missing. Perhaps the only difficulty about this supposition is the loose sense in which Ἰσοκράτης ἔφη must then be interpreted, as the speech in question (whether written, as I believe, by Isocrates, or not) was not delivered by him. In another speech, Isocr. *πρὸς Καλλίμαχον*, Or. 18 § 15, we have the words: θαυμάζω δὲ εἰ αὐτὸν μὲν ἰκανὸν γνῶναι νομίζει, ὅτι... ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ ἀνοίεται τοῦτ' ἐξευρεῖν, εἴπερ ἐβούλομην ψευδῆ λέγειν, ὅτι κ.τ.λ., and Aristotle may, after all, be quoting memoriter, as is his wont, from the latter passage; in this case we should have to suppose that Εὔθυνος is a slip of memory for Καλλίμαχος. See Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, II 203; and comp. Jebb’s *Attic Orators*, II 259. s.]

§ 15. ‘On the impossible, it is plain that the orator may be supplied with topics from the opposites of those which have been already mentioned (on the possible)’.

ὑπάρχει ‘are already there’, ready at hand, for use; as a stock, on which he may draw for his materials.

§ 16. The second of the *κονοὶ τόποι* is the topic of fact, ‘whether such and such a thing has been done or not’: this is most useful in the forensic branch, in courts of law. It is the *στάσις στοχαστική*, *status conjecturalis* the first of the legal issues, and the first question that arises in a case. To this is appended, §§ 23—25, fact future; or rather, future probability, whether so and so is likely to happen or not. This of course belongs almost to the deliberative orator, who has to advise upon a future course of policy. The following topics suggest arguments to prove the probability of some act having been committed which the pleader wishes to establish against his antagonist.

‘First of all we may infer that if anything that is naturally less likely to have occurred has happened (been done), then (*a fortiori*) anything (of the same kind) that is more usual may probably have happened also’.

πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, εἰ τὸ ἥπτον γίγνεσθαι πεφυκὸς
 17 γέγονεν, γεγονὸς ἀν εἴη καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον. καὶ εἰ τὸ
 ὕστερον εἴωθὸς γίγνεσθαι γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ πρότερον
 γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐπιλέλησται, καὶ ἔμαθέ ποτε τοῦτο.
 18 καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο, πέπραχεν πάντες γάρ,
 δταν δυνάμενοι βουληθῶσι, πράττουσιν ἐμποδὼν γὰρ
 19 οὐδέν. ἔτι εἰ ἐβούλετο καὶ μηδὲν τῶν ἔξω ἐκάλυνεν,

The *probability* the degree of which is estimated by the frequency of recurrence, being in the latter case greater. Introd. p. 160.

§ 17. ‘And if (in a relation of prior and posterior, antecedent and consequent) the usual consequent (of the antecedent) has happened, then (we may argue that) the antecedent also has happened; as, for instance, the having forgotten something implies a previous learning, some time or other, of the same’. Learning is the necessary antecedent of forgetting; without the first the second is impossible. As this is a *necessary connexion*, the argument from it is a *τεκμήριον*, a *certain* indication: it is not however convertible, as a necessary sequence; for it does not follow that, because a man can’t forget without having first learnt, he also can’t learn without afterwards forgetting: the converse is only probable, not necessary.

§ 18. When power is combined with the will to do a thing, we may argue that the thing has been done: this is human nature: every one, having the power to do what he wishes, does it; because there is no impediment, nothing to hinder him from the gratification of his desire. Polit. VIII (v) 10, 1312 b 3, ἀ δὲ βούλονται δυνάμενοι πράττουσι πάντες.

§ 19. ‘Further, it may be argued that an act has been done, if the supposed perpetrator had the wish or desire to do it, and no external circumstances stood in his way; or if he had the power of doing it (some injury to another), and at the same time was angry; or if he had at the same time a desire and the power of satisfying it’, (the *desire* here is especially *lussi*, and the act done, adultery); ‘for men for the most part are wont to gratify their impulses when they have the power of doing so; the bad from want of self-control, and the good because their desires are good or well-directed (because they desire what is good, and nothing else).

ἐβούλετο, ἐπεθύμει] “*Voluit* prævia deliberatione, *concupivit* ex affectu.” Schrader. If Schrader meant by *voluit* that *βούλησις* is *willing* and not *wishing*, and that it implies deliberation and purpose, as he certainly seems to say, this is a mistake. I will endeavour to determine the proper signification of *βούλησις* and its distinction from *ἐπιθυμία*.

First, however, it must be admitted that neither of the two terms, *βούλεσθαι* and *ἐπιθυμεῖν*, is confined exclusively to its own proper and primary sense: these like other terms of psychology are used with a latitude and indefiniteness which belong to a very early stage of inquiry into the constitution of our inner man. For instance, *ἐπιθυμία*, which properly denotes the three bodily appetites, is often extended to the

καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ὡργίζετο, καὶ εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐπεθύμει· ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ὃν ὀρέγονται, ἢν δύνωνται, καὶ ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι δι' ἀκρασίαν, οἱ δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς ὅτι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ εἰ ἔμελλε

whole class of *desires*, mental as well as bodily; and thus becomes identified or confounded with *βούλησις*.

From a comparison of three passages of our author in which we find notices of *βούλησις*, we draw the inference that it means *wish* and not *will*. *Will* implies *purpose*; and we are distinctly told in Eth. Nic. III 4, IIII b 20 seq. that *βούλησις* is distinguished from *προάρεσις*, deliberate moral purpose, by the absence of this. Further the exercise of *προάρεσις* is confined to things which are in our power to do or avoid; the wish sometimes is directed to what is impossible or unattainable, to immortality for instance or happiness. It is also directed to the *end*, whereas *προάρεσις* looks rather to the means of attaining the end. *τέλος* ἔστι τῶν πρακτῶν ὁ δι' αὐτὸν βούλομεθα, Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 a 19. Further it is always directed to what is good, real or supposed, Rhet. I 10. 8. Psychologically considered, it belongs to the family of the *όρέξεις*, the instinctive impulses which prompt to action, acting unconsciously and without deliberation. These are three, de Anima II. 3, 414 b 2, *όρέξις* μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμίᾳ (appetite) καὶ θυμός (passion, especially anger), καὶ *βούλησις* (wish, the mental desire of good). (*Βούλησις*, Rhet. u. s., is distinguished from *ἐπιθυμία*, by this intellectual character of discrimination between good and bad; *ἐπιθυμία* being a mere animal appetite, *ἄλογος ὄρέξις*). Comp. de Anima I. 5, 411 a 28, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ ὅλως αἱ ὄρέξεις, where the two are again distinguished. And in Rhet. u. s. the three *όρέξεις* are divided into *λογιστική* and *ἄλογοι*, the former character belonging to *βούλησις*, the latter (irrational) to *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*. *Ἐπιθυμία* therefore is bodily appetite, and *ἐπεθύμει* here, as a cause of crime, though not excluding hunger and thirst, refers more particularly to *lust*. In the second case, *ἐπιθυμοῦσιν τῶν ἐπιεικῶν*, ‘desire’ is extended to intellectual impulses, which can distinguish good from bad; and is thus confounded with *βούλησις*, which denotes wishing, but not willing. It is to be observed that the discrimination which is exercised by *βούλησις* in the choice of good, is purely impulsive or instinctive, otherwise it would not be one of the *όρέξεις*: it employs no calculation or deliberation like the *προάρεσις* preparatory to decision, and does not always stimulate to action; as when it is directed to impossibilities.

εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ὡργίζετο] Because anger, as long as it lasts, is always accompanied by the desire of vengeance, which, if a man have the power, he will be sure to wreak on the object of his anger, II 2. 2. After each of these three clauses supply *πέπραχεν*, from § 18, as the apodosis.

§ 20. *καὶ· εἰ ἔμελλε γίγνεσθαι, καὶ ποιεῖν]* What seems to be meant is this; anything which was on the point of being done, we may assume to have actually happened; or whatever a man was on the point of doing, that he actually did. Expressed at full length this would run, *καὶ εἰ τι ἔμελλε γίγνεσθαι, (έγένετο) καὶ (εἴ τις ἔμελλε) ποιεῖν, ἐποίησεν, or πέπραχεν*

[γίγνεσθαι, καὶ] ποιεῖν εἰκὸς γὰρ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ
21 ποιῆσαι. καὶ εἰ γέγονεν ὅσα πεφύκει πρὸ ἐκείνου ἡ
ἐνεκα ἐκείνου, οἷον εἰ ἡστραψε, καὶ ἐβρόντησεν, καὶ
εἰ ἐπείρασε, καὶ ἐπραξεν. καὶ εἰ ὅσα ὑστερον πε-
φύκει γίγνεσθαι ἡ οὐ ἐνεκα γίγνεται γέγονεν, καὶ τὸ

(again from § 18). In any other Greek author one would hardly perhaps venture upon thus supplying an ellipse; but I see no other way of extracting at once sense and Greek from the text. There appears to be no variation in the MSS. Bekker, ed. 3, and Spengel, read καὶ εἰ ἔμελλε [γίγνεσθαι, καὶ] ποιεῖν. In § 19, the latter also puts ἐβούλετο καὶ, and (after ἐκώλυεν) καὶ εἰ δυνατὸν (so A° for ἐδύνατο), in brackets, as interpolations. The last three words are also omitted by MS Z°. It seems to me that, in the two latter cases at least, the text is perfectly intelligible and defensible. The only reason alleged for omitting the five words in brackets in § 19 is that, if we retain them, εἰ ἐβούλετο...ἔκώλυεν is a mere repetition of the preceding εἰ ἐδύνατο καὶ ἐβούλετο. That this is not the case, Victorius has pointed out in his explanation. The former of the two topics, § 18, combines power and wish: both together are certain to produce the act. The latter statement is different; the wish alone is sufficient to produce the act—provided there are no external impediments in the way: in that case the mere wish, the internal impulse, is not sufficient.

'For it is natural or likely—this is all we want for our argument—that one who is waiting to do something, or on the point of doing it, would also actually carry out his intention, and do it: the probability is that it has been done'.

§ 21. In this connexion of antecedent and consequent, if it is usual, but not necessary, it is a sign, σημεῖον, and uncertain; when necessary, it is a τεκμήριον. Anal. Pr. II 27, sub init. σημεῖον (here including both kinds) δὲ βούλεται (would be, if it could: aspires to be) εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀναγκαῖα ἡ ἔνδοξος· οὐ γὰρ ὅντος ἔστιν ἡ οὐ γενομένου πρότερον, ἡ ὑστερον γέγονε τὸ πρᾶγμα, τοῦτο σημεῖον ἔστι τοῦ γεγονέαι ἡ εἶναι.

'And again, if what had been previously (πεφύκει, 'had always been', the regular accompaniment) the natural antecedent of so and so, (of the assumed event, or imputed act,) or means to a certain end, has happened, (then the ordinary consequent has happened, or the end aimed at been attained); for instance, we infer from the occurrence of thunder that there has been lightning; and from the attempt, the execution of a crime'. By ἐπείρασε, says Victorius, is meant—principally, not exclusively—stuprum, 'seduction', the attempt on a woman's chastity: on this use of the verb πειρᾶν see Ruhnken ad Tim. s. v. p. 210. Timaeus explains it, πειράσειν διὰ λόγων παῖδα ἡ γυναῖκα. Plat. Phaedr. 227 c, Arist. Plut. 150, and Lat. tentare.

'And (the converse) if what had been the ordinary natural consequent of something else, or the end of certain means (the aim and object of certain actions) has happened, then we infer that the ante-

πρότερον καὶ τὸ τούτου ἔνεκα γέγονεν, οἷον εἰ ἐβρόν-
τησε, καὶ ἡστραψεν, καὶ εἰ ἐπραξε, καὶ ἐπείρασεν.
ἔστι δὲ τούτων ἀπάντων τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δὲ
22 ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὕτως ἔχοντα. περὶ δὲ τοῦ μὴ γεγονέναι
φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

23 καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐσομένου ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν δῆλον. τό P. 139

cedent in the one case has occurred, the means to the end in the other have been employed, as we infer lightning from thunder, and the attempt from the execution of an act or crime. And of all these cases, in some the connexion is of necessity, in the rest only for the most part'. The *natural* antecedent and consequent, as the uniform order of nature, is the *necessary* connexion : of the uncertain issues of *human agency*, τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, actions which depend upon ourselves and our own will, nothing more than probability can be predicated : δύαπτητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας παχυλῶς καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιάτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι : the conclusions of moral and social sciences can but amount to probability (Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 b 19, *et passim*). Consequently, the connexion of motives and actions, and of actions with one another, follows only a general rule, and this rule can never be applied with absolute certainty.

§ 22. Materials for arguments on the topic of ‘not happening’, the disproof of a statement of fact, may plainly be derived from the opposites of the preceding, which shew how it may be established. The verb is omitted : supply, as in § 15, *ὑπάρχει*. This omission of the verb probably accounts for the omission of *ὅτι* in MSS Q, Y^b, Z^b.

§ 23. Arguments for the establishment of the probability of future events and consequences clearly may be derived from the same source: for where the power and the wish to do anything are united, the thing will be done; as likewise when desire, anger, and calculation, are accompanied by the power of gratifying the two first, and carrying out the third. Spengel has again, without manuscript authority, bracketed καὶ λογισμῷ as an interpolation; doubtless because it is not mentioned in §§ 18, 19, of which this is a summary. The objection has been already anticipated and answered by Victorius. Calculation or reasoning is implied, he thinks, in the desires of good men, which are always directed to what is good. I cannot think however that this is what Ar. means here by λογισμός. And if we insist upon the strict interpretation of ἐπιθυμοῦσι, as excluding any operation of the intellect, still it is hard to deny the author the opportunity of supplying in § 23 what he has omitted to notice in § 19. The statement is perfectly true: ‘calculation plus the power’ of carrying it out *will* produce future consequences: neither does it contradict anything that has been said before, but merely supplements it. After all even Aristotle is a man, and liable to human infirmities; and certainly his ordinary style of writing is not of that character which would lead us to expect rigorous exactness: on the contrary it is hasty and careless in a degree far beyond the measure of ordinary writing. Upon the whole, I see no reason whatsoever for

τε γὰρ ἐν δυνάμει καὶ βουλήσει ὃν ἔσται, καὶ τὰ ἐν
ἐπιθυμίᾳ καὶ ὄργῃ καὶ λογισμῷ μετὰ δυνάμεως ὄντα.
διὰ ταῦτα καὶ εἰ ἐν ὀρμῇ τοῦ ποιεῖν ἡ μελλήσει,
ἔσται· ως γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίγνεται μᾶλλον τὰ μέλ-
24 λοντα ἡ τὰ μὴ μέλλοντα. καὶ εἰ προγέγονεν ὅσα
πρότερον πεφύκει γίγνεσθαι, οἷον εἰ συννεφεῖ, εἰκὸς
25 ὑσται. καὶ εἰ τὸ ἔνεκα τούτου γέγονεν, καὶ τοῦτο p. 88.
εἰκὸς γενέσθαι οἷον εἰ θεμέλιος, καὶ οἰκία.

excluding καὶ λογισμῷ from the text: the MSS warrant it, and Bekker retains it.

διὰ ταῦτα κ.τ.λ.] The meaning of this obscure sentence seems to be this:—It follows from what has just been stated, διὰ ταῦτα—the statement, that is, that the co-existence of impulse (desire and passion) with power, is a sure source or spring of action—that the intention which these impulses suggest,—whether it be immediately, in the very impulse (or, starting-point, first start) to action, or (future) when a man is anxiously waiting for his opportunity (*ἐν μελλήσει*),—is most likely to be carried out; and then an *additional* reason is assigned for the probability of the future event when it is *on the point* of taking place, either immediately, or not long hence, that things that are impending (acts or events) are for the most part much more likely to happen than those that are not impending. With *ἐν ὀρμῇ* comp. Soph. Phil. 566, *οὔτω καθ' ὀρμὴν δρῶσιν*.

I subjoin Victorius' explanation. “*Vi etiam horum locorum, si operam dabat ut gereret, ac iam iamque eam rem aggrediebatur (hoc enim valere hic arbitror ἐν ὀρμῇ), aut denique si post facere aliquando statuerat (quod significari arbitror hoc verbo μελλήσει) dici potest id futurum: duos autem, si ita legatur, manifesto locos complectitur: quorum prior rei tentandae peragendaeque propinquior erat: alter tantum facere in animo habebat.*”

§ 24. ‘And if the things that had previously been in the habit of preceding, in a natural order of succession, have already happened, (then we may expect the usual consequent); if the clouds gather, we may expect rain’.

συννεφεῖν, transitive, Arist. Av. 1502. Here impersonal, according to the analogy of verbs which express states of weather or atmospheric phenomena, *νίει*, *νίφει*, *ἐβρόντησε*, *ηστραψεν*, *supra* § 21, *ἔσεισε*, Thuc. V. 52.

The impersonal use of these verbs is explained by the original expression, and subsequent omission of a subject, *ὁ Θεός* or *Ζεύς* (the God of the sky). In their ignorance of the natural causes of these and similar phenomena, they attributed them to divine interposition [Shilleto on Thuc. I 51. 2, *ξυνεσκόταξε*].

§ 25. ‘And if anything which would serve as means to a particular end (act or event) has happened, then we may infer that the end or object which these imply is likely to be brought about; as a foundation implies a future house’.

26 περὶ δὲ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ μείζονός τε καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ ὅλως μεγάλων καὶ μικρῶν ἐκ τῶν προειρημένων ημῖν ἔστι φανερόν. εἴρηται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς περὶ τε μεγέθους ἀγαθῶν καὶ περὶ τοῦ μείζονος ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐλάττονος. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν λόγων τὸ προκείμενον τέλος ἀγαθόν ἔστιν, οἷον τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, φανερὸν ὅτι δι' ἐκείνων ληπτέον τὰς 27 αὐξήσεις πᾶσιν. τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτά τι ζητεῦν περὶ

§ 26. The last of the three *kouoi tópoi* is that of amplification and depreciation, of exalting and magnifying or disparaging and vilifying anything, according as we desire to set it in a favourable or unfavourable light. Its usual name is *aὔξειν καὶ μειών*, II 18. 4; 26. 1; III 19. 3. Comp. Introd. p. 276, on II 26, and the note. Though this is a *kouos tópos*, and therefore can be used in the three branches of Rhetoric, it is most especially applicable to the *ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος*, and finds there its most natural and appropriate sphere; I 9. 40.

'The subject of (*περὶ*) the arguments or inferences that may be drawn as to the value of things, absolute or comparative; of greatness and littleness of things in themselves, or relatively to one another; or in general of things great and small; is clear from what has been already said'. They have been treated of under the head of the deliberative branch of Rhetoric, in I 6, on things good in themselves, and I 7, on the degrees, or comparative value of them.

ἀπλῶς] *simpliciter* (Victorius), seems to be more applicable to *μέγεθος* than to the relative *μείζον* and *ἐλάττον*. As it is applied here to the latter, it must mean that the degree, or relative value, is the *only* thing which is taken into the account of them in that chapter.

'And therefore, since in each of the three kinds of speeches (I 3. 5) the end or object proposed is some form of good, that is to say, either the expedient, or the fair and right, or the just, it is plain that these must be the channels by which they are all (all three kinds of speakers) supplied with the materials of their amplifications'.

οἶον] 'that is to say', *nempe, scilicet*, not 'for instance'; defining or explaining, not exemplifying; occurs perpetually in Aristotle's writings. Waitz has some examples on Categ. c. 4, 1 b 18; comp. note on 4 b 23; and Bonitz on Metaph. A 4, 985 b 6. [For some instances, see *infra*, note on III 1. 4.]

§ 27. 'But to carry our inquiries beyond this into the subject of magnitude and excess or superiority absolutely and in themselves is mere idle talk (trifling with words): for for use, or practical purposes (the needs or business of life), particular things are far more important (authoritative, carry greater weight with them, are more convincing) than universals'. What is said here of particulars being more useful than universals for practice, or for the practitioner in any art, and therefore

μεγέθους ἀπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχῆς κενολογεῖν ἔστιν· κυριώτερα γάρ ἔστι πρὸς τὴν χρείαν τῶν καθόλου τακαθ' ἔκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων.

περὶ μὲν οὐν δυνατοῦ καὶ ἀδυνάτου, καὶ πότερον γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν καὶ ἔσται ἢ οὐκ ἔσται, ἔτι δὲ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος τῶν πραγμάτων εἰ-
ιρήσθω ταῦτα· λοιπὸν δὲ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πίστεων CHAP. XX.
ἀπασιν εἶπεν, ἐπεί περ εἴρηται περὶ τῶν ἴδιων. εἰσὶ

for the rhetorician, is illustrated by Metaph. A 1, 981 a 12, πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνοντας δρῶμεν τοὺς ἐμπειρούς τῶν ἀνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον ἔχοντων. αὕτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἔκαστον ἔστι γνῶσις, ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέτεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἔκαστον εἰσιν· οὐ γάρ ἄνθρωπον ὕγαζει ὁ λατρεύων... ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἡ Σωκράτην. In Rhet. I 2. 11, where at first sight this might seem to be contradicted, the author is speaking of Rhetoric as an *art*, which deals with universals, if it be a true art and not a mere empirical practice: here as a practice, and as employed by a practitioner.

[κενολογεῖν] is found in the same sense applied to the *mere variety or idle talk, without meaning*, of the Platonic ideas, in Metaph. A 9, 991 b 20, and the repetition of the same passage, M 5, 1079 b 26.

CHAP. XX.

Having now finished the treatment of the special modes of rhetorical proof, the *εἰδη, ἥθος, πάθος* and *κοινοὶ τόποι*, we have next to speak of the universal.

Hitherto the objects of our investigation and analysis have been of a special character, included under particular sciences, chiefly moral and political, and also, under the three branches of Rhetoric, the topics severally appropriate to each: the *ἥθος* and *πάθος*, the secondary arguments, by which a favourable impression of the speaker's character is conveyed to the audience, and they themselves brought into the state of feeling which his purpose requires, are likewise confined to Rhetoric: as are also the *κοινοὶ τόποι*—common to all the three branches, though even these are not equally applicable to all, and may therefore in a sense be included under the term *ἴδια* (so Schrader).—We now proceed to what remains to be done before we bring the logical and intellectual division of Rhetoric to its conclusion—to give an account of the two universal methods common to all reasoning of every kind, compared with which all the rest may be called *ἴδια*, viz. deduction, demonstration, syllogism, and induction; or, as they appear in Rhetoric, in the imperfect forms of enthymeme (inference) and example; which are in fact the only two methods by which we can arrive at truth and knowledge. ὅτι δ' οὐ μόνον οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων γίνονται σχημάτων (the figures of syllogism), ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἥτισον πίστις καὶ καβ'

δ' αἱ κοιναὶ πίστεις δύο τῷ γένει, παράδειγμα καὶ ἐνθύμημα· ή γὰρ γνώμη μέρος ἐνθυμήματος ἔστιν.
 2 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ παραδείγματος λέγωμεν· ὅμοιον
 γὰρ ἐπαγωγῆ τὸ παράδειγμα, ή δὲ ἐπαγωγὴ ἀρχή.
 παραδειγμάτων δὲ εἴδη δύο· ἐν μὲν γάρ ἔστι
 παραδείγματος εἶδος τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγεγενη-
 μένα, ἐν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν. τούτου δὲ ἐν μὲν παρα-
 3 βολὴ ἐν δὲ λόγοι, οἷον οἱ Αἰσώπειοι καὶ Λιβυκοί. ἔστι

ὅπουανον μέθοδον, νῦν ἀν εἴη λεκτέον. ἄπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἡ διὰ συλ-
 λογισμοῦ ἡ ἔξι ἐπαγωγῆς. Aristotle supposed that inductive reasoning
 could be reduced to a syllogistic form [Grote's Aristotle I 268]. Anal.
 Pr. II 23, 68 b 9. εἰπερ μανθάνομεν ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ ἡ ἀποδείξει. Anal. Post. I
 18, 81 a 40. This explanation will reconcile the apparent contradiction
 of including the κοινοὶ τόποι under ἴδια; it is only as contrasted with the
 still more universal induction and demonstration that they can be so called.

'These common (universal) modes of persuasion, or rhetorical proof, are generically two (two in kind as we say; two *species* in one *genus*), example and enthymeme; for *γνώμη* is a part of enthymeme'. This last remark is meant to correct the ordinary treatment of the *γνώμη* as a distinct species of argument, apart from the enthymeme, of which in reality it is a mere variety. This is actually done in the Rhet. ad Al. c. 7 (8). 2 and c. 11 (12). The *γνώμη* and its logical character are described in the next chapter, § 2.

§ 2. 'First of all then let us speak of example; for example is like induction, and induction is a beginning or origin'. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῆ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον' καὶ γὰρ αἰσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλον ἐμποιεῖ. Anal. Post. II 19, 100 b 3, and the whole chapter. Induction is a *beginning*, because from and by it, originally from objects of sense, we collect all our primary (*πρῶτα*) and universal first principles, the highest *ἀρχαί*, from which all our syllogisms must ultimately be deduced. It seems that this is assigned as a reason for *beginning* with *παράδειγμα*, which is a variety of induction, rather than with *ἐνθύμημα*, the rhetorical offshoot of *ἀποδείξεις*, demonstration or deduction. On *παράδειγμα*, or example in general, see Introd. p. 105, seq.

'Of examples there are two kinds: one of them is to relate past facts, the other to invent them for oneself. Of the latter again, one kind is comparison or illustration; the other λόγοι, fables, like Aesop's and the Libyan'; (and the fables of Phaedrus, La Fontaine, and Gay). The illustration, 'those of Aesop and the Libyan', is confined to only one of the two kinds of λόγοι, fables proper, in which animals, plants, or even inanimate objects are endowed with speech and reason: the other includes fictions, tales, stories: analogous cases, fictitious, and made for the occasion, or more usually derived from the writings of poets, especially epic and tragic, philosophers, historians, or any authors of credit. See further on these terms and divisions, Introd. pp. 254—6, and the

δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν τοιόνδε τι, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς βασιλέα παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔαν
Αἰγυπτον χειρώσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ Δαρεῖος οὐ πρότερον P. 1393^b.
διέβη πρὶν Αἰγυπτον ἐλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη, καὶ πάλιν
Ξέρξης οὐ πρότερον ἐπεχείρησε πρὶν ἐλαβεν, λαβὼν
δὲ διέβη· ὥστε καὶ οὗτος ἐὰν λάβῃ, διαβήσεται· διὸ
4 οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον· παραβολὴ δὲ τὰ Σωκρατικά, οἷον

references there given: and on *λόγοι*, ‘fables’, p. 255, note. On the Fable, see some excellent remarks in Müller, *H. G. L.* c. XI 14, 15; and G. C. Lewis, in *Phil. Mus.* 1280, “On the fables of Babrius.” He begins with this definition:—“A fable may be defined to be an analogical narrative, intended to convey some moral lesson, in which irrational animals or objects are introduced as speaking.”

§ 3. ζοτὶ δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν] For *παράδειγμα* of the older editions, I accept with Bekker, ed. 3, Spengel's alteration *πράγματα λέγειν*. It is suggested by MS A^c *παραδείγματα λέγειν*, and supported by § 8, τὰ διὰ τῶν πραγμάτων; see in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* Munich 1851, p. 49.

‘The historical example (τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγεγενημένα) is of this kind: as if, for instance (a deliberative speaker) were to say, We must arm against the King’ (the Great King, the King of Persia, as usual without the article), ‘and not allow him to subdue Egypt: for in fact Darius did not cross (the Aegean to attack us) until he had secured (got possession of) Egypt, but as soon as he had done that, he *did* cross; and Xerxes again did not make *his* attempt upon us until he had seized it, but crossed as soon as he was master of it: and therefore (the *inference* from the two *examples* or historical parallels) this King also is likely to cross if he is allowed to seize it, so that we must not permit it’. The case here given in illustration is probably an imaginary one, *εἴ τις λέγοι*; and this seems to be Victorius's opinion. But it is barely possible that the recovery of Egypt by Ochus, ὁ μετονομασθεὶς Ἀρταξέρξης (Diod.), about 350 B.C., Clint. *Fast. Hell.* II, p. 316 and note w, may have attracted the attention of the Athenian assembly, and this argument have been used by one of the speakers on the question. Max Schmidt, in his tract *On the date of the Rhetoric*, makes use of this passage as helping to fix it, pp. 19—21. Artaxerxes' expedition to Egypt was undertaken in 351 B.C., and continued through the next year. Both the rival sovereigns, Nectanebus, the reigning king, and Artaxerxes, sent ambassadors to the Greek states for aid, and the subject excited general interest at Athens, as well as in the rest of Greece. It was at this time that Aristotle, who was then employed on his Rhetoric, introduced this illustration, which was suggested by what was actually going on at the time.

§ 4. *παραβολὴ* is *juxtaposition*, setting one thing *by the side* of another for the purpose of *comparison* and *illustration*; taking analogous or *parallel* cases; it is the argument from analogy, ἀν τις δύνηται ὅμοιον ὄραν, § 7. A good instance of *παραβολὴ* in this sense occurs, Pol. II 5, 1264 b 4, where Plato is said to derive a *παραβολὴ*, or analogy, ἐκ τῶν θηρίων

εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι οὐ δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἄρχειν· ὅμοιον γὰρ p. 89.
ώσπερ ἀν εἴ τις τοὺς ἀθλητὰς κληροίν μὴ οἱ ἀν δύνων-
ται ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλ' οἱ ἀν λάχωσιν, ἢ τῶν πλω-
τήρων ὃν τινα δεῖ κυβερνᾶν κληρώστειν, ὡς δέον τὸν
(i.e. dogs), to prove that the pursuits and occupations of men and women
should be the same.

'Of *παραβολή*¹ the Socratic practice or method is an example; as for instance if one were to say, that the magistrates ought not to be chosen by lot: for this is analogous to the case of choosing for the athletes (who were to enter the lists) not those who are fitted for the combat, but those upon whom the lot falls; or to choosing the steersman out of a crew of sailors on the principle that it was the man who won the toss, and not the man of knowledge and skill (the man who knows his business), that ought to be chosen'.

This very same analogy is ascribed to Socrates by the accuser at his trial, as one of those which he was in the habit of using, Xen. Memor. I 2.9. And the same mode of inference, from the analogy of the mechanical and other arts, was transmitted by Socrates to Plato, and through him to his pupil Aristotle, in whose writings it constantly appears in illustration of many of his moral and social and political theories. It is to this practice of Socrates that Critias refers, when he and Charicles, during the tyranny of the Thirty, summoned him before them, and forbade him to continue his dialectical practice and intercourse with the young Athenians. Socrates inquires what sort of questions he is ordered to abstain from. Ib. I 2.37, δὲ δὲ Κριτίας, ἀλλὰ τῶνδε τοὶ σε ἀπέχεσθαι, ἔφη, δεήσει, ὁ Σόλκρατες, τῶν σκυτέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων· καὶ γὰρ οἷμα αὐτὸς ἥδη κατατερίφθαι διαθρυλλουμένους ὑπὸ σοῦ. Similarly Callicles, Plat. Gorg. 491 A, νῆ τοὺς θεούς, ἀτεχνός γε ἀεὶ σκυτέας τε καὶ κναφέας καὶ μαγείρους λέγων καὶ ιατροὺς οὐδὲν παύει, κ.τ.λ. Alcibiades, Sympos. 221 E, ὅνος γὰρ κανθηλίους λέγει καὶ χαλκέας τιὰς

¹ Παραβολή is thus described by Eustath. ad Il. A p. 176 (ap. Gaisford, λέγεται δὲ παραβολὴ διότι τοῖς λεγομένοις παραβάλλει, τοντέστι συγκρίνει καὶ παρατίθησι, πράγμα τι γνωρίμον εἰωθὸς ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι· ὅπερ ὅφελει πάντως γνωριμώτερον εἶναι τοῦ δι' ὁ παρειληπται· κακίᾳ γὰρ παραβολῆς τὸ ἄγνωστον καὶ ἀσύνηθες... διότι οὐδὲ διδασκαλικὴ ἡ τοιαύτη ἐστὶ παραβολὴ. On the definition, and various definitions of the 'parable,' see Trench on the Parables, Ch. 1 Introd. The author in defining parable, and distinguishing it from fable, seems to confine himself too exclusively to the New Testament parables, when he says that the latter "is constructed to set forth a truth spiritual and heavenly," whereas the fable "never lifts itself above the earth"; it "inculcates maxims of prudential morality, industry, caution, foresight," all its morality being of a *worldly* character, p. 2. And again, p. 9, "the parable differs from the fable, moving as it does in a spiritual world, and never transgressing the actual order of things natural." Aristotle, to whom Dr Trench does not refer, distinguishes parable *in general* from fable by this; that the former depicts *human* relations (in which the N. T. parable coincides with it); it *invents* analogous cases, which are not *historical*, but always such as *might* be so; always probable, and corresponding with what actually occurs in real life. The fable is *pure fiction*, and its essential characteristic is, that it invests beasts, birds, plants, and even things inanimate with the attributes of humanity.

5 λαχόντα ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον. λόγος δέ, οἷος ὁ Στησίχορου περὶ Φαλάριδος καὶ Αἰσώπου ὑπὲρ τοῦ δημαγωγοῦ. Στησίχορος μὲν γάρ, ἐλομένων στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα τῶν Ἰμεραίων Φάλαριν καὶ μελλόντων φυλακὴν διδόναι τοῦ σώματος, τἄλλα διαλεχθεὶς εἶπεν αὐτοῖς λόγον ὡς ἵππος κατεῖχε λειμῶνα μόνος, ἐλθόντος δ' ἐλάφου καὶ διαφθείροντος τὴν νομὴν βουλόμενος τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν ἔλαφον ηρώτα τὸν καὶ σκυτοτόμος καὶ βυρσοδέψας, καὶ ᾧτε διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ταῦτα φαίνεται λέγειν. And Hippias' sneer, Xen. Mem. IV 4, 5 and 6, (Socrates had just compared *more suo* the teaching of justice to that of various trades,) ἔτι γὰρ σύ, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὰ αὐτὰ ἔκεινα λέγεις, ἀ ἐγὼ πάλαι ποτέ σου ἥκουσα, and Socrates' rejoinder repeated in Gorg. 490 E, 491 B. Compare Xen. Mem. III 1. 2 and 4, III 7. 6. Plat. Rep. I 332 C, 333 C, II 370 D, 374 C, VIII 551 C (the pilot), Gorg. 447 D, and indeed throughout most of his dialogues. His favourite trades for the purposes of this kind of illustration seem to have been that of the physician and cobbler (*ὁ σκυτοτόμος*).

ὅσπερ ἀν εἰ τις] See note ad I 1. 5, Vol. I, p. 9.

§ 5. The fable may be exemplified by that of Stesichorus about Phalaris, and that of Aesop, in his defence of the demagogue.

For when the Himereans had elected Phalaris general with absolute power, and were about to give him a body-guard, Stesichorus, after having finished the rest of his argument (or discussion), told them a fable, ‘how a horse was the sole possessor of a meadow, when a stag came, and desiring to take vengeance upon the stag for spoiling his pasture he asked the man (or a man *τινά*, MS A^o, Spengel) if he could help him to chastise the stag: the other assented, on the condition of his accepting a bit and allowing himself to mount him with his javelins: so when he had agreed and the other had mounted, instead of his revenge he himself became a slave henceforth to the man: so likewise you, said he, see to it that ye do not in your desire of vengeance upon your enemies share the fate of the horse: for the bit ye have already—when ye elected a general with absolute power, but if ye grant him a body-guard and let him get on your backs, *then* henceforward ye *will* be Phalaris’ slaves.’ The same fable is briefly told by Horace, Ep. I. 10. 34, *Cervus equum pugna melior communibus herbis pellebat*, &c.

This fable of Stesichorus, which Aristotle here assigns to the age and case of Phalaris, is by Conon ‘a writer in Julius Caesar’s time,’ Bentley, *Phalaris*, Vol. I. p. 106 (ed. Dyce [p. 101 ed. Wagner]) transferred to that of Gelon; and this latter version is regarded by Bentley as the more probable; ‘the circumstances of Gelon’s history seem to countenance Conon.’ ‘If we suppose then with the Arundel marble that Stesichorus lived Ol. LXXXIII 3,’ (this is highly improbable; it places Stesichorus’ *floruit* a full century too low, in the year B.C. 486; which should indeed be 485, the year in which Gelon became master of Syracuse, Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici, sub anno*,) ‘it exactly

ἄνθρωπον εἰ δύναιτ’ ἀν μετ’ αὐτοῦ κολάσαι τὸν ἔλαφον, δὲ δὲ ἔφησεν, ἐὰν λάβῃ χαλινὸν καὶ αὐτὸς ἀναβῆ ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἔχων ἀκόντια· συνομολογήσαντος δὲ καὶ ἀναβάντος, ἀντὶ τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι αὐτὸς ἐδούλευσεν ἥδη τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. “οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὑμεῖς” ἔφη “ὅρατε μὴ βουλόμενοι τοὺς πολεμίους τιμωρήσασθαι ταύτῳ πάθητε τῷ ἵππῳ· τὸν μὲν γὰρ χαλινὸν ἔχετε ἥδη, ἐλόμενοι στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα· ἐὰν δὲ φυλακὴν δῶτε καὶ ἀναβῆναι ἔασητε, δουλεύσητε ἥδη Φαλάριδον.” Αἴσωπος δὲ ἐν Σάμῳ συνηγορῶν δημαγωγῷ

agrees with the age of Gelon, and Conon's account of the story may seem more credible than Aristotle's. And then all the argument that would settle Phalaris' age from the time of Stesichorus, will vanish into nothing' (which is probably Bentley's principal reason for maintaining the paradox). Mure, Müller and Clinton, *F. H.*, *sub anno* 632, place the date of Stesichorus' birth in B.C. 645, 643 or 632, and 632, severally; 'so that,' says Müller, *H. G. L.* ch. XIV 4, (as he lived over 80) 'he might be a contemporary of the Agrigentine tyrant Phalaris, against whose ambitious projects he is said by Aristotle to have warned his fellow-citizens (he was a native of Himera) in an ingenious fable.' Mure likewise, Vol. III. p. 226, follows Aristotle. Clinton, *F. H.*, places Phalaris' accession to the throne of Agrigentum in B.C. 570. On Phalaris, see Mr Bunbury's article in Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*. Mr B. says, it would appear from Aristotle, Rhet. II 20, if there be no mistake in the story there told, that he was at one time master of Himera as well as Agrigentum.

On *εἰ δύναιτ’ ἄν*, see Appendix at the end of this book, *On ἄν with the optative after certain particles*.

§ 6. *Αἴσωπος*] On Aesop, see Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. XI 16.

'And Aesop in Samos as advocate for a demagogue on his trial for a capital offence, said that a fox in crossing a river was driven into a cleft or chasm (in the bank); being unable to get out, she suffered for a long time, and many dog-ticks fastened upon her. And a hedgehog, in his wanderings, when he saw her, took compassion upon her, and asked her, if he should (was to, *optative*) remove the dog-ticks from her. But she would not allow it. And upon his asking her why, she replied, because these are already satiated with me and suck (draw) little blood; but if you remove these, others will come, hungry, and drain me of all the blood that is left. But you too, men of Samos, he continued, *this* one will do you no more harm, for he has got rich; but if you put him to death, others will come who are poor, and they will waste all your public property by their thefts.'

This fable is referred to also by Plutarch, *An seni gerenda respublica* p. 790 C, ή μὲν γὰρ Αἴσωπος ἀλώπηξ τὸν ἔχινον οὐκ εἴα τοὺς κρότωνας

κρινομένω περὶ θανάτου ἔφη ἀλώπεκα διαβαίνονταν ποταμὸν ἀπωσθῆναι εἰς φάραγγα, οὐ δυναμένην δὲ ἐκβῆναι πολὺν χρόνον κακοπαθεῖν, καὶ κυνοραιστὰς πολλοὺς ἔχεσθαι αὐτῆς ἔχινον δὲ πλανώμενον, ὡς εἶδεν αὐτήν, κατοικτείραντα ἐρωτᾶν εἰ ἀφέλοι αὐτῆς τοὺς κυνοραιστάς· τὴν δὲ οὐκ ἔαν· ἐρομένου δὲ διὰ τί, ὅτι οὗτοι μὲν φάναι ἥδη μου πλήρεις εἰσὶ καὶ ὀλίγον ἔλκουσιν αἷμα· ἔαν δὲ τούτους ἀφέλης, ἔτεροι ἐλθόντες πεινῶντες ἐκπιοῦνται μου τὸ λοιπὸν αἷμα. “ἀτὰρ καὶ ὑμᾶς” ἔφη, “ὦ ἄνδρες Σάμιοι, οὗτος μὲν οὐδὲν ἔτι βλάψει (πλούσιος γάρ ἐστιν)· ἔαν δὲ τοῦτον ἀποκτείνητε, ἔτεροι ἥξουσι πένητες, οἱ ὑμῖν ἀνα-

7 λώσουσι τὰ κοινὰ κλέπτοντες.” εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ λόγοι δη-

αὐτῆς ἀφελεῖν βουλόμενον, ἀν γὰρ τούτους, ἔφη, μεστοὺς ἀπαλλάξης ἔτεροι προσίσται πεινῶντες. Victorius.

[εἰς φάραγγα] φάραγξ has two senses, ‘a cliff’, as Alcm. Fragm. 44 (Bergk), εὔδουσιν ὄρέων κορυφαὶ τε καὶ φάραγγες; and ‘a chasm’ or ‘cleft’, which it bears here. A fox in attempting to cross a rapid river has been carried down by the torrent, and lodged in a rent or chasm of the precipitous bank, and is there caught as it were in a trap, prevented from getting out by the rapidity of the stream in front. This sense of φάραγξ is illustrated by Thuc. II 76, bis, where it is used of the pits or clefts in the rocks into which the Athenians threw the bodies of the Spartan ambassadors who had been betrayed into their hands and then murdered, the Lacedaemonians having previously treated Athenian prisoners in the same manner, ἀπέκτειναν πάντας καὶ ἐς φάραγγας ἐνέβαλον. Eur. Troad. 448, φάραγγες ὑδατὶ χειμάρρῳ ρέονται, whether they are narrow clefts or ravines traversed by winter torrents. Arist. Equit. 248, of Cleon, φάραγγα (met. vorago, a chasm or abyss, which swallows up all the income of the state) καὶ χάρυβδιν ἀρπαγῆς. Xen. de Ven. V 16, Hares when pursued sometimes cross rivers, καὶ καταδύονται εἰς φάραγγας “are swallowed up in their chasms or abysses.”

Another of these political ‘fables’, of Antisthenes (Socraticus), is referred to by Ar., Pol. III 13, 1284 a 15. Speaking of the folly of attempting to control by legislation the born rulers, who, one or more, excel all the rest of the citizens together in virtue, and are like Gods amongst men, he adds, “they would very likely reply if the attempt were made, ἀπερ Ἀντισθένης ἔφη τοὺς λέοντας δημηγορούντων τῶν δασυπόδων (hares) καὶ τὸ ἵσον ἀξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν.”

κυνοραισταί, ‘dog-ticks’. These canine-tormentors are as old as Homer. Argus, Ulysses’ dog, in his old age was covered with them: ἐνθα κύων κεῖται Ἄργος ἐνίπλειος κυνοραιστέων. Od. p’ (XVII) 300.

§ 7. ‘Fables are adapted to public speaking, and the virtue they

μηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι πράγματα μὲν εὑρεῖν ὅμοια γεγενημένα χαλεπόν, λόγους δὲ ῥᾶσιν ποιῆσαι γὰρ δεῖ ὥσπερ καὶ παραβολάς, ἢν τις p. 90
δύνηται τὸ ὅμοιον ὁρᾶν, ὃ περ ῥάδιον ἐστιν ἐκ φιλο-

have lies in this, that whereas (*μέν*) similar facts that have really happened are hard to *find*, fables are easier (to *invent*—*εὑρεῖν* being unconsciously used in two different senses); for they must be invented, like the parallel, analogous, cases; (which, as we have seen, are invented for the occasion, but must be conformable to the circumstances of real life,) that is to say, if one *has* the faculty of seeing the analogy, which may be facilitated by the study of philosophy'. Philosophy is used here in a vague and popular sense, for intellectual study, and mental exercise in general. So research and philosophising are identified, Pol. V (VIII) 11, sub fin. 1331 a 16, *ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν*. Comp. III 11. 5, *οἷον καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ ἐν πολὺ διέχουσιν θεωρεῖν εὐστόχον*, and the note there. The tracing of resemblances in nature is the foundation of analogous reasoning, and consequently of the inductive method. *Ζητεῖν δὲ δεῖ ἐπιβλέποντα ἐπὶ τὰ ὅμοια· καὶ ἀδιάφορα, πρῶτον τί ἀπαντά ταῦτα ἔχουσιν*, κ.τ.λ. Anal. Post. II 13, 96 b 7. In Top. A 13, 105 a 25, *ἡ τοῦ ὅμοιον σκέψις* is said to be one of four *ὅργανα δὲ ὅν εὐπορήσομεν τῶν συλλογισμῶν*. Comp. c. 17, 108 a 7, seq. on analogies. See Trendelenburg, El. Log. Ar. § 59, p. 137. On the various senses of *φιλοσοφία* and *πραγματεία* (which are often identified) see Waitz, ad Org. 96 b 15, II. p. 415.

On Isocrates' comprehensive use of this word see note in *Camb. Journal of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* Vol. II, No. 5, p. 150, and especially the passage of *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως* §§ 180—192, 'where he includes in it all branches of mental education, in which Rhetoric of course occupies the foremost place.' Other references are there given¹. [Comp. Isocr. Paneg. § 10 τὴν περὶ τούς λόγους φιλοσοφίαν (with note) and especially Jebb's *Attic Orators*, II, p. 37.]

λόγοι δημηγορικοί] *δημηγορικὸν γένος*, or *δημηγορία*, is one of the alternative names of the first branch of Rhetoric, the *συμβουλευτικόν*. I 1. 10, *περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικαικά, τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας, ἐν τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς, ἡ δημηγορία*. III 12. 5, *ἡ δημηγορικὴ λέξις*. *Historical* examples (as indeed we are told in the next section) of similar cases that have already occurred, must of course be more useful to one who is addressing a public assembly on matters of state policy, than to the pleader in a court of justice, or a disclaimer in an epideictic speech. But these, says our text, are not always easy to be found; either there are none at all, or they are rare; or at all events easily forgotten: whereas *fables*, and other analogous cases, which may be invented for the occasion, may be easily supplied if the faculty of tracing resemblances already exists; if not, it may be cultivated by exercise in philosophical study.

ἀγαθὸν] some virtue, something good (about them), comp. I 2. 10, *φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ἔκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς*.

¹ *φιλοσοφία* is inadequately rendered 'literature' in Introd. p. 256.

8 σοφίας· ράω μὲν οὖν πορίσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν λόγων,
χρησιμώτερα δὲ πρὸς τὸ βουλεύσασθαι τὰ διὰ τῶν
πραγμάτων· ὅμοια γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὰ μέλλοντα
τοῖς γεγονόσιν.

9 δεῖ δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παραδείγμασι μὴ ἔχοντα μὲν
ἐνθυμήματα ὡς ἀποδείξεσιν (ἢ γὰρ πίστις διὰ τούτων),
ἔχοντα δὲ ὡς μαρτυρίοις, ἐπιλόγῳ χρώμενον
τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν· προτιθέμενα μὲν γὰρ ἔοικεν ἐπαγωγῇ,
τοῖς δὲ ρήτορικοῖς οὐκ οἰκεῖον ἐπαγωγὴ πλὴν ἐν

§ 8. ‘Now the arguments or inferences by way of fables (*τὰ διὰ*, with genitive, which are conveyed ‘through the channel of’, are conveyed ‘by’), are easier to supply (provide) oneself with, but those by way of facts (historical parallels) are more serviceable for deliberation ; because the future for the most part resembles the past’. We can *therefore* argue with probability from the results of circumstances past, to the results of similar circumstances, which are now under deliberation, in the future. Men are much the same in all ages; human nature is tolerably constant in its operations and effects ; the same motives prevail, and lead to similar actions ; what has been in the past, will be in the future.

§ 9. ‘*Examples* must be used, in the absence of enthymemes, as direct logical proofs—for this is the road to persuasion (or conviction)—if we have them, as (confirmatory) evidence, and they are to be employed as a supplement to our enthymemes : for when put first they resemble an induction (the several examples are the particulars, or facts, from which the general rule is collected), but induction is not appropriate to Rhetoric, except in rare cases ; but when they are appended to the others they are like evidence, and evidence is always acceptable (the witness always carries weight, is always listened to; people are *inclined* to believe him).

The enthymeme is the *σῶμα τῆς πίστεως*, I I. 3, ἀπόδειξις ρήτορικὴ
ἐνθύμημα...κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων, Ib. § II. On the application of the term
ἀπόδειξις to *rhetorical* proof, see note on I. II.

ἐπίλογος is here simply equivalent to *τὸ ἐπιλεγόμενον*, something added, appended, as a supplement, and not to be understood as the technical *ἐπίλογος*, the concluding member of the speech, the peroration.

[*ἐπιλόγῳ χρώμενον τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν*] This cannot mean ‘using the enthymemes as a supplement’, which is directly contrary to what the author intends to say. The construction is, *χρώμενον* (*αὐτοῖς ὡς*) *ἐπιλόγῳ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν*, that is *ὡς λόγῳ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν* as a *λόγος*—‘argument’ or ‘sentence’—after, following, supplementary to, the enthymemes. And this is confirmed by *ἐπιλεγόμενα μαρτυρίοις* in the next clause. This construction, the substantive taking the case of its verb, is fully justified by the examples given in the note on II 431, *supra* p. 56, note I.

ολίγοις, ἐπιλεγόμενα δὲ μαρτυρίοις, ὁ δὲ μάρτυς πανταχοῦ πιθανός. διὸ καὶ προτιθέντι μὲν ἀνάγκη πολλὰ λέγειν, ἐπιλέγοντι δὲ καὶ ἐν ἰκανόν· μάρτυς γὰρ πιστὸς καὶ εἰς χρήσιμος.

πόσα μὲν οὖν εἴδη παραδειγμάτων, καὶ πῶς αὐτοῖς καὶ πότε χρηστέον, εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ γνωμολογίας, ^{CHA} ρηθέντος τί ἔστι γνώμη, μάλιστ’ ἀν γένοιτο φανερὸν περὶ ποίων τε καὶ πότε καὶ τίσιν ἀρμόττει χρῆσθαι τῷ γνωμολογεῖν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. ἔστι δὲ γνώμη ἀπό-

'And therefore also, if you put your examples first you must necessarily employ a considerable number; if you introduce them afterwards even one is enough; for even a single witness that can be relied on is of service'. This is a second objection to putting the examples first. If you do so, they will resemble an induction: but an induction derived from only one or two particulars is of little or no force. Therefore the particular cases must be numerous; and so, not only the induction itself is inappropriate in Rhetoric, but you will also be obliged to make it long.

'So the subject of the number of kinds of examples, and how and when they are to be employed, has been dispatched (disposed of)'.

CHAP. XXI.

Of *γνῶμαι* 'maxims', general sentiments of a moral character, which serve as enthymemes, and are therefore included here as introductory to the treatment of them, an account has been given, with reference to other writers on the same subject, in Introd. p. 257 seq., to which the reader is referred. Compare on this subject Harris, *Philolog. Ing.* Vol. IV. p. 182 seq. The author mainly follows Aristotle.

For examples of *γνῶμαι* see Brunck's *Poetae Gnomici*, passim: and Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.*, Theognis, Phocylides, Solon, &c.

§ 1. *γνωμολογία*, 'the subject, or art of maxim-making', occurs again, Pl. Phaedr. 267 C, as part of the contents of Polus' rhetorical repertory¹. As to (the art of) maxim-making, we shall best arrive at a clear understanding of the objects, times, and persons, to which and at which the employment of it is most appropriate in our speeches, when it has been first stated what a maxim is.

§ 2. 'A maxim is a declaration—not however of particulars or individuals, as, for instance, what sort of a person Iphicrates is, but universally (a general statement, an universal moral rule or principle)'. *ἀπό-*

¹ This may help to throw light on the disputed explanation of this word in the passage of Plato, see Dr Thompson's note ad loc. It is there translated "the style sententious." *γνωμολογία* is here, at any rate, the science or study, the theory (*λόγος*), and (in Rhetoric) the use or practical application, of *γνῶμαι*, maxims or general moral sentiments; after the analogy of *διστρολογία*, *μετεωρολογία*, *δικολογία* (Rhet. I. 10), *φυσιολογία* (Plut.) and a great number of modern sciences; the use of the maxim predominates in the application of *γνωμολογεῖν* throughout the chapter.

Φανσίς, οὐ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἔκαστον, οἷον ποῖός τις Ἰφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων καθόλου, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εύθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν. ὥστ' ἐπεὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὁ περὶ τούτων συλλογισμός ἐστι σχεδόν, τά τε συμπεράσματα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἀφαιρεθέντος τοῦ συλλογισμοῦ γνῶμαι εἰσιν, οἷον

χρὴ δὲ οὐ ποθ', ὃς τις ἀρτίφρων πέφυκ' ἀνήρ,
παιδας περισσῶς ἐκδιδάσκεσθαι σοφούς.

φανσίς (*ἀποφαίνειν*) a ‘declaration’ or ‘utterance’. Here again we have in two MSS the *varia lectio* *ἀπόφασις*. See on this, note on I 8. 2. Comp. § 9, οἱ ἀγροίκοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀποφαίνονται, and § 16, διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα...

ἀποφαίνεσθαι seems to have some special connexion with *γνώμη* in its ordinary signification as well as this technical application. See Heindorf on Gorg. § 48, p. 466 c. In several passages which he quotes the same verb is used for *declaring* a *γνώμη*, in the sense of *opinion*. [“So Protag. 336 D, τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι; ib. 340 B.” Dr Thompson on Gorg. l. c.]

‘And not of all universals, as, for example, that straight is opposed to crooked, but only of those which are concerned with (human) actions, and are to be chosen or avoided in respect of action.’ This concern with human action—*πρᾶξις* can only be predicated of human beings—gives the *γνώμη* its *moral* character. See, for instance, the beginning of the second chapter of Eth. Nic. II. Of actions it is said, 1104 a 31, *αἴται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις*; they determine the moral character. And so frequently elsewhere. This moral character of the *γνώμη* however, though it undoubtedly predominates in the description and illustration of it through the remainder of the chapter, is not absolutely exclusive: the *γνώμη* may be applied likewise to all practical business of life, and all objects of human interest, as health in § 5; and *πρᾶξις* must be supposed virtually to include these. With this definition that of Auct. ad Heren. IV 17. 24 deserves to be compared: it is not so complete as Aristotle’s, but may be regarded as supplementary to it: *Sententia* (i. e. *γνώμη*, which is also the term by which Quintilian expresses it, Inst. Orat. VIII 5) *est oratio sumpta de vita, quae aut quid sit aut quid esse oporteat in vita breviter ostendit, hoc pacto*; it is there illustrated to the end of the chapter. One useful precept for the guidance of the rhetorician in the employment of the *γνώμη* may be quoted here, especially as Aristotle has omitted it. *Sententias interponi raro convenit, ut rei actores, non vivendi praeceptores videamur esse.* *γνῶμαι* often take the form of ‘precepts’. Harris, u. s., p. 182.

‘And therefore since rhetorical enthymemes are as one may say’

τοῦτο μὲν οὖν γνώμη· προστεθείσης δὲ τῆς αἰτίας καὶ τοῦ διὰ τί, ἐνθύμημά ἔστι τὸ ἄπαν, οἶον

χωρὶς γὰρ ἄλλης ἡς ἔχουσιν ἀργίας,
φθόνον παρ' ἀστῶν ἀλφάνουσι δυσμενῆ.

καὶ τὸ

οὐκ ἔστιν ὁς τις πάντ' ἀνὴρ εὐδαιμονεῖ.

καὶ τὸ

οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρῶν ὁς τις ἔστ' ἐλεύθερος
γνώμη, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἔχομένῳ ἐνθύμημα·

ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλος ἔστιν ἢ τύχης.

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(σχεδόν ‘pretty nearly’, that is, not absolutely, but generally, making allowance for some which are *not* concerned with the practical business of life—so Victorius) ‘the logical mode of reasoning or inference on these subjects (the business of life and human actions), when this syllogistic process is withdrawn (and the major premiss or conclusion is left alone), the conclusions and major premisses of enthymemes are *γνῶμαι*’. These premisses and conclusions taken by themselves are mere *enunciations* of some general principle: they do not become enthymemes, i.e. inferences or processes of *reasoning*, till the reason is added—sententia *cum ratione*, Quint. and Auct. ad Heren., Introd. p. 257—which is stated in the next sentence. *Hanc quidem partem enthymematis quidam initium aut clausulam epichirematis esse dixerunt: et est aliquando, non tamen semper.* Quint. VIII 5. 4 (de Sententiis, VIII 5. 1—8, q. v.).

‘For instance, “No man that is of sound mind ought ever to have his children over-educated to excess in learning,” (Eur. Med. 294). Now this is a maxim (moral precept, the *conclusion* of the enthymeme): but the addition of the reason, and the why (the *aīria* or cause) makes the whole an enthymeme, for example, “for besides the idle habits which they thereby contract to boot” (into the bargain—the comparative *ἄλλος*, other, in this common, but illogical use of the word, brings two heterogeneous things into illicit comparison: see [p. 46 *supra* and note on III 1.9]) “they reap (gain as their reward) hostile jealousy from the citizens.” The *ἀργία* here is the literary indolence, or inactivity, the withdrawal from active life and the consequent neglect of their duties as citizens, into which they are led by their studious habits. This is what provokes the jealousy and hostility of the citizens. Plato’s unpopularity at Athens was due to the same cause. Plato justifies himself against these charges of his enemies in four well-known passages, in the Republic [VI 484—497], Theaetetus [172 C] and Gorgias [527]; and in the seventh Epistle, if that be his [see Introd. to Dr Thompson’s ed. of the Gorgias, pp. xii—xiv].

These lines are put into the enthymematic form, as an argument, in § 7. It is a specimen of a *practical syllogism*, or enthymeme, logic applied to action or conduct. As a syllogism it would run thus: All

3 εἰ δή ἔστι γνώμη τὸ εἰρημένον, ἀνάγκη τέτταρα εἰδῆ
εἶναι γνώμης· ἢ γὰρ μετ' ἐπιλόγου ἔσται ἢ ἀνευ
4 ἐπιλόγου. ἀποδείξεως μὲν οὖν δεόμεναί εἰσιν ὅσαι
παράδοξόν τι λέγουσιν ἢ ἀμφισβητούμενον· ὅσαι δὲ
5 μηδὲν παράδοξον, ἀνευ ἐπιλόγου. τούτων δ' ἀνάγκη
τὰς μὲν διὰ τὸ προεγνῶσθαι μηδὲν δεῖσθαι ἐπιλόγου,
οἷον

ἀνδρὶ δ' ὑγιαίνειν ἄριστόν ἔστιν, ὡς γ' ήμīν δοκεῖ

ought to avoid, or no man should be rendered liable to, idle habits and the hatred of his fellow-citizens: children who are over-educated do become idle and unpopular; therefore children ought not to be over-educated.

'And again, "There is no man who is altogether happy"—Eur. Fragm. Sthenel. I (Dind., Wagn.). The *reason*, which converts it into an enthymeme, is supplied by Aristoph. Ran. 1217, ἢ γὰρ πεφυκὼς ἐσθλὸς οὐκ ἔχει βίον, ἢ δυσγενῆς ὁν, (he is here interrupted by Aeschylus who finishes the verse for him with ληκύθιον ἀπώλεσεν: but the Schol. supplies the conclusion,) πλονσίαν δροὶ πλάκα.

'And another, "there is none of mankind that is free" is a *γνώμη*, but with the addition of the next verse (*τῷ ἔχομένῳ ἔπει*) it becomes an enthymeme, "for he is the slave either of money or fortune." From Eur. Hec. 864. Our texts have *θυητῶν* for *ἀνδρῶν*: doubtless it is one of Ar.'s ordinary slips of memory in quotation, and a very unimportant one. But I think as a general rule, it is quite unsafe to rely upon our author's quotations in correction of any reading in more ancient writers.

§ 3. 'If then a *γνώμη* is what has been described, there must necessarily be four kinds of *γνώμη*: either with, or without, an appendage or supplement (containing the reason). It is first put forward independently as a *γνώμη*, and then, if it is not generally acceptable, and a reason is required, this is added, and it becomes an enthymeme.

§ 4. 'Those that require proof (*ἀπόδειξις* 'demonstration', as before, used loosely for proof of any kind) are all such as state anything paradoxical (contrary to received opinion; or surprising, unexpected, contrary to expectation, and to anything that you ever heard before) or anything which is questioned (or open to question): those that have nothing unexpected about them (may be stated, *λέγονται*) without a supplement'. These together make up the four kinds.

§ 5. The first two kinds are those which require no supplement. 'Of these, some must require no supplement owing to their being already well known, as, "best of all is wealth for a man, at least in my opinion;" because most people think so'.

The line here quoted is of uncertain origin. There was a famous *σκόλιον*, drinking-song or catch, usually attributed to Simonides, which Athen., xv 694 E, has preserved amongst several that he there quotes; and it is also to be found in Bergk's Collection, *Fragm. Lyr. Gr. Scolia*,

(φαίνεται γάρ τοῖς πολλοῖς οὕτω), τὰς δ' ἄμα λεγομένας δῆλας εἶναι ἐπιβλέψασιν, οἷον

οὐδεὶς ἑραστὴς ὅς τις οὐκ ἀεὶ φιλεῖ.

6 τιδύν δὲ μετ' ἐπιλόγου αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμήματος μέρος εἰσίν, ὥσπερ

χρὴ δ' οὐ ποθ' ὅς τις ἀρτίφρων,

13. It runs thus: ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρὶ θνατῷ, δεύτερον δὲ καλὸν φύνειν γενέσθαι, τὸ τρίτον δὲ πλούτειν ἀδόλως, καὶ τὸ τέταρτον ἡβᾶν μετὰ τῶν φίλων. This is repeated by Anaxandrides in some iambics of his Thesaurus, Fragm. I (Meineke, *Fr. Comm. Gr.* III 169), and quoted by Athen. immediately after the σκόλιον as a parallel or illustration. Anaxandrides does not know the author; οὐ τὸ σκόλιον εὑρὼν ἔκεινος, ζῶτις ἦν. Plato has likewise quoted it in *Gorg.* 451 E, and elsewhere (see Stallbaum's note). The Scholiast on this passage says, τὸ σκόλιον τοῦτο οἱ μὲν Σιμωνίδον φασίν, οἱ δὲ Ἐπιχάρμον. On which Meineke, u. s., note, says: 'Nonne igitur pro ἡμῖν legendum ἔμιν, et ipse ille versus, ἀνδρὶ δ' ὑγιαίνειν κ.τ.λ., Epicharmo tribuendus?' The trochaic metre is doubtless in favour of this supposition, but that shews on the other hand that it could not have formed part of the scolion above quoted, which is in quite a different measure: and also, supposing it to be taken from that, it would be a most improbable and unmeaning repetition of the first line. If therefore Meineke is right in attributing it to Epicharmus, it must have belonged to another and independent scolion. Another scholium in Cramer, Anecd. Paris. on Ar. Rhet. has τὸ "ἀνδρὶ δ' ὑγιαίνειν ἄριστον" Σιμωνίδον ἔστιν ἀπὸ τῶν σκολιῶν αὐτοῦ ἐπῶν. οἱ δὲ Ἐπιχάρμον. Meineke, u. s. Simonides at all events has something like it, οὐδὲ καλᾶς σοφίας χάρις, εἰ μή τις ἔχει σεμνὰν ὑγίειαν. This places health at the head of the list of goods: another distich, quoted in Ar. Eth. Nic. I 9, Eth. Eudem. init., as 'the Delian inscription' ἐπὶ τὸ προπύλαιον τοῦ Λητώφου (Eth. Eud.), Theogn. 255, and (in iambics) Soph. Fragm. Creus. (Stob. CIII 15, Dind. Fr. 326), places health second in the order, or rather, perhaps, leaves the question open. Ariphon of Sicyon (Athen. XV 702 A) wrote a hymn to Health, beginning ὑγίεια πρεσβίστοια μακάρων; he also regards it as the greatest of all blessings, σέθειν δὲ χωρὶς οὐτις εὐδαίμων ἔφυ, line 8. See in Bergk, *Fr. Lyr. Gr.* p. 841 [p. 984, ed. 2]. Comp. Philem. Fr. Inc. 62, αἰρό δ' ὑγίειαν πράτον, εἴτ' εὐπράξιαν κ.τ.λ.

'Whereas others (the second kind, of division 1) (though previously unknown) are clear the very moment they are uttered, provided you pay attention to them,' (or perhaps, 'the moment you cast your eye upon them'). Comp. Top. Γ 6, 120 a 32, 34; b 15 and 30, Ε 4, 132 a 27. ἐπιβλέψις Anal. Pr. I 29, 45 a 26, ἐπιβλέψεων Ib. V 17, προσεπιβλέπειν Ib. v 21 (from Waitz). Upon the whole I think the comparison of these passages is in favour of the former of the two interpretations: and so Victorius.

οἶον κ.τ.λ.] 'as "no lover is inconstant in his affection." Eur. Troad. 1051, quoted again, Eth. Eud. VII 2, 1235 b 21.'

§ 6. 'Of those which have the supplement (these are the two kinds

αὶ δ' ἐνθυμηματικαὶ μέν, οὐκ ἐνθυμήματος δὲ μέρος· αἱ περ καὶ μάλιστ' εὐδοκιμοῦσιν. εἰσὶ δὲ αὗται ἐν ὅσαις ἐμφαίνεται τοῦ λεγομένου τὸ αἴτιον, οἷον ἐν τῷ

ἀθάνατον ὄργὴν μὴ φύλασσε θητὸς ὥν· *cherish*
τὸ μὲν γὰρ φάναι μὴ δεῖν ἀεὶ φυλάττειν τὴν ὄργὴν

of the second division), some are part of an enthymeme, as “no man of sound mind ought,” (the commencement of the verses of Euripides in § 2), and the rest have an enthymematic character, but are not part of an enthymeme: which (the latter) are in fact the most popular’. *αἱ μὲν ἐνθυμήματος μέρος* may be thought to be a careless expression, contradictory to the description of enthymeme in I 2.13: since it is characteristic of the enthymeme that it omits at least one of the premisses (see on the enthymeme Introd. p. 104), and therefore a *γνώμη* with the reason appended represents a conclusion with one premiss, which is an enthymeme. The explanation seems to be that an enthymeme is an *assumed* syllogism: the inference which it draws rests upon the possibility of constructing a syllogism out of it: if that cannot be done, the inference is not valid. So that in one sense the enthymeme is a true and complete syllogism, in another, in so far as it *expresses* only one premiss, it may be called a *part* of it, and incomplete. And this serves to explain the statement of I 2.13, *τὸ δὲ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν* (i. e. a mode of syllogistic reasoning), *καὶ ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ή ἐξ ὧν ὁ πρῶτος συλλογισμός*.

‘And all those have this (latter) character in which the reason of the (general) statement is made to appear, as in this, “mortal as thou art, guard, keep (cherish), not immortal anger.” for, to say “that a man ought not to keep his anger for ever” is a *γνώμη*; but the addition, “as a mortal” (*because* he is a mortal), states the (reason) *why*. And like it again is this, “Mortal thoughts” (or a mortal spirit—that is, one which confines its aims and aspirations within the limits of its mortal condition), “not immortal, become a mortal man.”’

The first of these two quotations is used by Bentley in his *Dissertation on Phalaris*, p. 247 [p. 229 ed. Wagner], and foll. He does not attempt to fix the authorship of it, but contents himself with saying “this, though the author of it be not named, was probably...borrowed from the stage,” p. 247, but afterwards, p. 249 [231], “and even that one (the verse in question) is very likely to be taken from the same place” (viz. Euripides). Subsequently, p. 262 [243], he speaks of it as from “a poet cited by Aristotle,” and “Aristotle’s poet.” He quotes from Euripides’ Philoctetes, Fragm. IX (Dind.), XII (Wagner), a parallel passage as having been borrowed by the author of Phalaris, *ώσπερ δὲ θητὸν καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἔφυ, οὕτω προσήκει μηδὲ τὴν ὄργὴν ἔχειν ἀθάνατον, δόστις σωφρονεῖν ἐπισταταί*. The same verse, with *ἔχθραν* for *ὄργήν*, occurs also in Menander, Γνῶμαι μονόστιχοι, line 4, ap. Meineke *Fragm. Comm. Gr.* 340. Wagner, *Incert. Trag. Fragm.* p. 185, “Auctor versus, quisquis fuit, imitatus est Eurip. *Fragm. 790* (sc. *Philoct.*);” and to this also he ascribes the *γνώμη* attributed to Menander, *ἔχθραν* being “sive calami errore, sive imitatione.”

γνώμη, τὸ δὲ προσκείμενον “θυητὸν ὄντα” τὸ διὰ τὶ λέγει. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ τὸ

θυητὰ¹ χρὴ τὸν θυητόν¹, οὐκ ἀθάνατα τὸν θυητὸν¹ φρονεῖν.

7 φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων πόσα τε εἴδη γνώμης, καὶ περὶ ποιῶν ἔκαστον ἀρμόττει περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων μὴ ἀνευ ἐπιλόγου, ἀλλ’ ἢ προθέντα τὸν ἐπίλογον γνώμη χρῆ-

¹ θυτὰ...θυτόν. ‘Si Epicharmi est versus, male vulgares formas θυητὰ atque θυητὸν exhibet A...dorican formam ceteri omnes praeferunt.’ Spengel.

The second verse, θυτὰ χρή κ.τ.λ., is ascribed by Bentley to Epicharmus; a supposition with which the dialect and metre agree. Müllach, *Fragm. Philos. Gr.* p. 144, Fr. Epicharm. line 260. This maxim is alluded to, but condemned, in the exulting description of perfect happiness, Eth. Nic. x 7, 1177 b 32, οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παρανοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρωπὸν ὄντα οὐδὲ θυητὰ τὸν θυητόν, ἀλλ’ ἐφ’ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν κ.τ.λ. Buhle quotes Horace, Od. II 11. II, *quid aeternis minorem consiliis animum fatigas?*

For the use of the article in τὸν θυητόν, indicating a member of a certain class, see notes on I 7.13, II 4.31.

§ 7. ‘It is plain then from what has been said, how many kinds of γνώμη there are, and on what sort of subject (or occasion) each of them is appropriate; for (when it pronounces) on things questionable or paradoxical (or unexpected, surprising, as before) the supplement must not be omitted (*subaudi āρμόττει λέγειν*); but either the supplement should come first, and then the conclusion (of the inference) be used as a γνώμη—as, for instance, if it were to be said (returning to the first example, § 2), “now for my own part, since we are bound neither to incur jealousy nor to be idle, I deny that they (children) ought to be educated”; or else, say this first, and then add the supplement (the reason).

τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἢ παραδόξων κ.τ.λ.] ‘Ni enim ratio addatur, fidem non inveniet huiusmodi sententia. *Melius esse iniuriam accipere quam inferre* (this is the apparent paradox maintained by Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias and Republic): *supplicum misereri non oportere*, et his similia qui audit reicit; at si rationes annexantur, haud dubie assentietur; nempe qui facit iniuriam semper improbus est, at qui patitur probus esse potest. Et misericordia intempestiva iustitiae solet esse adversa.’ Schrader.

‘(When they are) about things, not unexpected, but obscure’ (not immediately intelligible. Understand δέ, ἀρμόττει, λέγειν αὐτάς), ‘you must add the (reason) why, as tersely as possible’. A popular audience is always impatient of long explanations, and long trains of reasoning; or enthymemes, II 22. 3; comp. I 2.12, III 17.6. In assigning therefore the reason for the ambiguous or seemingly paradoxical γνώμη, we must express ourselves in the fewest possible words, as briefly and compactly as possible.

σθαι τῷ συμπεράσματι, οἷον εἴ τις εἴποι “έγώ μὲν οὖν, ἐπειδὴ οὔτε φθονεῖσθαι δεῖ οὔτ’ ἀργὸν εἶναι, οὐ φῆμι χρῆναι παιδεύεσθαι,” ἡ τοῦτο προειπόντα ἐπειπέν τὰ ἔμπροσθεν, περὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ παραδόξων ἀδήλων δέ, 8 προστιθέντα τὸ διότι στρογγυλώτατα. ἀρμόττει δ’ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ τὰ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα καὶ τὰ αἰνιγματώδη, οἷον εἴ τις λέγει ὁ περ Στη-

στρογγυλος, ‘rounded’, ‘compact’ (as a ball), is properly applied to the *periodic* style—the period, *περι-όδος*, is in fact a kind of circle, “a sentence returning into itself,” Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* [II 155]. Comp. Dionysius, de Lysia Jud. c. 6. ἡ συντρέψουσα (condenses, packs close) τὰ νόμματα καὶ στρογγύλως ἐκφέρουσα λέξις, “expresses them in a rounded, compact, terse form.” Arist. Σκηνὰς καταλαμβάνουσα, Fragn. IV (Meineke, *Fr. Comm. Gr.* II 1142), of Euripides’ neat, terse, well-rounded style, *χρῶμι* γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῦ στόματος τῷ στρογγύλῳ. So *rotunde*; Cic. de Fin. IV 3. 7, *Ista ipsa, quae tu breviter,—a te quidem ἄφετε et rotunde: quippe habes enim a rhetoribus.* Brut. LXVIII 272, *rotunda constructio verborum.* Orat. XIII 40, *Thucydides praefractor nec satis, ut ita dicam, rotundus.* Nizolius ad verbum, *concinne, explicate, στρογγύλως.* Ernesti, *Clavis Cic.* s. v.

§ 8. ‘In such cases (or on such subjects) Laconic utterances and enigmatical sayings are appropriate, as when one employs what Stesichorus said at Locris, that they had better not be so presumptuous, lest their cicadas should be brought to chirp on the ground.’ Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα; pithy, sententious, *utterances*, which have become proverbial in our word ‘laconic’. Plutarch has made a collection of ‘Laconic Apophthegms’, from which it appears that they are usually of a character rather wise than witty—though there are also some extremely smart repartees in answer to impertinent questions or observations—pithy, pungent, pregnant, expressed with pointed brevity, which indeed is characteristic of them, and is also the ‘soul of wit’.

I will quote only one (a short one) as a specimen. Antalcidas: *πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀμαθεῖς καλούντα τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους Ἀθηναῖον, μόνοι γοῦν, εἴπεν, ήμεις οὐδὲν μεμαθήκαμεν παρ’ ὑμῶν κακόν.* Quite true (says Ant.); we are deplorably ignorant—“At any rate we are the *only* people that have learnt no mischief from *you*.” The word is applied to two sayings of Theramenes, before his death, Xen. Hellen. II 3 ult. For a description of these Λακωνικὰ ἀποφθέγματα as pointed and pithy as the *ρήματα* described, see Pl. Protag. 342 E [ἐνέβαλε ρῆμα ἅξιον λόγου βραχὺ καὶ συνεστραμμένον ὅσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοτιστής].

αἰνιγματώδη] hard, obscure, ambiguous sayings, which like *riddles* require solution before they can be understood; like that pronounced by Stesichorus to check the presumptuous insolence of the Locrians: the solution of which is, that cicadas always sit in trees when they chirp. So that, οὐ γίνονται τέττιγες ὅπου μὴ δένδρα ἔστιν, Arist. Hist. An. V 30, 556 a 21 (the entire chapter is on *téttiges*). When the trees are gone, when they have been felled *and the land ravaged*, then it is that the cicadas will

*σίχορος ἐν Λοκροῖς εἴπεν, δτι οὐ δεῖ ιβριστὰς εἶναι,
9 ὅπως μὴ οἱ τέττιγες χαμόθεν ἄδωσιν. ἀρμόττει δὲ P. 1395.
γνωμολογεῖν ἡλικίᾳ μὲν πρεσβυτέροις, περὶ δὲ τούτων* p. 92.

have to sing their song on the ground. This is what the insolence of the Locrians will bring them to. See Mure, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* (*Stesichorus*), III 248. He says, note 2, "Similar is our own popular proverb of 'making the squirrels walk', denoting a great fall of wood." This is repeated nearly *verbatim*, III 11.6. Demetrius, *περὶ ἔρμηνεας* (*περὶ συνθέσεως ὀνομάτων*) § 99 (Vol. III. p. 284, Spengel, *Rhet. Gr.*), attributes the saying to Dionysius, without telling us to whom it was said: and calls it an ἀλληγορία. And again, § 243, *περὶ δεινότητος* (III p. 315), οὕτω καὶ τὸ χαμόθεν οἱ τέττιγες ὑμῶν ἄσονται δεινότερον ἀλληγορικῶς ῥηθέν, ἢ εἰπερ ἀπλῶς ἐρήμηθη, τὰ δένδρα ὑμῶν ἐκκοπήσεται. The felling of the trees, especially the fruit trees, always accompanied the ravaging of a country in a hostile incursion. Hence *δευδρογεῖν* Thuc. I 108, of Megara, comp. II 75. 1, IV 79. 2. Dem. de Cor. § 90 (in a Byzantine decree), καὶ τὰν χώραν δάοντος καὶ δευδροκόπεοντος. [Dem. Or. 53 (*Nicostr.*) § 15, *Φυτευτήρια...κατέκλασεν, οὕτω δεινῶς
ὡς οὐδὲ ἄν οἱ πολέμιοι διαθέλει*].

§ 9. 'The use of maxims, or sententious language, is appropriate in respect of age (time of life) to elders, and as to subjects, should be directed to those in which the speaker has experience; since for one who is not so far advanced in life to employ maxims is as unbecoming as story-telling (i. e. fables, legends, mythical stories), whilst to talk about things that one knows nothing of is a mark of folly and ignorance (or want of cultivation). On *μυθολογεῖν* Victorius says, "Fabellarum sane auditione delectantur pueri; non tamen ipsis fabulas fingere aut narrare congruit." And this, because young people have as yet had little or no experience of life, and if they pronounce maxims and precepts at all, must do it of things of which they are ignorant: and this shews folly, as well as ignorance. So Quintilian, who supplies the reason for this precept: VIII 5. 8, *ne passim* (sententiae) *et a quocunque dicantur. Magis enim decent eos in quibus est auctoritas, ut rei pondus etiam persona confirmet. Quis enim ferat puerum aut adolescentulum aut etiam ignobilem, si iudicat in dicendo et quodammodo praecipiat?* "It has been said too they come most naturally from aged persons, because age may be supposed to have taught them experience. It must however be an experience suitable to their characters: an old general should not talk upon law, nor an old lawyer on war." Harris, *Philol. Ing.* Works IV 186. The Justice in the 'Seven Ages' (*As you like it* [II 6. 156]), who is advanced in years, is *full of wise saws and modern instances*. 'A sufficient indication (of the truth of what has just been said, viz. that it is only the simpleton, or the ignorant and uneducated, that pronounces maxims upon subjects of which he knows nothing), is the fact that rustics (clowns, boors) are especially given to maxim-coining, and ever ready to shew them off (exhibit them)'. This propensity to sententiousness, and the affectation of superior wisdom which it implies, characteristic of the 'rustic', has not escaped the observation of Shakespeare: whose numerous 'clowns' are *all* (I believe) addicted to this practice. Dogberry in *Much ado about nothing*—see in

ῳν ἔμπειρος τις ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ μὲν μὴ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα γνωμολογεῖν ἀπρεπὲς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ μιθολογεῖν, περὶ δ' ᾧν ἄπειρος, ἡλίθιον καὶ ἀπαίδευτον. σημεῖον δὲ ικανόν· οἱ γὰρ ἀγροῦκοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ ιο καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἀποφαίνονται. καθόλου δὲ μὴ ὄντος καθόλου εἰπεῖν μάλιστα ἀρμόττει ἐν σχετλιασμῷ καὶ δεινώσει,

particular, Act III Sc. 5—the ‘fool’ in *Lear* I 4—‘Touchstone’ in *As you like it*, III 3 and ‘Costard’ in *Love’s labour’s lost*, throughout; are all cases in point.

ἀγροῖκος, country-bred, rustic, boor, clown, implying awkwardness and the absence of all cultivation and refinement of language, manner, mind, is opposed to *δοτεῖος* which represents the opposite, city life, and city breeding, the city being the seat of refinement, cultivation personal and intellectual, civilisation and fashion; as *rusticus* to *urbanus*, and *Country* with its associations, to *Town* and its belongings, in our dramatists and light literature of the two last centuries, the echo of which has not quite died away.

§ 10. ‘Generalising, where there is no generality (stating a proposition or maxim universally which is only partially true), is most appropriate in complaint and exaggeration, and in these either at the commencement (of either of the two processes), or after the case has been made out (proved, *ἀποδεικνύαι* here again in a vague and general sense)’.

σχετλιασμός, “*conquestio*, h. e. ea pars orationis qua conquerimur et commoti sumus ex iniuria vel adversa fortuna”. Ernesti, *Lex. Technologiae Graecæ*, s.v. *Conquestio est oratio auditorum misericordiam captans*, Cic. Inv. I 55. 106, who gives a long account of it divided into 16 topics. This was the subject of Thrasymachus’ treatise, the *Ἐλεος* (*miserationes* Cic. [Brutus § 82]), referred to by Arist., Rhet. III 1. 7; the contents are satirically described by Plat., Phaedr. 267 C. It was “a treatise, accompanied with examples, on the best modes of exciting compassion” (Thompson ad loc.). What follows, *ὅργισαι τε αὐτοὺς* κ.τ.λ. describes the art of *δείνωσις*, which no doubt accompanied the *σχετλιασμός* in Thrasymachus’ work. On Thrasymachus’ *Ἐλεος* see Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. Vol. III 274, No. 9. *σχετλιασμός* therefore is the *act* of complaining, or the *art* of exciting the compassion of the audience for the supposed sufferings of the speaker himself or his client by age, penury, distress, or wrong or injury from others: and its appropriate place is the *ἐπίλογος*, the peroration of the speech. See Rhet. III 19. 3.

δείνωσις is a second variety of the same *κοινὸς τόπος*, viz. *ἀνέγησις* and *μείωσις*, to which both of these are subordinate. There is in fact a *natural* connexion between the two: pity for the person wronged is usually accompanied by indignation against the wrong-doer. This is *indignatio*, of which Cicero treats de Inv. I 53. 100—54. 105. *Indignatio est oratio per quam conficitur ut in aliquem hominem magnum odium aut in rem gravis offensio concitetur*. The art of exciting indignation or odium

II καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἡ ἀρχόμενον ἡ ἀποδείξαντα. χρῆσθαι δὲ δεῖ καὶ ταῖς τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαις, ἐὰν ὥστι χρήσιμοι· διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι κοινά, ὡς ὅμολογούν-

against any person or thing, by exaggeration or intensification; vivid description heightening the enormity or atrocity of that against which you wish to rouse the indignation of the audience. “*δείνωσις invidiae atque odii exaggeratio*,” Ernesti, *Lex. Techn. Gr.* s. v. Quint. VI 2. 24, *Haec est illa quae δείνωσις vocatur, rebus indignis asperis invidiosis addens vim oratio; qua virtute praeter alias plurimum Demosthenes valuit.* Ib. VIII 3. 88, *δείνωσις in exaggeranda indignitate.* IX 2. 104, *intendere crimen, quod est δείνωσις.* Comp. Rhet. III 19. 3, on the *ἐπίλογος*.

Macrobius Saturn. IV 6 (ap. Ernesti u. s.), *Oportet enim, ut oratio pathetica aut ad indignationem aut ad misericordiam dirigatur, quae a Graecis ὄλκος καὶ δείνωσις appellatur: horum alterum accusatori necessarium est, alterum reo; et necesse est initium abruptum habeat, quoniam satis indignanti leniter incipere non convenit.*

The illicit generalisation above mentioned is one of the arts employed to heighten the two *πάθη* which are most serviceable to the orator, *ἔλεος* and *ὅργη* or *νέμεσις* by σχετλιασμός and *δείνωσις*. The first is well illustrated by Victorius from Catullus, Epith. Pel. et Thet. 143, the deserted Ariadne exclaims, *Iam iam nulla viro iurantί femina credat, Nulla viri speret sermones esse fideles &c.* (similarly Ovid, Fasti III 475, *Nunc quoque 'nulla viro' clamabo 'femina credat'*) and Eur. Hec. 254, *ἀχάριστον νῦν σπέρμ' ὅστι δημηγόρους ζηλοῦτε τιμάς.* This is a generalisation from the single case of Ulysses. Add Cymbeline, Act II 5. 1; Posthumus. *Is there no way men to be, but women must be half-workers?* We are bastards all &c. and (already quoted in Introd.) Virg. Aen. IV 569, *varium et mutabile semper femina;* and Hamlet, Act I Sc. 2, [146], *Frailty, thy name is woman.* So οὐδὲν γειτονίας χαλεπώτερον § 15.

§ 11. ‘Maxims which are in everyone’s mouth (notorious), and universally known, should be also employed if they are serviceable (when they are to the point): for the fact that they are universal (universally known and employed) being equivalent to an universal acknowledgment (of their truth), they are generally supposed to be right (true and sound’).

τεθρυλημέναις καὶ κοιναῖς γνώμαις] Such are the sayings of the seven sages, and of the old gnomic poets in general, Theognis, Hesiod, Phocylides and the rest, which everybody remembers and repeats. *Θρυλεῖν* is to repeat again and again, as *ὑμεῖν, decantare.* Zonaras, *συνεχῶς λέγειν.* Suidas and Photius, *λαλεῖν, κυκᾶν.* (Hesych. *Θρυλλεῖ, ταράσσει, ὀχλεῖ, θρύλλοι, ψιθυρισμοί, ὄμιλίαι.*) Arist. Eq. 348, *τὴν νύκτα θρυλῶν καὶ λαλῶν ἐν ταῖς ὄδοις,* of the sausage-monger, who after having made, as he thinks, a good speech, walks about the streets all night *repeating it over and over again*, and chattering. Eurip. El. 909, *καὶ μὴν δι' ὅρθρων γ' οὐποτ' ἔξελιμπανον θρυλοῦσ', αἵ γ' εἰπεῖν ἥθελον.* “She had long practised and considered her speech in the early dawn of the mornings.” Paley. For *τεθρυλημέναις* cf. also III 7. 9; 14. 4, ‘notorious’. Plat. Phaedo 65 B, 76 D. πολυθρύλητον, Ib. 100 B, Rep. VIII 566 B. Isocr. Panath. § 237, *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 55, (λόγους) τοὺς*

των ἀπάντων, ὁρθῶς ἔχειν δοκοῦσιν, οἶον παρακαλοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν μὴ θυσαμένους

εἰς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης,
καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἥπτους ὅντας

Ξυνὸς Ἐννάλιος,

καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἀναιρεῖν τῶν ἔχθρῶν τὰ τέκνα καὶ μηδὲν

πάλαι παρ' ἴμιν διατεθρυλημένους. Ast, Lex. Plat. *decanare*. May not θρύλλειν (so it is sometimes written) be an onomatopoeia from the sound of the harp, like θρεπτανελό, Arist. Plut. 290; the notion of constant repetition, recurrences being derived from ‘harping’ perpetually on the same string, *chorda qui semper oberrat eadem?* [Horace, A. P. 356].

παρακαλοῦντι] *lit.* ‘to a man exhorting’; when Ar. wrote this dative he was most likely thinking of ἐὰν ὁσι χρήσιμοι, rather than of anything else; though it is extremely uncertain. ‘As for instance in an exhortation to make the adventure—run the risk of battle—without previous sacrifice’.

θυσαμένους] Schrader interprets *litare*, said of a sacrifice which *propitiates* the deity to whom it is offered. He may possibly mean that it is the use of the *middle voice* that gives it this sense ‘for themselves, for their own benefit’.

εἰς οἰωνὸς κ.τ.λ.] Hom. Il. XII 243 (Hector to Polydamas, who has threatened him with an evil omen). οἰωνὸς in the γνώμη has reference to the preceding θυσαμένους. Talk not to me of your omens (from sacrifice) says the officer, cheering on his men, who are disheartened by the absence of favourable omens; “One omen is best of all, to rally for our country’s defence.” Pope, “And asks no omen but his country’s cause.” Lord Derby, “The best of omens is our country’s cause.” Applied by Cicero to his own public conduct and intentions, Ep. ad Attic. II 3. 3, ult. Schrader quotes Cic. Cato Maior, 3. 4, *Q. Fabius Maximus, augur cum esset, dicere ausus est optimis auspiciis ea geri quae pro reipublicae salute gererentur: quae contra rempublicam fierent contra auspicia fieri.*

‘And again an exhortation to run the risk (*subaudi παρακαλοῦντι ἐπὶ τὸ κινδυνεύειν*¹) with inferior forces’; Ξυνὸς Ἐννάλιος, Il. XVIII 309. This again is from a speech of Hector, expressing his readiness to encounter Achilles. Οὐ μιν ἔγωγε φεύξομαι...ἀλλὰ μᾶλ’ ἀντην στήσομαι, η κε φέρησι μέγα κράτος, η κε φεροίμην. Ξυνὸς Ἐννάλιος, καὶ τε κτανέοντα κατέκτα. This passed into a proverb for ‘the equal chances of battle’. Archilochus, (Bergk, *Fr. Lyr. Gr.* No. 56, p. 479 [p. 550, ed. 2]), ἐπίτυμον γὰρ ξυνὸς ἀνθρώποις Ἀρης. Aesch. S. c. T. 409, ἔργον δ' ἐν κύβοις Ἀρης κρινέ. Liv. XXVIII 19, *In pugna et in acie, ubi Mars communis et victum saepe erigeret et affligeret victorem.* Ib. v 12, XXI 1 (quoted by Trollope on the verse of Homer).

‘And an exhortation (und. as before) to destroy enemies’ children

¹ Gaisford, echoing F. A. Wolf, says of this, “*Recte statuit W. haec non sana esse. Mihi videtur verbum aliquod excidisse.*” In a writer like Aristotle there is nothing at all extraordinary in such an ellipse as I have supposed: in any other it might no doubt lead one to suspect an omission.

ἀδικοῦντα

νήπιος ὃς πατέρα κτείνας παιδας καταλείπει.

12 ἔτι ἔνιαι τῶν παροιμιῶν καὶ γνῶμαι εἰσιν, οἶον παροι-
13 μία “Αττικὸς πάροικος.” δεῖ δὲ τὰς γνώμας λέγειν
καὶ παρὰ τὰ δεδημοσιευμένα (λέγω δὲ δεδημοσιευμένα
οἶον τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄγαν), ὅταν ἡ τὸ
ἡθος φαίνεσθαι μέλλῃ βέλτιον, ἢ παθητικῶς εἰρημένη
ἢ. ἔστι δὲ παθητικὴ μέν, οἶον ἢ τις ὄργιζόμενος

even when innocent, “Childish is he, who first slays the father and then leaves the children behind.” This is a verse of Stasinus’s *Κύπρια*, one of the Cyclic poems. It is ascribed to him by Clemens Alex. *Strom.* VI p. 747. Dūntzer, *Fragm. Epic. Gr.* p. 16. See note on I 15. 14.

§ 12. ‘Some proverbs also are *γνῶμαι*; for example, “an Attic neighbour” is a proverb (and also may be used as a *γνώμη*). *νήπιος ὃς κ.τ.λ.* is quoted as a *proverb* in I 15. 14; here it is a *γνώμη*. It may be added to the list of Trench’s ‘immoral proverbs’, *On Proverbs*, p. 82 seq.

On the *παροιμία*, its definition and character, see Erasmus, *Adag. Introd.*: and Trench, “on the lessons in Proverbs.”

What sort of neighbour an *Attic neighbour* was, may be best gathered from the description of the Athenian character drawn by the Corinthians, and contrasted with that of their Lacedaemonian rivals, in their speech at the Congress at Sparta. Thuc. I 70. The restless, excitable, intriguing spirit, the love of novelty and foreign adventure, the sanguine temper, quick wit, and daring audacity, therein described, must necessarily have made them the most troublesome and dangerous of neighbours; ever ready to interfere in their neighbours’ affairs, and form schemes of aggrandisement at their neighbours’ expense. Another proverb of the same kind is mentioned by Schrader as having been applied to the Franks, *Francum amicum habeas, vicinum non habeas*: it is found in Eginherd’s *Life of Charlemagne*. Gibbon also refers to it, without naming his authority. In the 10th century at Constantinople, “a proverb, that the Franks were good friends and bad neighbours, was in every one’s mouth.” *Decline and Fall*, ch. XLIX. Vol. IV. p. 509 (Murray, 1846).

§ 13. ‘Maxims may also be cited in opposition to, or in contradiction of, those that have become public property—by these I mean such as ‘know thyself’, ‘avoid excess’ (the maxims or adages of Solon and Chilon)—whenever one’s character is likely to be put in a more favourable light (thereby), or the *γνώμη* has been pronounced in an excited state of feeling (by the opponent who is to be answered); of this ‘pathetic’ *γνώμη* an instance is, if for example a man in a fit of passion were to say that it is false that a man is bound to know himself, “this gentleman at any rate, if he knew himself, would never have claimed to be elected general.”’

Aristotle has said that there are two classes of cases in which a

φαίη ψεῦδος εἶναι ὡς δεῖ γιγνώσκειν αὐτόν· οὗτος γοῦν εἰ ἐγίγνωσκεν ἑαυτόν, οὐκ ἀν ποτε στρατηγεῖν ἡξίωσεν. τὸ δὲ ἥθος βέλτιον, ὅτι οὐ δεῖ, ὥσπερ φασί, φιλεῖν ὡς μισήσοντας ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μισεῖν ὡς φιλή-
14 σοντας. δεῖ δὲ τῇ λέξει τὴν προαιρεσιν συνδηλοῦν,

generally accepted or ‘universal’ maxim—such as Solon’s *γνῶθι σεαυτόν*—may be contradicted *with effect*. One of these is, when the *γνώμη* itself, including the contradiction of it—as appears from the example—is uttered in a state of excited feeling, real or assumed, such as indignation. The example of this is a man *in a fit of passion*, *όργιζόμενος*, loudly asserting that Solon’s universally accepted maxim, or the precept conveyed by it, is untrue, or at any rate liable to exception; for if so and so (some imaginary person) had had a true knowledge of himself (and his own incapacity) he never would have aspired to be a general: but he *has* done so, and succeeded in the attempt: and this *success* shews the falsity of the rule, as a prudential maxim, at any rate in this case; and also being *undeserved* provokes the indignation of the speaker. And it is to be observed that this *success* without merit is *necessary* to inspire the feeling, the existence of which is distinctly stated. The case is that of Cleon, Thuc. IV 27 seq. Victorius however understands it in a different sense. According to him the case is that of an Iphicrates, who raised himself from a low condition to the height of power and distinction; Rhet. I 7.32, ‘Ιφικράτης αὐτὸν ἐνεκωμίας λέγων ἔξ ὅν ὑπῆρξε τάντα; I 9.31, ἔξ οὖν εἰς οἷα, (τὸ τοῦ Ιφικράτους); if Iphicrates had ‘known himself’, i. e. remembered his origin, he never could have entered upon such a career. But it seems to me that this is not a proper interpretation of ‘self-knowledge’, and that the maxim could not be applied in this sense: the mere recollection of his former low estate surely is not entitled to the name of knowledge of self. Iphicrates, instead of disobeying the precept, conformed to it in the strictest sense; he did *know himself* so well, he was so fully aware of his capacity for fulfilling the duties of the office, that he did not hesitate to apply for and exercise the command of an army. Victorius’ words are; “*παθητικῶς* dicet, qui ira percitus ita loquetur” (but what is the *occasion* of the anger, when it is thus interpreted? The mere contradiction of an universal maxim does not give rise to a fit of passion), “*falsum est omnino, quod aiunt, debere homines seipso nosse: hic enim profecto si se ipsum cognosset nunquam praetor ducre exercitum voluisse.*” It may perhaps be meant that the speaker *assumes* indignation in order to give force to his contradiction: or really gets into a passion at the thought of the folly of mankind for believing it.

‘Our character is bettered, men’s opinion of our character is improved, by saying for instance (*subaudi oīov ēl tis λέγοι, aut tale aliquid*) that we ought not, as is said, to love as with the prospect of our love being turned into hatred, but rather the reverse, to hate as if that was likely to become love’. This is Bias’ precept or suggestion, *ὑποθήκη*, see note on II 13.4.

§ 14. ‘The language (statement, expression) should be accompanied

εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιλέγειν, οἶον ἢ οὕτως εἰπόντα, ὅτι “δεῖ δὲ φιλεῖν οὐχ ὕσπερ φασίν, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀεὶ φιλήσοντα· ἐπιβούλου γὰρ θάτερον,” ἢ ὁδε “οὐκ ἀρέσκει δέ μοι τὸ λεγόμενον· δεῖ γὰρ τόν γ' ἀληθινὸν φίλον ὡς φιλήσοντα ἀεὶ φιλεῖν.” καὶ “οὐδὲ τὸ p. 93. μῆδεν ἄγαν· δεῖ γὰρ τούς γε κακοὺς ἄγαν μισεῖν.”

15 έχουσι δ' εἰς τοὺς λόγους βοήθειαν μεγάλην μίαν p. 1395 b. μὲν δὴ διὰ τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἀκροατῶν· χαίρουσι

by the manifestation of the deliberate moral purpose (by which the moral character of every thought and action is estimated), or if not, the reason (at any rate) should be added; as thus “a man's love should be, not as people say, but as though it were to be lasting (as deep and fervent and assured, as though it were to endure for ever); for the other (the reverse) has the character of treachery (belongs to, is characteristic of, a designing, plotting, treacherous man; implying deceit together with evil designs of future mischief).” This is the construction that *may* be put upon it: it also admits of a more favourable interpretation: see the note on II 13. 4, already referred to. ‘Or thus, “but the statement, the maxim, does not satisfy me: for the true, sincere, genuine friend should love as if his love were to last for ever.” And again, neither does the (maxim) “nothing to excess (satisfy me); for the wicked surely should be hated to excess.”’

§ 15. ‘These *γνῶμαι* are of the greatest service (help) to our speeches —one of which’ (the other follows in the next section) ‘is due to, arises out of, the want of cultivation and intelligence in the audience; for they are delighted if ever any one chance to light upon, and express in general terms, any opinion that they hold themselves, but partially’.

φορτικότης, as far as Classical Greek is concerned, appears to be a *ἀπαξ λεγόμενον*: it is found also in Eustathius (Steph. *Thes.* sub v.). *φορτικός*, from *φόρτος* a burden or load, burden-like, burden-ish, and hence met. burdensome, oppressive, annoying: especially applied to *vulgarity*, in person, manners, or intellect. The last of these senses, intellectual *vulgarity*, the want of cultivation and refinement, and especially of philosophical cultivation—a coarse and vulgar habit of mind, which looks merely at the surface of things, with little or no faculty of observation or power of distinction, and contents itself with a mere vulgar knowledge shared with the mass of mankind—is, if not *peculiar* to Aristotle, at any rate much more commonly found in his writings than in others. In this sense the *φορτικός* does not differ much from the *ἀπαίδευτος*, and is opposed to the *χαριεῖς*, which, in Aristotle, often expresses the *highest degree* of grace and refinement, arising from the study of philosophy. It is in this signification that the word is used here, meaning a want of intelligence and of philosophical or (generally) intellectual training, which disqualifies men for making distinctions and estimating the value of an argument; consequently they measure the validity of a

γὰρ ἔάν τις καθόλου λέγων ἐπιτύχη τῶν δοξῶν ἃς ἔκεινοι κατὰ μέρος ἔχουσιν. ὁ δὲ λέγω, δῆλον ἔσται ὅδε, ἀμα δὲ καὶ πῶς δεῖ αὐτὰς θηρεύειν. ή μὲν γὰρ γνώμη, ὥσπερ εἰρηται, ἀπόφανσις καθόλου ἔστιν, χαίρουσι δὲ καθόλου λεγομένου ὁ κατὰ μέρος προ-
νηπολαμβάνοντες τυγχάνουσιν· οἶον εἴ τις γείτοσι τύχοι κεχρημένος ἡ τέκνοις φαύλοις, ἀποδέξαιτ' ἀν τοῦ εἰπόντος ὅτι οὐδὲν γειτονίας χαλεπώτερον ἡ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἡλιθιότερον τεκνοποίας. ὥστε δεῖ στοχά-

reason not by its logical force or cogency, but by its coincidence with their own previously conceived opinions; which they love to hear exaggerated by the orator, who humours them by these illicit generalisations. The Scholiast explains it *ἀγροκίαν*. Victorius has, I think, entirely mistaken the meaning of the word. The *φορτικότης* here ascribed to vulgar audiences is much the same as the *μοχθηρία τῶν ἀκροατῶν*, III 1. 5, the vices or defects, which oblige the orator to have recourse to *τὰλλα ἔξω τοῦ ἀποδεῖξαι* in order to convince them, because they are unable to appreciate logic alone. Comp. I 2. 13, on this subject, ὁ γὰρ κριτής *ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἀπλοῦς*. See also on III 1. 5.

'My meaning will be explained, and at the same time also how they (the *γνῶμαι*) are to be caught' (hunted, pursued, like game, Anal. Pr. I 30, 46 a 11, *θηρεύειν ἀρχάς*), 'by what follows (ὅδε)'. 'The *γνώμη*, as has been stated (§ 2), is an utterance or declaration expressed universally; and an audience is always delighted with the expression, as of an universal truth, of any opinion which they previously, but partially, entertain: for example, if a man chanced to have bad neighbours or children, he would be glad to hear (approve) any one who said "nothing is more troublesome (harder to bear) than neighbourhood" (abstract for concrete, *γείτονες* neighbours), or "nothing is more foolish than the procreation of children."— Possibly also, though this is doubtful, a man with a frail wife might like to hear Hamlet exclaim "Frailty, thy name is woman."

γειτονίας] Plat. Legg. VIII 843 C, *χαλεπὴν καὶ σφόδρα πικρὰν γειτονίαν ἀπεργάζονται. γειτονᾶν*, apud eundem. For *χαλεπώτερον γειτονίας*, comp. Thuc. III 113, *ἔδεισαν μὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔχοντες αὐτὴν χαλεπώτεροι σφίσι πάροικοι ὡσι.* With the *γνώμη* comp. Demosth. πρὸς Καλλικλέα [Or. 55], init. οὐκ ἦν ἄρ', ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, χαλεπώτερον οὐδὲν ἡ γείτονος πονηροῦ καὶ πλεονέκτου τυχεῖν (Victorius), evidently referring to this proverb, [cf. Hesiod, Op. et D. 345, *πῆμα κακὸς γείτων*].

στοχάζεσθαι κ.τ.λ.] 'And therefore (the speaker) must guess what their previous (already formed) opinions are and what sort of things they are about (*how* they think about what), and then express this opinion in a general proposition on these matters'. Schrader quotes Cic. de Orat. II 44. 186, (M. Antonius) *sicut medico...sic cum aggredior ancipitem causam et gravem, ad animos iudicium pertractandos omni mente in ea cogitatione curaque versor, ut odorer quam sagacissime possim quid sentiant quid existiment quid exspectent quid velint, quo deduci oratione facillime posse videantur.*

ζεσθαι πῶς τυγχάνουσι ποῖα προϋπολαμβάνοντες, 16 εἰθ̄ οὕτω περὶ τούτων καθόλου λέγειν. ταύτην τε δὴ ἔχει μίαν χρῆσιν τὸ γνωμολογεῖν, καὶ ἐτέραν κρείττων ηθικοὺς γὰρ ποιεῖ τοὺς λόγους. ηθος δὲ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις δήλη ή προαιρεσις. αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαιρετῶν, ὥστε ἀν χρησταὶ ὡσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοήθη φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα.

περὶ μὲν οὖν γνώμης, καὶ τί ἔστι καὶ πόσα εἴδη αὐτῆς καὶ πῶς χρηστέον αὐτῆς καὶ τίνα ὡφέλειαν ι ἔχει, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα· περὶ δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων καθόλου CHAP.XII.

πῶς ποῖα] Two interrogatives without copula: common in Greek—but in verse rather than prose—as Soph. Phil. 1090, *τοῦ ποτε τεύξομαι...πόθεν ελπίδος.*

§ 16. ‘This then is one use (or usefulness, advantage) of the employment of *γνῶμαι*, there is also another, and a better; that is, that it gives an ethical character to our speeches. All speeches have this moral character in which the moral purpose is manifested’. Comp. III 17.9. The *ηθος* referred to in III 16.9 is of a different kind, it is *dramatic* character, the third of the three distinguished in Introd. p. 112.

‘All *γνῶμαι* have this effect, because any one who uses a *γνώμη* makes a declaration in general terms about the objects of moral purpose (or preference), and therefore if the *γνῶμαι* themselves are good (have a good moral tendency) they give to the speaker also the appearance of good character’. On *ἀποφαίνεσθαι*, see above on II 21.2.

‘So, for the treatment of *γνώμη*, its nature, number of kinds, mode of employment, and advantages, let so much suffice’.

CHAP. XXII.

On the treatment of enthymemes in general. A summary of the contents of this chapter is given in the Introduction, p. 260 seq., and the enthymeme in its logical aspect described in the same, p. 101—8. The principal part of it is occupied with the selection of topics of enthymemes, preparatory to, and exemplified by, c. 23, the *τόποι τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων*. [On the enthymeme, see Grote's *Aristotle* I 291—3.]

On the selection of topics, comp. Top. A 14. “*Derivatum est hoc caput ex εὐπορίᾳ προτάσεων, ratione conquirendi medios terminos*”—the middle term which connects the two extremes and so gives rise to the conclusion, is *therefore the thing to be looked for in constructing a syllogism—“quae docetur, Anal. Pr. 1 27—32: ut seq. cap. (23) e libris Topicorum, c. 24 et 25 ex Elenchis Soph. est traductum.”* Schrader. Of course the mode of treatment is *adapted* to the purposes of Rhetoric. I will repeat

τε εἴπωμεν, τίνα τρόπον δεῖ ζητεῖν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τοὺς τόπους· ἄλλο γάρ εἶδος ἐκατέρου τούτων ἔστιν.
2 ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις ἔστιν, εἴρηται πρότερον, καὶ πῶς συλλογισμός, καὶ τί διαφέρει
3 τῶν διαλεκτικῶν· οὐτε γάρ πόρρωθεν οὔτε πάντα δεῖ

here, that the enthymeme differs from the strict dialectical syllogism only in *form*. The materials of the two are the same, *probable* matter, and of unlimited extent: the dialectician may dispute, and the rhetorician draw his inferences, about *anything whatsoever*. The difference between the two is simply this, that the dialectician rigorously maintains the form of the syllogism, with its three propositions, major and minor premiss and conclusion: the rhetorician *never* expresses all three—if he did, his enthymeme would become a regular syllogism—though his argument or inference derives all the validity of its reasoning from the syllogism, of which it is a *kind*. [See esp. *note* on p. 103 of Introd.]

§ 1. ‘Let us now speak of enthymemes in general, that is, of the mode of looking for them, and next their (principal) *τόποι*’ (general heads of enthymemes, arguments or inferences; a classification of *cases* to which orators may refer for appropriate arguments in any *particular* case which they have to argue: in c. 23); ‘for each of these is (of) a different kind’. On which Schrader, “ratio seligendi enthymemata differt a locis ipsis. Quomodo aliud est argenti fodina, aliud argentum investigandi et explorandi modus.”

§ 2. ‘Now that the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism has been already stated (I 2.8, and 13), and also how (in what respects) it is a syllogism, and wherein it differs from those of dialectics (I 2.11); for—these are two of the differences—we must neither go very far back, nor introduce all the steps (of the regular syllogism), in drawing our inferences; the one is obscure by reason of its length, the other is mere chattering (idle talk, or vain repetition, leading to nothing, III 3.3), because it states what everybody sees already (what is already evident).’

οὐτε γάρ πόρρωθεν κτλ.] This is a manifest reference to I 2.13, where *both* of these two things which the rhetorician has to avoid are expressly mentioned.

First, he must not deduce his inference, the conclusion which he wishes to establish, by a long train of connected syllogisms from a remote distance, συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον... ἀνάγκη μὴ εἶναι εὐεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος, ὃ γάρ κριτής ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἀπλοῦς. Comp. I 2.12, ἔστι τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς (τῆς ῥητορικῆς)...έν τοῖς τοιούτοις ὀκροταῖς οἱ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. (Comp. Topic. A 11, 105 a 8, where this is extended to dialectical argumentation. A similar precept is given in III 17.6. πόρρωθεν of ‘far-fetched’ metaphors, III 2.12. Comp. III 3.4.) This will only puzzle his ‘simple’ audience, whose powers of perception and memory will be alike unable to keep pace with him. The reasoning of the rhetorician must be as clear and as brief as possible.

Secondly, he must draw his conclusion without expressing all that

λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀσαφὲς διὰ τὸ μῆκος, τὸ δὲ ἀδολεσχία διὰ τὸ φανερὰ λέγειν. τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ πιθανωτέρους εἶναι τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἐν τοῖς ὄχλοις, ὥσπερ φασὶν

belongs to the regular syllogism; this is also for the sake of brevity; the formal syllogism is unsuitable to the orator who has a great deal to say, and is hastening to his conclusion, fearing to weary his audience, because it *expresses* a great deal that is self-evident, and may well be left for the hearers themselves to supply. Besides this, the enthymeme which he employs obliges him to omit either one of the two premisses or the conclusion; which of them it is to be, depends upon the degree in which the reasoning will be intelligible without it: anything that is absolutely *φανερόν* should (in reasoning) be omitted to save time. These are the two points in which the use of the enthymeme differs from that of the dialectical syllogism.

With respect to the first, the dialectician, whose object is merely to gain the victory in the dispute, and who has an antagonist more or less a match for him, can take his own time, and need not accommodate his reasoning to the intelligence of his opponent: to the rhetorician, the time allowed is generally limited, he has usually an uneducated and perhaps unintelligent audience to address, which he must keep in good humour, and therefore neither puzzle nor weary. The second point conveys the essential difference between the enthymeme and dialectical syllogism, that in the former *οὐ πάντα δεῖ λαμβάνοντας συνάγειν*. *πάντα* may also include, what Schrader adds, "multas propositiones probabiles, communes, intempestivas," which "plane omitti debere praecipit."

On ἀδολεσχία, see note on III 3. 3. Eth. N. III 13, 1118 *a* 1. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 3, 165 *b* 15.

τοῦτο γάρ] *γάρ* here can hardly bear its usual signification, that of 'a reason assigned': the fact—that the uneducated are more convincing to a mob than your philosopher—is not the reason of the preceding statement, but rather the reverse; the previous statement explains (supplies the reason or explanation of) the fact. It must therefore be a case of that use of *γάρ* which Schleiermacher in his translation of Plato represents by *nämlich, videlicet*; a use of the word which frequently occurs in the Platonic dialogues. And so I have translated it: though it is to be observed that if *nämlich* always represents the Greek *γάρ* (in these special cases), the English 'namely' will not always represent the German *nämlich*. [Comp. note i on p. 134, and Shilleto on Thuc. I. 25. 4.]

'This, *namely*, is also the reason why the ignorant (or illiterate) have a greater power of persuading when they are addressing a mob than the highly educated or cultivated (in dialectics and philosophy), as the poets say that the uncultivated are the more accomplished speakers in a crowd'.

οἱ ποιηται] is generalised from one, viz. Euripides, who alone is referred to. The plural sometimes expresses the single individual *plus* those like him. So we speak of 'our Newtons and our Bacons',

οἱ ποιηταὶ τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους παρ' ὅχλῳ μουσικωτέρως

as if there were several of them, ‘poets, Homers and Virgils’; or else conveys contempt, ‘don’t talk to me of your Hegels and Schellings’ (from some one who was no admirer of German philosophy) and so on. Soph. Phil. 1306, *ψευδοκήρυκας*, of Ulysses alone (Schneidewin). Sim. Plat. Rep. III 387 C, *Κωκυταίς τε καὶ Στύγας*. Aesch. Agam. 1414, *Χρυσηῖδων μελιγμα τῶν ὑπ' Ἰλίῳ*. (Longin. περὶ ψήφους § 23, ἐξῆλθον “Ἐκτορές τε καὶ Σαρπίδονες, Eur. Rhes. 866, οὐν οἴδα τοὺς σὸνς οὐν λέγεις Ὁδυσσέας. Hor. Ep. II 2. 117, *Catonibus atque Cethegis*, Lucan, Phars. I 313, *nomina vana, Catones*, quoted in Blomfield’s Gloss. ad loc.) Arist. Ran. 1041, *Πατρόλων Τεύκρων Θυμολεόντων* (characters of Aeschylus). See Valckn. ad Theocr. Adon. line 141, sub fin. *Δευκαλίωνας*.

The verses here referred to, not directly quoted, are from Eur. Hippol. 989, *οἱ γάρ ἐν σοφοῖς φαῦλοι, παρ' ὅχλῳ μουσικώτεροι λέγειν*. The same verses are referred to by Plutarch, de Educ. Lib. c. 9, p. 6 B.

μουσικός, has here an unusual sense, which seems to be borrowed from the notion of *cultivation*, literary and intellectual, which the term expresses: hence ‘skilled in’, ‘highly trained or cultivated’ in the practice of a *particular art*. So Rost and Palm Lex. *wohlunterrichtet, geschickt*. “Accomplished in” seems to unite the two meanings; general cultivation, with special skill in the particular art. Ast’s *Lex. Plat.*, on *μουσικῶς*: “Et in universum *decenter*. Plat. Rep. III 403 A, *ἔρως πέφυκε ... μουσικῶς ἐρᾶν*, Legg. VII 816 C.”

‘For the one (*τηπαιδευμένοι*) talk about generals and universals, the others about (*lit.* ‘from’, the materials *from* which the speech is derived) what they really know, and things that are near to us (near, that is, to our observation, things sensible; and to our interests, those which nearly concern us)’. The *κοινὰ καὶ καθόλον* are the general or abstract, and universal notions, with which alone the philosopher and man of science care to deal. These are of course remote from popular knowledge and interests. The *artist* also is conversant with ‘generals’ and not with ‘particulars or individuals’: the rules of art are all general rules. Experience or empiricism deals with the particular: *ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἔκαστον ἔστι γνῶσις, η̄ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου*. Metaph. A 1, 981 a 15. Rhet. I 2. 11, II 19. 27. But although these *abstract* universal truths and rules are in themselves better known, *καθ' αὐτά, ἀπλῶς, τῇ φύσει γνωριμώτερα*, that is, convey a higher and more comprehensive kind of knowledge, yet *to us, ημῖν, πρὸς ημᾶς*, things of sense and the *concrete*, the visible and palpable, are nearer or closer (*ἐγγύis*), clearer and more interesting, and in this sense, better known; the knowledge of these *comes to us first*, as the simpler *πρότερον*, appeals to our senses, and is consequently more in accordance with *our* lower nature¹. The distinction of absolute or objective, and relative or subjective, knowledge is very familiar to Aristotle. See Phys. Auscult. at the

¹ *φύσις* is used in more than one sense: thus it may be applied to the normal or abstract notion of *nature*, its true and highest form, perfect nature; or an imperfect nature, as it shews itself in us and our imperfect faculties and condition.

λέγειν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ καθόλου λέγουσιν,
οἱ δὲ ἔξ ὧν ἵσται, καὶ τὰ ἐγγύς. ὥστ' οὐκ ἔξ ἀπάν-
των τῶν δοκούντων ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ὠρισμένων λεκτέον, p. 94.
οἷον ἢ τοῖς κρίνουσιν ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται. καὶ τοῦτο
P. 1396.

beginning [p. 184 a 16], πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἢ ὁδὸς καὶ
σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ἡμῖν
τε γνώριμα καὶ ἀπλῶς. Metaph. Z 4, 1029 b 1, seq. Bonitz ad loc. Waitz
ad Organ. 71 a 1, II 299, 71 b 24, p. 307. Trendelenburg ad de Anima
p. 337 seq., *Elem. Log. Ar.* § 19, p. 82.

'We therefore must not derive our arguments or inferences from all possible opinions' ("ex omnibus quae probantur, et vera esse videntur." Victorius); 'but select them out of those which are defined or determined or settled for us (marked off, and separated from the rest, as especially suitable to our purpose) (in some way or other) as, for instance, either by the judges (i. e. their known opinions: this in a law case) or those whose authority they accept'.

That is, there are many truths, such as scientific generalities, which may indeed be included amongst *opinions* (because they are *believed* as well as *known*) but yet are alien to the purposes of Rhetoric, and also many opinions, properly so called, which are unfit for its use, οὐκ ἔξ
ὧν ἔτυχεν, I 2. 11; and besides this, "every fool has some opinions", I 2. 11; we must therefore make a selection if we wish to persuade—we had been already told that though the sphere of Rhetoric, like that of Dialectics, is theoretically unlimited, I 2. 1, yet that in practice it is usually confined to the business of life and human action, and therefore that its materials are in fact drawn from Politics, including Ethics, from political and social philosophy, ib. § 7.

Here however there is a still further restriction—we must select out of the vast range of probable opinions those which happen to suit our immediate purpose: for instance, if we are arguing a case in a law-court we must draw our inferences from such opinions as they (the judges) themselves are known to hold, or at any rate such as those whom they regard as authorities are known to approve. *κρίνειν* and *κριτής*, as we have seen, II 1. 2; 18. 1, may be extended to the *decision* of audiences in all three branches of Rhetoric, the assembly, the judges, and the *θεαταί* or *θεωροί* of an epideixis, and Victorius takes this view. As however *κρίνουσιν* is qualified by *οἷον*, which shews that there are other analogous cases, the two audiences of indirect *κρίνοντες* may perhaps be left to be understood.

τῶν δοκούντων] 'probable opinions', comp. II 1. 6; 25. 2, and *φαίνεται* in I 2. 11, and in the succeeding clause.

καὶ τοῦτο δέ] 'And this too should be clear—the speaker should be quite certain—that it *does* so appear to—that this *is* really the opinion of—all or most (of any audience).—If δέ be retained (so Bekker), compare note on I 6. 22. MS A° δῆ. *Quaere δεῖ;*? Victorius seems to understand it so, as he uses the word *debet*; perhaps supposing that the notion of 'ought' is carried on from the preceding *λεκτέον*: and this is confirmed by the following *συνάγειν*.

δ', ὅτι οὕτω φαίνεται, δῆλον εἶναι ἡ πᾶσιν ἡ τοῖς p. 1395.
πλείστοις. καὶ μὴ μόνον συνάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.

4 πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι περὶ οὗ δεῖ λέγειν
καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι εἴτε πολιτικῷ συλλογισμῷ εἴθ'

'And his inferences should be drawn not only from necessary propositions, but also from those that are only true for the most part', probabilities. The *τεκμήριον*, the certain sign, the necessary concomitant, is the only *necessary* argument admitted in Rhetoric: its ordinary materials are *εἰκότα* and *σημεῖα*, things by their very name and nature only probable. On these materials of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 160 seq. One might suppose from the phraseology adopted here, *μὴ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ*, that the necessary propositions and conclusions were the rule and the probable the exception; instead of the reverse. The true statement is found in I 2. 14. Comp. Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 δ 32—36.

§ 4. 'So first of all it must be understood that anything we have to speak or reason about' (on *συλλογίζεσθαι* et sim. for reasoning in general, see note on I I. II), 'whether it be on a political subject or any other whatever, it is necessary to (have in our possession) be acquainted with everything that belongs to this also (*καὶ* besides the *συλλογισμός* itself, or the particular point which the argument has in view), either all or some (according to circumstances); for if you have nothing (no information, no facts) in your possession (as material) you will have nothing to draw your inferences from'. The same thing is stated, and nearly in the same words, Anal. Pr. I 30, 46 α 3, ἡ μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὄποιανοῦν καὶ μάθημα· (all learning and all philosophy and science begin with *observation*.) δεῖ γὰρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ οἱς ὑπάρχει περὶ ἔκατερον ἀθρεῖν, καὶ τούτων ὡς πλείστων εὐπορεῖν. And again, α 22, ὥστε ἀν ληφθῆ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ἔκαστον, ἡμέτερον ἦδη τὰς ἀποδείξεις ἔτοιμας ἐμφανίζειν. εἰ γάρ μηδὲν κατὰ τὴν ιστορίαν παραληφθείη τῶν ἀληθῶν ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς πράγμασιν, ἔξουmen περὶ ἄπαντος, οὐ μὲν ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις, ταύτην εὑρεῖν καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐ δὲ μὴ πέφυκεν ἀπόδειξις, τοῦτο ποιεῖν φανερόν. The *ὑπάρχοντα* here spoken of are all that properly belong to a thing, all its properties, qualities, attributes, all its antecedents and consequences—these are especially important in human actions, the rhetorician's subject—everything closely connected with it, whether similar or different, as opposites, relative terms and so on: in short, if you have to speak or reason upon any subject, if you wish to succeed, you must first know *all about it*. This is illustrated at length from the three branches of Rhetoric in the next five sections.

λαβεῖν I take to be here *λαβεῖν τῷ νῷ* or *τῇ διανοίᾳ*, to seize or grasp with the mind, apprehend, conceive.

πολιτικῷ] Politics, including Ethics, being almost exclusively the source from which rhetorical enthymemes are to be drawn, though theoretically the field of rhetorical practice is boundless: see note on p. 224. Otherwise, *πολιτικὸς συλλογισμός* may mean 'a rhetorical syllogism' or

όποιωοῦν, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ἔχειν υπάρχοντα,
ἢ πάντα ἡ ἔνια· μηδὲν γάρ ἔχων ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἀν ἔχοις
5 συνάγειν. λέγω δ' οἷον πῶς ἀν δυναίμεθα συμβου-
λεύειν Ἀθηναῖοι εἰ πολεμητέον ἢ μὴ πολεμητέον, μὴ
ἔχοντες τίς η δύναμις αὐτῶν, πότερον ναυτικὴ ἢ πε-
ζικὴ ἢ ἄμφω, καὶ αὕτη πόση, καὶ πρόσοδοι τίνες ἢ
φίλοι καὶ ἔχθροι, ἔτι δὲ τίνας πολέμους πεπολεμή-
6 κασὶ καὶ πῶς, καὶ τάλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἢ ἐπαινεῖν, εἰ
μὴ ἔχοιμεν τὴν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίαν ἢ τὴν ἐν

enthymeme: ‘political’ that is ‘on political subjects’, to which Rhetoric is almost exclusively confined, is so far convertible with ‘rhetorical’. This seems to be Victorius’ view; on II 22. 10.

§ 5. ‘As an instance of what I mean—how could we possibly advise the Athenians’ (the *συμβουλευτικὸν γένος*) ‘whether they should make war or not, unless we know what is the nature of their power (or forces), whether it is a naval or military force, or both, and its amount or magnitude, and what their revenues are, and their friends or enemies, and besides all this what wars they have waged, and with what success (or possibly, what are their *modes* of warfare)—and everything else of the same sort’. Compare with this I 4 7, to the end, on political topics.

§ 6. ‘Or deliver a panegyric’ (the *ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος*) ‘if we had not the sea-fight at Salamis, and the battle at Marathon, or all that was done on behalf of the Heraclidae, or anything else of the like sort. For all (panegyrists) derive their encomiums from the fair deeds, renown, distinctions (of their hero), real or supposed’.

These are the stock subjects of the Athenian declaimers: οὐχ *χαλεπὸν* Ἀθηναῖοις ἐν Ἀθηναῖοις ἐπαινεῖν, I 9. 30, III 14. 11. Plato’s Menexenus has all these topics, the Heraclidae, 239 B; Marathon, c. 10; Salamis, c. 11. Isocrates, Panegyricus, §§ 54—60; 64, 65; Marathon and Salamis, § 85 seq. Comp. Philipp. § 147. de Pace § 37. Panath. § 194, Eurystheus and the Heraclidae; § 195, Marathon. He can’t even keep it out of the *περὶ ἀντιδόσεως* (though that speech is of a purely personal nature); where it appears again, § 306. Lysias, *ἐπιτάφιος*, §§ 11—16, 20—26, 27—43. And the same three topics recur in the same order, only more briefly treated, in the *ἐπιτάφιος* attributed to Demosthenes, § 8 seq. Pseudo-Dem. *περὶ συντάξεως* § 22. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 259. Demosth. c. Aristocr. § 198. These topics are *not* introduced in the Speech for the Crown.

The tragic poets wrote dramas upon the same stories of unfailing interest, as Aeschylus’ Persae, and Euripides’ Heraclidae; and Aristophanes refers derisively to this habit of self-glorification, Acharn. 696—7, Vespr. 711, Equit. 781—785, and 1334. The *Μαραθωνομάχαι*, the warriors of Marathon, Ach. 181, Nub. 986, is not applied altogether in jest.

[*ἐν Μαραθῶνι* is an instance of departure from the stereotyped ad-

Μαραθῶνι μάχην ἡ τὰ ὑπὲρ Ἡρακλειδῶν πραχθέντα
ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐκ γὰρ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἡ
7 δόκούντων ὑπάρχειν καλῶν ἐπαινοῦσι πάντες. ὅμοίως
δὲ καὶ ψέγουσιν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, σκοποῦντες τί¹
ὑπάρχει τοιοῦτον αὐτοῖς ἢ δοκεῖ ὑπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι
τοὺς Ἐλληνας κατεδουλώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν
βάρβαρον συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἀριστεύσαντας ἡν-
δραποδίσαντο Αἰγινήτας καὶ Ποτιδαιάτας, καὶ ὅσα
ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον ἀμάρτημα
ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς. ὡς δὲ αὕτως καὶ οἱ κατηγοροῦντες
καὶ οἱ ἀπολογούμενοι ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων σκοπού-
8 μενοι κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται. οὐδὲν δὲ δια-

verbal form *Μαραθῶνι*, without the preposition. See Cobet, *Variae Lectiones*, p. 201, and Dr Thompson's ed. of the *Gorgias*, p. 152.]

§ 7. ‘And in like manner also topics of censure are derived from the opposites of these, by considering what of the like (i.e. τὸ ἐναντίον, the opposite) nature actually belongs, or seems to belong, to them’ (the objects of the censure; *things* as well as *men*: see note in *Cambr. Journal of Cl. and Sacred Phil.*, Vol. II., No. 5, p. 158), ‘as for instance, that they (the Athenians) reduced the Greeks to servitude and made slaves of the Aeginetans and Potidaeans, men that had shared in the fight and distinguished themselves against the barbarian (in the Persian invasion), and everything else of the like kind; and any other similar offence that can be alleged against (*lit. belongs to*) them’. On the treatment of the Aeginetans, see Thuc. II. 27; and of the Potidaeans, Ib. c. 70. Against the charges brought against the Athenians of abusing their maritime supremacy, and oppressing their subject states, and other iniquities, Isocrates, Paneg. § 100 seq., defends them as well as he can: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἥδη τινὲς ἡμῶν κατηγοροῦσιν, ὡς ἐπειδὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θαλάττης παρελάθομεν πολλῶν κακῶν αἴτιοι τοῖς Ἐλλησι κατέστημεν, καὶ τόν τε Μηλίων ἀνδραποδισμὸν καὶ τὸν Σκιωναίων ἔλεθρον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς λόγοις ἡμῖν προφέρουσιν’ κ. τ. λ.

‘And in like manner also, plaintiff and defendant (in a court of justice) derive their (arguments in) accusation and defence from the circumstances of the case, which they have to consider (take into account)’. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα are here the acts and facts alleged, the characters of the two parties, and such like.

Schmidt, *On the date of Aristotle's Rhet.* p. 17, remarks on the three last sections, that the examples therein given would have been used by none but a resident at Athens, and go far to shew that the Rhetoric was written in that city.

§ 8. ‘But in doing this (in acquiring the requisite information on the facts of the case, and the character and history of the person) it

φέρει περὶ Ἀθηναίων ἢ Λακεδαιμονίων ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἢ
θεοῦ ταῦτὸ τοῦτο δρᾶν· καὶ γὰρ συμβουλεύοντα τῷ
Ἀχιλλεῖ καὶ ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ ψέγοντα καὶ κατηγο-
ροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα
ἢ δοκοῦντα ὑπάρχειν ληπτέον, ἵν' ἐκ τούτων λέγωμεν
ἐπαινοῦντες ἢ ψέγοντες εἴ τι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ὑπάρ-
χει, κατηγοροῦντες δὲ ἢ ἀπολογούμενοι εἴ τι δίκαιον
ἢ ἄδικον, συμβουλεύοντες δὲ εἴ τι συμφέρον ἢ βλα-
9 βερόν. ὁμοίως δὲ τούτοις καὶ περὶ πράγματος ὅτου-
οῦν, οἷον περὶ δικαιοσύνης, εἰ ἀγαθὸν ἢ μὴ ἀγαθόν, ἐκ p. 95.
10 τῶν ὑπάρχοντων τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. ὥστε'

makes no difference whether our subject be Athenians or Lacedaemonians, man or god; for whether we advise Achilles' (for any individual), 'or praise or censure, or accuse or defend him, we must alike make ourselves acquainted with all that belongs, or is thought to belong to him, in order that from this we may have to state whatever belongs to him and to his interests, whether fair or foul (noble or base, right or wrong), in praise and censure; just or unjust, in accusation and defence; and in advising' (advice or counsel includes *ἀποτρέπειν* as well as *προτρέπειν*) 'expedient or injurious'.

§ 9. 'And in like manner any subject whatsoever is to be dealt with ; as for example, the question of justice, whether it be good or bad, (must be discussed from topics) derived from the belongings of justice and good'. Victorius reminds us of Thrasymachus' thesis in the first book of Plato's Republic—and he might have added that of Callicles in the Gorgias—that injustice is in reality, and by nature, superior to justice, which is the good of others, but injurious to the just man himself.

§ 10. 'And therefore since everyone manifestly demonstrates (i. e. argues, infers) in this way (i.e. from and by the knowledge of everything that belongs to his subject) whether his reasoning takes the exact or rigorous form of the syllogism (as in scientific demonstration, and probably also in dialectical argument), or employs the laxer mode (of the rhetorical enthymeme)'—(γάρ in the parenthesis that follows, assigns the reason for the 'selection', the περὶ ἔκαστον ἔχειν ἔξειλεγμένα; and as it comes before that for which it assigns the reason, must be translated 'since')—'since they don't take (their propositions, premisses, materials) from *everything*' (οὐκ ἔξι ἀπάντων τῶν δοκούντων κ.τ.λ. supra § 3—see note ad loc.—οὐκ ἔξι ὅντες τετυχεῖν, I 2.11 : although it is true that Rhetoric admits of this, it *may* argue anything), 'but from what belongs to each particular subject (that comes under their notice), and by means of the *speech* (at any rate, to say nothing about the demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms) it is plainly impossible to prove anything otherwise¹; it

¹ This I take to be the meaning of διὰ τοῦ λόγου. The other interpretation, 'it is plain by reason', or 'reason shews that', is supported by Muretus and Vater.

ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάντες οὕτω φαίνονται ἀποδεικνύντες, ἐάν τε ἀκριβέστερον ἐάν τε μαλακώτερον συλλογίζωνται

is clearly necessary, as in the Topics (or Dialectics, in general), first to have ready on each particular subject a selection already prepared of the probabilities and of those circumstances of the case which are most suitable, appropriate (opportune, timely, seasonable, germane to the matter in hand); (these are to be kept in stock, and ready prepared for use on occasion: from which are distinguished *τὰ ἔξ οὐσιῶν*); and also about circumstances (evidence, or what not) that arise on the sudden, to pursue your inquiries in the same way (make yourself acquainted with them as far as possible in such an emergency); turning your attention not to things indefinite (such as universals, intellectual and moral) but to what actually belongs to the subject of your speech, and including (drawing a line round, enclosing with a line) as many, and as close (nearly connected) to the subject, as possible: for the more of these circumstances there are in your possession, so much the easier is it to prove your point; and the closer the connexion, so much the more appropriate are they, and less general'.

Of the selection of *προτάτεις* for syllogisms, Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 6, it is said, *διαιρετέον δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων* (antecedents, consequents, and concomitants) *ὅσα τε ἐν τῷ τι ἔστι, καὶ ὅσα ὡς ἴδια* (*propria*: properties which, though not of the essence of the subject, are yet inseparably attached to it, and *peculiar to*, characteristic of it), *καὶ ὅσα ὡς συμβεβηκότα κατηγορεῖται, καὶ τούτων ποιὰ δοξαστικῶς καὶ ποιὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν*. *ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ ἀν πλειόνων τοιούτων εὐπορῇ τις θάττου ἐντεύξεται συμπεράσματι, ὅσῳ δὲ ἀληθεστέρων μᾶλλον ἀποδείξει.* *Mutatis mutandis*, and omitting the *ποιὰ κατ' ἀλήθειαν* 'the truths of science', this agrees with what we find in the Rhetoric.

[*ἀκριβέστερον*] the more exact mode of reasoning by formal syllogism, demonstrative or dialectical: the latter probably included, because, as far as the form is concerned, the dialectical syllogism follows precisely the same rules as the other, and the construction of the two is identical.

[*μαλακώτερον*] softer, more yielding, less stiff and rigid and unbending, is naturally transferred to a *more relaxed* or *less rigorous* mode of reasoning, in force and substance, i.e. to the rhetorical enthymeme. Though the word is very often used metaphorically, I can find no other instance of this particular application of the metaphor. [For the metaphor, compare Metaph. E 1, 1025 b 13, *ἀποδεικνύοντας ἡ ἀναγκαιότερον ἡ μαλακώτερον*, ib. K 7, 1064 a 6, *δεικνύαι τὰ λοιπὰ μαλακώτερον ἡ ἀκριβέστερον*, de generatione et corruptione, B 6, 333 b 25, *ἔδει οὖν ἡ ὄρισασθαι ἡ ὑποθέσθαι ἡ ἀποδεῖξαι, ἡ*

Victorius renders it, "as by general use, so also, *ita etiam ratione quadam confirmatur*," meaning by *ratio* the process of reasoning. As to the first, it seems to me that *διὰ τὸν λόγον* would be a very affected and unnatural way of expressing either 'by reason', or 'by reasoning': it would rather be *τῷ λόγῳ* if that were the meaning. Also *διὰ* with the genit., which denotes the channel, medium, course, or means, of anything, is much more appropriately joined with *δεικνύαι*, with which my version connects it, than with *δῆλον*, which, to say the least, would be very unusual Greek.

(οὐ γὰρ ἔξ ἀπάντων λαμβάνουσιν ἄλλ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ ^{P. 139} ἔκαστον ὑπαρχόντων), καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον ἄλλως δεικνύναι, φανερὸν ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, πρῶτον περὶ ἔκαστον ἔχειν ἔξειλεγμένα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ τῶν ἐπικαιροτάτων, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἔξ ὑπογυίου γιγνομένων ζητεῖν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀποβλέποντα μὴ εἰς ἀόριστα ἄλλα

ἀκριβῶς ἡ μαλακῶς, ἡ ἀμῶς γέ πως, ib. N 3, 1090 b 8, μὴ λιαν ἡ μαλακὸς (ό λόγος), de Caelo, Δ 6, 313 b 4, ἐντὸς λύει μαλακῶς. Index Aristotelicus (Bonitz.)]

^{ώσπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς}] Brandis, in the tract so often referred to [Philol. IV i] p. 18, notices on this “that it marks the connexion between Rhetoric and the Topics, i. e. dialectics”, being a reference to II 23. It seems not to refer to any particular passage of the Topics, but merely to state in general terms that the mode of treating the Topics is the same in Rhetoric as in ‘the Topics’, i. e. the entire work, or the practice of dialectics in general. Similarly Schmidt, in the tract *On the date of the Rhet.* p. 2, “verisimile est etiam in tribus aliis locis (videlicet, II 22. 10, II 23. 9, II 26. 4) eum non suos de arte topicā libros (we need not go so far as this) sed hanc artem ipsam intellexisse.” Is it possible that this may be one of the, I might almost say, *ordinary* lapses of the Aristotelian memory in quotation, and that he has referred to the Topics instead of the Prior Analytics? In the latter, I 30, quoted above on § 4, there is a passage which contains a statement very closely resembling what has been said here about the selection of topics, 46 a 10, ὅπως μὴ βλέπωμεν εἰς ἀπαντά τὰ λεγόμενα...ἄλλ' εἰς ἐλάττω καὶ ὠρισμένα, καθ' ἔκαστον δὲ ἐκλέγειν τῶν δυτῶν, οἷον περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἡ ἐπιστήμης. Whether this be so or not, the passage at all events deserves to be compared with this section of the Rhetoric. Top. A 14 is upon the selection of *προτάσεις*, chiefly in the shape of δόξαι for dialectical purposes; but cannot, I think, be *directly* referred to here.

^{ἔξειλεγμένα, ἔκλογῆς, § 12.]} “The collection of premisses, whether scientific theses, or dialectical organa, or rhetorical specific data, is expressed by the word ἐκλέγειν or ἔκλαμβάνειν,” Poste, Poster. Anal. p. 121, note 1, comp. p. 25, and note 1. The terms occur constantly in the Anal. Prior. [Comp. *supra* I 2, 1358 a 23, βέλτιον οὖν ἐκλέγεσθαι τὰς προτάσεις.] The use of them is not confined to Aristotle, and seems to be technical. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 10 (11), § 2, ἐκληπτέον.

^{ἐπικαιροτάτων]} So Top. Γ 6, 109 a 36, μάλιστα ἐπίκαιροι καὶ κοινοὶ τῶν τόπων. Ib. H 4 init.

§ 11. ^{ἔξ ὑπογυίου]} See note on I 1. 7, p. 11. The phrase is applied here to circumstances that arise out of the occasion, which you must seize on as well as you can; extemporaneous, sudden, unpremeditated, and therefore unprepared; temporary accidents of the subject in hand, *quae repente eveniunt* (Victorius). These we must collect *as well as we can*, on the spur of the moment; but the same rules are to be observed as in the other cases. Poste, u. s., p. 24, “singular circumstances.”

εἰς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα περὶ ὃν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιγράφοντας ὅτι πλεῖστα καὶ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ πράγματος· ὅσῳ μὲν γὰρ ἄν πλείω ἔχηται τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, τοσούτῳ ῥᾶσιν δεικνύναι, ὅσῳ δὲ ἐγγύτερον, τοσούτῳ οἰκειότερα 12 καὶ ἥττον κοινά. λέγω δὲ κοινὰ μὲν τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὅτι ἀνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι τῶν ἡμιθέων καὶ ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸ "Ιλιον ἐστρατεύσατο· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει πολλοῖς, ὥστ' οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὁ τοιοῦτος

περιγράφοντας] *περιγράφειν* and *περιγραφή* are usually applied to the *outline* of a drawing, so *περιγεγράφω τάγαθόν* of a rough sketch or outline of good (opposed to *ἀναγράψαι*, to fill up, *lit.* draw over, this outline) Eth. N. I 7, init. and *περιγραφή* Ib. 1098 a 23: but this is not applicable here. *Praefinientem seponentemque* says Victorius. The meaning required seems to be that of ‘enclosing’, for the purpose of keeping things separate from others, so that you may be able to lay your hand upon them at once when you want them, and not have to *sort* them at the time: for this purpose you draw a line of demarcation round them, which keeps them from getting mixed up with other things that resemble them, or at all events that you don’t want just then. [Metaph. K 7, 1064 a 2, *ἐκάστη γὰρ τούτων περιγραψαμένη τι γένος αὐτῇ περὶ τοῦτο πραγματεύεται.*]

ἥττον κοινά] ‘less general’, and therefore more *special*, *ἴδια*. *κοινά* is illustrated in the next section; from which it appears that it means here the wider and higher generalisations which are attributes of very large classes, and have therefore nothing *special*, distinctive, and characteristic, about them. Neither of them is used in a technical sense, as *genus* and *species*. *ἴδια* are *peculiarities* and peculiarities of *individuals*.

In contrast with what is here said of the selection of rhetorical topics compare Anal. Pr. I 27, 43 b 1 seq., on the selection of topics for demonstrative syllogisms: in these the major premisses and conclusions must be universal and necessary, and the rules laid down are in conformity with that. Near the end of the chapter, *ληπτέον δέ κ.τ.λ.* 43 b 32, seq. a supplementary note is added, on probable (*τὰ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*) questions and their syllogisms, referring to dialectical and rhetorical proofs.

§ 12. ‘By “common” or “general” I mean, saying (for instance) in praise of Achilles, that he is a man, or one of the demigods, or that he joined the expedition against Troy; for these things belong (these distinctions are shared by, are common) to many others besides, so that one who does this (such an one) praises Achilles no more than Diomede. By “special” or “peculiar”, what belongs’ (properly as a *separable accident*, but not technical here) ‘to no one else but Achilles, as for instance to have slain the famous (*τόν*) Hector, the best and bravest of the Trojans, and the renowned Cycnus, who, being invulnerable, prevented the landing of the whole (Greek) army; and that he was the youngest of those that made the expedition, and joined it without taking the oath’ (unsworn, i. e. voluntarily, whereas the rest were *compelled* to serve by their engagement to Tyndareus), ‘and anything else of the same kind’.

Αχιλλέα ἐπαινεῖ ἡ Διομήδην· ἴδια δὲ ἀ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκεν ἢ τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ, οίον τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν "Εκτόρα τὸν ἄριστον τῶν Τρώων καὶ τὸν Κύκνον, ὃς ἐκώλυσεν ἄπαντας ἀποβαίνειν ἄτρωτος ὥν, καὶ ὅτι νεώτατος καὶ οὐκ ἔνορκος ὥν ἐστράτευσεν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

13 εἰς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς ἐκλογῆς καὶ πρῶτος οὗτος ὁ τοπικός, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων λέγωμεν.
στοιχείον δὲ λέγω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυμήματος τὸ αὐτό.
 πρῶτον δὲ εἴπωμεν περὶ ὧν ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν πρῶτον.

[*Κύκνον*] Cycnus does not appear in Homer. The earliest mention of him seems to be that of Pindar, Ol. II 82 (146), who uses him for the same purpose as Aristotle, viz. for the glorification of Achilles. (Ar.'s notice may possibly be a reminiscence of Pindar.) Ἀχιλλέα...δες "Εκτόρ" ἔσφαλε, Τρώας ἄμαχον ἀστραβῆ κίονα, Κύκνον τε θανάτῳ πόρεν, Αοὺς τε παιδί Αιθίοπα (Memnon.) The story of Achilles' encounter with Cycnus at the landing of the troops, the long conflict with his 'invulnerable' antagonist, and how Achilles finally destroyed him, are all related at length by Ovid, Met. XII 64—145. He was the son of Neptune, Ovid u. s. 72, *proles Neptunia*; is again classed with Hector, line 75; and in lines 135—144 is described as finally crushed and strangled with the thong or fastening of his own helmet.

[*ἄτρωτος*] not *unwounded*, but *invulnerable* (invulnerable by ordinary weapons; not absolutely, since he was killed). Pind. Nem. X II, ἀτρώτῳ κραδίῃ, Isthm. III 30 ἄτρωτοι πᾶδες θεῶν. Plat. Symp. 219 E.

[*οὐκ ἔνορκος*] The oath sworn by Helen's suitors to her father Tyndareus at Sparta, that they would defend him whom she chose for her husband against any aggression. This was Menelaus. Victorius quotes, Pausan. Lac. c. 24, "Ομῆρος δὲ ἔγραψε μὲν τῆς ποιήσεως ἀρχόμενος ὡς Ἀχιλλεὺς χαριζόμενος τοῖς Ἀτρέως παισί, καὶ οὐκ ἐνεχόμενος τοῖς ὄρκοις τοῖς Τυνδάρεων, παραγένοιτο εἰς Τροιαν". The passage referred to seems to be Il. A 158. Ulysses says the same of his son Neoptolemus, Soph. Phil. 72, σὺ μὲν πέπλευκας οὔτ' ἔνορκος οὐδενί κ.τ.λ.: and Philoctetes of himself, Ib. 1026. The story of the oath is told in Eurip. Iph. Aul. 49—65; and frequently alluded to elsewhere in the Tragic writers. Comp. Soph. Aj. 1111, Teucer of Ajax, οὐ γάρ τι τῆς σῆς οὐνεκ' ἐστρατεύσατο,.....ἄλλα οὐνεχ' ὄρκων οίσιν ἦν ἐνάμορτος.

§ 13. 'One method of the selection then, and the first (most important), is this, namely the topical (dialectical, following the dialectical method, that *by topics*); and now let us pass on to the elements of enthymemes; by *elements* and *topics* of enthymemes I mean the same thing'. This is repeated, c. 26. I. On *στοιχεῖον=τόπος*, and why so called, see Introd. pp. 127, 128. Add to the examples there given, Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37). 9, *στοιχεῖα κοινὰ κατὰ πάντων*, which seems to mean *τόποι*.

14 ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων εἴδη δύο· τὰ μὲν γὰρ δεικτικά ἔστιν ὅτι ἔστιν ή οὐκ ἔστιν, τὰ δὲ ἐλεγκτικά, καὶ διαφέρει ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἐλεγχος καὶ συλλογισμός. 15 ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν δεικτικὸν ἐνθύμημα τὸ ἐξ ὄμολογουμένων συνάγειν, τὸ δὲ ἐλεγκτικὸν τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα συνάγειν. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ημῖν περὶ

'But (before we proceed to do so) let us first state the necessary preliminaries'.

§ 14. 'Of enthymemes namely there are two kinds: for some undertake to shew that something is, or is not, so and so—*direct proof*; the establishment of a proposition, affirmative or negative—others are *refutative*; and these differ just like refutation and syllogism in dialectics'. On this and the next section see Introd. pp. 262, 3, and the notes.

§ 15. 'The demonstrative enthymeme (which proves *directly*) is, to draw an inference' (to 'gather,' *colligere*; corresponding to the conclusion, *συμπέρασμα*, of the regular syllogism) 'from universally admitted premisses (those general probabilities which everyone is ready to admit); the refutative is to draw inferences or conclusions not *agreeing* (with the opinions or inferences of the adversary)'. The *ἐλεγχος* is *ἀντιφάσεως συλλογισμός*, the negative of, or conclusion contradictory to, the conclusion of the opponent: *refutation* always assumes an opponent, real or imaginary, whose arguments, or opinions, or theories are to be refuted by proving the negative.

This interpretation is in conformity with the received signification of *ἀνομολογούμενος* 'disagreeing with, contradictory'. This negative sense is rare: Plat. Gorg. 495 A, Ar. Anal. Pr. I 34, 48 a 21 [*τοῦτο δὲ ἀνομολογούμενον τοῖς προειρημένοις*], Rhet. II 23. 23, *bis*, are the only instances cited; comp. Buttm. Auctar. ad Heind. Gorg. § 108, p. 490. So Victorius, "quae adversentur iis quae ab adversario ostensa prius et conclusa fuerint;" and Augustinus Niphus (quoted by Schrader) "quod ex datis concessisse adversario repugnantia atque improbabilia colligit. Repugnantia autem et improbabilia dico quae sunt contra adversariorum opinionem."

§ 16. 'Now of the general heads or classes of the specific topics that are useful or necessary we may be said to be pretty nearly in possession; for the premisses on each particular subject have been selected, so that the special topics from which enthymemes on the subjects of good or bad, fair or foul (right or wrong), just or unjust, must be derived' (these are the *εἴδη*, analysed under the heads of the three branches of Rhetoric in the first book, from c. 4. 7, to 14), 'and in like manner the topics of the characters, and feelings, and states of mind, have been previously taken and are before us' (*ἔπαρχονται* are *ready for us*, for our use).

The construction of the preceding clause *ώστε*—οἱ τόποι I understand to be this, though Vahlen [*Transactions of the Vienna Acad. of Sciences*, Oct. 1861, p. 131] declares *ώστε* and *τόπων* to be indefensible. *Τόπων* is attracted, as usual, to the construction of the relative, for οἱ τόποι ἐξ οὗ δεῖ φέρειν τὰ ἐνθυμήματα: and οἱ τόποι is repeated at the

ἐκάστων τῶν εἰδῶν τῶν χρησίμων καὶ ἀναγκαίων

end of the clause—unnecessarily perhaps, but not ungrammatically—in the second part of it introduced by *καὶ*. As to the *ὅστε*, readers of Aristotle must have remarked that his *ὅστε*'s are not always to be very strictly interpreted; sometimes they almost lose the force of a logical *consequence*, and indicate little more than a *sequence*. I presume that Vahlen's meaning (which is not explained) is, that *ὅστε κ.τ.λ.* is a mere repetition, and no consequence at all. But the two things spoken of are not precisely identical, and there is a certain connexion of cause and effect between them: it is first said in general terms that the premisses upon each subject of Rhetoric have been already selected: and from this it may *in a sense* be said to *follow* that we are supplied *in detail*, with topics for our enthymemes, with *εἶδη* or special topics under the three branches of Rhetoric, and also for the *ἥθη*, *πάθη* and *ἔξεις* in Bk. II.

Vahlen, u. s. pp. 130, 1, for the reasons before mentioned (some account of his views on this subject has been given in the introductory observations on c. 18), condemns the whole of section 16, as the interpolation of an editor, who has inserted (we are not told *why*) a sentence 'without motive, and disturbing' the connexion, in which of course, following the *altered* arrangement (which is assumed) he has placed the *ἥθη* and *πάθη* immediately after the *εἶδη* (as they now stand).

Besides this he objects to *παθημάτων* and *ἔξεων*, with which we have next to deal. *πάθημα* in this sense for *πάθος*, is certainly very rare, perhaps unique. But, *per contra*, there are at least four passages where *πάθημα* is found in other senses, to express which *πάθος* is always elsewhere employed. Metaph. A 2, 982 b 16, *τῶν τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων*, and c. 4, 985 b 12, *τῶν παθημάτων (τῆς ὑποκειμένης οὐσίας)*: Anal. Post. I 10, 76 b 13, *τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ παθημάτων*, and Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 b 9 *ὅσα φυσικά ἔστι παθήματα*: which certainly seem to be sufficient to justify *παθημάτων* here¹.

¹ [Bonitz (*Aristotelische Studien* V 50, and *Index Aristotelicus*) holds that in Aristotle there is no clear distinction of meaning between *πάθημα* and *πάθος*, "sed eadem fere vi et sensu varietate utrumque nomen, saepius alterum, alterum rarius usurpari." In the Aristotelian writings, *πάθημα* is never found in the sing. except in the spurious *Physiognomonica* 8οβ a 2; the gen. pl. *παθημάτων* occurs 38 times, *παθῶν* only 8. (Note Eth. Eudem. B, 2, 1220 b 6, λεκτέον δὴ κατὰ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πῶι ἄττα ἥθη. Εσται δὲ κατὰ τὸ τὰς δυνάμεις τῶν παθημάτων, καθ' ἃς ὡς παθητικοὶ λέγονται, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἔξεις, καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ταῦτα λέγονται τῷ πάσχειν πῶι ἡ ἀπάθεια εἶναι. μερά ταῦτα η διάρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις (?) τῶν παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἔξεων. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, θυμὸν φόβον αἰδὼ ἐπιθυμίαν.) Bernays, while admitting that the words are often used loosely, draws the following distinction: *πάθος ist der Zustand eines πάσχων und bezeichnet den unerwartet ausbrechenden und vorübergehenden Affect; πάθημα dagegen ist der Zustand eines παθητικοῦ und bezeichnet den Affect also inhäritrend der afficirten Person und als jederzeit zum Ausbruche reif. Kürzer gesagt, πάθος ist der Affect und πάθημα ist die Affection* (Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie, Abhhandl. der hist. phil. Gesellschaft in Breslau, I. pp. 149, 194—6). The distinction is insisted on in a treatise by H. Baumgart, *Pathos und Pathema im Aristotelischen Sprachgebrauch*, Königsberg, 1873, pp. 58.]

ἔχονται οἱ τόποι ἔξειλεγμέναι γὰρ αἱ προτάσεις περὶ ἔκαστον εἰσιν, ὡστ' ἔξ ὅν δεῖ φέρειν τὰ ἐν-^{p. 96.}
 θυμήματα τόπων περὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ κακοῦ, ἢ καλοῦ ἢ
 αἰσχροῦ ἢ δικαίου ἢ ἀδίκου, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἡθῶν καὶ
 παθημάτων καὶ ἔξεων ὠσαύτως εἰλημμένοι ἡμῖν ὑπάρ-
 17 χούσι πρότερον οἱ τόποι. ἔτι δὲ ἄλλον τρόπον καθ-^{p. 1397.}

As to *ἔξεων*, this, through a deviation from the author's usual phraseology, who generally confines himself to *ἡθος* and *πάθη*, appears again in this connexion, II 12 init., *τὰ δὲ ἡθη ποῖοι τινες κατὰ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς ἔξεις κ.τ.λ.* The author there himself tells us his meaning, interpreting *ἔξεις* by *ἀρετὰς καὶ κακίας*; and I can see no reason for condemning the word, as Vahlen does, except the very insufficient one, that it is unusual¹. The *ἔξεις* in this sense, do actually enter into, and in fact constitute the *ἡθος*, and I do not see why they should not be specially mentioned, if Aristotle chose to depart from his ordinary practice, and do so.

So far then we have been occupied with the *εἶδη*, special subjects derived from special sciences, and specially employed each in one of the three departments of Rhetoric—this is generally, not absolutely true; for though the three ends of Rhetoric, the good or useful, the just, and the noble or right, are more appropriate and more serviceable, each in *one* of the three branches, yet any of them can be, and sometimes is, introduced in them all—and we must now turn to the topics, the families, classes, of arguments into which enthymemes in *general* may be made to fall. This is for convenience of practice, that we may know where to look for them when we want them, and apply that which happens to be appropriate to the particular case. This classification is made in the 23rd chapter, which therefore is the *rhetorical* representative of the far more extensive and minute classification of *dialectical* topics, and is the object also of Cicero's *Topica*. And as the treatise on fallacies, the book *περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων*, is appended to the books of the Topics, so we have a similar chapter on rhetorical fallacies (c. 24) added to the analysis of the genuine arguments.

I will here remark (against Vahlen) that the word *καθόλου* § 17, which contrasts these universal *τόποι* with the special topics that have preceded, renders the actual mention of them in the foregoing section almost, if not quite, necessary.

§ 17. ‘Let us now proceed further in another way to take (or find)

¹ I have noticed in many recent German commentators on Aristotle, Brandis being an honourable exception, a disposition to pin down their author to a fixed and particular mode of expression in certain cases from which he is never to be allowed to deviate. Aristotle is the very last writer to whom any such rule should be applied. He is always hasty, often careless; and, as we have seen in so many instances in this work, is very apt to use words in senses either vague and indeterminate, or (properly) inapplicable, or unusual; and his style is loose and careless to a fault, both in construction and expression. He is a writer who more than all others requires a most liberal allowance for irregularities.

όλου περὶ ἀπάντων λάβωμεν, καὶ λέγωμεν παρασημαινόμενοι τοὺς ἐλεγκτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀποδεικτικοὺς καὶ τοὺς τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων, οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἐπεί περ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν. δηλωθέντων δὲ τούτων, περὶ τῶν λύσεων καὶ ἐνστάσεων διορίσωμεν, πόθεν δεῖ πρὸς τὰ ἐνθυμήματα φέρειν.

I. ἔστι δ' εἰς μὲν τόπος τῶν δεικτικῶν ἐκ τῶν ἐναν-

universal topics about every thing (taken promiscuously, that is, from any of the *εἴδη*, and applied indifferently to any of the three branches of Rhetoric), and add a supplementary note upon the refutative and demonstrative (*subaudi tóπους ἐνθυμημάτων*) topics of enthymemes (the contents of c. 23), and those of apparent' (shams, impostors, not genuine), ‘not real, enthymemes; not real, because this is likewise the case with syllogisms (of which enthymemes though mutilated are a copy, and therefore share with the others the fallacious kind)’.

The literal translation of *οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων, ἐπεί περ οὐδὲ συλλογισμῶν* is, “enthymemes not real, because there are also unreal (not-real syllogisms”); *οὐδέ*, neither, being broken up into two parts, of which the *δέ* contrasts *συλλογισμῶν* with *ἐνθυμημάτων*, and the *οὐ* negatives the *genuineness* (und. from the preceding) of the syllogism, not the syllogism itself.

παρασημαινόμενοι] is a very oddly chosen word to express the treatment of chapters 23 and 24, which are just as much connected with the subject of the work, and treated with as much care and detail, as the rest. It means according to Victorius (and Rost and Palm's *Lex.*) *adscribere, adnotare*, applied to something of subordinate interest and importance, or not immediately and closely connected with the subject in hand, as a *note* on the margin of a manuscript; ‘noting beside’ the main subject, a *supplementary note*. This is certainly the meaning of it in Top. A 14, 105 b 16, where it is applied to the ‘noting down’ of the opinions of individual philosophers, ‘beside’, as supplementary to, those which are generally accepted: and also, as Victorius thinks, of *παράσημα* in de Soph. El. 20, 177 b 6—this is not quite so certain: [*ἐν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις παράσημα ποιοῦνται* (signa ponunt ad vocabula distinguenda), *Index Aristotelicus*]. Alexander Aphrodisiensis in his commentary on the former passage adds *παραγράφειν*, apparently as a synonym, or interpretation of the other.

‘And after this has been made clear, let us pass on to the determination of solutions and objections, whence they must be brought, from what sources derived, for the refutation of enthymemes’. Of *λύσις* and its two modes, *ἔλεγχος* and *ἐνστάσις*, the contents of c. 25, see Introd. 268 seq.

CHAP. XXIII.

In an excellent *Review of the study of ancient Rhetoric* [by Spengel], read at the celebration of the eighty-third anniversary of the foundation

of the Munich Academy of Sciences, 1842, a clear account is given of the relation of these *τόποι ἐνθυμητῶν* that follow to the *εἶδη* of the first book, of which I will give a translation with very slight alterations.

To the first of these he gives the name of 'formal', to the second of 'material' proofs. "Formal proofs, such as they appear in Dialectics and Rhetoric, are of an universal nature, and therefore applicable alike to all branches of science; they form the collective Topics, which Aristotle has elaborated for Dialectics with wonderful completeness in the most comprehensive of all the works of his Organon; whilst in Rhetoric, not without reference to the other, he has selected and put forward only what is most essential. Material proofs are with him such as are derived from the principles of the special sciences, the knowledge of which the orator must bring with him, ready for any occasion on which it may be properly applied. Aristotle is by no means of opinion that a mere superficial description, without thorough knowledge of the object to be described, and alien to the true spirit of it, can be called 'rhetorical' with propriety; on the contrary, the orator must be thoroughly imbued with the knowledge of his subject, whatever department of knowledge it may happen to belong to, and from this special science bring with him his concrete proofs, for the purpose of convincing. Accordingly, for forensic pleading the accurate study of law is indispensable, for the deliberative speaking or counselling that of Politics, the science of government, and similarly for each kind the special knowledge which belongs to it. But this special knowledge cannot be obtained from Rhetoric itself, otherwise it would carry in itself all knowledge, which is not the case: the office of Rhetoric is, to work up the proofs which the special science offers, to combine them with the 'formal', and so to bring the subject within the reach of universal comprehension."

On the contents of this chapter, and its connexion with the Topics, Brandis, ap. Schneidewin's *Philologus* [IV i.] p. 18, has the following remarks. "We now turn (c. 23) to the universal points of view (topics) most worthy of attention for the formation or refutation of enthymemes, which are briefly discussed. Before passing to this, Aristotle has already pointed out the connexion which exists between this division of the Rhetoric and the Topics (c. 22 § 10). It is perfectly conceivable however that here also (as before, referring to Rhet. I 7,) what in the Topics has met with a detailed discussion in regard of the various modes of applying them, is here only briefly referred to, and with an exclusive view to the application to be made of them in speaking." He then illustrates this at some length from the two works; but it will be more convenient to leave these details till we come to them in the course of the notes on the topics themselves. [On the Topics, see in general Grote's *Aristotle*, ch. IX.]

Cicero, *Topica*, first gives a summary classification of the various forms of these arguments under their most general heads, III II. These are, *coniugata, ex genere, ex forma, ex similitudine, ex differentia, ex contrario, ex adiunctis, ex antecedentibus, ex consequentibus, ex repugnantibus, ex caussis, ex effectis, ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum,* (the last, *comp. maiorum et minorum*, are the topics of Rhet. I 7,) which are afterwards described in greater detail and illustrated, cc. IX 38—XVIII 71, *Haec ego argumenta, quae transferri in multas causas*

τίων· δεῖ γὰρ σκοπεῖν εἰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον

possunt, locos communes nominamus, de Inv. II 15. 48. Quintilian treats them, Inst. Orat. V 10, 20—94, and sums them up thus, § 94; *Ergo ut breviter contraham summam, ducuntur argumenta a personis, causis, locis, tempore (cuius tres partes diximus, praecedens, coniunctum, insequens), facultatibus (quibus instrumentum subiecimus), modo (id est ut quidque sit factum), finitione, genere, specie, differentibus, propriis, remotione, divisione, initio, incrementis, summa, similibus, dissimilibus, pugnantibus, consequentibus, efficientibus, effectis, eventis, iugatis, comparatione, quae in plures diducitur species. Iugata are Cicero's conjugata, Aristotle's σύντοιχα and ὄμοιαι πτώσεις.*

These arguments can *all* (?) be turned both ways, and applied to prove either the affirmative *διεκτικά, κατασκευαστικά*, constructive, confirmatory; or the negative, *Δεγκτικά*, (23. 30); *ἀνατκενάζειν, ἀναρεῖν*; destructive of the proposition maintained by the theorist (in philosophy), the opponent (in dialectics). Rhetoric *τανατία συλλογίζεται* [I 1. 12]. Of the first, *ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων*, this is expressly stated.

§ 1. One class of demonstrative (or affirmative) enthymemes is derived from *opposites*: we have to consider, namely, whether the opposite (to the one) belongs to (i. e. can be said, or predicated of) the opposite (to the other). Two pairs of opposites are supposed, as in the example, temperance and licentiousness, good, i. e. profitable, and injurious: the question is whether the two opposed terms or things stand in the same relation to one another, i. e. that one can be predicated of the other, as the two first, to which they are opposed: if they can, the original proposition may be maintained, or inferred by the enthymeme; if not, it can be confuted or destroyed. The inference in either case is drawn *ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων*, from the correctness or incorrectness, the truth or falsehood, of the assertion of compatibility or coexistence in the opposites, or that one can be predicated of the other. Thus in the example, if the opposites to the original proposition—temperance is profitable—stand in the same relation to one another as the two members of the first, so that the one can be truly predicated of the other—if the opposite, injurious, is truly predicable of licentiousness—then, so far, we infer the truth of the first: if not, the proposition may be confuted. The inference, like all other rhetorical inferences, is *probable*, not necessary: it can always be contradicted.

Aristotle, as we have already seen (note on c. 19. 1), distinguishes four kinds of *ἀντικείμενα*, or opposites; contradictory, contrary (extremes under the same genus, as here *σωφροσύνη* and *ἀκολασία* are the two extremes, virtue and vice, under the genus *ἥπος*, moral character), relative, and *ἔξις* and *στέρησις*, state and privation. In the Topics all the four kinds in their relation to this form of argument are successively handled; in the Rhetoric, the treatment is confined to the single kind of contraries, as the most useful and plausible, and the rest passed over. See Brandis, u. s., p. 18. The passage in the Topics corresponding to this is B 8, 113 b 27, seq. [Grote's *Ar.* I, chap. IX pp. 422, 3]; but compare also B 2, 109 b 17; on the import and limitations of *ἐναντίον* Ib. c. 7; Γ 6, init. on the great advantages and wide extent of these two first topics, viz. this, and the next,

μητεκαν τὰ σιρὶς προσωπῶν ὑπέκειται.
 ὑπάρχει, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν εἰ μὴ ὑπάρχει, κατασκευάζοντα δὲ εἰ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ὅτι τὸ σωφρονεῖν ἀγαθόν· τὸ γὰρ ἀκολασταίνειν βλαβερόν. ἡ ὡς ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ· εἰ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος αἴτιος τῶν παρόντων κακῶν, μετὰ τῆς εἰρήνης δεῖ ἐπανορθώσασθαι.

εἴ περ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῖς κακῶς δεδρακόσιν
 ἀκουσίως δίκαιον εἰς ὄργὴν πεσεῖν,
 οὐδὲ ἀν ἀναγκασθείσι τις εὑ δράσῃ τινά,
 προσῆκόν ἔστι τῷδ' ὀφείλεσθαι χάριν.

ἀλλ' εἴ περ ἔστιν ἐν βροτοῖς ψευδηγορεῖν
 πιθανά, νομίζειν χρή σε καὶ τούναντίον,
 ἀπισττ ἀληθῆ πολλὰ συμβαίνειν βροτοῖς.

τῶν συστοίχων καὶ τῶν πτώσεων. ὅμοιος γὰρ ἔνδοξον τὸ ἀξιῶσαι, εἰ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ λύπην πᾶσαν εἶναι κακόν κ.τ.λ. followed by a series of illustrations: also B 9, 114 b 6. The treatment of opposites in the Topics and Rhetoric corresponds in this, that in both works it has reference solely to the art of reasoning, to the inferences affirmative or negative that may be drawn by constructive, or refutative, syllogisms and enthymemes.

Cicero (who borrows a good deal from Aristotle), Topic. xi. 47, *Deinceps locus est, qui a contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum eorum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt* (Arist.), *ut sapientia et stultitia... Haec quae ex eodem genere contraria sunt appellantur adversa.* His instance is, *si stultitiam fugimus, sapientiam sequamur* (this in the Aristotelian form would be, If folly is to be shunned, wisdom is to be sought or pursued). He then goes through the three remaining kinds of *contraria*, following Aristotle.

Ex contrariis, Frugalitas bonum, luxuria enim malum (enthym.). *Si malorum causa bellum est, erit emendatio pax: si veniam meretur qui imprudens nocuit, non meretur praemium qui imprudens profuit.* Quint. v 10. 73. In the last example, the opposites are, excuse, indulgence (for a fault), and reward (for a service), injury and benefit: the merit or *desert* is common to both: only in the one case it takes the form of demerit, which *deserves* punishment: as is also the absence of purpose, of good or ill intention.

ἀναιρεῖν, ‘to take up’, passes on to the sense of removing, taking away; thence to *taking off*, destroying; and so finally, when it comes to logic, is applied to the argument which upsets, subverts, destroys, or refutes the adversary’s argument or position.

‘Or (a second example) as it is in the Messeniac speech (of Alcidamas, on which see note on I 13. 2), “for if it is the war which is the cause of the present evils, it is by the peace (which I now propose) that they must be rectified.” *συμβούλευει ὁ Ἀλκιδάμας τοῖς Δακεδαιμονίοις μὴ καταδουλῶσαι τοὺς ἐν Μεσσηνῇ, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐναντίου.* Εἰ γὰρ ὁ

2 ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων πτώσεων ὁμοίως γὰρ δεῖ υπάρ-

πόλεμος, φησί, προυξένησε τάδε τὰ κακά, εἰρήνη πάλιν ταῦτα ἐπανορθώσεται (Scholiast). ‘Verba ipsa Alcidamantis scholiastes videtur conservasse.’ Sauppe ad Alcid. Fragn. Messen. 2. *Oratores Attici*, III 154. Quintilian has borrowed this, see above [middle of p. 239].

“The four lines which follow as a third example are of uncertain authorship : Gaisford attributes them either to Agathon or Theodectes : the enthymeme *ex contrario* that it contains would suit either of them, since they both cultivated Rhetoric as well as the dramatic art (Wagner *Trag. Gr. Fragn.* III 185). To avoid the conjunction of *εἰ* and *οὐ*, Elmsley, ad Med. 87, proposes *ἔτει*. Reisig, *Coniect.* I p. 113 (ap. Pflugk), justly replies that *εἴπερ* is equivalent to *ἔτει*, and therefore admits the same construction. On *εἰ* with *ἄν* and the optative, see Appendix (on II 20 § 5) at the end of this book ; and on *εἰ* followed by *οὐ*, see Appendix C, Vol. I p. 301. For *οὐδὲ* *ἄν*, Wagner proposes either *ἢν* or *ἄν*.

Cicero, de Inv. I xxx 46, has adopted this : *In contrariis hoc modo; nam si iis qui imprudentes laeserunt ignosci convenit, iis qui necessario profuerunt haberi gratiam non oportet*, and Quintilian, V 10. 73, (above).

The second quotation (example 4), is from Euripides' Thyestes, Fragn. VII (Wagner). This we learn from the Scholiast, quoted in Wagner's note. Matthiae refers to the similar paradox in Agathon's couplet, Rhet. II 24. 10.

§ 2. Top. II. ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων, πτώσεων] On *πτώσεις* and *σύστοιχα*, see note on I 7. 27. *πτώσις* “grammatische abbiegung,” Brandis [*Philol.* IV i]. ‘Another (inference may be drawn) from similar inflexions ; for the inflected words (or, the inflexions of the word) must be capable of similar predication, (for instance from *δίκη* by inflexion, or variation of termination, are formed the *πτώσεις*, *δίκαιος*, *δίκαιως*—as well as the grammatical cases, *inflection and declension*, and if *δίκαιον* can be predicated of anything, then *δίκαιως* must be predicable of the same). We may therefore argue, says the example, ‘that justice is not all good’, taking the negative side, *μη̄ ὑπάρχειν*, good is not universally predicable of justice ; otherwise good would be predicable of the *πτώσις*, *δίκαιως*, which is not true in all cases ; ‘for all good is *αἰρέτων*, an object of choice ; but a just punishment, or to be *justly* punished, everybody would allow not to be desirable’. This is an application of the topic to its negative, destructive, or refutative use : the inference is that the rule laid down is not true. Compare with this example, I 9. 15, where the same distinction is made : although *τὰ δίκαια* and *δίκαιως* *ἔργα* are similarly predicable, yet this is not the case with the *πάθη* : *ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ* (this is therefore an exceptional case to which the ordinary rule of *ὁμοιαι πτώσεις* does not apply) *ταύτη τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ δεῖ τὸ δίκαιως καλόν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦσθαι αἰσχρὸν τὸ δίκαιος μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως*.

Brandis u. s. notes on this topic another difference which shews itself between the Topics and the Rhetoric, that whereas in the former the *σύστοιχα* are usually (not always) added to the *πτώσεις* in the treatment of it, they are here omitted, and the grammatical form of co-ordinates alone taken into account.

χειν ἥ μὴ υπάρχειν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον οὐ πᾶν ἀγαθόν· καὶ γὰρ ἀν τὸ δικαίως, νῦν δὲ οὐχ αἰρετὸν τὸ δικαίως ἀποθανεῖν. ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα· εἰ γὰρ θατέρω υπάρχει τὸ καλῶς ἥ δικαίως ποιῆσαι, θατέρω τὸ πεπονθέναι, καὶ εἰ κελεῦσαι, καὶ τὸ πε-

The use of the topic as a dialectical argument is abundantly illustrated in the Topics, in very many places, as may be seen by consulting Waitz's Index ad Organon, s. v. The principal passage on the subject is Top. B 9,—where the *πτώσεις*, the grammatical co-ordinates, are properly subordinated to the more extensive *σύνστοιχα*, things which are logically co-ordinate, 114 b 34. The latter are exemplified by *δικαιοσύνη*, *δίκαιος*, *δίκαιον*, *δικαίως*. Compare A 15, 106 b 29, on the application of them to ambiguous terms, *πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα*, also Γ 3, 118 a 34; Δ 3, 124 a 10, and the rest, which indicate their various applications¹.

Cicero, Top. IV 12, comp. IX 38, illustrates *coniugata*, which is his name for Ar.'s *πτώσεις*, by *sapiens*, *sapienter*, *sapientia*; and the argument from it by, *Si compascuus ager est, iūs est compascere*. *Haec verborum coniugatio*, he says, *συγνυγία dicitur*: on which Spengel (*Specim. Comm. in Ar. Lib. II 23*, Heidelb. 1844) remarks, “Non Aristotelem qui semper συντοιχίαν dicit, sed posteriores, in primis Stoicos, intelligit.” In de Or. II 40, 167, they are called *coniuncta*.

Quintilian, who treats the topic with some contempt as hardly deserving of notice, has, Inst. Orat. v 10. 85, *His illud adiicere ridiculum putarem, nisi eo Cicero uteretur, quod coniugatum vocant: ut, Eos, qui rem iustum faciant iuste facere, quod certe non eget probatione; Quod compascuum est compascere licere* (from Cicero).

§ 3. Top. III. ἐπ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα] The argument, from mutual relation of terms or notions. This is treated, Top. B 8, 114 a 13, under the head of oppositions or opposites, ἀντιθέσεις, or ἀντικείμενα, of which it is one of the four varieties. For example, inferences may be drawn from double to half, and *vice versa*, from triple to multiple and the converse; from knowing or knowledge ἔπιστήμη, to the thing known τὸ ἔπιστητόν; from sight as a sensation, to the thing seen as an object of sense. The logical objections, ἔνοτάσεις, that may be brought against it are also given [Grote's *Aristotle I*. pp. 423, 424].

“Latina schola vocat *relata*. Talia sunt ista: facere pati; emere vendere; dare accipere; locare conducere: et nomina ista; pater filius; dominus servus; discipulus magister.” Schrader. He also cites as an example, Cic. Orat. XLI 142, *Sin ea non modo eos ornat penes quos est, sed etiam universam rem publicam, cur aut discere turpe quod scire*

¹ If I am not mistaken ὄμοιαι *πτώσεις* is a misnomer. If *πτώσεις* are the various inflexions—declensions in an extended sense—of a root-word, the term must be confined to the changes of the terminations: in these appears, not similarity, but difference: the similarity lies, not in the terminations, but in the idea or root common to all the varieties: ‘similar’ therefore, though it may very well be predicated of the *σύνστοιχα*, is not properly applied to *πτώσεις*.

ποιηκέναι, οἷον ὡς ὁ τελώνης Διομέδων περὶ τῶν τελῶν “εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν τὸ πωλεῖν, οὐδὲ ἡμῖν τὸ ὀνεῖσθαι.” καὶ εἰ τῷ πεπονθότι τὸ καλῶς ἡ δικαίως ὑπάρχει, καὶ τῷ ποιήσαντι, καὶ εἰ τῷ ποιήσαντι, καὶ τῷ πεπονθότι. ἔστι δὲ ἐν τούτῳ παρα- p. 97.
λογίσασθαι· εἰ γὰρ δικαίως ἐπαθέν τι, δικαίως πέπονθεν, ἀλλ’ ἵσως οὐχ ὑπὸ σοῦ. διὸ δεῖ σκοπεῖν χωρὶς εἰ ἄξιος ὁ παθὼν παθεῖν καὶ ὁ ποιῆσας ποιῆσαι, εἴτα P. 1397.

honestum est, aut quod nosse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum docere: a good illustration of the argument from relatives.

This topic has occurred before, II 19. 12, as one of the topics of ‘the possible’: where the parallel passages of Cic. Topic. XI 49, and de Inv. I 30. 47, will be found in the note. On the same, Quintilian, Inst. Or. V 10. 78, *Illa quoque quae ex rebus mutuam confirmationem praestantibus ducuntur (quae proprii generis videri quidam volunt, et vocant ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα, Cicero ex rebus sub eandem rationem venientibus) fortiter consequentibus iuxterim* (I should be bold to add to *consequents*): *si portorium Rhodiis locare honestum est et Hermocreonti conducere; et quod discere honestum, et docere* (from de Inventione, u. s.). The argument is, ‘If it may be said of one (of the two terms of the relation) that he has *done* rightly or justly, then the same terms may be applied to what the other has *suffered* (*ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν*, agent and patient, are relative opposites¹); and similarly (*κελεύειν* is relative to *πειθεῖσθαι*) command implies obedience, and the converse (this may be *inferred* as the ordinary, probable, not a necessary consequence): as Diomedon the tax-collector argued about the taxes (i. e. the *farming* of them) “If it is no disgrace to you to *sell*, neither is it to us to *buy*.”

οἷον ὡς] This pleonasm occurs again in § 6, οἷον ὡς Ἱφικράτης.

Of Diomedon, nothing is known but what we learn from the passage.

‘And if the terms fairly or justly can be applied to the sufferer, then also to the doer (or perpetrator) of the act; and conversely, if to the doer then also to the sufferer’. If there be any difference between this and the preceding, *εἰ γὰρ θατέρω—πεπονθέναι*, it is that the first is the general expression of the relation between agent and patient, the second is a particular exemplification of it, in the justification of what would otherwise be a crime.

‘But this admits of a fallacy: for though it may be true (in general, or in itself) that deserved suffering involves the justice of the punish-

¹ The relation of *ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν*, agent and patient, action and passion, is well illustrated in the argument between Polus and Socrates, Plat. Gorg. c. 32, 476 B, seq. It is there shewn by analogy—the usual Socratic and Platonic method—that the relation between the two prevails throughout its various applications, and therefore that crime and punishment follow the same law, and that justice or desert in the punishment of the criminal or patient implies the like justice in the infliction of it by the agent, and *vice versa*.

χρῆσθαι ὅποτέρως ἀρμόττει· ἐνίστε γὰρ διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει, ὡσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλκμαιῶνι τῷ Θεοδέκτου *After the justice of the sufferer is done, not hinder the doer from being wrong*

μητέρα δὲ τὴν σὴν οὐ τις ἐστύγει βροτῶν;

ment, yet perhaps (it does not always follow that) *you* should be the agent of it, that the punishment should be inflicted by *you* (any particular individual). This fallacy is actually illustrated from Theodectes' Orestes, *infra* c. 24 § 3. The argument is used by Orestes in his trial for the murder of his mother Clytemnestra. In the trial scene of the Eumenides this point is taken into consideration, and the act of Orestes justified by Apollo and Athena on the general ground of the superiority of male to female; the father, the author of his existence, has a higher claim upon the son's affection and duty than the mother, and Orestes was right in avenging his father's death even upon her. Aesch. Eumen. 625 seq., 657 seq., 738-40. Comp. Eur. Orest. 528, where Tyndareus, Clytemnestra's father, says, *Θυγατὴρ δὲ μηδὲ θανοῦσ' ἔπραξεν ἔνδικα· ἀλλ' οὐχὶ πρὸς τοῦδε εἰκὸς ήν αὐτὴν θανεῖν*: and Orestes, *i.b.* 546, defends himself on the same grounds as in Aeschylus, *ἔγώ δὲ ἀνόσιος εἰμι μητέρα κτανών, ὅσιος δέ γ' ἔτερον ὄνομα, τιμωρῶν πατρί*. 552, *πατὴρ μὲν ἔφύτευσεν με κ.τ.λ.* 562, *ἐπὶ δὲ ζεύσα μητέρα, ἀνόσια μὲν δρῶν ἀλλὰ τιμωρῶν πατρί*. Electr. 1244, (quoted by Victorius on *φησὶ δὲ ἀποκρινόμενος—κτανεῖν*.) the Dioscuri to Orestes, *δίκαια μέν ννν ηδὲ ἔχει· σὺ δὲ οὐχὶ δρᾶς*. The case of Orestes and Clytemnestra became one of the stock examples in the rhetorical books. Auct. ad Heren. I 10.17, I 15.25, 16.26. Cic. de Inv. I 13. 18, 22. 31. Quint. Inst. Or. III 11. 4, and II seq., VII 4. 8.

'And therefore a separate investigation is required, not only whether the sufferer deserved to suffer, but also whether the doer had a right to do it (as, to inflict the punishment), and then make the appropriate use of either: because sometimes there is a difference in cases of this kind (i. e. both kinds of right are not always found together: the punishment may be just, but *you* may not be the proper person to inflict it), and there is nothing to prevent (the case being) as it is put in Theodectes' Alcmaeon (where this 'division', *διαλαβόντα*, is actually made): "And did no mortal abhor thy mother?" This is a question put to Alcmaeon, probably by Alphesiboea (Victorius), whose reply includes the words actually quoted, *ἀλλὰ διαλαβόντα χρὴ σκοπεῖν*, with, of course, a good deal more about the murder which is omitted. 'To which (Alcmaeon) says in reply "nay but we must first distinguish, and *then* consider the case." (The *division* or *distinction* here spoken of is well illustrated by the parallel passage, the case of Orestes, II 24. 3.) 'And when Alphesiboea asks "How?", he replies, "To her they adjudged death, (i. e. decided that she was justly slain,) but (decided also) that *I* should not have been the murderer." From this reply it may be gathered that the judges in Theodectes' play had made the requisite distinction: the death of Eriphyle they agreed was deserved, but it was not for her son to inflict the penalty. "Alcmaeon Eriphylen matrem suam interfecrat, quod haec Amphiarai mariti salutem prodiderat" (Alcmaeon's act, like that of

φησὶ δ' ἀποκρινόμενος

ἀλλὰ διαλαβόντα χρὴ σκοπεῦν·

έρομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀλφεσιβοίας πῶς, ὑπολαβών φησι

τὴν μὲν θανεῖν ἔκριναν, ἐμὲ δὲ μὴ κτανεῖν.

καὶ οἷον ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη καὶ τῶν ἀποκτεινάντων Νικάνορα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ δικαίως ἔκριθσαν ἀποκτεῖναι,

Orestes, was justified by the implied murder of his father—the treachery which caused his death). “Alphesiboea fuit Alcmaeonis uxor.” Schrader. This fragment is quoted by Wagner, Theodect. Fragm. Alcm. I, but without a word of commentary, III 118.

On Theodectes of Phaselis, the rhetorician and dramatic poet, the friend of Aristotle, who frequently refers to his compositions in both kinds, and on the rhetorical character of his writings, which is well illustrated here and in II 24. 3, see Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* ch. XXVI § 7, who refers to these passages. Also, *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX Vol. III p. 260 seq.¹ To the passages there quoted on this author, add Theopomp. *Hist. Phil. Lib. I, Fr. 26, ap. Fragm. Hist. Gr.* (Didot) p. 282; and a ref. to his *Philoctetes*, *Eth. Nic.* VII 8, 1150 b 9.

Two other examples follow, but, as Spengel (*Tract on the Rhet.* in *Trans. Bav. Acad.*, Munich 1851, p. 46) justly says, they have no connexion with the preceding example from Theodectes, and the division which it exemplifies, but are illustrations of the general topic. Retaining the text (with Bekker) as it stands, we must accordingly understand the words *ἔστι δ' ἐν τούτῳ—μὴ κτανεῖν* as parenthetical, and suppose that the author, after the insertion of this as a *note*, proceeds with his exemplification of the general topic. Spengel, u. s., p. 47, suggests that they may have been a later addition by the author himself, a note written on the margin, which has got out of its place. My supposition, of a note, *not* written on the margin, but embodied in the text as a parenthesis—which is quite in Ar.’s manner—will answer the purpose equally well, and save the text in addition.

‘And, another example, the trial of Demosthenes and those who slew Nicanor; for as they were adjudged to have slain him justly (the act), it was held that his death (the passion or suffering) was just’. This is cited by Dion. Halicarn., Ep. I ad Amm. c. 12, as a proof that Aristotle was acquainted with and quoted the speeches of Demosthenes, referring it to the case (against Aeschines) for the Crown. In doing so he omits *περὶ*. Of course *ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη* cannot have this meaning: and it is most probable that it is not the Orator that is here referred to, but Thucydides’ general, or some other person of the name.

¹ The unwarrantable identification, there supposed, p. 261, of the Theodectea with the ‘Ρητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον, has been sufficiently corrected in Introd. to *Rhet.* pp. 55—67, on the Theodectea; where more information will be found about the author and his works.

δικαίως ἔδοξεν ἀποθανεῖν. καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος, περὶ οὐ ἐκέλευσε κρῖναι εἰ δίκαιος ἢν ἀποθανεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἄδικον ὃν τὸ ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν δικαίως ἀπο-

Neither is anything known of Nicanor and his murderers. On the use of Demosthenes' name in the Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 46, note 2.

'And again, the case of him that died at Thebes; concerning whom he (the spokesman of the defendants) bade them (the judges) decide whether he (the murdered man) deserved death, since there was no injustice in putting to death one that deserved it'. "In hanc quoque historiam nunquam incidi." Victorius. Buhle rightly refers it to the case of Euphron, introduced as an episode, and described at length by Xenophon, Hellen. VII 3. There had been one of the usual quarrels between the aristocratical (*οἱ βέλτιστοι*) and the popular party at Sicyon, of which Euphron took advantage, with the design of making himself master of the city. But knowing that as long as the Thebans occupied the acropolis he had no chance of success, he collected a large sum of money and went to Thebes with the intention of bribing the Thebans to assist him. Some Sicyonian exiles learning this, followed him to Thebes and murdered him in the acropolis. Here the murderers were brought to trial before the magistrates and council, who were already there assembled. The accusation of the magistrates, and the speech for the defence, are both recorded. All the accused with one exception asserted their innocence: one alone admitted the fact, and in justification of it pleaded for himself and the rest the guilt of the man that had been slain, just as Aristotle here describes it. *Οἱ μὲν οὖν Θηβαῖοι τάντα ἀκούσαντες ἔγνωσαν δίκαια τὸν Εὔφρονα πέπονθέντα.* But the Sicyonians (*οἱ πολῖται*), interpreting the word 'good' in the sense of good to them (*τὸν εὐεργέτας ἔαντάν*), said he was a *good* man, and buried him in the market-place, and adore him as the (second) founder of their city (*ὡς ἀρχηγέτην*), like Brasidas at Amphipolis (Thuc. V. II).

The whole of this section, with the exception of the last example, *καὶ περὶ τοῦ Θήβησιν ἀποθανόντος*, is quoted by Dionysius l. c. in support of his view that Demosthenes' speeches had been delivered before the composition of the Rhetoric, and were accessible to its author. The difference between the text which he seems to have used and that now received is very great, and apparently unaccountable. Besides minor discrepancies, the entire quotation from Theodectes, *ἐνιότε γὰρ—κτανεῖν* is omitted; and the clauses preceding and following stand thus, *ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο παραλογίσασθαι. οὐ γὰρ εἰ δικαίως ἔπαθεν οὐν, καὶ δικαίως ὑπὸ τούτου πέπονθεν, ὡς ὁ φόνου ἄξια ποιῆσας πατήρ, εἰ ὑπὸ τοῦ ιοῦ τοῦ ἔαντού τὴν ἐπὶ θανάτῳ ἀπάγεται, δεῖ σκοπεῖν χωρὶς.....όποτέρως ἢν ἀμβότητι. ἐνότε γὰρ διαφωνεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ἀλκμαίωνι τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, καὶ οἷον ἡ περὶ Δημοσθένους δίκη κ.τ.λ.* All the alterations seem to be for the worse, and in one of them, *ἔπαθεν* ἢν for *ἔπαθεν τι*, the grammatical blunder betrays corruption. The additional example of the father and son introduced by Dionysius is, as Spengel observes, not here in point. The very example for the sake of which the extract was made is mutilated, and the explanation, *ἐπεὶ γὰρ—ἀποθανεῖν*, omitted: from which Spengel very justly argues that it could

4 θανόντα. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥπτου, οἷον “εἰ μηδὲ οἱ θεοὶ πάντα ἴσασι, σχολῆ γε οἱ ἀνθρωποί.”

not have been in the MS that he used : if he had read it there, he could not have so absurdly misapplied the example to the case for the Crown: Spengel has reviewed the two passages in connexion in the tract above cited, pp. 44—47. Our text, which is, when properly explained, perfectly consistent and intelligible, is retained by Bekker and seems to require no alteration : at all events none of Dionysius' variations could be advantageously introduced.

§ 4. Top. IV. The argument from greater to less—from that which is more to be expected to that which is less (Brandis)—and the converse ; Top. B 10, 114 b 37 seq. To which is subjoined, § 5, εἰ μήτε μᾶλλον μήτε ἥπτου, where two things are compared which are equally likely or probable, and accordingly the one may be inferred from the other : of this there are three cases, ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ἡ δοκεῖν ὑπάρχειν τριχῶς. Top. Ib. 115 a 15. Of the first there are four varieties : according as (1) the more or less is predicated of the *same* object—if pleasure is good, then the greater the pleasure the greater the good; and if wrong-doing is bad, the greater the wrong the worse; the *fact* is to be ascertained by induction—or (2) when one of two things is predicated (in the way of comparison), if that of which it is more likely to be predicated is without it (any property or quality), the same may be inferred of the less likely ; or conversely, if the less likely has it, *a fortiori* the more likely : or (3) (the reverse of the preceding) when two things are predicated of one, if the more likely is not there, we may infer that the less likely will not, or if the less likely be found there, that the more likely will also : (4) when two things are predicated of two others, if that which is more likely is wanting to the one, the less likely will surely be wanting to the other ; or, conversely, if that which is less likely to be present to the one is there, the other will be sure to have that which is more likely [Grote's *Ar.* I. p. 425]. These nice distinctions, though appropriate to Dialectics, are unnecessary in Rhetoric, and are therefore here omitted ; but the examples will suggest the proper use of the topic. The inference in all these cases is plain and will be acknowledged by the audience, and that is all that is required.

The inference from greater to less, or from more to less likely or probable, is commonly called the *argumentum a fortiori*; the rule *omne maius continet in se minus* may also be referred to the same principle, though the two are not absolutely coextensive.

Cic. Topic. III 11, *Alia (ducuntur argumenta) ex comparatione maiorum aut parium aut minorum.* This is well exemplified in IV 23. XVIII 68, *Reliquis est comparationis locus cuius...nunc explicanda tractatio est. Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntur: in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectio.* These four modes of application are clearly explained and illustrated in the following sections, 69—71.

De Orat. II 40. 172, *Maiora autem et minora et paria comparabimus sic: ex maiore; si bona existimatio divitiae praestat et pecunia tanto opere expetitur, quanto gloria magis est expetenda: ex minore; Hic*

τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν, εἰ ὁ μᾶλλον ἀν ὑπάρχοι μὴ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ ὁ ἡττον. τὸ δὲ ὅτι τοὺς πλησίου τύπτει ὡς γε καὶ τὸν πατέρα, ἐκ τοῦ, εἰ τὸ ἡττον ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει, καθ' ὅπότερον ἀν 5 δέη δεῖξαι, εἴθε ὅτι ὑπάρχει εἴθε ὅτι οὐ. ἔτι εἰ μήτε

parvae consuetudinis causa huius mortem fert tam familiariter; Quid si ipse amasset? quid hic mihi faciet patri? (Terent. Andr. I I. 83): ex pari sic; est eiusdem et eripere et contra rem publicam largiri pecunias.

De Inv. I 28.41, II 17.55, de Orat. Part. II 7, ult. Quint. v 10. 86—93, Apposita vel comparativa dicuntur quae maiora ex minoribus, minora ex maioribus, paria ex paribus probant. These are applied, subdivided, and illustrated through the remaining sections.

Another from the more or less, as for instance, "if not even the gods are omniscient, surely men can hardly be supposed to be so:" for that is as much as to say, if that to which something is more likely to belong wants it, plainly that which is less likely must want it too. Again (the argument) that a man who was capable of striking his father would also strike his neighbours, follows (is derived from) the (general rule or principle), that the less involves or implies the (possible existence, or capacity, *δύναμις*, of the) greater; in whichever way we are required to argue (the inference is required to be drawn), whether the affirmative or the negative'. This last example, as an exemplification of the inference from less to greater, has been looked upon as an error, and various corrections have been proposed, as by Vater, and Spengel in *Specim. Comm. ad Ar. Rhet. II c. 23*, p. 12, 1844. The latter has subsequently altered his opinion, and in 1851 (*Trans. of Bav. Acad.* p. 58) he admits that the explanation suggested by Victorius, and adopted by Muretus, Majoragius, and others, is sufficient to support the text; which, as usual, is retained by Bekker. No doubt, according to the ordinary interpretation of *μᾶλλον* and *ἡττον* in one of these comparisons, where the greater and less are referred to the *magnitude* and *importance* of the crime, the argument is *ἐκ τοῦ μᾶλλον, ex maiore ad minus*: the man who would strike his father (the greater) would *a fortiori* strike an ordinary acquaintance. But Ar. has here departed from this usual application of the topic, and makes the comparison in respect of the *frequency* of the crime: as it is less usual to strike one's father than one's neighbour, a man that could be guilty of the former, is much *more likely* to commit the latter and lesser offence: and the inference is from the less to the greater *in this sense*. "Aristoteles, cum boni viri officium sit nemini vim afferre, cumque iniuria ab omni abesse debeat, si tamen ibi manet ubi minus esse debebat, illuc etiam existet ubi frequentius esse consuevit: et haec causa est cur εἰ τὸ ἡττον ὑπάρχει appellari, *a minore*que eam significari voluerit." Victorius.

On the double reading of MS A^o, see Spengel, *Trans. of Bav. Acad.* 1851 p. 57 [and to the same effect in Spengel's ed., 1867; "in A post δέη δεῖξαι haec sententia alia ratione verbis τύπτει ὅτι...δεῖ δεῖξαι explicatur...duplicem sententiae formam iuxta positam melius perspiciemus:

μᾶλλον μήτε ἡττον· ὅθεν εἴρηται
 καὶ σὸς μὲν οἰκτρὸς παιδας ἀπολέστας πατήρ·
 Οἰνεὺς δ' ἄρ' οὐχὶ κλεινὸν ἀπολέστας γόνον;
 καὶ ὅτι, εἰ μηδὲ Θησεὺς ἡδίκησεν, οὐδὲ Ἀλέξανδρος,
 καὶ εἰ μηδὲ οἱ Τυνδαρίδαι, οὐδὲ Ἀλέξανδρος, καὶ εἰ
 τὸ δ' ὅτι τοὺς πλησίους τύπτει ὃς γε καὶ τὸν πατέρα
 τύπτει ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ τὸ ἡττον ὑπάρχει, καὶ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ
 μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει· τοὺς γάρ πατέρας
 ἡττον τύπτουσιν ἢ τοὺς πλησίουν. ἢ
 δὴ οὕτως ἡ εἰ φῶ μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει, μὴ
 ὑπάρχει, ἡ φῶ ἡττον εἰ ὑπάρχει ὄπότε-
 ρου δεῖ δεῖξαι·
 εἴθ' ὅτι ὑπάρχει εἴθ' ὅτι οὖ?]

On these Aristotelian διττογραφίαι, see Torstrik, Praef. ad de Anima, p. xxi, seq.

§ 5. The second branch of these inferences from comparison, is that of parallel cases. This is the argument from analogy, the foundation of induction, the observation of resemblances in things diverse, leading to the establishment of a general rule: the Socratic and Platonic Method: comp. c. 20. 4, note. *Ex pari*, Cic. de Inv. I 30. 47, *ut locus in mari sine portu navibus esse non potest tatus, sic animus sine fide stabilis amicis non potest esse*. On the argument from analogy in general, see note on c. 19. 2.

'Again if the comparison is not of greater and less, (but of things equal or parallel): whence the saying, "Thy father too is to be pitied for the loss of his children. And is not Oeneus then, for the loss of his illustrious offspring?" ἀρα marks the inference. "Par infortunium parem misericordiam meretur." Schrader. The verses are supposed (by Victorius, Welcker, *Trag. Gr.* p. 1012, and Wagner, *Fr. Trag. Gr.* III 185) to be taken from Antiphon's Meleager, which is quoted again § 20, and at II 2. 19. (Antiphon, a Tragic Poet contemporary with the Elder Dionysius, Rhet. II 6. 19, Clinton *F. H.* Vol. II. Praef. XXXIII, flourished at the end of the fifth cent. B. C. Compare note on II 2. 19.)

The first of the two verses—if the story is that of Meleager—refers to the death of the two sons of Theseus, Toxeus and Plexippus, by the hand of their nephew Meleager: Oeneus was the father of Meleager, whom he too had now lost. The words are those of some one who is consoling Althea, Oeneus' wife, and perhaps belong (says Victorius) to Oeneus himself. The meaning then would be, (Oeneus to his wife,) You speak of the losses of your father whose sons are slain—are not mine as great as his, in the loss of my famous son Meleager? and do we not therefore equally deserve pity? The story is told in Diod. Sic. IV 34 (Schrader), and Ov. Met. VIII. See 86, 87, *An felix Oeneus nato victore fruetur, Theseus orbus erit? melius lugebitis ambo.*

The conduct of Alexander or Paris in the abduction of Helen is next justified by the *parallel case* of Theseus; who did the same; Isocr.

Πάτροκλον "Εκτωρ, καὶ Ἀχιλλέα Ἀλέξανδρος. καὶ εἰ μηδ' οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνῖται φαῦλοι, οὐδὲ οἱ φιλόστοφοι. καὶ εἰ μηδ' οἱ στρατηγοὶ φαῦλοι ὅτι ἡττῶνται πολλάκις, οὐδὲ οἱ σοφισταί. καὶ ὅτι "εἰ δεῖ τὸν ἴδιώτην τῆς ὑμετέρας δόξης ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ὑμᾶς τῆς τῶν 6 Ἐλλήνων." ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ τὸν χρόνον σκοπεῖν, οἶον

Helen. §§ 18—20; and every one—and more especially an Athenian audience—must allow that he was a good man and could do no wrong (*οὐκ ἡδίκησεν*); and of the Tyndaridae, Castor and Pollux, who carried off the two daughters of Leucippus, Phoebe and Eleaera (or Hilaira, Propert. Γ 2. 15), Ov. Fast. v 699, Theocr. Id. xxii 137, and these were demigods; and if Hector is not blamed for the death of Patroclus, neither should Paris be censured for that of Achilles. This is from some *ἔγκωμιον* or *ἀπολογία Ἀλεξάνδρου*, of an unknown rhetorician, similar to Isocrates' Helen. It is referred to again, § 8, and 24 §§ 7, 9.

"And if no other artists (professors of any art or science) are mean or contemptible, neither are philosophers: and if generals are not to be held cheap because they are often defeated, neither are the sophists (when their sophistical dialectics are at fault). From some speech in defence of philosophy, and of the Sophists.

The following is an argument, urged by an Athenian orator upon the general assembly, from the analogy of the relation of a private citizen to the state of which he is a member, to that of the same state as an individual member of the great community of the entire Greek race to the whole of which it is a part: if it be the duty of an individual Athenian to pay attention to, to *study*, the glory of his own country, then it is the duty of you, the collective Athenians whose representatives I am now addressing, to study in like manner the glory of the entire Greek community. Or it might be used by the *epideictic* orator in a Panegyric (*πανηγυρικός λόγος*, delivered in a *πανήγυρις*), pleading, like Isocrates, for the united action of the Greeks against the Barbarian.

§ 6. Top. v. The consideration of time. This kind of argument, though important in Rhetoric, is inappropriate in Dialectics, and therefore receives only a passing notice in the Topics, B 4, III b 24, *ὅτι ἐπὶ τὸν χρόνον ἐπιβλέπειν, εἴ πον διαφωνεῖ*, where the word *ἐπιβλέπειν* shews that it is a mere passing glance, a cursory observation, that it requires: and in Cicero's Topics it is altogether omitted [Grote's *Ar.* I p. 418]. The application of it in Top. B 11, II 5 b 11, referred to by Brandis, is different, and indeed unsuited to rhetorical purposes.

On this topic of time, and its importance in Rhetoric, Quintilian, Inst. Orat. v 10. 42 seq., after a preliminary division of time into (1) general (now, formerly, hereafter,) and (2) special or particular time, proceeds, *Quorum utrorumque ratio et in consiliis* (genus deliberativum) *quidem, et in illo demonstrativo* (*τῷ ἐπιδεικτικῷ γένει*) *genere versatur; sed in iudiciis frequentissima est. Nam et iuris quaestiones facit, et qualitatem distinguat, et ad coniecturam plurimum confert* (contributes very greatly to the establishment of the fact—the *status conjecturalis* or *issue of fact*—

ως Ἰφικράτης ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀρμόδιον, ὅτι “εἰ πρὶν p. 98.
ποιῆσαι ἡξίουν τῆς εἰκόνος τυχεῖν ἐὰν ποιήσω, ἔδοτε
ἄν ποιήσαντι δ’ ἄρ’ οὐ δώσετε; μὴ τοίνυν μέλλοντες

and especially to the refutation of the assertion of an alleged fact : this is illustrated by the cases following); *ut quum interim probationes inexpugnabiles afferat, quales sunt, si dicatur (ut supra posui) signator, qui ante diem tabularum decessit: aut commisisse aliquid, vel quum infans esset, vel quum omnino natus non esset.* Further, §§ 45–48, arguments may be readily drawn *ex iis quae ante rem facta sunt, aut ex coniunctis rei, aut insequentibus*, or from time past, present (*instans*), and future : and these three are then illustrated. Inferences may be drawn from what is past or present, to the future, from cause to effect ; and conversely from present to past, from effect to cause. It seems that the two principal modes of applying the topic of time to Rhetoric are (1) that described by Quintilian, in establishing, or, more frequently, refuting the assertion of a fact, which is the chief use that is made of it in the forensic branch—this is again referred to, II 24. 11, on which see Introd. p. 274—the consideration of probabilities of time in matters of fact : and (2) the καιρός, the right time, the appropriate occasion, which may be employed by the deliberative orator or politician in estimating the expediency, immediate or prospective, of an act or course of policy; and by the panegyrist to enhance the value and importance of any action of his hero, or of anything else which may be the object of his encomium. On this use of καιρός comp. I 7. 32, I 9. 38, and the notes. For illustrations, see Top. Γ 2, 117 a 26—b 2.

‘Another from the consideration of time, as Iphicrates said in the case (*subaudi δίκη*) against Harmodius, “Had I before the deed was done laid claim to the statue, provided I did it, you would have granted it me ; will you then (the inference) refuse to grant it me now that I *have* done it? Do not, then, first make the promise in anticipation, and then, when you have received the benefit, defraud me of it.”’ The case, or speech, as it is here called ‘against Harmodius’, is also known by the name of *ἡ περὶ τῆς εἰκόνος*: this was the statue which was granted him in commemoration of the famous defeat of the Lacedaemonian μόρα in B. C. 392. Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 243, Ask the judges why they made the presents, and set up the statues, to Chabrias, Iphicrates, and Timotheus. The answer is, ‘Ιφικράτει ὅτι μόραν Δακεδαιμονίων ἀπέκτεινεν. [Dem. Lept. 482 § 84. τιμῶντές ποτε Ἰφικράτην οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν ἐτιμήσατε...ib. § 86, οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμῖν ἀρμόττει δοκεῖν παρὰ μὲν τὰς εὐεργεσίας οὕτω προχείρως ἔχειν, ωστε μὴ μόνον αὐτοὺς τοὺς εὐεργέτας τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἔκεινον φίλους, ἐπειδὰν δὲ χρόνος διέλθῃ βραχύς, καὶ στα αὐτοῖς δέδωκατε ταῦτ’ ἀφαιρεῖσθαι]. The speech here referred to was attributed by some—as Pseudo-Plutarch vit. Lys. συνέγραψε δὲ λόγον καὶ Ἰφικράτει τὸν μὲν πρὸς Ἀρμόδιον—to Lysias¹, which is denied by Dionysius, de Lysia

¹ See on this and two other speeches of Iphicrates attributed to Lysias, Sauppe, ad Fragm. Lys. xviii and lxv. *Oratores Attici* III 178 and 190; [also Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, p. 335].

μὲν ὑπισχνεῖσθε, παθόντες δὲ ἀφαιρεῖσθε.” καὶ πάλιν πρὸς τὸ Θηβαῖον διεῖναι Φίλιππον εἰς τὴν Ἀττικήν, P. 1398
ὅτι “εἰ πρὶν βοηθῆσαι εἰς Φωκεῖς ἡξίου, υπέσχοντο
ἄν· ἀτοπον οὖν εἰ διότι προεῖτο καὶ ἐπίστευσε μὴ
7 διήσουσιν.” ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καθ' αὐτοὺς πρὸς

Iud. c. 12, on two grounds, first the inferiority of the style, which was unworthy of Lysias; and secondly, because Lysias died seven years before the deed for which the statue was granted. Aristotle plainly ascribes it to Iphicrates himself. The speech *περὶ τῆς εἰκόνος*, is quoted again, § 8. See also Clinton *Fasti Hellenici* II 113, *sub anno* 371. It was not till after Iphicrates had resigned his military command, and retired into private life, *δποδὸν τὰ στρατεύματα θδώτης γίνεται*, that he claimed his statue, *μετὰ Ἀλκισθένην ἄρχοντα*, i. e. in the archonship of Pharsiclides, B. C. 371. The grant was opposed by Harmodius, a political antagonist.

‘And again to induce the Thebans to allow Philip to pass through their territories into Attica, it is argued that, “had he made the claim (or preferred the request) before he helped them against the Phocians (when they wanted his aid), they would have promised to do so; and therefore it would be monstrous for them *now* to refuse it, because he threw away his chance (*then*)’;—behaved liberally or with reckless generosity (so Vict.) on that occasion, and neglected to avail himself of his opportunity, (see the lexicons, s. v. *προίεσθαι*)—‘and trusted to their honour and good faith’. The former event occurred in B. C. 346, when Philip allied himself with the Thebans and overran Phocis, and so put an end to the Phocian war. An embassy was sent to the Thebans after the capture of Elataea B.C. 339, to request that Philip’s troops might be allowed to march through their territory to attack Attica; but was met by a counter-embassy from Athens, proposed and accompanied by Demosthenes, who prevailed upon the Thebans to refuse the request, and conclude an alliance with Athens. *κατὰ Ανοιμαχίδην ἄρχοντα*, Dionys. Ep. I ad Amm. c. 11. On this embassy and the proposals there made, see Demosthenes himself, de Cor. §§ 311, 313, from which it would seem that the words here quoted are not Philip’s, but an argument used by his ambassadors. Comp. also § 146, *οὔτ’ εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀλθεῖν δυνατός...* *μήτε Θηβαῖον διέντων*: and Aesch. c. Ctes. § 151, *καὶ γράψειν ἔφη ψήφισμα* (ό Δημοσθένης)...*πέμπτεν ὥμας πρέσβεις αἰτήσουσας Θηβαῖος διόδον ἐπὶ Φίλιππον*, (referred to by Spengel, *Specim. Comm. ad Ar. Rhet.* Heidelb. 1844, p. 15). In the following year, 338 B. C. *ἐπὶ ἄρχοντος Χαιρόνδου*, was fought the battle of Chaeronea. M. Schmidt (*On the date of the Rhet.* Halle, 1837, p. 16) uses this passage in fixing the date of Ar.’s work. [See Introd. p. 38.]

Dionys., ad Amm. c. 11, cites the whole of this topic. The only important variations are two manifest blunders; the omission of *εἰς* before *Φωκεῖς*, and *διέστευσεν μὴ δώσουσιν* for *ἐπίστευσε μὴ διήσουσιν*.

§ 7. Top. vi. This topic, “the retort which turns the point of what has been said against ourselves upon him who said it,” viz. the adverse

τὸν εἰπόντα· διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος, οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ·

party in the law-court or assembly, belongs, as Brandis also remarks, u. s., p. 19, exclusively to Rhetoric. "Cum argumentum ducitur ex iis quae ex moribus vitaque ipsorum dicta sunt, admodumque ipsis congruent, adversus illum ipsum qui dixit: eminent autem, inquit, hic inter alios, ac vim maximam semper habere existimatus est." Victorius. That *κατά* in the definition means 'against' and not 'of' (in respect of) appears from the example. Iphicrates asks Aristophon, who had accused him of taking bribes to betray the fleet, "Would you have done it yourself? No; I am not like *you*. Well then, as you admit that *you*, Aristophon, are incapable of it, must not I, Iphicrates, (your superior in virtue and everything else,) be still more incapable of it?" As Ar. adds, the argument is worth nothing unless the person who uses it is conscious of his own moral superiority, and knows that the audience whom he addresses shares his conviction: employed against an 'Aristides the Just', it would be simply ridiculous.

διαφέρει δὲ ὁ τρόπος κ.τ.λ.] This is interpreted by Spengel, *Specim. Comm.* u. s., p. 16 [and ed. 1867], "Mores sunt qui in hac re in discrimen vocantur; mores enim et vita eminent et litigantes discernit." I doubt if *τρόπος*, standing thus alone, can mean *mores*: nor, I think, is the mention of character and manners appropriate in this place: further on it would be suitable. Gaisford's explanation and connexion seem to be upon the whole most satisfactory. "Verba οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ—εἴπειν puto esse διὰ μέσου. His certe seclusis belle procedunt omnia. Sententiae nexus hic est; Excellit autem hic modus (vel locus—reading *τόπος*), Sed ad fidem accusatori detrahendam." And in that case, Quintilian's words, v. 12. 19, *Aristoteles quidem potentissimum putat ex eo qui dicit, si sit vir optimus &c.*, may be a translation of *διαφέρει ὁ τρόπος*. *διαφέρειν*, if thus understood, denotes 'pre-eminence, distinction above others'.

οἷον ἐν τῷ Τεύκρῳ] This is no doubt Sophocles' tragedy of that name: of which four fragments (and one doubtful one) still survive. See Wagner, *Fragm. Tr. Gr.* I 388, 9. "Quum Ar. ubi poetarum nomina omisit tantummodo clarissimos quosque respexerit, facile inducimur ut eum Sophoclis Teucrum dixisse credamus." And Spengel, *Spec. Comm.* u. s., p. 16 [and ed.] "Sophoclis puto; si alias esset, nomen addidisset." The same play is quoted again, III 15. 9, whence it appears that Ulysses was one of the characters. In an altercation with Teucer, the latter must be supposed to have used a similar argument, or retort, founded upon his own acknowledged superiority in moral character¹. See Wagner l.c.

¹ Ulysses may be supposed to have accused Teucer of the murder of his brother—comp. Aj. 1012 seq. and 1021, where such a suspicion is hinted at: If *you*, Ulysses, are shocked at such a crime, do you suppose that *I*, Teucer, could have been guilty of it? The same argument was employed by Euripides in his Telephus. *Fragm. XII*, Dindorf, ap. Arist. Acharn. 554. Wagner, II p. 364. Fr. Tel. 24. *ταῦτ' οἶδ' ὅτε ἀνέδρατε* (ita Meineke), *τὸν δὲ Τήλεφον οὐκ οἰμεσθα;* comp. Valck. Diatr. ad Fr. Eurip. p. 211, "Telephi verba cum Ulysse loquentis." Ulysses had been making some charge against Telephus, who makes this reply: *You* would have done so and so: am *I* not as likely, or still more so, to have done the same? Plut. *ἀποφθ. βασιλέων*, Alex. II, p. 180 B, *Δαρείου δίδοντος αὐτῷ μυρία τάλαντα καὶ τὴν Ἀσταν*

ῳ ἐχρήσατο· Ἰφικράτης πρὸς Ἀριστοφῶντα, ἐπερόμενος εἰ προδοίη ἀν τὰς ναῦς ἐπὶ χρήμασιν οὐ φάσκοντος δὲ “εἶτα” εἶπεν “σὺ μὲν ὢν Ἀριστοφῶν οὐκ ἀν προδοίης, ἐγὼ δὲ ὢν Ἰφικράτης;” δεῖ δὲ ὑπάρχειν

who gives a long account of the subject of the play, and compares it with Pacuvius' play of the same name, supposed to be borrowed from Sophocles.

Aristophon was already celebrated as an orator in 403 B.C. (Clinton, *F. H., sub anno.*) His fame may be inferred from the frequent and respectful mention of him by Demosthenes especially (see for instance, de Cor. § 219, de Fals. Leg. § 339), Aeschines and Dinarchus. See Baiter et Sauppe, *Orat. Att. Ind. Nom.* s. v., p. 21, Vol. III. He was an Azenian, Ἀζηνεύς, and thereby distinguished from his namesake of Collytus, de Cor. § 93. The speech to which Iphicrates here replies was delivered in “the prosecution of Iphicrates by him and Chares for his failure in the last campaign of the Social war, Diod. XVI 15. 21,” (Clint. *F. H. sub anno.*) in the year 355 B.C., at an already advanced age. See also Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. 65, *Or. Att.* III 190: and note on Rhet. III 10. 6. He died before 330, the date of the de Corona, Dem. de Cor. § 162. On the speech ἵπερ Ἰφικράτους προδοίας ἀπολογία, attributed to Lysias (rejected by Dionysius, de Lys. Iud. c. 12, comp. note on § 6 *supra*; on that against Harmodius), from which Iphicrates' saying against Harmodius is supposed to have been extracted, see Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. LXV, (*Orat. Att.* III 190): and comp. ibid. p. 191, Aristid. Or. 49, who quotes the same words somewhat differently, and, like Aristotle, attributes them directly to Iphicrates, and *not* to Lysias. [A. Schaefer, *Dem. und seine Zeit*, I 155.]

Quintilian, V 12. 10, borrows this example, referring it however to a different class of arguments, *probationes quas παθητικά vocant ductas ex affectibus*, (he means the *ἡθος*.) § 9. After quoting the *nobilis Scauri defensio*, (on which see Introd. p. 151, note 1,) he adds, *cui simile quiddam fecisse Iphicrates dicitur, qui cum Aristophontem, quo accusante similis criminis reus erat, interrogasset, an is accepta pecunia rempublicam proditurus esset? isque id negasset; Quod igitur, inquit, tu non fecisses, ego feci?* Comp. Spalding's note *ad locum*.

εἰ προδοίη ἄν] εἰ=πότερον; see Appendix, *On ἄν with the optative after certain particles* [printed at the end of the notes to Book II].

δεῖ δὲ ὑπάρχειν κ.τ.λ.] ‘But (the person who employs the argument) must have this advantage on his side, that the other (the opponent) would be thought more likely to have done the wrong: otherwise, it would seem absurd, for a man to apply this to an Aristides (the model of justice and integrity) when he brings a charge;—(not so), but only for the discrediting (throwing a doubt upon, making the audience distrust, the credibility) of the accuser: (if δλλά be connected with what immediately precedes, to complete the sense, something must be supplied, such as οὐχ

νεμασθαι πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπίσης, καὶ Παρμενίων εἰπέντος, Ελαθον ἀν εἰ Ἀλέξανδρος ἦμην, κἀγώ, νὴ Δία, εἶπεν, εἰ Παρμενίων ἦμην.

μᾶλλον ἀν δοκοῦντα ἀδικῆσαι ἐκεῖνον· εἰ δὲ μή, γελοῖον ἀν φανείη, εἰ πρὸς Ἀριστείδην κατηγοροῦντα τοῦτό τις εἴπειεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἀπιστίαν τοῦ κατηγόρου· ὅλως γάρ βούλεται ὁ κατηγορῶν βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ φεύγοντος· τοῦτ' οὖν ἐξελέγχειν ἀεί. καθόλου

οὗτος, ἀλλὰ χρηστέον¹⁾), and this, because as a general rule the accuser pretends to be (*would be if he could*) a better man than the defendant: this (assumption) then always requires confutation'. Should not *δεῖ* be *δεῖ;*²⁾

βούλεται] *βούλεσθαι* like *ἐθέλειν* frequently implies a tendency, design, intention, or aspiration, real or imaginary—the latter in things inanimate—wants to be, would be, would like to be, if it could; and hence here it denotes the assumption or pretension of superior goodness, 'he *would* be better'. Zell, ad Eth. Nic. III 1. 15 (III 2, 1110 b 30, Bk.), Stallbaum ad Phaed. 74 D. Ast ad Phaedr. 230 D, p. 250. Thompson ad eundem locum. Viger, pp. 263, 264, n. 77.

Eth. N. III 2, 1110 b 30, τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἰ τις κ.τ.λ. 'won't be called', 'don't choose to be called', as if it had the choice. Hist. Anim. I 16. II [495 a 32], θέλει γάρ εἶναι διμερής (wants to be, would be if it could); of a general tendency, intention or plan, not completely carried out) ὁ πλεύμων ἐν ἀπασι τοῖς ἔχουσιν αὐτὸν' ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. [the *Index Aristotelicus* does not quote this passage, either under *θέλειν* or under *διμερής*, though it is given under *πλεύμων*]. Ib. VII 3. 4 [583 b 26], *ai καθάρσεις βούλονται...οὐ μὴν ἐξακριβοῦσί γε κ.τ.λ.* (the same); de Part. Anim. IV 10, 29, θελει, Ib. III 7. 2, ὁ ἐγκέφαλος βούλεται διμερής εἶναι. de Gen. An. II 4, 9, 10 (bis eodem sensu). Ib. V 7. 17, [787 b 19], τὰ δ' ὅστα ζητεῖ τὴν τοῦ νεύρου φύσιν is used in the same sense. This I believe to be a ἄπαξ λεγόμενον, [no instance is given in the *Index Aristotelicus*, s. v. *ζητεῖν*, where even the passage just quoted is not cited]. de part. An. IV 2. 10, βούλεται, 'is designed to be'; so Eth. N. V 7, 1132 a 21, ὁ δικαστής βούλεται εἶναι οἷον δίκαιον ἔμψυχον, animated justice, the embodiment of abstract justice—this is what he is intended to be, though he often falls short of it. Ib. c. 8, 1133 b 14, βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον. de Anima A 3, 407 a 4, βούλεται, Plato means or intends. Topic. Z 5, 142 b 27, τὸ δὲ γένος βούλεται τὸ τι ἔστι σημαίνειν. Ib. c. 13, 151 a 17. Pol. II 6, 1265 b 27, ἡ σύνταξις ὅλη β. εἶναι (πολιτεία) 'is designed, or intended, to be'. Ib. 1266 a 7, ἐγκλίνειν β. πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν. Ib. I 5, 1254 b 27, c. 6, 1255 b 3, c. 12, 1259 b 6, et saepe alibi. ["Saepe per βούλεται εἶναι significatur quo quid per naturam suam tendit, sive id assequitur quo tendit, sive non plene et perfecte assequitur." *Index Aristotelicus*, where more than forty references are given.]

So Latin *velle*; Cic. Orat. XXXIII 117, *quem volumus esse eloquentem.* Hor. A. P. 89, *versibus exponi tragicis res comica non vult.*

καθόλου δ' ἄποτός ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.] Und. ὁ τρόπος (or ὁ τόπος) from above: not

1 This is the usual way of connecting the parts of the sentence; but I think Gaisford's explanation, quoted above, is certainly to be preferred.

2 ["In cod. abest καὶ post Τεύκρῳ" (p. 252), 'ego addidi; post φανεῖη extat εἰ, ego καὶ scripsi: deinde τοῦτό τις, ego τοῦτ' οὗτος; extremo autem loco δεῖ, Muretus aliique δεῖ.' Ussing, in *Opuscula Philologica ad Madvigium*, 1876, p. 1.]

δ' ἄτοπός ἔστιν, ὅταν τις ἐπιτιμᾷ ἄλλοις ἢ αὐτὸς ποιεῖ ἢ ποιήσειν ἄν, ἢ προτρέπῃ ποιεῖν ἢ αὐτὸς μὴ ποιεῖ μηδὲ ποιήσειν ἄν. ἄλλος ἐξ ὄρισμοῦ, οἶνος ὅτι τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδέν ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ

as Victorius, who supposes it to mean an absurd man. ‘And in general the use of it is absurd whenever a man censures (*taxes*) others for something which he does himself, or would do (if he had the opportunity), or exhorts them to do what he does not do now himself, and never would do (under any circumstances)’. The first of these two cases is that of Satan rebuking sin; the second that of one who preaches what he does not practise.

§ 8. Top. VII. Definition. The definition of terms is the basis of all sound argument, and the ambiguity of terms one of the most abundant sources of fallacy and misunderstanding. A clear definition is therefore necessary for intelligible reasoning. To establish definitions, and so come to a clear understanding of the thing in controversy, was, as Aristotle tells us, the end and object of the Socratic method. The use of the definition in dialectics is treated in the Topics, A 15, 107 a 36 — b 5 [Grote's *Ar.* I p. 404], B 2, 109 b 13 seq. and 30 seq. Cic. Topic. V 26—VII 32. De Inv. II 17. 53—56. Orat. Part. XII 41. De Orat. II 39. 164. Quint. V 10. 36, and 54 seq.

The first example of the argument from definition, is the inference drawn by Socrates at his trial from the definition of *τὸ δαιμόνιον*, Plat. Apol. Socr. c. 15. Meletus accuses him of teaching his young associates not to believe in the gods recognized by the state, and introducing other new divinities, *ἔτερα δαιμόνια κανά*, in their place. Socrates argues that upon Meletus' own admission he believes in *δαιμόνια* divine things (27 c); but divine things or works imply a workman; and therefore a belief in *δαιμόνια* necessarily implies a belief in the authors of those works, viz. *δαιμόνες*. But *δαιμόνες* are universally held to be either *θεοί* or *θεῶν παιδεῖς* (27 D), and therefore in either case a belief in *δαιμόνια* still implies a belief in the gods. The conclusion is *τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἶναι δαιμόνια καὶ θεῖα ἡγείσθαι* (E).

In Xenophon's apology this argument is entirely omitted; and Socrates is represented as interpreting the *κανὰ δαιμόνια* (which he is accused of introducing) of *τὸ δαιμόνιον*, the divine sign which checked him when he was about to do wrong; and this is referred to the class of divine communications—oracles, omens, divination and so forth.

As to the status of the *δαιμόνες* opinions varied: but the usual conception of them was, as appears in Hesiod, Op. et D. 121, and many passages of Plato, Timaeus, Laws (VIII 848 D, *θεῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἐπομένων θεοῖς δαιμόνων*), IV 713 B, οὐκ ἀνθρώπους ἀλλὰ γένους θειοτέρουν τε καὶ ἀρείονος, *δαιμόνας*, and elsewhere, that they were an order of beings, like angels, intermediate between men and gods, and having the office of tutelary deities or guardian angels to the human race. So Hesiod, u. s., Theogn. 1348 (of Ganymede), Plat. Phaedo 108 B, 107 D, 113 D. Aristotle seems to imply the same distinction when he says, de Div. per Somn. I 2, init., that dreams are not *θεοπεπτά*, because they are natural, *δαιμόνια μέντοι· η γάρ*

ἔργον· καίτοι ὃς τις οἴεται θεοῦ ἔργον εἶναι, τοῦτον ἀνάγκη οἴεσθαι καὶ θεὸς εἶναι. καὶ ως Ἰφικράτης, ὅτι γενναιότατος ὁ βέλτιστος· καὶ γὰρ Ἀρμοδίῳ καὶ Ἀριστογείτονι οὐδὲν πρότερον ὑπῆρχε γενναιόν πρὶν γενναιόν τι πρᾶξαι. καὶ ὅτι συγγενέστερος αὐτός· “τὰ γοῦν ἔργα συγγενέστερά ἔστι τὰ ἐμὰ τοῖς Ἀρμοδίον καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος ἢ τὰ σά.” καὶ ως ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι πάντες ἀν ὄμολογήσειαν τοὺς μὴ κοσμίους οὐχ ἐνὸς σώματος ἀγαπᾶν ἀπόλαυφοις δαιμονίᾳ, ἀλλ’ οὐ θεῖα. This argument of Socrates is repeated, III 18. 2, more at length, and with some difference of detail.

The second example is taken from Iphicrates' speech upon the prosecution of Harmodius, the δίκη πρὸς Ἀρμόδιον, *supra* § 6, “cum Harmodius generis obscuritatem obiiceret, definitione generosi et propinquū fastum adversarii repressit et decus suum defendit.” Schrader. Harmodius had evidently been boasting of his descent from the famous Harmodius, and contrasting his own noble birth with the low origin of Iphicrates. The latter replies, by defining true nobility to be merit, and not mere family distinction (comp. II 15, and the motto of Trinity College, *virtus vera nobilitas [Iuv. VIII. 20 nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus]*); ‘for Harmodius (himself) and Aristogeiton had no nobility anterior to their noble *deed*’. Next as to the relationship which Harmodius claimed: he himself is in reality more nearly related to Harmodius than his own descendant: true kinsmanship is shewn in similarity of actions: ‘at all events my *deeds* are more nearly akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton than thine’. This is still more pointedly expressed in Plutarch's version, Ἀποφθέγματα Θασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν Ιφίκρατος, ε', p. 187 B, πρὸς δὲ Ἀρμόδιον, τὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ Ἀρμόδιον ἀπόγονον, εἰς δυνγένειαν αὐτῷ λοιδορούμενον ἔφη· τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ἀπ' ἡμῶν γένος ἄρχεται, τὸ δὲ σὸν ἐν σοὶ πάνεται. This seems to be taken, with alterations, from a speech of Lysias, ap. Stob. flor. 86. 15, quoted by Sauppe, Fragm. Lys. XVIII. Or. Att. III 180. Another form of Iphicrates' saying, briefer still, is found in Pseudo-Plut. περὶ εὐγενείας c. 21 (ap. Sauppe u. s.), Ἰφικράτης ὀνειδιζόμενος εἰς δυνγένειαν ἔγα τρέξω, εἴπε, τοῦ γένους.

The third is taken from the Alexander of some unknown apologist, quoted before, § 5, and § 12; and c. 24. 7 and 9. On this Schrader; “sententia illius videtur haec esse: Paridem intemperantem habendum non esse, una quippe Helena contentum. Argumentum e definitione temperantis (temperantiae) petitum.” Similarly Victorius, “μὴ κόσμος est qui una contentus non est...sed quot videt formosas mulieres tot amat. Cum sola Helena ipse contentus vixerit, non debet intemperans vocari.”

ἐνὸς therefore is ‘one only’, and ἀγαπᾶν ‘to be satisfied with’. ἀπόλαυσις, of *sensual* enjoyment, Eth. N. I 3, sub init., ὁ ἀπόλαυσικὸς βίος, the life of a Sardanapalus. Ib. III 13, 1118 a 30, ἀπόλαυσει, ἡ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' αἵρησις καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. VII 6, 1148 a 5, τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπόλαυσεις.

σιν. καὶ δι' ὁ Σωκράτης οὐκ ἔφη βαδίζειν ὡς Ἀρχέλαον· ὕβριν γὰρ ἔφη εἶναι τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἀμύνασθαι ὄμοιώς εὐ παθόντα ὥσπερ καὶ κακῶς. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι ὀρισάμενοι καὶ λαβόντες τὸ τί ἐστι, συλλογί-
9 ζοῦται περὶ ὧν λέγουσιν. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς,

The fourth is, the reason that Socrates gave for refusing to go to pay a visit to Archelaus; that it would be ignominious to him, to receive favours from a man, and then not to have the power of requiting the benefits (good treatment) in the same way as one would injuries (ill treatment). This was a new definition, or an extension of the ordinary one, of *ὕβρις*, which is “wanton outrage,” *supra* II 2. 5, an act of aggression. *ὕβρις* usually implies hostility on the part of him who inflicts it; in this case the offer of a supposed benefit is construed as inflicting the ignominy.

The abstract *ὕβρις*, for the concrete *ὕβριστικόν*, occurs often elsewhere, as in Soph. Oed. Col. 883, ἀρ' οὐχ ὕβρις τάδ'; KP. *ὕβρις*: ἀλλ' ἀνεκτέα. Arist. Ran. 21, εἰλ' οὐχ ὕβρις ταῦτ' ἐστι; Lysistr. 658, Nub. 1299. Similarly Ter. Andr. I 5. 2, *quid est si hoc non contumelia est?* (Reisig ad loc. Soph.) And in other words; ὁ μῖσος (i. e. μισητόν hated object) εἰς "Ελλήνας, Eur. Iph. T. 512; ὁ μῖσος, Med. 1323, and Soph. Philoct. 991. ἀλγός for ἀλγεύοντο, Aesch. Pr. Vinct. 261. Eur. Ion, 528 γέλως for γελῶσιν, and Dem. de F. L. § 82, ἐστι δὲ ταῦτα γέλως, μᾶλλον δ' ἀναισχυντία δεινή. Arist. Acharn. 125, ταῦτα δῆτ' οὐκ ἀγχόνη.

The contempt of Archelaus implied in this refusal is noticed by Diog. Laert., Vit. Socr. II 5. 25, ὑπερεφρόνησε δὲ καὶ Ἀρχελάον τοῦ Μακεδόνος...μήτε παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπελθών; and see Schneider's note on Xenophon, Apol. Socr. § 17, on Socrates' ordinary conduct in respect of the acceptance of fees and gratuities and favours in general. On Archelaus and his usurpation of the throne of Macedonia, and his tyranny and crimes, see Plato Gorg. c. XXVI p. 470 C—471 C.

'For all these first define the term (they are about to use), and then, having found its true essence and nature, they proceed to draw their inference (conclude) from it on the point that they are arguing. The *ὅρος* or *ὅρισμός*, 'definition', is itself defined at length, Metaph. Δ 12, 1037 b 25, seq.: and more briefly Top. A 8, 103 b 15, 101 b 39, Z 6, 143 b 20. The definition of a thing is its *λόγος*, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων, that which expresses the *formal cause* of a thing; the *what it was to be*; the essence of it,—or that which makes it what it is. Only *εἴδη* or species can, strictly speaking, be defined: the definition of the *εἴδος* gives the *γένος*, the essentials, together with the *διαφορά*, or specific difference: and these two constitute the definition; which is here accordingly said to express τὸ τί ἐστι, 'the, what the thing really is'. On the definition see Waitz, *Organ.* II p. 398, and Trend. *El. Log. Ar.* § 54, et seq. This topic of definition afterwards became the *στάσις ὀρική, nomen or finitio*; one of the legal 'issues', on which see Introduction, Appendix E to Bk III pp. 397—400.

§ 9. Top. VIII. ἐκ τοῦ ποσαχῶς] Between the topics of definition and division (§ 10) is introduced this topic of ambiguous terms, or words

ιο οἷον ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς περὶ τοῦ ὄρθως. ἄλλος ἐκ διαιρέσεως, οἷον εἰ πάντες τριῶν ἔνεκεν ἀδικοῦσιν· ἢ τοῦδε γὰρ ἔνεκα ἢ τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε· καὶ διὰ μὲν τὰ δύο p. 99.

that are susceptible of many and various senses, such as *good* (Top. A 15, 106 a 4 [Grote's *Ar.* I p. 402]); which must be carefully examined to see whether or no they are all of them applicable to the argument. It is treated at great length in Top. A 15, and again B 3; and is inserted *here* (between definition and division) because it is equally applicable to both (Brandis). The exhaustive treatment bestowed upon it in the Topics supersedes the necessity of dwelling on it here; and we are accordingly referred to that treatise for illustration of it. Brandis, u.s., p. 19, objects to *περὶ τοῦ ὄρθως*, "that there is nothing in the Topics which throws any light upon the enigmatical *ὄρθως*"; and proposes *περὶ τοῦ εἰ ὄρθως* 'upon the right use of the terms', i. e. whether it can be applied properly in any one of its various senses or not. But surely the reading of the text may be interpreted as it stands in precisely the same meaning: *οἷον ἐν τοπικοῖς* (*λελεκτα*, or *διώρυσται*) *περὶ τοῦ ὄρθως* (*χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ*), 'as in the Topics (we have treated) of the right use of the terms'. Muretus has omitted the words in his transl. as a gloss: and Victorius, followed by Schrader and Buhle, understands it as a reference, not directly to the Topics, but to the 'dialectical art', as elsewhere, II 22. 10, for instance—see Schrader's note on II 25. 3. "Disciplina Topica intelligenda est." Buhle. It seems to me to be a *direct* and explicit reference to the passages of the Topics above mentioned, in which the right way of dealing with these ambiguous terms is described.

§ 10. Top. IX. *ἐκ διαιρέσεως*] the topic of division. This is the division of a *genus* into its *εἶδος* or *species*; as appears from the example, the three motives to crime, from which the inference is drawn. *Definitioni subiecta maxime videntur genus, species, differens, proprium. Ex his omnibus argumenta ducuntur.* Quint. V 10. 55. Top. B 2, 109 b 13—29. Γ 6, 120 a 34 [Grote's *Ar.* I p. 435]. On *διαιρεσίς* in demonstration, use and abuse, see Anal. Pr. I 31. Trendel. *El. Log. Ar.* § 58, p. 134 seq. Cic. Topic. V 28, XXII 83, de Orat. II 39. 165, *Sin pars (rei quaeritur) partitione, hoc modo: aut senatus parendum de salute rei publicae fuit aut aliud consilium instituendum aut sua sponte faciendum; aliud consilium, superbūm; suum, adrogans; utendum igitur fuit consilio senatus.* Quint. V 10. 63, 65 seq. *Ad probandum valet, et ad refellendum, § 65. Periculosum;* requires caution in the use, § 67. The example, which illustrates the topic by the three motives to crime or wrong-doing, pleasure, profit, and honour, is taken from Isocrates' *ἀντίδοσις*, §§ 217—220, as Spengel points out, *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 20, note. All the three are successively applied to test the accusation (of corrupting youth) that his enemies have brought against him, and all of them are found to be unsuitable to explain the alleged fact. He therefore concludes by the method of exhaustion, that having no conceivable motives, he is not guilty. It must however be observed that Ar.'s *διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ φασιν*, is not supported by anything in Isocrates' text. The causes and motives of actions have been already *divided* in I 10, with a very

11 ἀδύνατον, διὰ δὲ τὸ τρίτον οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ φασιν. ἄλλος ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, οἷον ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας, ὅτι περὶ τῶν

different result. The same terms are there employed, διελάμεθα § 6; and διαιρέσεις § 11.

For an example of this topic, see II 23. 22 in the note.

On the inference from 'disjunctive judgments', see Thomson, *Laws of Thought*, § 90, p. 160.

§ 11. Top. x. ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς] The rudimentary kind of induction, of which alone Rhetoric admits: two or three similar cases being adduced to prove a general rule, from which the inference is drawn as to the present case. It is the argument from analogy, or cases in point. This and the following, says Brandis, u. s., naturally find nothing corresponding to them in the Topics. Cic. de Or. II 40. 168, *ex similitudine; si ferae partus suos diligunt, qua nos in liberos nostros indulgentia esse debemus? &c.* Quint. v 10. 73, *est argumentorum locus ex similibus; si continentia virtus, utique et abstinentia: Si fidem debet tutor, et procurator. Hoc est ex eo genere quod ἐπαγωγὴν Graeci vocant, Cicero inductionem.*

ἐκ τῆς Πεπαρηθίας] δίκης; comp. § 6, ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ἀρμόδιον. An extract 'from the well-known Peparethian case', about the parentage of a child; the speaker adduces two analogous cases, or cases in point, to prove the rule which he wishes to establish, that it is the mother who is the best judge of the parentage of the child. Gaisford quotes Homer, Od. A 215, μήτηρ μέν τ' ἐμέ φησι τοῦ ἔμμεναι, αὐτὰρ ἔχωγε οὐκ οἰδ'. οὐ γάρ πω τις ἐὸν γόνον αὐτὸς ἀνέγνω: on which Eustathius; δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει τὰ εἰρημένα ὁρθῶς ἔχειν.

Πεπαρηθίας^{1]}] "Concionis (ut puto) sive alterius generis scriptioris nomen est Peparethia," Victorius. But in that case it would be masc. (with λόγος understood), not feminine: and the analogy of § 6 is also in favour of the ellipse of δίκης. Otherwise we might understand ἐπαγωγῆς, or γυναικός.

The meaning is, 'Another topic of inference is induction; as, for instance, it may be inferred as a general rule from the Peparethian case, that in the case of children (as to the true parentage of children) women always distinguish the truth better (than the other sex)'. And the same rule has been applied, from a similar induction, in two other recorded cases; 'for, in the first, (on the one hand), at Athens, in a dispute in which Mantias the orator was engaged with his son (about his legitimacy), the mother declared the fact (of the birth, and so gained the cause for her child); and in the second, at Thebes, in a dispute between Ismenias and Stilbo (for the paternity of a child), Dodonis (the mother)

¹ Peparethus, one of a small group of islands (Sciathus, Icus, Halonnesus, Scyrus; Strab. Thessal. IX 5) off the coast of Magnesia, πρόκεινται τῶν Μαγνήτων, Strabo u. s. (νῆσος μὲν τῶν Κυκλαδῶν, Steph. Byz. s. v., una ex Cycladibus, Buhle. οὖν ἀποθεν Εὐβόλας, Suidas), N.E. of Euboea: famous for its wine, Soph. Phil. 548, εἴβοτρον Πεπαρηθον, Aristoph. Thesmoph. Sec. Fr. I (ap. Athen. I 29, A [Aristoph. fragm. 301. Dind. ed. 5]) Meineke, *Fragm. Com.* II 1076. Comp. Herm. Fragm. Phorm. 2 12 (ap. eund. II 410).

τέκνων αἱ γυναῖκες πανταχοῦ διορίζουσι τάληθές·
τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ Ἀθήνησι Μαντίᾳ τῷ ρήτορι ἀμφισβη- P. 1398
τοῦντι πρὸς τὸν νιὸν ή μήτηρ ἀπέφηνεν, τοῦτο δὲ
Θήβησιν Ἰσμηνίου καὶ Στίλβωνος ἀμφισβητούντων
ἢ Δωδωνὶς ἀπέδειξεν Ἰσμηνίου τὸν νιόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
Θετταλίσκον Ἰσμηνίου ἐνόμιζον. καὶ πάλιν ἐκ τοῦ
νόμου τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, εἰ τοῖς κακῶς ἐπιμεληθεῖσι τῶν
made a declaration that it belonged to Ismenias; and in consequence
Thettaliscus was always regarded as Ismenias' son.

'Mantias the orator', whose name does not appear in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.*, may be the same person who is mentioned as the father of Mantitheus and Boeotus, of the deme of Thoricus, Dem. Boeot.-de nom. §§ 7, 10; comp. §§ 30 (bis), 37. ['Mantias proposed that Plangon should declare on oath before an arbitrator, whether Boeotus and Pamphilus were her sons by Mantias or not. She had assured him privately that if the oath in the affirmative were tendered to her, she would decline to take it... She, however, unexpectedly swore that they were her sons by Mantias.' From Mr Paley's Introd. to Dem. Or. 39, *Select Private Orations*, I p. 131. Comp. supplementary notes on pp. 134 and 182].

Ismenias, whose name likewise is wanting in Smith's *Dict.*, was in all probability the one somewhat celebrated in Theban history, as leader, with Autoclydes, of the anti-Lacedaemonian party at Thebes, mentioned by Xenophon, *Hellen.* v 2. 25 seq. He was accused by his opponent Leontiades, tried, and put to death by a court appointed for the purpose by the Lacedaemonians, who were then (383 B.C.) in occupation of the Cadmeia, Xen. Ib. §§ 35, 36, Grote, *Hist. Gr.* x pp. 80, 85, 86 [chap LXXVI]. His name is also associated by Mr Grote, *H. G.* x 380, 387, 391 [chap. LXXXIX], with that of Pelopidas, as one of the ambassadors to the court of Artaxerxes at Susa in 367 B.C.; and again, as taken prisoner with him by Alexander of Pherae in the following year. The authority for these statements appears to be Plutarch, *Artax.* xxii for the first; and Id. *Pelopid.* xxix *sub fin.* for the second: Xenophon does not mention him in this connexion. At all events, it was not the same Ismenias, that was put to death in 383, and accompanied Pelopidas, as ambassador and captive, in 367 and 366¹. Of Stilbon, and the other persons named, I can find no further particulars.

'And another instance from Theodectes' "law"—if to those who have mismanaged other people's horses we don't entrust horses of our own, or (our ships) to those who have upset the ships of others; then, if the rule hold universally, those who have ill guarded or maintained the safety and well-being of others, are not to be employed in (entrusted with) the preservation of our own'. Sauppe, *Fragm. Theod.* Nόμος (*Or. Att.* III

¹ The name Ismenias appears to have been traditional in Boeotia from the very earliest times. Ἰσμηνίης ὁ Βοώτιος is mentioned in the biography of Homer ascribed to Herodotus, §§ 2, 3, as one of the original settlers of the new colony of Cumæ in Aeolia, and carrying with him Homer's mother Crithæis.

ἀλλοτρίων ἵππων οὐ παραδιδόσι τοὺς οἰκείους, οὐδὲ τοῖς ἀνατρέψασι τὰς ἀλλοτρίας ναῦς· οὐκοῦν εἰ δόμοίως ἐφ' ἀπάντων, καὶ τοῖς κακῶς φυλάξασι τὴν ἀλλοτρίαν οὐ χρηστέον ἔστιν εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν σωτηρίαν. καὶ ὡς Ἀλκιδάμας, ὅτι πάντες τοὺς σοφοὺς τιμῶσιν. Πάριοι γοῦν Ἀρχίλοχον καὶ περ βλάσφημον ὄντα τετιμήκασι, καὶ Χῖοι "Ομηρον οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην,

247), thinks with every appearance of probability that Theodectes' 'law' "(*declamationem*) ad rationes militum mercenariorum lege ab Atheniensibus accurate ordinandas pertinuisse." Both the fragments quoted by Aristotle, here, and again § 17, agree perfectly with this view. The extract here stigmatizes the folly shewn by the Athenians in entrusting their interests to mercenaries—like Charidemus and his fellows—who have already shewn their incapacity and untrustworthiness whilst in the employment of others—foreign princes and states—who have used their services. The other extract, § 17, is to shew that by their gross misconduct and the mischief they have already done, most of them—with the exception perhaps of men like Strabax and Charidemus—have entirely disqualified themselves for employment. From the example in Theodectes' 'law', the *general principle* may be inferred, that it is folly to entrust with the care of our own interests and the management of our affairs such as have already shewn themselves incapable by previous failures in like cases. The argument from the analogy of trades and professions is quite in the manner of Socrates and Plato.

On Theodectes himself and his works, see note on II 23. 3, and the references there.

[Ἀλκιδάμας] Of Alcidamas and his writings, see note on I 13. 2, and the reff. This fragment is referred by Sauppe, *Fragm. Alcid.* 5, to Alcidamas' *Μουσεῖον*; of which he says, on fragm. 6, that he supposes it to have been: "promptuarium quoddam rhetoricum, quod declamationes de variis rebus contineret" ["Alkidamas...sein mannigfaltige rhetorische Probestücke umfassendes Buch μουσεῖον nannte," Vahlen, *der Rhetor Alcidamas*, p. 495]. Alcidamas' *Μεσσηνιακὸς λόγος* is quoted, I 13. 2, and II 23. 1.

[Πάριοι γοῦν—ἡ πόλις] translated in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. 9, Vol. III. p. 267.

[τοὺς σοφούς] are here the great 'wits', men of genius; men distinguished (not here specially as *artists*, but) for literature, learning, or wisdom in general.

Of Archilochus, his life, character, and writings, a good account is to be found in Mure, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* Vol. III. p. 138 seq. (Bk. III. ch. iii), in which the *βλασφημία* noted by Alcidamas, as well as his great celebrity, is abundantly illustrated. See also Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. xi §§ 6—10, and 14. *Archilochum proprio rabies armavit iambo*, Hor. A. P. 79 (with Orelli's note). *Parios iambos*, Ib. Ep. I 19. 23 seq.

[οὐκ ὄντα πολίτην] This, the vulgata lectio, is retained by Bekker, and even (for once) by Spengel, though A° has *πολιτικόν*. In favour of this,

καὶ Μυτιληναῖοι Σαπφὼ καὶ περ γυναικα οὖσαν, καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Χίλων τῶν γερόντων ἐποίησαν ἡκιστα φιλολόγοι ὄντες, καὶ Ἰταλιῶται Πυθαγόραν, καὶ Λαμψακηνοὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ξένον ὄντα ἔθαψαν καὶ

the reading of the best MS, it may be urged, that *πολίτην* would represent the Chians as *disclaiming* Homer as their fellow-citizen, quite contrary to the pertinacity with which they ordinarily urged their claim to the honour of his birthplace. This was carried so far, that Simonides in one of his fragments, Eleg. Frigm. 85 line 2 (Bergk), says of a quotation from Homer, *Xios ζειπεν ἀνήρ*. Comp. Thucyd. III 104. On this 'Ionic' claim, see further in Mure, *Hist. Gk. Lit.* Vol. II p. 202. On the other hand οὐ *πολίτην* *may* mean—as Müller supposes, *Hist. Gk. Lit.* ch. V § 1—that they claimed, not Homer's *birth*, but merely his *residence* among them. The other reading *πολιτικόν* affords an equally good sense; that his Chian fellow-countrymen conferred honours upon Homer, though not upon the ordinary ground of public services, or active participation in the business of public life; as the Athenians—had they so pleased—might have dealt with Plato.

καὶ περ γυναικα οὖσαν] "Sappho so far surpassed all other women in intellectual and literary distinction that her fellow-countrymen, the Mytileneans, assigned to her the like honours with the men, whom she equalled in renown; admitted by her countrymen of every age to be the only female entitled to rank on the same level with the more illustrious poets of the male sex." Mure, *H. G. L.* Vol. III p. 273, Sappho. He refers to this passage. *Chilon*, Mure, Ib. p. 392. Diog. Laert., vit. Chil. 68, substitutes the ephory for the seat in the *γερουσίᾳ* as the honour conferred on Chilon by the Lacedaemonians.

φιλολόγοι] 'of a literary turn'.

'Ιταλιῶται] (*Σικελιῶται*) Greek settlers in Italy (and Sicily). Victorius remarks that these are properly distinguished from *'Ιταλοί*, the original inhabitants, who would not have understood Pythagoras' learning, or institutions, or moral precepts.

Pythagoras, according to the received account, as reported by Diogenes Laertius, vit. Pyth., was a native of Samos, to which after various travels he was returning, when, finding it oppressed by the tyranny of Polycrates, he started for Croton in Italy; κάκει νόμος θεῖς τοῖς Ἰταλιώταις ἐδοξάσθη σὺν τοῖς μαθηταῖς, οἱ πρὸς τοὺς τριακοσίους ὄντες φύκονόμουν ἀριστα τὰ πολιτικά, ώστε σχεδὸν ἀριστοκρατίαν εἶναι τὴν πολιτείαν, § 3. In what way the honour of his new fellow-citizens was expressed rather by respect and admiration, than by substantial rewards, may be gathered from the famous αὐτὸς ἔφα of his pupils, and from a notice in Diogenes, § 14, οὗτος δὲ ἔθαυμάσθη κ.τ.λ.

Anaxagoras was a native of Clazomenae in Ionia, but, τέλος ἀποχωρῆσας εἰς Αἴρανχον αὐτοῦ κατέστρεψεν. Diog. Laert., Anaxagoras, § 14, a custom held in his honour, Ib. τελευτήσαντα δὴ αὐτὸν ἔθαψαν ἐντίμως οἱ Λαμψακηνοὶ καὶ ἐπέγραψαν· Ἐνθάδε, πλείστον ἀληθεῖς ἐπὶ τέρμα περήσας οὐρανίου κόσμου, κεῖται Ἀναξαγόρας, § 15.

τιμῶσιν ἔτι καὶ νῦν...ότι Ἀθηναῖοι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις χρησάμενοι εὐδαιμόνησαν καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοῖς Λυκούργου, καὶ Θήβησιν ἄμα οἱ προστάται φίλοσοφοι ἐγένοντο καὶ εὐδαιμόνησεν ἡ πόλις. ἄλλος ἐκ κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ὁμοίου ἡ ἐναντίου, μά-

καὶ [Αθηναῖοι] ita vulg. et vet. transl. Lat. “**ὅτι** [Αθηναῖοι], A° apud Vict. et Gaisf.” Spengel. Accordingly Bekker, Ed. 3, Spengel and Vahlen now read **ὅτι** [Αθ.] preceded by the mark of something omitted. And in fact, as Spengel observes, what follows is not a proper continuation of the preceding quotation from Alcidamas, but a new example of the general topic of induction. The general rule which is derived from the two following instances has fallen out, or something suggesting it, to which **ὅτι** refers, has been omitted either by a copyist, or possibly in his haste by the author himself. Aristotle is capable of this; continuing perhaps to quote from Alcidamas, he may have neglected to supply the proper connexion. The general principle that is to be inferred from the induction may be the Platonic paradox that the true statesmen are philosophers: this appears from the three examples, ‘that the Athenians flourished and were happy under the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians under those of Lycurgus; and at Thebes, the prosperity (or flourishing condition) of the city was coeval with the accession of its leaders to philosophy’. I have rendered the last words thus to express **ἐγένοντο**. But the meaning of the whole is doubtless as Victorius gives it, that the happiness of Thebes, that is, its virtue and glory, began and ended with the philosophy of its leaders. This is inadequately expressed by **ἐγένοντο**, which only conveys the beginning of the coincidence: and, if the explanation of the suppressed rule be right, would have been better represented by **ἄμα οἱ φιλόσοφοι προστάται ἐγένοντο**. The last word is a correction of Victorius from MS A° for the **vulgata lectio ἐλέγοντο**. (The leaders here referred to are Epaminondas and Pelopidas.)

§ 12. **Τὸπ. XI.** This is an inference **ἐκ κρίσεως**, ‘from an authoritative judgment or decision already pronounced upon the same question, or one like it, or the opposite’ (opposites may always be inferred from opposites); ‘either universally and at all times’ (supply **οὗτῳ κεκρίκασιν**) ‘or, in default of that, by the majority, or the wise—either all or most—or good’. This topic, like the last, is naturally wanting in the dialectical Topics, to which it is inappropriate. Brandis, u. s.

Cicero, Top. xx 78, mixes up this topic with the authority of character, the **ἡθος ἐν τῷ λέγοντι**, which ought not to be confounded though they have much in common; the authority being derived from the same source, intellectual and moral pre-eminence, but employed in different ways. The former of the two is made supplementary to the other, *sed et oratores et philosophos et poetas et historicos: ex quorum et dictis et scriptis saepe auctoritas petitur ad faciendam fidem.* Quintilian omits it in his enumeration, v 10.

λιστα μὲν εἰ πάντες καὶ ἀεί, εἰ δὲ μή, ἀλλ' οὐ γε πλεῖστοι, ἢ σοφοὶ ἢ πάντες ἢ οἱ πλεῖστοι, ἢ ἄγαθοί. ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ κρίνοντες, ἢ οὓς ἀποδέχονται

We have here, and in the following sentence, a classification of ‘authorities’ from whose foregone decisions we may draw an inference as to the truth of a statement, or the rectitude of a principle, act, or course of policy which we have to support; or the reverse. Such are the universal consent of mankind¹, *quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus*: short of that, the judgment of the majority: or of the ‘wise’, especially *professional* men, experts, pre-eminently skilled in any art, science, practice, pursuit, or the majority of *them*: or, lastly, the good, the right-minded, and therefore sound judging; whose minds are unclouded by passion or partiality, unbiassed by prejudice, clear to decide aright: men of *φρόνησις* who have *acquired the habit* of right judgment in practical business and moral distinctions. The good, or virtuous man, the *φρόνιμος* or *ἄγαθός*, or the *ὁρθὸς λόγος*, appears again and again in Aristotle’s Moral and Political writings as the true *standard of judgment*. Comp. Rhet. I 6.25, *ἄγαθόν, ὁ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡ γνωμῶν προέκρινεν*, and see note and references there.

The wise, as *authorities*; particularly judges and legislators, as well as poets, philosophers, statesmen, prophets and seers, and the like; are one class of *μάρτυρες* (as attesting the truth of a statement or principle) of the *ἄτεχνοι πίστεις*, I 15.13, seq.: where Homer, Periander, Solon, Themistocles (as an interpreter of oracles), and Plato, are selected as examples.

ἢ εἰ αὐτοὶ οἱ κρίνοντες] again *κεκρικασιν*. ‘Or again, (special classes of authorities,) if the judges themselves, or those whose authority they accept (have already pronounced upon the point); or those whose decision we have no *power* of opposing, such as our lords and masters (any one that has power, controul, over us, with whom it is *folly* to contend); or those whose decision it is not *right* to oppose, as gods, father, pastors and masters’ (whom we are *bound* in duty to obey).

‘An instance of this is what Autocles said in his speech on the prosecution of Mixidemides’ (this is lit. ‘as Aut. said, what he *did say* against M.’) ‘that’ (before εἰ supply *δεινὸν εἶναι aut tale aliquid*, ‘it was monstrous that, to think that’) — ‘the dread goddesses’ (the *Eumenides* or *Erinnyes*) ‘should be satisfied to bring their case² before the Areopagus, and Mixidemides not?’ That is, that the *authority* of the court had been proved by the submission of the *Eumenides*, Mixidemides was therefore bound to submit in like manner: the jurisdiction and its claims had been already *decided*. Of the circumstances of the case nothing further is known: but it seems

¹ On the force of this argument from universal consent, see Cic. Tusc. Disp. I cc. 12, 13, 14, 15: especially 13, 30 (of the belief in God), and 15, 35, *omnium consensus naturae vox est*, seq. With which compare the maxim, *Vox populi vox Dei*.

² *Δίκην δοῦναι* is here, as in Thuc. I 28, *δίκας ηθελον δοῦναι*, ‘to submit to trial or adjudication’: comp. Aesch. c. Ctes. § 124, and the phrase *δίκην δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν*, denoting a general legal settlement of differences. The usual meaning is ‘to pay the penalty or give satisfaction’.

οι κρίνοντες, ἢ οῖς μὴ οἶόν τε ἐναντίον κρίνειν, οἷον τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ οῖς μὴ καλὸν τὰ ἐναντία κρίνειν, οἷον θεοῖς ἢ πατρὶ ἢ διδασκάλοις, ὥσπερ τὸ εἰς Μιξιδημίδην εἶπεν Αὐτοκλῆς, εἰ ταῖς μὲν σεμναῖς θεαῖς ικανῶς εἶχεν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγω δοῦναι δίκην, Μιξιδημίδη δ' οὐ. ἢ ὥσπερ Σαπφώ, ὅτι τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ οὕτω κεκρίκασιν ἀπέθνησκον γὰρ ἄν. ἢ ὡς Ἀρί-

from the allusion here, that Mixid. had first refused to submit to the Court of Areopagus the trial of some charge against him, on which he was subsequently, and consequently, prosecuted in one of the ordinary courts of Autocles.

The appearance of the *σεμναῖς θεαῖς* as prosecutors in the court of the Areopagus is of course a reference to their prosecution of Orestes in Aeschylus' Eumenides. Of Mixidemides we know but the name. Autocles was a much more important personage. He was an Athenian, son of Strombichides, Xen. Hellen. VI 3, 2, one of the seven ambassadors sent to the congress at Sparta in 371 B.C., in the spring before the battle of Leuctra, Xen. l. c., who reports his speech § 7. Xenophon (u. s. § 7) calls him *μᾶλα ἐπιστρεψής ρήτωρ*, 'a very careful orator' (so Sturz, Lex. Xen. and Lexx. but I think rather, 'dexterous', one who could readily *turn himself about* to anything, 'versatile': and so apparently Suidas, who renders it *ἀγχίστος*). Autocles was again employed in 362—361 "in place of Ergophilus (Rhet. II 3, 13) to carry on war for Athens in the Hellespont and Bosphorus." (Grote.) Xenophon's Hellenics do not reach this date. His operations against Cotys in the Chersonese, and subsequent trial, are mentioned by Demosth. c. Aristocr. § 104 and c. Polycl. § 12, and his name occurs, pro Phorm. § 53 [A. Schaefer's *Dem. u. s. Zeit* I pp. 64, 134 and III 2. p. 158]. See Grote, *H. G.* x 223 [c. LXXVII], and 511 seq. [c. LXXX]. Another Autocles, *ὁ Τολμαῖον*, is mentioned by Thuc. IV 53, and again c. 119: and another by Lysias, *πρὸς Σίμωνα* § 12: and a fourth by Aeschines, de F. Leg. § 155.

'Or (another example) Sappho's saying, that death must be an evil: for the gods have so decided; else they would have died themselves': using the gods as an *authority* for the truth of her dictum.

'Or again, as Aristippus to Plato, when he pronounced upon some point in—as he, Aristippus, thought—a somewhat too authoritative tone, "Nay but," said he, "our friend"—meaning Socrates—"never used to speak like that."

Aristippus draws an inference from the *authority* of their common master—who never dictated, but left every question open to free discussion, always assuming his own ignorance, and desire to be instructed rather than to instruct—to the proper rule in conducting philosophical discussion. On Aristippus see Grote's *Plato*, Vol. III. p. 530, seq. ch. XXXVIII.

On this passage, see Grote, *Plato*, III 471, and note. In qualification of what is there said of Plato's 'arrogance', so far as it can be gathered

στιππος πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰ- p. 100.
πόντα, ὡς φέτο· “ἀλλὰ μὴν δὲ γέ ἐταῖρος ημῶν” ἔφη
“οὐθὲν τοιοῦτον,” λέγων τὸν Σωκράτην. καὶ Ἀγη-

from our text, take Victorius' commentary on *ὅς φέτο*, with which I entirely agree: “quae sequuntur verba modestiam Platonis defendant, et paene declarant sine causa Aristippum arrogantiae eum insimulasse: addit enim *ὅς φέτο*, ut opinio illius erat.” I will not however deny that Plato may even in conversation have been occasionally guilty of dogmatizing: in his latest writings, such as the Timaeus and Laws, and to a less degree in the Republic, such a tendency undoubtedly shews itself: but by far the larger portion of his dialogues, which represent probably nearly three-fourths of his entire life, are pervaded by a directly opposite spirit, and are the very impersonation of intellectual freedom. Following the method and practice of his master, he submits every question as it arises to the freest dialectical discussion, so that it is often impossible to decide which way (at the period of writing any particular dialogue) his own opinion inclines; and always presents in the strongest light any objections and difficulties in the thesis which he is maintaining. I think at all events with Victorius that Aristotle at any rate lends no countenance here to Aristippus' charge of dogmatic assumption. So far as his outward bearing and demeanour were concerned, I can conceive that he may have been haughty and reserved, possibly even morose: but a habit of ‘laying down the law’, or of undue assumption and pretension in lecturing and discussion—which is what Aristippus appears here to attribute to him—seems to me to be inconsistent with what we know from his dialogues to have been the ordinary habit of his mind, at least until he was already advanced in life¹.

[*ἐπαγγελτικώτερον*] *ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι* is to ‘announce’, ‘make public profession of’, as of an art, pursuit, business, practice. Xen. Memor. I 2. 7, *ἐπ’ ἀρετήν*, of the Sophists, who ‘made a profession of teaching virtue’. So Πρωταγόρου *ἐπάγγελμα*, Rhet. II 24. II. This ‘profession’ may or may not carry with it the notion of pretension without performance, imposture, sham, *φαινομένη σοφία*, show without substance: and it is by the context and the other associations that the particular meaning must be determined. Thus when Protagoras says of himself, *τοῦτο ἔστιν, ὡς Σ., τὸ ἐπάγγελμα ὃ ἐπαγγέλλομαι*, he certainly does not mean to imply that he is an impostor: when Aristotle I. c. applies the term to him, this is by no means so certain; judging by his account of the Sophists, de Soph. El. I, 165 a 19 seq. Instances of both usages may be found in Ast, Lex. Plat. There can be no doubt that undue *assumption* or pretension is meant to be conveyed by Aristippus in applying the word to Plato's tone and manner.

‘And Agesipolis repeated the inquiry of the God at Delphi, which he had previously made (of the God) at Olympia (Apollo at Delphi, Zeus at Olympia), whether his opinion coincided with his father's;

¹ I have expressed my opinion upon some points of Plato's character, in contrast with that of Aristotle, in Introd. to transl. of Gorgias p. xxvii, and note; to which I venture here to refer.

σίπολις ἐν Δελφοῖς ἐπηρώτα τὸν θεόν, πρότερον κεχρημένος Ὁλυμπίασιν, εἰ αὐτῷ ταύτᾳ δοκεῖ ἃ περ τῷ πατρὶ, ὡς αἰσχρὸν ὃν τάναντία εἰπεῖν. καὶ περὶ τῆς P. 1399.
 ‘Ελένης ὡς Ἰσοκράτης ἔγραψεν ὅτι σπουδαία, εἴπερ Θησεὺς ἔκρινεν· καὶ περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὃν αἱ θεαὶ προέκριναν, καὶ περὶ Εὐαγόρου, ὅτι σπουδαῖος, ὡσπερ Ἰσοκράτης φησίν· Κόνων γοῦν δυστυχήσας, πάντας

assuming or inferring’ (*ὡς sc. from the obvious duty of respecting the authority of a father*) ‘the disgracefulness of pronouncing the contrary’.

For v. l. ‘*Ὑγήσιππος* Victorius and Muretus had proposed to substitute ‘*Αγησίπολις*, from Xen. Hellen. IV 7. 2, which has been adopted in the recent editions of Bekker and Spengel; being also confirmed by a variation in the old Latin Transl., which has *Hegesippus polis*. See Spengel in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 53. Gaisford in *Not. Var.* and Victorius. Xenophon in the passage cited tells the whole story. Agesipolis is the first of the three kings of Sparta of that name, who came to the throne in 394 B.C. (Clinton, *F. H.* II p. 205). His expedition into Argolis, to which the consultation of the oracle was preparatory, was in 390 (Clinton, *F. H. sub anno*). This Agesipolis has been not unnaturally confounded with his more distinguished fellow-citizen and contemporary Agesilaus, to whom Plutarch, *Reg. et Imper. Apophthegm.*, Agesilaus 7, p. 191 B, erroneously ascribes this saying as an *apophtegm* (Gaisford). And similarly Diodorus, XIV 97, has substituted the latter name for the former in his account of (apparently) the same event that Xenophon is relating in the passage above cited. See Schneider’s note *ad locum*.

‘And Isocrates’ argument about Helen, to shew that she was virtuous and respectable, (as she must have been) since (*εἴπερ*, if—as he *did*) she was approved by Theseus (Theseus decided, or gave judgment in her favour). Aristotle’s *ἔκρινεν* expresses Isocrates’ *ἀγαπήσαντας καὶ θαυμάσαντας*. See *ante*, I 6. 25. The passage of Isocrates referred to occurs in his Helen §§ 18—22. Compare especially §§ 21, 22. He concludes thus, *περὶ δὲ τῶν οὐτώ παλαιῶν προσήκει τοῖς κατ’ ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον εὖ φρονήσασιν ὄμονοοῦντας ἡμᾶς φαίνεσθαι*, to give way to their *authority*.

‘And the case of Alexander (Paris) whom the (three) goddesses (Juno, Minerva, Venus) preferred’ (selected, decided, by preference; *πρό*, before all others; to adjudge the prize of beauty). This instance is given before, with the preceding, in I 6. 25.

‘And—as Isocrates says, to prove that (*ὅτι*) Evagoras was a man of worth—Conon, at all events after his misfortune, left all the rest and came to Evagoras’. Evagoras, the subject of Isocrates’ panegyric, Or. IX, was king of Salamis in Cyprus. In the spring of 404 B.C., after the defeat of Aegospotami (*δυστυχήσας*), he fled for refuge to Evagoras, Xen. Hellen. II 1. 29; the words *δυστυχήσας ὡς Εὐαγόραν ἥλθε* are a direct quotation from the Oration, § 52. This incident of Conon’s *forced* visit is absurdly embellished, exaggerated, and distorted from its true significance by the voluble panegyrist, § 51 seq.

13 τοὺς ἄλλους παραλιπών, ως Εὐαγόραν ἥλθεν. ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν μερῶν, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς, ποία κίνησις

§ 13. Top. XII. [ἐκ τῶν μερῶν] the argument from the parts to the whole. This topic, so briefly dispatched here, is much more clearly and fully set forth in the Topics, B 4, 111 a 33 seq. [Grote's *Ar.* I p. 417], to which we are referred; the same example being given in both. The parts and whole, are the species and genus. Anything of which the genus or whole can be predicated must likewise fall under one of its species, because the species taken together make up the genus; if knowledge for instance be predicate of something, then some one of its parts or branches—grammar, music or some other species of knowledge—must needs be predicate of the same; otherwise it is no part of knowledge. And the same applies to the declensions—παρωνίμως λεγόμενα, the same root or notion with altered terminations—of the words representing the genus; what is true of ἐπιστήμη &c. is equally true of ἐπιστήμων, γραμματικός, μουσικός. If then all the parts of the genus are or can be known (this is assumed in the text), we have to consider when any thesis is proposed, such as, the soul is in motion (*τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖσθαι*, meaning, that the soul *is* motion), what the kinds of motion are, and whether the soul is capable of being moved in any of them; if not, we *infer*, 'from part to whole', that the genus motion is *not* predicate of soul, or that the soul is devoid of motion.

κίνησις is usually divided by Aristotle into four kinds, (1) φορά, motion of translation, motion proper; (2) ἀλλοίωσις, alteration; (3) αὔξησις, growth; and (4) φθίσις, decay. De Anima I 3, 406 a 12. Again Metaph. A 2, 1069 b 9, κατὰ τὸ τι ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἡ ποσὸν ἡ ποῦ, where γένεσις ἀπλῆ καὶ φθορά are added to the list, and distinguished from αὔξησις and φθίσις, but still included in four divisions; γένεσις καὶ φθορά, κατὰ τόδε or τὸ τι; αὔξησις καὶ φθορά, κατὰ τὸ ποσόν; ἀλλοίωσις, κατὰ τὸ πάθος, or ποιόν; and φορά, κατὰ τόπον, or ποῦ. In Phys. VII 2 sub init. there are distinguished φορά, ποσόν, ποιόν. Categ. c. 14, 15 a 13, six, γένεσις, φθορά, αὔξησις, μείωσις, ἀλλοίωσις, ἡ κατὰ τόπον μεταβολή. Plato gives two, Parmen. 138 C, (1) motion proper or of translation and (2) change. To which, p. 162 E, is added as a distinct kind the motion of revolution or rotation, (1) ἀλλοίωσθαι, alteration, change of character, κατὰ τὸ πάθος, τὸ ποιόν; (2) μεταβαίνειν, change of place; and (3) στρέφεσθαι, revolution. And in Legg. x c. 6, 893 B seq., where the distinctions are derived from *a priori* considerations, ten is the total number, 894 C. (Comp. Bonitz ad loc. Metaph., Waitz ad l. Categ.) Cicero treats this topic of argument, under the general head of *definitio*, Top. v 26, seq., afterwards subdivided into *partitio* and *divisio*; and under the latter speaks of the process of dividing the genus into its species, which he calls *formae*; *Formae sunt haec, in quas genus sine ullius praetermissione dividitur: ut si quis ius in legem, morem, aequitatem dividat*, § 31: but does not go further into the argument to be derived from it.

Quintilian, v 10. 55, seq., follows Cicero in placing *genus* and *species* under the head *finitio*, § 55, comp. § 62; in distinguishing *partitio* and *divisio*, as subordinate modes of *finitio* § 63; and points out the mode of drawing inferences, affirmative or negative, from the division of the genus into its parts or *species*, as to whether anything proposed

ἢ Ψυχή· ἢδε γὰρ ἢ ἢδε. παράδειγμα ἐκ τοῦ Σωκράτους τοῦ Θεοδέκτου· “εἰς ποῖον ἱερὸν ἡσέβηκεν;

can or can not be included under it, § 65. These are his examples.
Ut sit civis aut natus sit oportet, aut factus: utrumque tollendum est, nec natus nec factus est. Ib. *Hic servus quem tibi vindicas, aut verna tuus est, aut emptus, aut donatus, aut testamento relictus, aut ex hoste captus, aut alienus: deinde remotis prioribus supererit alienus.* He adds, what Aristotle and Cicero have omitted; *periculorum, et cum cura intuendum genus; quia si in proponendo unum quodlibet omisserimus, cum risu quoque tota res solvitur.*

‘Example from Theodectes’ Socrates: “What temple has he profaned? To which of the gods that the city believes in (recognises, accepts) has he failed to pay the honour due?” The phrase *ἀσεβεῖν εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς* occurs twice (as Victorius notes) in Aesch. c. Ctes. §§ 106, 107. Theodectes’ “Socrates,” which is (most probably) quoted again without the author’s name § 18, was one of the numerous *ἀπολογίαι Σωκράτους* of which those of Plato and Xenophon alone are still in existence. We read also (Isocr. Busiris § 4) of a paradoxical *κατηγορία Σωκράτους* by Polycrates (one of the early Sophistical Rhetoricians, Spengel *Art. Script.* pp. 75–7. *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX vol. III 281–2), which was answered by an *ἀπολογία Σωκράτους* from Lysias, Speng. op. cit. p. 141. On this see Sauppe, *Lys. Fragm. cxiii Or. Att.* III 204: which is to be distinguished from another and earlier one, also by Lysias. Sauppe, u. s. Fr. CXII p. 203. [Blass, *Att. Bereds.* I, p. 342, II, pp. 337, 416.]

Theodectes is here answering the charge of Meletus, *οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων*, Xen. Mem. I 1. 1, Apol. Socr. § 11, Plat. Ap. Socr. 26 B. To this Xenophon, like Theodectes, replies by a direct contradiction, and affirmation of the contrary, Mem. I 1. 2, *θύων τε γὰρ φανερὸς θῆν, κ.τ.λ.* comp. § 20; and sim. Apol. Socr. § 11 seq. How the charge is met by Plato in his *Apology* cc. XIV, XV, and dialectically argued, has been already intimated, *supra* § 8,—see note, and comp. III 18. 2. The difference of the mode of treatment severally adopted by the two disciples in the defence of their master is remarkable. The *inference* implied in Theod.’s argument is this:—You accuse Socrates of impiety and disbelief in the gods. Has he ever profaned a temple? Has he neglected to worship them and do them honour, by sacrifice and other outward observances? The indignant question, implying that the speaker defies the other to contradict him and prove his charge, assumes the negative. But such offences as these are the *parts* of impiety which indicate disbelief in the gods—the orator in his excitement takes for granted that the enumeration is complete, that there is nothing else which could prove disbelief in the gods—and if he is not guilty of any of them, neither can he be guilty of the impiety which includes these, and these alone, as its parts; the whole or genus is *not* predicate of him¹.

¹ This argument may possibly be suitable to a sophist and declaimer, but the use of it in a court of justice would certainly be exposed to the ‘danger’ against which Quintilian warns those who employ the topic in general.

τίνας θεῶν οὐ τετίμηκεν ὡν ἡ πόλις νομίζοι;”
 14 ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ ἐπὶ τῶν πλείστων συμβαίνει ὥσθ' ἐπε-
 σθαί τι τῷ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν, ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολου-
 θοῦντος προτρέπειν ἡ ἀποτρέπειν καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἡ
 ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἡ ψέγειν. οἶον τῇ παιδεύ-

§§ 14, 15. Top. XIII. *Argumentum ex consequentibus*; ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων
 τοῦ ἀγαθῶν ἡ κακῶν, which Vict. found as a title to the topic in one of
 his MSS. On ἐπεισθαί and ἀκολουθεῖν, and their various senses, dialectical
 and in the ordinary language, see note on I 6. 3. The general meaning
 of them seems to be ‘concomitant’; that which constantly waits or
 attends upon something, either as antecedent, simultaneous, or sub-
 sequent.

There are two topics of consequents, XIII and XIV. The first is simple. Most things have some good and some bad consequent usually or inseparably attached to them, as wisdom and the envy of fellow-citizens are the ordinary results of education. In exhortation, defence, and encomium (the three branches of Rhetoric) we urge the favourable consequence—the resulting wisdom in the case proposed—if we have to dissuade, to accuse, to censure, the unfavourable; each as the occasion may require. The second is somewhat more complex. Here we have two opposites (*περὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀντικειμένων*) to deal with—in the example public speaking falls into the two alternatives of true and fair speaking, and false and unfair. These are to be treated ‘in the way before mentioned’, τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ: that is, in exhorting or recommending we take the favourable consequent, in dissuading the unfavourable. But the difference between the two topics lies in this (*διαφέρει δέ*); that in the former the opposition (that must be the opposition of the good and bad consequent, for there is no other) is *accidental*—that is, as appears in the example, there is no relation or logical connexion between wisdom and envy; they may be compared in respect of their value and importance as motives to action, but are not logical opposites—but in the latter, the good and the bad consequences are two contraries (*τάνατία*) love and hatred, divine and human. In the example of the second topic, the dissuasive argument which comes first assigns evil consequences (*hatred*) to both alternatives of public speaking: that in recommendation, the contrary, *love*. The topic of consequences, in the general sense, as above explained, has been already applied in estimating the value of goods *absolute*, I 6.3; and in the comparison of good things, I 7.5. In Dialectics it does not appear in this simple shape, though it is virtually contained in the application of it to the four modes of *ἀντίθεσις* or opposition, Top. B 8; and in the comparison of two good things, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 5—15. Brandis u. s. [*Philologus* IV 1] observes of the two Rhetorical topics, that they could not find an independent place and treatment in the Topics.

Cicero speaks of the general topic of consequence *dialecticorum proprius ex consequentibus antecedentibus et repugnantibus*, omitting the

τει τὸ φθονεῖσθαι ἀκολουθεῖ κακόν, τὸ δὲ σοφὸν εἶναι ἀγαθόν· οὐ τοίνυν δεῖ παιδεύεσθαι, φθονεῖσθαι γὰρ οὐ δεῖ· δεῖ μὲν οὖν παιδεύεσθαι, σοφὸν γὰρ εἶναι δεῖ. ὁ τόπος οὗτός ἐστιν ἡ Καλλίππου τέχνη προσλαβοῦσα καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ τἀλλα, ὡς εἴρηται.

simple form in which it appears in Rhetoric. His *consequentialia* are necessary concomitants, *quae rem necessario consequuntur*. Top. XII 53. The mode of handling it is illustrated, XIII 53.

Quint. v 10. 74, Ex consequentibus sive adiunctis; *Si est bonum iustitia, recte iudicandum: si malum perfidia, non est fallendum. Idem retro.* § 75, sed haec consequentialia dico, ἀκολουθά; *est enim consequens* (in Cicero's sense) *sapientiae bonitas; illa sequentia, παρεπόμενα, quae postea facta sunt aut futura.* And two other examples of the application of the argument, §§ 76, 77. Quintilian naturally, like Aristotle, gives only the rhetorical, and omits the dialectical use of the topic.

Note by the way the redundant ὥστε in συμβαίνει ὥσθ' ἔπεισθαι. See Monk on Eur. Hippol. 1323, Κύπρις γὰρ ήθελ ὥστε γίγνεσθαι τάδε. And add to the examples there given, Thuc. I 119, δεηθέντες ὥστε ψῆφ., VIII 45, ἐδίδασκεν ὥστε, Ib. 79, δόξαν ὥστε διαναφοράχειν Ib. 86, ἐπαγγελλόμενοι ὥστε βοηθεῖν. Herod. I 74, III 14. Plat. Protag. 338 C, ἀδύνατον ὥστε, Phaedr. 93 B, ἔστιν ὥστε, 103 E, (Stallbaum's note,) Phaedr. 269 D (Heindorf ad loc. et ad Protag. l. c.). Dem. de F. L. § 124 (Shilleto's note). Aesch. de F. L. p. 49, § 158, ἔάστε...ώστε. Arist. Polit. II 2, 1261 a 34, συμβαίνει ὥστε πάντας ἄρχειν (as here), Ib. VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 12, συμβέβηκεν ...ώστε. Ib. VIII (V) 9, 1309 b 32, ἔστιν ὥστ' ἔχειν. Pind. Nem. V 64, Soph. Oed. Col. 1350 (D), δικαιῶν ὥστε...Eur. Iph. T. 1017 (D), πῶς οὖν γένοιτο ἀν ὥστε... Ib. 1380.

The example of Top. is taken from the passage of Eur. Med. 294, already employed in illustration of a γνώμη, II 21. 2. Education of children has for its inseparable attendants wisdom or learning as a good, and the envy of one's fellow-citizens as an evil: we may therefore take our choice between them, and argue either for or against it, persuading or dissuading. (Note a good instance of *μὲν οὖν*, as a negative (usually) corrective, 'nay rather'; this of course comes from the opponent who is arguing on the other side, that education is advantageous. Also in § 15.)

'The illustration of this topic constitutes the entire art of Callippus—with the addition (no doubt) of the possible, (the *κοινὸς τόπος* of that name,) and all the rest (of the *κοινοὶ τόποι*, three in number), as has been said', in c. 19, namely.

The two notices of Callippus and his art of Rhetoric in this passage and § 21, are all that is known to us of that rhetorician. He is not to be confounded with the Callippus mentioned in I 12. 29. Spengel, *Art. Script.* 148—9, contents himself with quoting the two passages of this chapter on the subject. He was one of the early writers on the art of Rhetoric; and it is possible that a person of that name referred to by

15 ἄλλος, ὅταν περὶ δυοῖν καὶ ἀντικειμένοιν ἡ προτρέπειν ἡ ἀποτρέπειν δέη, καὶ τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν χρῆσθαι. διαφέρει δέ, ὅτι ἐκεῖ μὲν τὰ τυχόντα ἀντιτίθεται, ἐνταῦθα δὲ τάναντία. οὗν ιέρεια ὥν εἴα τὸν νιὸν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γάρ, ἔφη, τὰ δίκαια λέγης, οἱ ἀνθρωποί σε μισήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ θεοί. δεῖ μὲν οὖν δημηγορεῖν· ἐὰν μὲν γάρ τὰ δίκαια λέγης, οἱ θεοί σε φιλήσουσιν, ἐὰν δὲ τὰ ἄδικα, οἱ ἀνθρωποι. τουτὶ δὲ στὶ ταύτῳ τῷ λεγομένῳ τὸ ἔλος πρίασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἄλας· καὶ η βλαί-

Isocrates—who was born in 436 B.C.—as one of his first pupils, περὶ ἀντιδόσεως § 93, may have been this same Rhetorician Callippus.

§ 15. Tiresias, ap. Phoen. 968, δοτις δὲ ἐμπύρῳ χρῆται τέχνη μάταιος· ἦν μὲν ἔχθρὰ σημῆνας τύχη, πικρὸς καθέστηχ' οἰς ἀν οἰωνοσκοπῇ. Ψευδὴ δὲ ἵπ' οἴκτον τοῖσι χρωμένοις λέγων ἀδικεῖ τὰ τῶν θεῶν, is compared by Victorius¹ with the example in the second topic.

This second topic of consequences differs from the preceding in these particulars. In the first, which is simple, the consequences of the thing which is in question are twofold—bad and good, and these are unconnected by any reciprocal relation between them. The second is more complicated, and offers contrary alternatives, which are set in opposition ἀντιτίθεται τὰντία, as δίκαια and ἄδικα λέγειν in the example—and then, ‘proceed as before’, τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ τρόπῳ; that is, state the consequence of each, (favourable in exhortation or recommendation, unfavourable in dissuasion,) and bring the two into comparison in order to strike the balance of advantage or disadvantage between them. In public speaking, for instance, the alternatives are, true and fair, and false and unfair, words and arguments: if your object is to dissuade from it, you adduce the ill consequences of both, and contrast them, so as to shew which is the greater.

‘But that is all one with the proverb, to buy the marsh with the salt’: i.e. to take the fat with the lean; the bad with the good; the unprofitable and unwholesome marsh (*palus inamabilis*, Virg. G. IV 479, Aen. VI 438) with the profitable salt which is inseparably connected with it. An argument pro and con, but only of the first kind, Top. XIII, by comparing the good and the bad consequence, according as you are for or against the purchase. An Italian proverb to the same effect is quoted in Buhle’s note, *comprare il mel con le mosche*; and the opposite, the good without the bad, appears in the Latin, *sine sacris haereditas*, Plaut. Capt. IV 1. 5 (Schrad.). [We may also contrast the proverb μηδὲ μέλι, μηδὲ μελίσσας: ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ βουλομένων παθεῖν τι ἀγαθὸν μετὰ ἀπευκτοῦ (Diogenianus, cent. vi, 58). Cf. Sappho, fragm. 113.]

¹ Gaisford, *Not. Var.*, cites this as from Victorius. It is not found in my copy, Florence, 1548.

σωσις τοῦτ' ἔστιν, ὅταν δυοῖν ἐναντίοιν ἐκατέρω ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ἔπηται, ἐναντία ἐκάτερα ἐκατέροις.

There is an evident intention in the association of *ἔλος* and *ἄλας*: the alliterative jingle, as in so many other proverbs (*παθήματα μαθήματα*, safe bind safe find), sharpens the point, and helps its hold on the memory.

Some MSS have *ἔλαιον* for *ἔλος*, which is expressed in the Vet. Tr. Lat., ‘olim (oleum) emi et sales,’ and by other interpreters; and also adopted by Erasmus, *Adag.*, oleum et salem oportet emere; ‘to be in want of oil and salt,’ implying insanity, against which this mixture was supposed to be a specific. Victorius, referring to the Schol. on Arist. Nub. 1237, *ἀλσίν διασπρυχθείσις ὄναιτ'* ἀν ωτοσι, who notes *τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας ἀλσὶ καὶ ἔλαιῳ διέβρεχον, καὶ ὠφελούντο*, supposes that some copyist having this in his mind altered *ἔλος* into *ἔλαιον*. At all events the proverb in this interpretation has no meaning or applicability here.

In the following paragraph (*καὶ η βλαίσωσι...ἐκατέροις*) the meaning of *βλαίσωσι*, the application of the metaphor, and its connexion with what follows, which appears to be intended as an exemplification or explanation of the use of *βλαίσωσι*, are, and are likely to remain, alike unintelligible. The Commentators and Lexicographers are equally at fault; Spengel in his recent commentary passes the passage over in absolute silence: Victorius, who reasonably supposes that *βλαίσωσι* (metaphorically) represents some figure of rhetorical argument, candidly admits that nothing whatsoever is known of its meaning and use, and affords no help either in the explanation of the metaphor, or its connexion with what seems to be the interpretation of it. Buhle, and W. Dindorf, ap. Steph. *Thes. s. v. praevaricatio*; Vet. Lat. Tr. *claudicatio*; Riccoboni *inversio*. Vater discreetly says nothing; and Schrader that ‘which amounts to nothing. After all these failures I cannot hope for any better success; and I will merely offer a few remarks upon the passage, with a view to assist others as far as I can in their search for a solution.

βλαισός and *ῥαιβός*, *valgus* and *varus*, all of them express a deformity or divergence from the right line, or standard shape, in the legs and feet. The first (which is not always explained in the same way¹) seems to correspond to our ‘bow-legged’, that is having the leg and foot bent outwards: for it was applied to the hind legs of frogs, *βλαισοπόδης βάτραχος*, poet. ap. Suidam. And Etym. M. (conf. Poll. 2. 193,) interprets it, *ὅ τοὺς πόδας εἰς τὰ ἔξω διεστραμμένος* (with his feet distorted so as to turn outwards) *καὶ τῷ Λ στοιχεῖῳ ἐουκός*; so that it seems that it may represent the act of straddling. The adj. itself and some derivatives not unfrequently occur in Ar.’s works on Nat. Hist.; likewise in Galen, once in Xenophon, *de re Eq.* 13, and, rarely in other authors; but *βλαίσωσι* appears to be a *ἄπαξ λεγόμενον*. *ῥαιβός* is the opposite defect to this, ‘bandy-legged’, where the legs turn inwards. And to these correspond *valgus* and *varus*: the first, *qui suras et crura habet extrosum intortas*, of which Petronius says, *crura in orbem pandit*; and Martial, *crura... simulant quae cornua lunaee*. *Huic contrarius est varus, qui introrsus*

¹ *βλαισός*...bandy-legged, opposed to *ῥαιβός*. *ῥαιβός*, crooked, bent, esp. of bandy legs. Liddell and Scott’s Lex. sub vv.

16 ἄλλος, ἐπειδὴ οὐ ταύτᾳ φανερῶς ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ἀφανῶς, ἀλλὰ φανερῶς μὲν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἐπαι-

pedes et crura obtorta habet. "Vari dicuntur incurva crura habentes." Festus (ap. Facc.). Heindorf ad Hor. Sat. I. 3, 47. G. Dindorf (in Steph. *Thes.*) explains it by *praevaricatio*, quoting Cic. Orat. Partit. XXXVI 126, (*praevaricator definitur*) *ex nomine ipso, quod significat eum qui in contrariis caassis quasi vare (Edd. varie) esse positus videatur*¹. If we revert to the derivation, and apparently the original meaning, of the word, following Cicero, and understand it as 'a deviation from the right' course or path, by a metaphor from bent or distorted legs, *praevaricatio* might be taken as expressing by a similar metaphor the general meaning of *βλάστωσις*; but in its ordinary acceptation of 'the betrayal of his client by an advocate, and collusion with his opponent'—in which Buhle and the Translators must be supposed to understand it, since they offer no other explanation—it seems altogether inappropriate. So however Rost and Palm, in their *Lexicon*.

The translation, as the passage stands, is 'and the *βλάστωσις* is, or consists in, this, when each (either) of two contraries is followed (accompanied) by a good and an ill consequence, each contrary to each', (as in a proposition of Euclid). This is a generalisation of the example in Top. XIV: the two contraries are the fair and unfair speaking; each of which has its favourable and unfavourable consequence; truth, the love of God and hatred of men; falsehood, the love of men and hatred of God. But how this is connected with *βλάστωσις* I confess myself unable to discover. The nearest approach I have been able to make to it—which I only mention to condemn—is to understand *βλάστωσις* of the straddling of the legs, the Δ of the Etymol. M., which might possibly represent the divergence of the two inferences pro and con deducible from the topic of consequences: but not only is this common to all rhetorical argumentation, and certainly not characteristic of this particular topic, but it also loses sight of the deviation from a true standard, which we have supposed this metaphorical application of the term to imply.

§ 16. Top. XV. This Topic is derived from the habit men have, which may be assumed to be almost universal, of concealing their real opinions and wishes in respect of things good and bad, which are always directed to their own interests, under the outward show and profession of noble and generous sentiments and of a high and pure morality. Thus, to take two examples from de Soph. El. c. 12, they openly profess that a noble death is preferable to a life of pleasure; that poverty and rectitude, is better than ill-got gains, than wealth accompanied with disgrace: but secretly they think and wish the contrary. These contrary views and inclinations can always be played off one against the other in argument, and the opponent made to seem to be asserting a paradox: you infer the one or the other as the occasion requires. This is in fact the most effective (*κυριώτατος*) of all topics for bringing about this result. The mode of dealing with the topic is thus described in de Soph. El. 1, c. 173 a 2, "If the thesis is in accordance with their real desires, the

¹ Compare the whole passage §§ 124—126, in illustration of *praevaricatio*.

νοῦσι μάλιστα, ἵδια δὲ τὰ συμφέροντα μᾶλλον βού-^{ρ. 101.}
λονται, ἐκ τούτων πειράσθαι συνάγειν θάτερον τῶν
γὰρ παραδόξων οὗτος ὁ τόπος κυριώτατος ἔστιν.
17 ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάλογου ταῦτα συμβαίνειν οἶνος ὁ

respondent should be confronted with their public professions; if it is in accordance with them [the latter], he should be confronted with their real desires. In either case he must fall into paradox, and contradict either their publicly expressed, or secret opinions." Poste, Transl. p. 43. This is for dialectics: but it may be applied equally well to rhetorical practice, in which there is nearly always a real or (as in the epideictic branch) imaginary opponent. The author proceeds, Ib. 173 a 7, further to illustrate this by the familiar opposition of *φύσις* and *νόμος*, nature and convention or custom, which is to be handled in the same way as the preceding, and is *πλεῖστος τόπος τοῦ παράδοξα λέγειν*: referring to Callicles' well-known exposition of the true doctrine of justice conventional and natural, in Plato's Gorgias, c. 38, foll.

This topic does not occur in Cicero's tract, which is confined to dialectics; nor is it found amongst the rhetorical topics of Quintilian's tenth chapter of Book V, which has supplied us with so many illustrations of Aristotle.

'Another; whereas in public and in secret men praise not the same things, but openly most highly extol what is just and right, yet secretly (privately, in their hearts,) prefer their own interest and advantage, from these (i. e. from premisses derived from the one or the other of these two modes of thought and expression, whichever it be that the opponent has given utterance to,) we must endeavour to infer the other: for of all *paradoxical* topics (topics that lead to paradox, which enable us to represent the opponent as guilty of it,) this is the most effective (most powerful, mightiest, most authoritative)'. If the opponent has been indulging in some high-flown moral commonplaces about virtue and honour, by an appeal to the real but *secret* feelings of the audience on such matters, we must shew that such sentiments are paradoxical, or contrary to common opinion; or conversely, if we have occasion to assume the high moral tone, make our appeal to those opinions which they openly profess, and shew that it is a paradox to assume with the opponent that men are incapable of any other motives than such as are suggested by sordid self-interest.

§ 17. Top. XVI. 'Another (inference may be drawn) from the *proportion* of so and so (*ταῦτα*)'. This is the argument from analogy in its strict and proper sense, the 'analogy of relations'. See Sir W. Hamilton, quoted at II 19. 2, and on the argument from analogy in general. The analogy or proportion here is the literal, numerical or geometrical, proportion, $2 : 4 :: 8 : 16$. "Analogy or proportion is the similitude of ratios." Eucl. El. Bk. V def. 8.

This topic also does not appear in the dialectical treatise, where it is inappropriate; nor in Cicero and Quintilian, except so far as the *ordinary* and *popular* analogy (see again the note above referred to)

'Ιφικράτης τὸν νιὸν αὐτοῦ νεώτερον ὄντα τῆς ἡλικίας,
ὅτι μέγας ἦν, λειτουργεῖν ἀναγκαζόντων, εἰπεν ὅτι εὶ^{P. 1399}
τοὺς μεγάλους τῶν παιδῶν ἄνδρας νομίζουσι, τοὺς
μικροὺς τῶν ἀνδρῶν παιδας εἶναι ψηφιοῦνται. καὶ
Θεοδέκτης ἐν τῷ νόμῳ, ὅτι πολίτας μὲν ποιεῖσθε τοὺς
μισθοφόρους, οἷον Στράβακα καὶ Χαρίδημον, διὰ τὴν

is recognised under the names of *similitudo* (C) and *similia* (Q). Similitude is between two, proportion requires four terms. Eth. N. v 5, 1131 a 32, ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἴσοτης ἐστὶ λόγων (equality or parity of ratios), καὶ ἐν τέταρσι ἐλαχίστοις. And comp. the explanation of the 'proportional' metaphor in Poet. XXI 11, and the examples, §§ 12, 13. Accordingly of the two examples each has four terms, and the inference is drawn from the similitude of the two ratios.

'As Iphicrates, when they (the assembly, *ψηφιοῦνται*,) wanted to force upon his son the discharge of one of the liturgies' (pecuniary contributions to the service of the state, ordinary and extraordinary, of a very onerous character), 'because he was tall, though he was younger than the age (required by law), said that if they suppose tall boys to be men, they will have to vote short men to be boys': the proportion being, Tall boys : men :: short men : boys. Two ratios of equality. The argument is a *reductio ad absurdum*. The first ratio is hypothetical. If tall boys are really to be regarded as men, then by the same ratio, &c.

'And Theodectes, in the "law" (which he proposes, in his declamation, for the reform of the mercenary service, see above § 11, note) 'you make citizens of your mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, for their respectability and virtue, and won't you (by the same proportion) make exiles of those who have been guilty of such desperate (*ἀνήκεστα*) atrocities?'

Of these 'mercenaries' who swarmed in Greece from the beginning of the fourth century onwards, the causes of their growth, their character and conduct, and the injury they brought upon Greece, see an account in Grote, *Hist. Gr.* Vol. XI p. 392 seq. [chap. LXXXVII].

Charidemus, of Oreus in Euboea, in the middle of that century, was perhaps the most celebrated of their leaders. He was a brave and successful soldier, but faithless, and profligate and reckless in personal character. Theopomp. ap. Athen. X 436 B.C. Theopomp. Fr. 155, Fragn. Hist. Gr., ed. C. and Th. Müller, p. 384 b (Firmin Didot). διὰ τὴν ἐπείκειαν, therefore, is not to be taken as an exact description of Charidemus' character, but is the assumption upon which the Athenians acted when they conferred these rewards. His only real merit was the service he had done them. He plays a leading part in Demosthenes' speech, c. Aristocratem; who mentions several times, §§ 23, 65, 89, the citizenship conferred on him by the Athenians in acknowledgment of his services, as well as—somewhat later—a golden crown, § 145, πρῶτον πολίτης, εἴτα πάλιν χρυσοῖς στεφάνοις ὡς εὐεργέτης στεφάνωται, § 157,

ἐπιείκειαν· φυγάδας δ' οὐ ποιήσετε τοὺς ἐν τοῖς μη-
18 σθοφόροις ἀνήκεστα διαπεπραγμένους; ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ,
τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐὰν ἡ ταύτον, ὅτι καὶ ἔξ ὥν συμβαίνει
ταύτα· οἵον Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν
οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέ-
γουσιν· ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ συμβαίνει μὴ εἶναι τοὺς θεούς
ποτε. καὶ ὅλως δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον ἔξ ἑκατέρου λαμ-
βάνειν ὡς ταύτῳ δεῖ· “μέλλετε δὲ κρίνειν οὐ περὶ

presents, and the name of ‘benefactor’, 185, and 188. Besides the Athenians, he was employed by Cotys and his son Cersobleptes, kings of Thrace, and by Memnon and Mentor in Asia. A complete account of him and his doings is to be found in Weber's Proleg. ad Dem. c. Aristocr. pp. LX—LXXXIII.

Of the other mercenary leader, Strabax, all that we know is derived from Dem. c. Lept. § 84, that through the intervention or by the recommendation (*διὰ*) of Iphicrates he received a certain ‘honour’ from the Athenians, to which Theodectes' extract here adds that this was the citizenship. We learn further from Harpocration and Suidas that Strabax is—an *ὄνομα κύριον*. “De commendatione Iphicratidis, ornatus Strabax videri potest Iphicratidis in eodem bello (sc. Corinthiaco) adiutor fuisse.” F. A. Wolff, ad loc. Dem.

§ 18. Top. XVII. Inference from results or consequents to antecedents, parity of the one implies parity or identity of the other¹: if, for instance, the admission of the *birth* of the gods equally with that of their *death*, leads to the result of denying the eternity of their existence—in the former case there *was* a time when they *were not*, as in the other there is a time when they *will not be*—then the two assertions (the antecedents) may be regarded as equivalent, or the same in their effect, and *for the purposes of the argument* ὅτι ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν, because they both lead to the same result or consequent; so that one can be put for the other, whichever happens to suit your argument.

On Xenophanes, see note on I 15. 29, and the ref. On this passage, Müllach, Fr. Phil. Gr., Xenoph. Frigm. Inc. 7, “Hoc dicto veteres poetae perstringuntur, qui quum diis aeternitatem (potius *immortalitatem*) tribuerent, eos tamen hominum instar ortos esse affirmabant eorumque parentes et originem copiose enarrabant.” And to nearly the same effect, Karsten, Xenoph. Fr. Rell. XXXIV. p. 85. The saying against the assertors of the birth of the gods is not found amongst the extant fragments, but the arguments by which he refuted this opinion is given by Aristotle (?) de Xenoph. Zen. et Gorg. init. p. 974. 1, seq. and by Simplicius, Comm. in Phys. f. 6 A, ap. Karsten p. 107, comp. p. 109.

For *καὶ—δέ*, see note on I 6. 22.

‘And in fact, as a general rule, we may always assume’ (*subaudi δεῖ, χρή,*

¹ “Von der Gleichheit der Folgen auf Gleichheit des ihnen zu grunde liegenden schliessende.” Brandis [Philologus IV i.].

Ισοκράτους ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν.” καὶ ὅτι τὸ διδόναι γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ δουλεύειν ἔστιν, καὶ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης ποιεῖν τὸ

aut tale aliquid) the result of either of two things to be the same with that of the other (*ἐκαρέου*), (or with *ἐκάστου*, as A^c, adopted by Spengel, the result of *anything*, i. e. any things, two or more, that we have to argue about) ‘as in the example, “what you are about to decide upon is not Isocrates, but a study and practice, whether or not philosophy deserves to be studied.”’ Whether you decide upon Isocrates or his pursuit and study, the inference or result *is the same* (*ταῦτόν*), and can be deduced equally from both. I have here adopted Spengel’s emendation of Isocrates for Socrates, “quam emendationem,” as Spengel modestly says, “Victorius si integrum vidisset Antidosis nobis non reliquisset”. It is given in his *Specim. Comm. in Ar. Rhet.*, Munich, 1839, p. 37. A comparison of this passage with Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως, § 173, οὐ γὰρ περὶ ἑμοῦ μέλλετε μόνον τὴν ψῆφον διοίσειν ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, ὡς πολλοὶ τῶν νεωτέρων προσέχοντι τὸν νοῦν, certifies the emendation. Even Bekker has accepted it. At the same time the *vulgata lectio Σωκράτους*, as Victorius interprets it, yields a very sufficient sense, thus more briefly expressed by Schrader, “Socrate damnato simul damnabitur studium sapientiae : Socrate servato servabuntur sapientiae studia;” Socrates and his study or pursuit stand or fall together ; to condemn Socrates, is to condemn philosophy : and might even be thought to be confirmed by *κρίνειν*, which more immediately suggests a *judicial* decision.

‘And that (the result, effect, consequence of) giving earth and water is the same as, equivalent to, slavery’. The demand of ‘earth and water’ by the Persian monarchs from a conquered prince or state, in token of submission, and as a symbol of absolute dominion or complete possession of the soil—therefore equivalent to slavery, *δουλεύειν*—is referred to frequently by Herodotus, IV 126, Darius to Idanthyrsus, the Scythian king, δεσπότη τῷ σῷ δῶρῳ φέρων γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ. V 17, the same to Amyntas king of Macedonia, Ib. 18, the same to the Athenians, Ib. 73, VII 131, 133, 138, 163. Plut. Themist. c. 6. Plin. N. H. XXII 4 (ap. Bähr), *Summum apud antiquos signum victoriae erat herbam porrigerere victos, hoc est terra et altrice ipsa humo et humatione etiam cedere: quem morem etiam nunc durare apud Germanos scio.* It appears from Du-cange, Gloss. s. v. *Investitura*, that this custom was still continued in the transmission of land during the middle ages (Bähr).

‘And participation in the general peace (would be equivalent to) doing (Philip’s) bidding’. The Schol. on this passage writes thus : Φίλιππος κατηγάκασε τοὺς Ἀθηναῖούς ἵνα εἰρηνεύσωσιν μετ’ αὐτοῦ ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι χώραι, ὁ δὲ Δημοσθένης ἀντιπίπτων λέγει ὅτι τὸ μετέχειν τῆς κοινῆς εἰρήνης μετὰ τοῦ Φίλιππον ἡμᾶς, ὡς καὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας, ἐστι τὸ ποιεῖν ὃ προστάττει ὁ Φίλιππος. Spengel was the first to point out (*Specim. Comm. u. s. p. 39*) that the *κοινὴ εἰρήνη* here referred to is the same of which mention occurs several times in a speech περὶ τῶν πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν—attributed to Demosthenes, but more probably by Hyperides ; see the Greek argument, and Grote, *H. Gr.* [chap. XC] XII 21 and note—

προσταττόμενον. ληπτέον δ' ὁπότερον ἀν ἡ χρή-
19 σιμον. ἄλλος ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ταύτο τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ αἰ-
ρεῖσθαι ὑστερον ἡ πρότερον, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν, οἷον τόδε
τὸ ἐνθύμημα, “εἰ φεύγοντες μὲν ἔμαχόμεθα ὅπως

§§ 10, 11, 17, 19, 30. The *κοινὴ εἱρήνη*, and the *συνθῆκαι πρὸς Ἀλέξ.* both denote the convention at Corinth of the deputies of all the Greek states, with the exception of the Lacedaemonians who refused to appear, in 336 B. C., “which recognised Hellas as a confederacy under the Macedonian prince (Alexander, not Philip) as imperator, president, or executive head and arm.” Grote, u. s. p. 18. The speech *π. τ. π. Ἀλέξ. σ.*, according to the same authority, p. 21, was delivered in 335. But neither Aristotle's quotation, nor the Scholiast's comment, can refer to this speech, as Spengel himself observes. If the Scholiast is right in describing the opposition of Demosthenes as directed against *Philip*, it must be referred to a different speech delivered by him against the *former* agreement of a similar kind with Philip, after Chaeronea, which took place two years earlier than that with Alexander, in 338. Grote, u. s., p. 17. Comp. xi 700. [A. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit*, III 186—193.]

This passage has been already referred to in the Introduction, on the question of the date of publication of the Rhetoric, p. 28; and again, 46 note 2, on the references to Demosthenes in the same work.

'Of the two alternatives (the affirmative or negative side, whether the result is or is not the same, either may be taken, whichever happens to be serviceable'. Or, as Victorius, 'of the two alternatives, which though in themselves different, yet in the result are the same, we may always take that which best suits our argument'.

§ 19. Top. xviii. 'Another (is derived from the natural habit or tendency of mankind) that the same men don't always choose the same things' (Spengel omits *τὸν αὐτὸν* with A^c; Bekker, as usual, retains it) 'after as before (something intermediate, act, occurrence, period), but conversely' (i. e. *do* the second time what they have avoided the first, or *vice versa*); 'of which the following enthymeme is an example'.

ἢ *quære* ἢ? which expresses 'as' (in the way in which), much more naturally than ἢ. This seems to be the required sense: and so I think Victorius understands it, "non eadem iidem homines diversis temporibus sequuntur." The same meaning is very awkwardly expressed, if indeed it is expressed, by rendering ἢ 'or'. In that case *ὑστερον* and *πρότερον* must be 'at one time or another': Riccobon 'posterior vel prius' 'after or before': 'sooner or later'. I will put the question, and leave it to the judgment of others. Which is the more natural expression, the more usual Greek, and more in accordance with the example? 'The same men don't always choose the same things after as before', i. e. the second time, when they have to repeat some action or the like, as the first time, when the circumstances are perhaps different: or, if ἢ be *or*, 'men don't always choose the same things after or before, sooner or later'. Surely the alternative is here out of place; in this case it should be *kai*, not ἢ.

[*ἐνθύμημα*] Victorius interprets this "argumentum *ex contrariis conclusum*:" on which see Introd. pp. 104, 5, Cic. Top. XIII 55. This is the

κατέλθωμεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ὅπως μὴ μαχώμεθα.” ὅτε μὲν γὰρ τὸ μένειν ἀντὶ τοῦ μάχεσθαι

sense in which it is found in the Rhet. ad Alex., Cicero and Quintilian, and was in fact the *common* usage of it. But, as far as I can recollect, it *never* occurs in this special sense, at all events, in Aristotle's Rhetoric; and is in fact one of the leading distinctions between it and the Rhet. ad Alex. Neither was there any occasion to depart here from *his* ordinary use of the term: for enthymemes, i. e. rhetorical inferences in general, are exactly what he is employed in illustrating throughout this chapter.

The original sentence of Lysias begins with, *δευὸν γὰρ ἀν εἰη, ω' Αθηναῖοι, εἰ κ.τ.λ.* ‘For monstrous would it be, men of Athens, if when we were in exile we fought for our return (to be restored to our) home, and now that we *have* returned (been restored) we shall fly to avoid fighting’. We were eager to fight before (this was, as will appear afterwards, with the Lacedaemonians who aided the Thirty), shall we now after our restoration shrink from it? The *example* is an instance of what men are in the habit of doing, viz. changing their minds without reason: the argument, that it is unreasonable, and monstrous at all events to do it now.

κατελθεῖν, to return from exile, prop. ‘down’, *κατά*, viz. to the shore or harbour, at which almost all returned exiles would naturally arrive; either from the interior of the country, *ἀναβαίνειν καταβαίνειν*; or from the open sea into port, *ἀνάγεσθαι* contrasted with *κατάγεσθαι, προσσχεῖν*. Aesch. Choeph. 3, and his own commentary, Arist. Ran. 1163—5.

This is followed by Aristotle's explanation, which is certainly more obscure than what it professes to explain. ‘That is to say (*γάρ*), at one time (before) they preferred staying (where they were, ‘maintaining their ground’) at the price of fighting; at another (*after* their restoration) not fighting at the expense of not staying’, i. e. the *second* time, they preferred *not staying*, quitting the city, to avoid fighting. It is necessary to interpret *ἀντὶ* in this way, not ‘instead of’—if the reading be sound, to bring the explanation into conformity with the example; and thus no alteration is required.

The words quoted by Ar. are taken from a speech of Lysias, of which Dionysius, de Lys, Iud. c. 33, has preserved a long fragment; printed amongst Lysias' speeches as Orat. 34. Baiter et Sauppe *Or. Att.* I 147. [Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit I p. 441 and Jebb's *Attic Orators* I p. 211.] Dion. gives an account of the occasion of it in the preceding chapter. He doubts if it was ever actually delivered. The title of it is, *περὶ τοῦ μὴ καταλύσαι τὴν πάτριον πολιτείαν Αθήνησι*; and its object was to prevent the carrying into effect of a proposal of one Phormisius, one of the restored exiles *μετὰ τοῦ δῆμου*,—this was after the expulsion of the Thirty in 403 B. C., when the demus had been restored and recovered its authority, and the other party were now in exile—to permit the return of the present exiles, but to accompany this by a constitutional change, which should exclude from political rights all but the possessors of land; a measure which would have disfranchised 5000 citizens. The passage here quoted refers to a somewhat different subject. The Lace-

ἥροῦντο, ὅτε δὲ τὸ μὴ μάχεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ μὴ μένειν.
20 ἄλλος τὸ οὖν ἔνεκ' ἀν εἴη, εἰ μὴ γένοιτο, τούτου ἔνεκα

daemonians, who were at hand with their troops, were trying to impose the measure upon them by force, dictating, and ordering, *κελεύοντων, προστάττοντων*, § 6, and apparently preparing to interfere with arms. Lysias is accordingly exhorting the Athenians to resist manfully, and not to give way and quit the city again, after their restoration, for fear of having to fight: and Aristotle—and this is a most striking instance of the difficulty that so frequently arises from Aristotle's haste and carelessness in writing, and also of his constant liability to lapses of memory—quoting from memory, and quoting wrong, and neglecting to mention the occasion of the speech and the name of the author, which he had probably forgotten for the time,—has both altered the words and omitted precisely the two things—δεινὸν ἀν εἴη, which shows what the *inference* is intended to be, and *Λακεδαιμονίοις*—which would have enabled his readers to understand his meaning. The passage of Lysias runs thus : δεινὸν γὰρ ἀν εἴη, ὃ Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ὅτε μὲν ἐφεύγομεν, ἐμαχόμεθα Λακεδαιμονίοις ἵνα κατελθώμευεν, κατελθόντες δὲ φευξόμεθα ἵνα μὴ μαχόμεθα. And it is now pretty clear what the intention of the writer of the fragment was, namely to stimulate the Athenian assembly not to submit to the dictation of the Lacedaemonians and to encounter them if it were necessary in battle, by urging the inconsistency and absurdity of which they would be guilty, if, whilst they were ready to fight before their restoration to their city, now that they were in actual possession of it they should quit it and return into exile, merely to avoid fighting.

§ 20. Top. xix. The wording of this is also very obscure from the extreme brevity. The title of the topic in one of Victorius' MSS is ἐκ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν σκόπον τοῦ λαβόντος, συμβαίνειν, 'inference, from the issue being contrary to the aim or intention of the receiver,'—i. e. a mistake on the part of the receiver of a gift, who takes it as offered with an intention different from the real motive. This however is only a single instance of the application of the topic, and derived solely from the *illustration*, οἷον εἰ δοῖς κ.τ.λ. The true interpretation is, as Brandis expresses it, u. s., p. 20, the general one, "An inference from the possible, to the real, motive," as appears from the examples.

Two readings have to be considered : v. l. followed and explained by Victorius εἰ μὴ γένοιτο, which Bekker (ed. 3) has retained ; and, Vater's conjecture, ἡ γένοιτο, following the Schol., οὐτίνος ἔνεκα εἶναι, ἦτοι, διὸ δίδωμι σοι νομίσματα (this again refers exclusively to the first example). ἡ γένοιτο, ἦτοι ἔδωκα : which at all events seems to shew that *he* read ἡ γένοιτο : this is also expressed in Muretus' version, 'cuius rei causa aliquid est, aut fieri potest,' and adopted by Spengel in his recent edition. To this in what follows εἶναι ἡ γέγενῆσθαι properly corresponds. The translation will then be, 'To say, that the *possible* reason for a fact (*εἶναι*) or motive for an action (*γίγνεσθαι*), (*lit.* that for which anything *might* be, or be done), *that is* the (*true*) reason or motive of the fact or action; as in the case of one giving another something, in order to cause him pain by afterwards taking it away (withdrawing it)'. Here is an ostensible motive—a *gift* being usually intended to cause pleasure—which

φάναι εἶναι ἡ γεγενῆσθαι, οἷον εἰ δοίη ἀν τις τινὶ ἵν' ἀφελόμενος λυπήσῃ. ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ' εἴρηται,
 πολλοῖς ὁ δαίμων οὐ κατ' εὔνοιαν φέρων
 μεγάλα δίδωσιν εύτυχήματ', ἀλλ' ἵνα
 τὰς συμφορὰς λάβωσιν ἐπιφανεστέρας.

conceals the real motive, which is to cause pain; and this is the inference, you infer from the apparent fact or possible motive to the real one; the object of the topic being to assign a motive which suits your argument. Such then is the general meaning of the topic: the examples are all of the possible concealed *motive* or *intention*—which may be bad or good as your argument requires—that being the form in which it is more likely to be of use in Rhetoric. οὐ ἔνεκ' ἀν εἴη ἡ γένοντο ‘that for which so and so would, could, or might be, or be done’, (*would* be naturally or generally, *might* be possibly,) expresses the conditionality or possibility of the fact, motive, or intention, a meaning which is confirmed by ἐνδέχεται γάρ κ.τ.λ., in the explanation of the third example. (I call it the *third*, *οἷον εἰ δοίη ἀν—λυπήσῃ* being an illustration.)

On Victorius' interpretation of *εἰ μὴ γένοντο*, ‘cuius rei caussa aliquid esse potest, quamvis factum non sit,’ Vater says, “sed hoc *quamvis factum non sit*, ad rem non satis facit, neque in exemplis quae sequuntur eo respicitur an haec caussa vera sit necne;” but whether that be so or not, I think that a still better reason may be given for rejecting it, that *εἰ μὴ γένοντο* cannot be rendered *quamvis &c.*, which would require *εἰ καὶ*, or *καὶ εἰ (κεὶ) μὴ γένοντο*. Victorius seems to mean, though the Greek (even independently of *εἰ* for *quamvis*) would hardly I think bear such an interpretation, ‘to assert that what *may* be the cause of a thing (i. e. an act) really is so, although it has not been (or, were not) done at all’; in other words, ‘though it is *not*’: and this, though I cannot think it the right rendering, can scarcely be said to be altogether ‘beside the point.’

On *εἰ δοίη ἀν*, see Appendix on *εἰ δίδωται ἀν*, c. 20. 5, ‘*On ἀν with Optative after certain particles*’ [printed at the end of the notes to this Book].

In conformity with the explanation there given, *δοίη ἀν*, the conditional, is joined with *εἰ*, just as the future might be, of which in fact the conditional (as the *tense* is in French and Italian) is a mere modification.

The first example, from an unknown Tragic poet (Wagner, *Frags. Trag. Gr.* III 186), warns us that ‘Heaven bestows on many great successes or prosperity, which it offers not out of good will, with no kind or benevolent intent, but that the disasters that they (afterwards) meet with may be more marked and conspicuous’—a contrast of the apparent with the real intention, from which an inference may be drawn and applied to a parallel case. Victorius compares Caes. de B. G. I 14 (ad *Helvet. legatum*) *Consuescit deos immortales, quo gravius homines ex commutatione rerum doleant, quos pro scelere eorum ulcisci velint, his secundiores interdum res et diuturniore impunitatem concedere.* [Cf. Claudian's *tolluntur in altum, ut lapsu graviore ruant* (in *Rufinum I. 22, 23*).]

καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Μελεάγρου τοῦ Ἀντιφῶντος,

οὐχ ἵνα κτάνωστι¹ θῆρ', ὅπως δὲ μάρτυρες

p. 102.

ἀρετῆς γένωνται Μελεάγρῳ πρὸς Ἑλλάδα.

καὶ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Αἰαντος τοῦ Θεοδέκτου, ὅτι ὁ Διομήδης προείλετο Ὁδυσσέα οὐ τιμῶν, ἀλλ' ἵνα ἥττων ἡ ὁ ἀκολουθῶν ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τούτου ἔνεκα ποιῆσαι.

¹ οὐχ ἵνα κάνωσι

'And another from Antiphon's Meleager'. Referred to above, II 2. 19, where some account is given of the author, and the story of his play. The author of the Meleager is Antiphon the *Tragic* poet. See also note on II 23. 5, where the lines quoted are probably from some play. Wagner, *Fr. Tr. Gr.* III 113. Antiph. Fr. 3. Conf. Meineke, *Fragm. Com. Gr.* I 315. He suggests *κάνωσι* for *κτάνωσι* (*καίνειν* is found several times in Soph., twice in Aesch., and once in Xen. Cyrop.): Gaisford, *Not. Var.* 327, with much less probability *οὐχ ὡς κτάνωσι*¹. '(The intention is) not to slay the beast, but that Meleager may have witnesses of his valour in the eyes of all Greece'. "Qui locus," says Meineke, i. c., "ex prologo fabulae petitus videtur. Fortissimi quique Graecorum heroes (ita fere apud poetam fuisse videtur) convenerunt, non quo ipsi aprum Calydonium interficiant, sed ut Meleagri virtutem Graecis testificantur."

A third from Theodectes' Ajax (Aj. Frag. 1, Wagner, u. s., p. 118); cited again § 24, and III 15. 10, where the same passage of the play is referred to. It is there employed in illustration of the interpretation of a fact or a motive, favourable or unfavourable according to the requirements of the argument; exactly as in the topic now under consideration. Ar. there explains in much plainer terms its use and application: *κοινὸν δὲ τῷ διαβάλλοντι καὶ τῷ ἀπολυμένῳ, ἐπειδὴ τὸ αὐτὸν ἐνδέχεται πλειόνων ἔνεκα πραχθῆναι, τῷ μὲν διαβάλλοντι κακοηθιστέον ἐπὶ τῷ χείρον ἐκλαμβάνοντι* (putting an unfavourable construction upon the act and its motive), *τῷ δὲ ἀπολυμένῳ ἐπὶ τῷ βελτιον* (the reverse). The same explanation will apply to both quotations alike. Theodectes' play contained no doubt a rhetorical contest—which would be quite in his manner, like Ovid's—between Ajax and Ulysses for the arms of Achilles, in which the argument from the construction of motives would be applied to the fact, by the competitors, in the two opposite senses. Ulysses would refer to the 'preference' (*προείλετο* occurs in both the passages), shewing a sense of his superior merit, implied by Diomedes when he chose him out of all the Greeks to be his companion in the hazardous exploring expedition to Troy by night (Hom. Il. K. 227 seq. Ovid. Met. XIII 238 seq. *Est aliquid de tot Graiorum millibus unum A Diomede legi*, line 241); Ajax would retort that this was not the real motive of Diomedes's choice, but it was that 'the attendant might be inferior to himself' (II 23. 20) or (as it is expressed in III 15. 10), 'because he alone was too mean to be his rival', to compete with him in his achievements, and to share in the renown to be thereby acquired.

Of *ἐνδέχεται*, as illustrating *εἰ δοίη ἄν*, I have already spoken.

¹ Bekker and Spengel both retain *οὐχ ἵνα κτάνωσι!*

21 ἄλλος κοινὸς καὶ τοῖς ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ τοῖς συμβουλεύοντι, σκυπεῖν τὰ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα, καὶ ὧν ἔνεκα καὶ πράττουσι καὶ φεύγουσιν· ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἂν εἰν μὲν ὑπάρχῃ δεῖ πράττειν, εἰν δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, μὴ πράττειν. οἷον εἴ δυνατὸν καὶ ράδιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ φίλοις, ἡ βλαβερὸν ἔχθροις καὶ ἐπιζήμιον, ἡ ἐλάττων ἡ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος. καὶ P. 140 προτρέποντι δὲ ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἀποτρέποντι ἐκ τῶν

§ 21. Top. xx. ‘Another, common to counsellors (in deliberative rhet.) as well as the two parties in forensic pleadings’. This seems to imply that the preceding topic is confined to the forensic branch; and to this, of the three, it is no doubt, most applicable; the suggestion and construction of motives and intentions being there most of all in request. Still in an encounter of two opponents in the public assembly, as in that of Dem. and Aesch., it is almost equally available; and in the remaining branch even more so, as a topic of panegyric or censure. The present topic, like the five preceding, with the partial exception of Top. xv, which appears also amongst the ‘fallacies’ of the de Soph. El., is applicable to Rhetoric alone and does not appear in the dialectical treatise.

It embraces arguments, which may be used in the deliberative kind in exhorting to some act or course of policy, or dissuading from it; and in judicial practice in the way of accusation or defence; in which ‘we have to inquire, first what are the motives and incentives to action, and what things on the contrary deter men from acting. The things which, if they be on our side or are favourable to us, *ἐὰν ὑπάρχῃ*, supply motives for action, are such as possibility, facility, advantage, either to self or friends, (of accomplishing or effecting anything); or anything injurious (hurtful, damaging: that is, the power of injuring) and’ (bringing loss upon, on this form of adj. see note on I 4.9) ‘involving loss to enemies, or (if or when) the (legal) penalty (for doing something) is less than the thing (that is, the thing done, the success of the deed and the profit of it), (“fructus voluptasque quae inde percipitur”: “quod cupiebant quod sequabantur et optabant” Victorius). The construction of the last words, *ἡ ἐλάττων ἡ ζημία τοῦ πράγματος* seems to be, if *construction* it can be called, that *ἡ ζημία* is continued as an apposition to the preceding nominatives; ‘the penalty being less than the profit’ is another incentive to action. ‘From such cases as these, arguments of exhortation or encouragement are drawn, dissuasive from their contraries (impossibility, difficulty, disadvantage, injury, &c.). From these same are derived arguments for accusation and defence: from dissuasives or deterrents, of defence; from persuasives, of accusation’. That is to say, in defending a client from a charge of wrong-doing, you collect all the difficulties, dangers, disadvantages and so on, to which the accused would be exposed in doing what he is charged with, and *infer* from them the improbability of his guilt: in accusing, you urge all or any of the opposite incitements to commit a crime, above enumerated. To these last, the inducements to the com-

ἐναντίων. ἐκ δὲ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων καὶ κατηγοροῦσι καὶ ἀπολογοῦνται· ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀποτρεπόντων ἀπολογοῦνται, ἐκ δὲ τῶν προτρεπόντων κατηγοροῦσιν. ἔστι δὲ ὁ τόπος οὗτος ὅλη τέχνη ἡ τε Παμφίλου καὶ 22 ἡ Καλλίππου. ἄλλος ἐκ τῶν δοκούντων μὲν γίγ-

mission of crime, may be added the topic *cui bono*, ‘Cassianum illud’ [Cic. Phil. II § 35]. Compare with this the passage upon the various motives and inducements to crime and wrong-doing, in I 10. 5 seq., which is there mixed up with a general classification of all sources and causes of action.

‘And of this topic the entire “art” of Pamphilus and Callippus is made up’. Of Callippus it has been already stated, *supra* § 14, that nothing is known but these two notices of Aristotle. It is likely, as I have there pointed out [pp. 271—2], that he was one of the earliest pupils of Isocrates mentioned in his *ἀντίδοσις*, § 93.

Pamphilus, the rhetorician, is mentioned by Cicero, *de Orat.* III 21. 82, together with Corax, in somewhat contemptuous terms, *Pamphilum nescio quem*, and of his Rhetoric, it is said, (*tantam rem*) *tamquam pueriles delicias aliquas depingere*. It is plain therefore that Pamphilus, like Callippus, belonged to the early school of Rhetoricians of the age of Gorgias and the Sophists, and treated his art like them in a ‘puerile’ and unworthy manner. Another, and very brief notice of him occurs in Quintilian, III 6. 34, a chapter on the *status* or *στάσις*; he rejected *finitio*, the *ὅρικὴ στάσις*. Spalding in his note describes the contents of Pamphilus’ ‘art’ from the passage of the *Rhet.*, and then discusses, without coming to a conclusion, the question whether or no this Pamphilus can be identified with a painter of the same name, mentioned in Quint. XII 10. 6, Pliny in several places, and Aristoph. Plut. 385, and the Schol. Spalding has no doubt that Quint.’s Pamphilus, III 6. 34, is the rhetorician. Spengel, *Art. Script.* p. 149, note 83, thinks that he cannot be the same as Aristotle’s, (*erat itaque ille P. non ante Hermagorae tempora,*) in consequence of his acquaintance with *στάσεις*, which were of much later invention, and the name of them unknown even to Ar. The same doubt occurred to myself: but I laid the evil spirit by the consideration that though Aristotle was unacquainted with the technical terms and classification of the *στάσεις*, he yet was familiar with the *thing*, which he frequently refers to; and the *technical expression* may belong to Quintilian and not to Pamphilus. Nine times the name of Pamphilus occurs in the *Orators*, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom. p. 109, ad *Orat. Att.* vol. III,) but the rhetorician is not among them.

§ 22. Top. XXI. The object of this topic is (says Brandis, u. s., p. 20) to weaken the force of arguments from probability. “In incredibilibus provocatur ad effectum, qui si conspicuus sit, resisti non potest quin, quod incredibile videbatur, iam probabile quoque esse fateamur.” Schrader.

‘Another (class of arguments) is derived from things which are believed to come to pass (*γίγνεσθαι*, actually to take place or happen)

νεσθαι ἀπίστων δέ, ὅτι οὐκ ἀν ἔδοξαν, εἰ μὴ ἦν ἡ ἐγγὺς ἦν. καὶ ὅτι μᾶλλον ἡ γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἢ τὰ εἰκότα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν· εἰ οὖν ἀπίστον καὶ μὴ εἰκός, ἀληθὲς ἀν εἴη· οὐ γὰρ διά γε τὸ εἰκός καὶ πιθανὸν δοκεῖ οὕτως. οἶον Ἀνδροκλῆς ἔλεγεν ὁ Πιτθεὺς κατη-

but (still) are beyond (ordinary) belief, (you argue, namely) that they would not have been believed at all, had they not actually been or nearly so': i.e. either *been* in existence, or come so near to it, made so near an approach to it, as to enable us by a slight stretch of imagination to realize it so as to be convinced of its existence. Any case of very close analogy, for instance, to the thing in question might produce this conviction. *ἢ ἐγγὺς* is a saving clause; 'fact or nearly so'. Rhetorical argument does not aim at absolute truth and certainty: it is content with a near approach to it within the sphere of the probable, which is enough for complete persuasion.

'Nay even more', (we may further argue that these at first sight incredible things are even *more* likely to be true than those that *are* at first sight probable. Supply *δοκοῦντά ἔστι* for the constr. and (*μᾶλλον*) *ἀληθῆ* or *ὅτα ἔστι τῶν εἰκότων καὶ πιθανῶν* for the sense): 'because men believe in (suppose, assume the existence of,) things either actual, real or probable: if then it (the thing in question) be incredible and not probable, it must be true; because its probability and plausibility are *not* the ground of our belief in it'. The argument of the last clause is an exemplification of Topic IX, § 10, *suffra*, see note there. It is an inference *ἐκ διαιρέσεως*, 'from division'; a *disjunctive judgment*. All belief is directed to the true *or* the probable: there is no other alternative. All that is believed—and *this* is believed—must therefore be either true or probable: *this* is not probable; therefore it must be true. *ἀληθές more antiquae philosophiae* identifies truth and being: *ἀληθές* here = *ὅτι*.

In other words, the antecedent improbability of anything may furnish a still stronger argument for its reality than its probability. Anything absolutely incredible is denied at once, unless there be some unusually strong evidence of its being a *fact*, however paradoxical. That the belief of it is actually entertained is the strongest proof that it is a *fact*: for since no one would have supposed it to be true without the strongest evidence, the evidence of it, of whatever kind, must be unusually strong. The instance given is an exemplification of the topic in its first and simplest form.

'As Androcles of Pitthus' (or Pithus, whence *ὁ Πιτθεύς*; an Attic deme, of the tribe Cecropis) 'replied in the charge he brought against the law, to the clamour with which he was assailed by them' (the assembly, before which he was arraigning the existing state of the law) 'for saying "the laws require a law to correct them and set them right" which they thought highly improbable—"why so do fish require salt (to keep them from corruption), though it is neither probable nor plausible that bred as they are in brine (the salt sea) they should require salt: and so does

γορῶν τοῦ νόμου, ἐπεὶ ἔθορύβησαν αὐτῷ εἰπόντι “δέονται οἱ νόμοι νόμου τοῦ διορθώσοντος,” “καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἰχθύες ἀλός, καίτοι οὐκ εἰκὸς οὐδὲ πιθανὸν ἐν ἄλμῃ τρεφομένους δεῖσθαι ἀλός, καὶ τὰ στέμφυλα ἔλαιον· καίτοι ἄπιστον, ἐξ ὧν ἔλαιον γίνεται, ταῦτα δεῖσθαι 23 ἔλαιον.” ἄλλος ἐλεγκτικός, τὸ τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα σκοπεῖν, εἴ τι ἀνομολογούμενον ἐκ πάντων καὶ χρόνων

oil-cake' (*στέμφυλα*, the cake or mass of olives remaining after the oil has been pressed out) 'require oil (for the same reason), though it is highly improbable that the very thing that produces oil should require oil itself'. Here we have an improbable statement which is shewn by two close analogies to be after all very near (*ἔγγύς*) the truth.

Of Androcles, and the time and circumstances of his proposed alteration of the laws, nothing is known but what appears in our text. The names of three Androcleses occur in the Orators, (Sauppe, Ind. Nom. p. 13, *Or. Att.* III) of which the first, mentioned by Andocides *περὶ μνστρηλον* § 27, may possibly be the speaker here referred to. The Androcles of Thuc. VIII 65, (comp. Grote, *H. G.* VIII 43 [c. LXII], Plut. Alcib. c. 19,) the accuser and opponent of Alcibiades, assassinated in 411 B.C. by the agents of Pisander and the oligarchical party, is most likely identical with Andocides; the time of the events referred to in both authors being nearly the same. I think upon the whole that it is not improbable that Thucydides, Andocides and Aristotle may mean the same person¹.

στέμφυλα] Ar. Nub. 45, Equit. 806, was a common article of food in Attica. It denoted not only the cake of pressed olives, but also of grapes from which the juice had been squeezed. Phrynicus, s. v., has *οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τὰ τῶν βοτρύων ἐκπιέσματα ἀμαθῶς· οἱ δὲ Ἀττικοί στέμφυλα ἔλαιων.* Suidas, on the other hand, *τὸ ἔκδυμα τῆς σταφυλῆς ἢ τῶν ἔλαιων, οἵς ἀντὶ ὅψιν ἔχρωντο*, and to the same effect, Hesychius. Also Galen, ap. Lobeck, note. Lobeck settles the matter by quoting Geoponic. VI 12. 435, *εἰδέναι χρή ὅτι στέμφυλα οὐχ, ὡς τινές νομίζουσι, τῶν ἔλαιων μόνον ἔστι πυρῆνες, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ τῶν σταφυλῶν γίγαρτα.* (*πυρῆνες* must surely be a mistake; no amount of pressing could ever convert grape-stones or olive-kernels into an *ὅψιν*, a dainty or relish, and moreover what is here said, that the oil proceeds from the *στέμφυλα*, shews that the cake is made of the olives themselves, and not of the mere stones.) The word occurs frequently, as might be expected, in the fragments of the Comic writers: see the Index to Meineke's Collection.

§ 23. Top. XXII. 'Another, to be employed in refutation', (i. e. of an adversary; which, real or imaginary, is always implied in refutation. The office of the *ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα* is *τὰ ἀνομολογούμενα συνάγειν*, 'to conclude contradictions', II 22. 15, and note: see also Introd. ad h. l.

¹ The writer of the Article *Androcles*, in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.*, has no doubt upon this point. He says on this passage, "Ar. has preserved a sentence from one of Androcles' speeches, *in which he used an incorrect figure!*".

καὶ πράξεων καὶ λόγων, χωρὶς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀμφισ-
βητοῦντος, οἷον “καὶ φησὶ μὲν φιλεῖν ὑμᾶς, συνώ-
μοσε δὲ τοῖς τριάκοντα,” χωρὶς δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ, “καὶ
φησὶ μὲν εἶναι με φιλόδικον, οὐκ ἔχει δὲ ἀποδεῖξαι
δεδικασμένον οὐδεμίαν δίκην,” χωρὶς δ’ ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ καὶ
τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, “καὶ οὗτος μὲν οὐ δεδάνεικε
πώποτ’ οὐδέν, ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς λέλυμαι ὑμῶν.”

24 ἄλλος τοῖς προδιαβεβλημένοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις καὶ p. 103
πράγμασιν, ἢ δοκοῦσι, τὸ λέγειν τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ πα-

p. 263 and note—) is to take into consideration (and argue from) all contradictions, repugnances, disagreements (between your statements or conduct, and the opponent's), whatever contradiction may be derived from all times (conflicting *dates*), actions and words; separately (distinctly; there are three distinct modes of employing it) in the case of the adverse party, as for instance, “and he says he loves you, and yet he conspired with the Thirty”: the thirty tyrants namely, after Aegospotami, B. C. 404: this is from the deliberative branch: ‘and separately in your own case (as applied to your own conduct, *πράξεις*), “and he says that I am litigious, and yet he can't prove that I have ever brought a single case into court.” and again, distinguished from the preceding, the application of it to oneself *and* the opponent (in the way of a contrast of two opposite characters and modes of conduct), “and he has never lent any one a single penny, whilst I have even ransomed (got you liberated, λέλυμαι,) many of you (out of captivity).” This last example reminds us of the contrast drawn by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. pp. 412, 13, seq., of his own character and conduct as compared with that of the rest of the ambassadors to Philip, Aeschines, Philocrates and Phrynon: in which the ransom of captives plays an important part.

This is Cicero's *locus ex repugnantibus*, Top. III 11, IV 21, where it is illustrated by an example, which concludes, *repugnat enim recte accipere et invitum reddere*. And further, XII 53 seq. Quintilian, V 10. 74, *Ex pugnantibus, Qui est sapiens stultus non est. Ib. 8. 5, ex repugnantibus.*

§ 24. Top. xxiii. The title of this topic ‘in scripto quodam libro’ apud Victorium, is ἀπὸ τοῦ λεγομένης τῆς αἵριας λύεσθαι διαβολήν.

‘Another, for’ (the benefit of; the *dative* seems to follow λέγειν;) ‘those that have been previously brought into suspicion or odium, (whether by actual calumny) or suspected’ (thought to be, having the appearance of being, δοκοῦσι, guilty of something wrong, for some *other* reason —so Vater, reading ἢ δοκοῦσι), ‘both men and things, is to state the reason for the (otherwise) unaccountable circumstance: for there must be *some* reason (δι' ὃ is the *αἵρια*,) for this appearance (of guilt)’. MS A^c has μὴ δοκοῦσι, which Victorius adopts and defends. All the recent edd. have ἢ. Victorius understands by μὴ δοκοῦσι a qualification of *προδιαβεβλημένοις*, to express the unexpected, apparently unreasonable, nature

ραδόξου· ἔστι γάρ τι δί' ὁ φαινεται. οἶνον ὑποβε-
βλημένης τινὸς τὸν αὐτῆς νιὸν διὰ τὸ ἀσπάζεσθαι

of the calumny or suspicion, which seems to be quite unsuitable to the character and circumstances of the object of it: “quae tamen nullo modo haerere ipsis videatur, quod alienae ab ea sint.” This agrees extremely well with the *παραδόξου* following, and this reading and explanation is deserving at all events of consideration. It supposes *only one* case to be contemplated, that of *unjust* suspicion and consequent calumny. Vater on the contrary thinks that there are *two* cases intended, direct calumny, and suspicion *for any other reason*; and that this requires η δοκοῦσι. His transl. is, “Homines significantur, qui propter calumniam vel alia de caussa videantur aliquo modo affecti esse.” This is not very clear; but I suppose his meaning to be what I have said. In this case we must understand *ἀδικήσαι*, or something equivalent, after δοκοῦσι. Spengel, in his recent edition, says that Victorius’ reading and interpretation is refuted by the sense of the passage—which I cannot agree with—and that διαβεβληθεῖσαι must be understood after η δοκοῦσιν. But what is the meaning of ‘apparent’ calumny? and how is it distinguished from the other?

There is another point which has hitherto escaped observation, viz. the interpretation of *καὶ ἄνθρωποις καὶ πράγμασι*. Victorius interprets it as in apposition to *τοῖς διαβεβλημένοις*, ‘qui valet ad purgandas alias et personas et res,’ which at first sight seems the most natural and obvious explanation, and I have adopted it in my translation. But then, what are the *things* that can be calumniated or brought under suspicion? One might suppose that it means human actions: but Victorius renders it *res*; and in fact actions are necessarily included in *τοῖς διαβεβλημένοις*; they are *the* things that are subject to misinterpretation; and therefore there is no ground for a distinction between *men* and their *actions*, so far at least as they are subject to calumny. I will venture to suggest, though not with complete confidence, that we might give the words a different construction, and understand them thus, “for the benefit of those who have been unjustly—we must in this case read $\mu\eta$ δοκοῦσιν, unlikely to be guilty—subjected to suspicion, *by* men (by human agency, directly) or by circumstances” (indirectly; which would be equivalent to Vater’s second case). At all events it makes very good sense.

We now come to a still greater difficulty, the interpretation of *ὑπο-βεβλημένης* in the example. A° reads διαβεβλημένης τινὸς πρὸς τὸν νιὸν ‘when a certain woman had been brought into suspicion with respect to (i. e. as to her conduct or dealings with) her son’, which gives a very sufficient sense, but is rejected by Victorius as well as Bekker and Spengel and modern editors in general.

Victorius’ rendering—and no other Commentary that I have seen has a word on the subject—is as follows; I must give it in his own words as it will hardly bear translation. “Ceu cum mater quaedam filium subiisset, corporique ipsius corpus suum supposuisset, ut commode eum osculari posset, in eo habitu corporis spectata visa est stuprum cum adolescenti exercere.” *ὑποβεβλημένης* is translated literally.

έδόκει συνεῖναι τῷ μειρακίῳ, λεχθέντος δὲ τοῦ αἰτίου ἐλύθη ἡ διαβολή· καὶ οἶον ἐν τῷ Αἴαντι τῷ Θεοδέκτου Ὁδυσσεὺς λέγει πρὸς τὸν Αἴαντα, διότι ἀνδρειότερος 25 ὥν τοῦ Αἴαντος οὐ δοκεῖ. ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰτίου, ἀν τε ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι ἔστι, καν μὴ ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· ἄμα γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ οὐ αἴτιον, καὶ ἀνευ αἰτίου οὐθέν

I see no other meaning that can be attached to the words as the text at present stands, but it must be observed that ὑποβεβλημένης τὸν αἰτῆς νιόν is very strange Greek for *supposuisse filium corpori suo*, and I do not see how it can be justified. The accus. after ὑποβάλλειν represents not the thing *under which* you throw something, but the thing that you *throw under* something else: and the *passive* ὑποβεβλημένης meaning ‘*throwing herself under*’, is possible perhaps, but by no means usual, Greek. The ordinary construction of ὑποβάλλειν with two objects, appears in these examples. The object *thrown* is in the accus.; the object under which it is thrown is either in the dat. or has a prepos. introduced before it. ὑποβάλλειν πλευροῖς πλευρά, Eur. Or. 223, ὑποβ. ἀμφὶ μαστὸν σποδόν, Suppl. 1160. Xen. Oecon. 18. 5, ὑπ. τὰ ἄτριπτα ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας. Plut. Brut. 31, ὑπ. τοῖς ξίφεσιν τὰς σφαγάς, and similarly in the metaph. applications of it (from Rost and Palm’s Lex.). On the genit. ὑποβεβλημένης see note on II 8. 10.

The general meaning of the whole is, that a mother had been seen in this position which she had assumed for the purpose of embracing her *own son*—which was not known to the witness—was accordingly subjected to the suspicion of illicit intercourse with him: and we are to suppose further, that her character hitherto had been unimpeachable: when the true reason was explained or stated, the calumny was at once quashed (dissolved or unloosed as a knot). On this sense of λύειν, διαλύειν, &c. see note in Introd. on II 25, p. 267, note 1.

A second example is taken from the argument between Ajax and Ulysses in the contest for the arms of Achilles, in Theodectes’ tragedy ‘the Ajax’, already referred to § 20 *supra*: where Ulysses tells Ajax ‘why (the reason, which explains the paradox), though he is really braver than Ajax, he is not thought to be so.’ What the reason was we are not told; nor does Ovid. Met. xiii supply the deficiency.

On διότι and its three senses, see note on I 1. 11.

§ 25. Top. xxiv. *ἀντὸν τοῦ αἰτίου*] the inference ‘from cause to effect.’ ‘If the cause be there (its effect which necessarily follows, must be there too, and) the fact (alleged) is so: if absent, then (its effect is absent too, and) it is not so: for cause and effect always go together, and without a cause (i.e. its proper cause) nothing is’. Brandis, u. s., p. 20, observes, that this like the preceding topics is confined to Rhetoric. Cicero, Top. §§ 58–67, treats of cause in general and its varieties: but has nothing exactly corresponding to this, though he speaks of the great importance of the general topic to orators (65–7). Quintilian, observing that the “*argumentatio, qua colligi solent ex iis quae faciunt ea quae efficiuntur, aut contra, quod genus a causis vocant,*”

ἐστιν. οἶον Λεωδάμας ἀπελογούμενος ἐλεγε, κατηγορήσαντος Θρασυβούλου ὅτι ἦν στηλίτης γεγονὼς

is nearly akin to that of antecedent and consequent, v 10. 80, exemplifies it in the four following sections.

‘Leodamas, for instance, said in his defence, when charged by Thrasybulus with having had his name inscribed on the column (as a mark of infamy) in the Acropolis, only he had struck (or cut) it out in the time of ‘the Thirty’, replied that it was impossible; for the Thirty could have trusted him more if the record of his hatred of the *people* had remained engraved on the column’. The fact is denied on the ground of the absence of a *sufficient cause*: an example of the second case, the negative application of the topic, *ἀν μὴ ὑπάρχῃ*.

On Leodamas, see on I 7. 13, and the reff. Sauppe, ad Orat. Fragm. XVI, *Or. Att.* III 216, thinks it impossible that the two Leodamases mentioned by Ar., here and I 7. 13, can be the same [*mit Recht*, A. Schaefer, *Dem. u. s. Zeit.* I p. 129 n.]. He argues that the Leodamas whose name was inscribed on the column as a ‘traitor’ (*in proditorum indice inscr.*), according to Thrasybulus, before the domination of the Thirty, that is, not later than 404 B.C. (he says 405), when he must have been about thirty years old¹, could not have been the Leodamas mentioned by Demosth. c. Lept. § 146, as one of the Syndics under the Leptinean law, in 355 B.C., and consequently, that the latter, the famous orator of Acharnae, must have been a different person, because he would then have been nearly 90. Clinton, *F. H.* II 111, sub anno 372—3, merely says, quoting Rhet. II 23. 25, “From this incident it appears that Leodamas was already grown up and capable of the duties of a citizen in B.C. 404, which shews him far advanced in years at the time of the cause of Leptines, in B.C. 355.” And this appears to me to be a sufficient account of the matter. Thrasybulus’ accusation of Leodamas is mentioned likewise by Lysias, c. Evandr. § 13, et seq.

The circumstances referred to in this accusation and defence, and the meaning and intention of the inscription which Leodamas is said to have effaced, are not quite clear. The use of the *στήλη* or pillar here referred to was twofold: the object of it in either case was the same, to perpetuate the memory of some act or character to all future time. But the fact or character commemorated might be either good or evil; and in the former case it was the name of a public benefactor, in the latter of some signal malefactor or public enemy, that was inscribed. It is usual to apply the latter explanation to the case here in question, which is probably what is meant; and then it seems the story must be this:—At some uncertain time previous to the expulsion of the thirty tyrants and their Lacedaemonian supporters by Thrasybulus and his friends, the recovery of the city, and restoration of the demus in 403 B.C., the name of Leodamas had been inscribed as a mark of infamy—as a traitor to his country, as Sauppe u. s. and Herm. *Pol. Ant.* § 144. II interpret it—according to custom on a pillar erected in the Acropolis for that purpose. Now if it was ‘hatred to the demus’ that was engraved on it (*έγγεγραμμένης*) as

¹ Je n'en vois pas la nécessité.

ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει, ἀλλ' ἐκκόψαι ἐπὶ τῶν τριάκοντα· οὐκ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἔφη· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἂν πιστεύειν αὐτῷ τοὺς τριάκοντα ἐγγεγραμμένης τῆς ἔχθρας πρὸς τὸν

the sign and cause of his imputed infamy, it follows that it must have been erected at some period when the popular party was in the ascendant; Leodamas of course being a supporter of the oligarchs. When his friends were in power and he had the opportunity, Thrasybulus charges him, *inter alia* of course, with having ‘struck or cut it out’ to efface the record. He denies the possibility of their effect by arguing the absence of all assignable *cause*, which could have produced it: for this permanent record of his ‘hostility to the people’ would have been an additional recommendation to the Thirty, who would have trusted him all the more for it. Thrasybulus, says Victorius, was accusing Leodamas of being an enemy and a traitor to his country; and one of the arguments he brought forward was the existence of this inscription, the subsequent disappearance of which he attempted to explain. He likewise cites in illustration of the use of the topic Cic. pro Mil. § 32, cum ostendere vellet insidiatorem fuisse Clodium. *Quonam igitur pacto probari potest insidias Miloni fecisse Clodium? satis est quidem in illa tam audaci tam nefaria bellua docere magnam ei caussam, magnam spem in Milonis morte propositam, magnas utilitates fuisse.* And, as Cic. goes on to remark, this is *Cassianum illud, cui bono fuerit.*

Of *στήλη* the pillar, and *στηλίτης*, the person whose name is engraved on it, in its unfavourable sense, where the inscription is a record of infamy—which may be compared with our use of the pillory, the custom of *posting* the name of a defaulter at the Stock Exchange, or a candidate who has disgraced himself in an examination; the object in each case being the same, exposure of the culprit, and a warning to others¹; the difference between the ancient and modern usages, that the latter are temporary, the other permanent—the following are examples: Andoc. περὶ μνστ. § 78, in a Ψήφισμα: Lycurg. c. Leocr. § 117, ποιήσαντες στήλην, ἀναγράφειν τοὺς ἀλεπρίους καὶ τοὺς προδότας: Demosth. Phil. Γ § 42, where an historical example is given, and the whole process described. Isocr. περὶ τοῦ ζεύγους, § 9, στηλίτην ἀναγράφειν.

Of the favourable sense, Victorius quotes an instance from Lys. c. Agorat. § 72, προσγραφῆναι εἰς τὴν στήλην ὡς εὐεργέτας ὅντας. Herm. Pol. Ant. u. s. See also Sandys' note on Isocr. Paneg. § 180.

ἐκκόψαι] Ar. seems here to have arbitrarily departed from his original constr. Having begun with *κατηγορεῖν* and *ὅτι ἦν*, he abruptly changes to the infin. as if *λέγειν* and not *κατηγορεῖν* had preceded: so that

¹ At Milan, says Manzoni, Introd. to the ‘*Storia della colonna infame*,’ in 1830, the judges condemned to the most horrible tortures some persons who were accused of having helped to spread the plague, and in addition to other severe penalties, *decretaron di più, che in quello spazio* (where the house of one of the condemned had stood) *s' innalzassee una colonna, la quale dovesse chiamarsi infame, con un' iscrizione che tramandassee ai posteri la notizia dell' attentato et della pena.* *E in ciò non s' ingannarono: quel giudizio fu veramente memorabile.*

26 δῆμον. ἄλλος, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο βέλτιον ἄλλως ἢ ἐνδέχεται ὡν ἢ συμβουλεύει ἢ πράττει ἢ πέπραχε σκοπεῖν· φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, εἰ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, οὐ πέπραχεν· οὐδὲὶς γὰρ ἐκὼν τὰ φαῦλα καὶ γιγνώσκων προαιρεῖται· P. 1400.δ. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος· πολλάκις γὰρ ὕστερον γίνεται δῆλον πῶς ἦν πρᾶξαι βέλτιον, πρότερον δὲ ἀδῆλον.

27 ἄλλος, ὅταν τι ἐναντίον μέλλῃ πράττεσθαι τοῖς πε-

we must supply λέγειν to explain the government of the infinitive. It cannot be the optative.

§ 26. Top. xxv. ‘Another, to consider whether it ever was, or is still, possible to improve (do better, more advantageously, under more favourable conditions,) in any other way (by following any other course, by any alteration of time, place, conditions, circumstances), any (bad) advice (which the counsellor is charged with having given, Vict.), or anything which he is doing, or ever has done (anything wrong that he is either meditating or has committed), (you infer) that, if this be *not* so (if he has *not* taken advantage of these possible improvements, which would have contributed to the success of his advice or design), he is not guilty at all ; because (no one would ever neglect such opportunities if he had it in his power to avail himself of them) no one, intentionally and with full knowledge, ever prefers the worse to the better.’ It seems from the omission of *συμβουλεύει* and *πράττει*, and the prominence given to *πέπραχεν* the *past act* in the explanation of the reason, that although this topic *may* be applied to deliberative oratory, it is much more usual and useful in defending yourself or a client in a court of law. You say, My client cannot be guilty of the act with which you charge him, for he could have done it much better, would be much more likely to have been successful, in some other way ; at some other time, and place, or under other circumstances : therefore, since he has *not* chosen to do the thing in the best way that he could, and at the same time had full knowledge of what *was* the best way of doing it, it is plain that he has not done it now under less favourable circumstances. This is excellently illustrated by Victorius from another passage of Cic. pro Mil. XVI 41. In retorting upon Clodius the charge of lying in wait to assassinate, he first enumerates several favourable opportunities which Milo had previously neglected to avail himself of, and asks whether it was likely that, having acted thus, he should now choose an occasion when time and circumstances were so much less favourable, to carry out such a design: *Quem igitur cum omnium gratia noluit (occidere), hunc voluit cum aliquorum querela? quem iure, quem loco, quem tempore, quem impune non est ausus, hunc iniuria, iniquo loco, alieno tempore, periculo capitinis, non dubitavit occidere?*

‘But there is a fallacy in this : for it often does not become clear till afterwards (after the commission of the act) how the thing might have been better done, whereas before it was anything but clear’.

§ 27. Top. xxvi. ‘Another, when anything is about to be done

πραγμάτευοις, ἀμα σκοπεῖν· οίον Ξενοφάνης Ἐλεάταις ἐρωτῶσιν εἰ θύωσι τῇ Λευκοθέᾳ καὶ θρηνῶσιν, οὐ μή, συνεβούλευεν, εἰ μὲν θεὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι, μὴ θρηνεῖν,

opposed to what has been done already (by the same person), to look at them together': i. e. to bring together things that had been hitherto separate, and so to be able to compare them—παράλληλα φανερὰ μᾶλλον *infra* § 30; παράλληλα τὰ ἔναντια μᾶλιστα φαίνεσθαι, III 2. 9, 9. 8, II. 9, 17. 13, παράλληλα μᾶλλον τὰντια γνωρίζεται—a process which clearly brings out the contradiction. Brandis u. s. [*Philologus* IV i] p. 20 thus expresses the argument of the topic, "to detect a contradiction in the action in question." It seems in itself, and also from the example selected, to be most appropriate in giving advice.

'As Xenophanes, when the Eleates (his present fellow-citizens) consulted him, asked his advice, whether they are to offer sacrifices and dirges to Leucothea, or not; advised them, if they supposed her to be a goddess not to sing dirges (a *funeral* lament implying death and mortality); if a mortal, not to offer sacrifices'. Xenophanes here, by bringing the two practices into immediate comparison—if the example is meant to represent literally the statement of the topic, we must suppose that the Eleates *had already* done one of the two; deified her most likely; and now wanted to know whether they should do the other—makes the contradiction between sacrificing to (which they had done), and lamenting as dead (which they were about to do), the same person.

Of Xenophanes—of Colophon, but then living at Elea, or Velia, where he founded the Eleatic school—we have already had notice in I 15. 29, and II 23. 18.

εἰ θύωσι] *εἰ* being here equivalent to *πότερον*, admits equally with it of construction with the deliberative conjunctive: compare the same deliberative conjunctive in interrogation, as a modified doubtful future; *τί ποιῶμεν*; 'what *are* we to do?' instead of the direct, 'what shall we do?' Matth. *Gr. Gr.* 526.

This passage is cited by Lobeck, *Aglaophamus, Eleus.* § 21, Vol. I. p. 167.

Plutarch refers more than once to this dictum of Xenophanes, but supposes it to have been addressed to the Egyptians, about the worship of Osiris, and the propriety of *θρῆνοις* in his honour. De Superst. c. 13, p. 171 E, Amator. c. 18, 763 D, de Is. et Osir. c. 70, 379 B. Wyttensbach ad loc. de Superst. Athen. xv 697 A, quoting Aristotle, *ἐν τῇ ἀπολογίᾳ, εἰ μὴ κατέψευσται ὁ λόγος*: apud eundem.

Ino, daughter of Cadmus and Harmonia, and wife of Athamas, in a fit of madness inspired by Hera, threw herself and her son Melicertes—two sons, Eur. Med. 1289; see the whole passage, 1279—1292—into the sea. Both of them became sea deities: she under the name of Leucothea, Melicertes of Palaemon. Virg. Georg. I 436—7. The stories of Athamas and Ino are told under those two names in Smith's *Dict. Biogr.* Cic. Tusc. Disp. I 12. 28. de Nat. D. III 15. 39 *in Graecia multos*

28 εἰ δὲ ἄνθρωπον, μὴ θύειν. ἄλλος τόπος τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἀμαρτηθέντων κατηγορεῖν ἢ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, οἷον ἐν τῇ Καρκίνου Μῆδείᾳ οἱ μὲν κατηγοροῦσιν ὅτι τοὺς παιδας ἀπέκτεινεν, οὐ φαίνεσθαι γοῦν αὐτούς· ἡμαρτε γὰρ ἢ Μῆδεια περὶ τὴν ἀποστολὴν τῶν παιδῶν· ἢ δὲ ἀπο-

habent ex hominibus deos—Leucotheam quae fuit Ino, et eius Palaemonem filium cuncta Graecia.

§ 28. Top. XXVII. ‘Another, from mistakes made; to be employed in accusation or defence’. The example is an illustration of both; the accusers convert the mistake that Medea made in sending away her children into a charge of having murdered them; Medea retorts the same argument from *another* mistake which she could have committed had she done what they allege, of which however she is incapable. Brandis, “in any mistake that has been made to find a ground of accusation or defence.”

‘For instance, in Carcinus’ Medea, the one party (of the disputants in the play) charge her with the death of her children—at all events (say they) they no where appear: because Medea made a mistake in (in respect of) sending away her children (instead of merely sending them away, they argued that she had made away with them, since they were no where to be found): her defence is, that it was not her children, but Jason, that she would have killed (if she had killed any one); for she would have made a mistake in failing to do this, if she had done the other too’: and of such a mistake she never could have been guilty. “Quasi dicat, quomodo tam stulta fuisse” (how could I have made such a mistake?) ‘ut innocentes filios necassem; perfidum autem coniugem et auctorem omnium meorum malorum relinquerem?’ Victorius.

Carcinus, a tragic poet contemporary with Aristophanes, and his sons, Philocles, Xenotimus, and Xenocles, are often mentioned by Aristophanes, never without ridicule. See Vesp. 1501—12, Nub. 1261, Pac. 782, 864, and in Holden, *Ouom. Arist.* Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* c. XXVI § 2, passes him over with very slight notice, “known to us chiefly from the jokes and mockeries of Aristophanes.” Meineke, *Hist. Crit. Com. Gr.* p. 505 seq., *Fragm. Comic.* Vol. I., has a long and learned discussion, principally with the object of distinguishing this Carcinus from others of the same name. There was at all events one other tragic poet of the name, whom Meineke supposes to have been the grandson of the former, p. 506, being said by Suidas to be the son of Xenocles (or Theodectes). This Carcinus flourished according to Suidas ‘before the reign of Philip of Macedon’, in the first half of the 4th cent. B.C. Some fragments of his Achilles, Semele, and Tereus, are given by Wagner in his collection, *Fragm. Trag. Gr.* III 96, seq. with some others of uncertain plays: but he has omitted all those that are mentioned by Aristotle, the Medea here, the Oedipus in III 16. 11, the Thyestes, Poet. 16. 2. In Poet. 17. 2, there is a reference to a character, Amphiaraus, in a play of his not named, with which Ar. finds fault. Athen. I 22 A. See also Clinton, *F. H.* II. Introd. XXIII.

λογεῖται ὅτι οὐκ ἀν τοὺς παῖδας ἀλλὰ τὸν Ἰάσονα ἀν
ἀπέκτεινεν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἡμαρτεν ἀν μὴ ποιήσασα,
εἴπερ καὶ θάτερον ἐποίησεν. ἔστι δὲ ὁ τόπος οὗτος
τοῦ ἐνθυμήματος καὶ τὸ εἶδος ὅλη ἡ πρότερον Θεο-
δώρου τέχνη. ἄλλος ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, οὗν ὡς ὁ
Σοφοκλῆς

σαφῶς Σιδηρὼ καὶ φοροῦσα τούνομα,

'And this topic and the kind of enthymeme is the whole of the earlier art of Theodorus'. Comp. *supra* § 14 of Callippus, and § 21, of Callippus and Pamphilus.

[*ἡ πρότερον Θ. τέχνη*] i. e. *ἡ πρότερον οὖσα, γεγραμμένη, πεποιημένη*: as *οἱ πρώτοι*, 'the earliest writers', III 1. 9. Theodorus' work must have passed through two editions, of which the second, from what is said here, seems to have been larger and more complete. This one is the 'first' or 'earlier' edition; the one *before* the second. If this contained nothing but the illustration of the topic of 'mistakes', it must have been extremely insufficient as an 'art of rhetoric'. We must ascribe either to his second and enlarged 'Art' or to speeches and rhetorical exercitations all that Aristotle says of him, together with Tisias and Thrasyphorus, *de Soph.* El. c. 34, 183 b 32, as well as the *κανὰ λέγειν*, *Rhet.* III 11. 6, and his divisions of the speech, III 13. 5; as also the notices of him in Plato's *Phaedrus*, Quintilian, Cicero *Brut.* XII 48, &c., Dionysius, &c. (which may be found in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX. III 284 foll.¹). Of Theodorus of Byzantium—to be distinguished from another Theodorus, a rhetorician of Gadara, Quint. II 15. 21—see further in Speng. *Art. Script.* p. 98 seq.; Westermann, *Gesch. der Beredtsamkeit*, § 30. 16, p. 40, § 68. 7, p. 140. Sauppe, *Fragm. Or. Att.* VIII, *Or. Att.* III 164, simply refers to Spengel's *Artium Scriptores*, and to his own tract in *Zimmerm. diurn. lit. antiqu.* 1835, p. 406. [Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, I p. 253.]

§ 29. Top. xxviii. The argument, *ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος, significant names*: "which draws an inference from the signification of a name." Brandis. A dialectical topic akin to, but by no means identical with, this, (the one is confined to surnames, the other extends to all words in general,) occurs in Top. B 6, 112 a 32, to consider the derivation and signification of names with a view to applying them as suits the immediate purpose: which coincides more nearly with Cicero's topic, *quum ex vi nominis argumentum elicetur, quam Graeci ἐτυμολογίαν vocant* Top. VIII. 35 seq., than with the rhetorical form of it as it appears here; though both of the others may be regarded as including this special rhetorical application. But in the rhetorical treatise, the *de Inv.* II 9. 28, we have the same use of names (i. e. surnames) suggested as by Ari-

¹ In referring to this paper I take the opportunity of withdrawing all that I have said in p. 286, *ἡ πρότερον Θεοδώρου τέχνη*, and the illustration from Carcinus. It is sufficiently corrected in the note on this section.

stotle: *Nam et de nomine nonnumquam aliquid suspicionis nascitur... ut si dicamus idcirco aliquem Caldum vocari, quod temerario et repentina consilio sit.*

Quintilian, v 10. 30, 31, thinks that an argument can seldom be drawn from a surname, except in the case of such significant names as are assigned for a reason, as *Sapiens* (Cato and Laelius), *Magnus* (Pompey), and *Plenus*(?); or where the name is not significant, but suggests a crime—as the name Cornelius, in the case of Lentulus, was suggestive of conspiracy (for a reason there given). The use of the name recommended by Aristotle's topic (which he does not mention) is pronounced, in the case of Euripides—who represents Eteocles as attacking the name of his brother Polynices, *πολὺ νείκος, ut argumentum morum—* as insipid and tasteless, *frigidum*. It is however 'a frequent material for jokes; especially in the hands of Cicero, who freely employs it, as in the case of Verres'. The passage of Euripides referred to, is Phoen. 636–7; Eteocles terminates the altercation with his brother with the two lines, *ἔξιθ' ἐκ χώρας δὲ ληθῶς δ' ὄνομα Πολυνείκη πατήρ ἔθετο σοι θείᾳ προνοίᾳ νεικέων ἐπώνυμον.* With this use of significant names all readers of the Greek Tragic poets are familiar. It is not to be regarded in them as a mere play on words, but they read in the significant name the character or destiny of its bearer: and thus employed they have a true tragic interest. It is singular therefore that Elmsley, who had certainly studied the Greek dramatists with care and attention, should, on Bacch. 508, after citing a number of examples, end his note with this almost incredible observation, "Haec non modo ψυχρά sunt" (is the epithet borrowed from Quintilian?), "verum etiam tragicos malos fuisse grammaticos. Quid enim commune habent Ἀπόλλων et ἀπολλύναι praeter soni similitudinem?" And this is all that is suggested by Ajax's pathetic exclamation, *αλ αλ τίς ἀν ποτ' φερ' κ.τ.λ.* Soph. Aj. 430, and the rest! Elmsley has omitted Aesch. S. c. T. 658, *ἐπωνύμῳ δὲ κάρτα Πολυνείκη λέγω*, from his list; and Eur. Antiope, Fr. 1 (Dind., Wagner), and Fragn. 2, Ibid. Agath. Fragn. Thyest. 1 ap. Wagn. Fr. Tr. Gr. III 74. Add from other sources, Dante *Div. Com. Purg.* XIII. 109, *Savia non fui, avviegna che Sapia fossi chiamata.* Shaksp. *Rich. II.*, Act II. Sc. I 73, Gaunt. *O how that name befits my composition! Old Gaunt indeed; and gaunt in being old, &c.* The king asks, *Can sick men play so nicely with their names?* No, is the reply, miserly makes sport to mock itself, &c.: which is not a bad answer to Elmsley's objection. This tracing of the character or destiny in the name is particularly common in the Hebrew of the Old Test., as the well-known instance of Genesis xxvii, 36, 'Is not he rightly named Jacob? for he hath *supplanted* me these two times.' The practice, which seems to be a suggestion of nature itself, is thus shewn to have prevailed in various times, nations and languages.

The line of Soph. is from his *Tyro*, Fragn. 1 (Fr. Soph. 563), Dind. Siderō, Tyronis neverca: Fragn. IX, Wagn. Fragn. *Trag. Gr.* II 413, "Egregie Brunck. versum huc rettulit, quo haud dubie Sideronis crudelitas in Tyronem exagitatur." On the Tragedy and its contents, Wagner u. s. p. 410. Victorius and Gaisford cite Eustath. ad Il. A p. 158, et ad Il. Γ 379=287. 35, *καὶ εἰσὶν δὲ ληθῶς φερόνυμα τὸ σίντες οἱ παρ' Ομῆρο...ώσ...*

καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπαίνοις εἰώθασι λέγειν, καὶ p. 10
ὡς Κόνων Θρασύβουλον Θρασύβουλον ἔκάλει, καὶ
Ἡρόδικος Θρασύμαχον “ἀεὶ Θρασύμαχος εἰ,” καὶ
Πῶλον “ἀεὶ σὺ πῶλος εἰ,” καὶ Δράκοντα τὸν νομο-
θέτην, ὅτι οὐκ ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος·

κατὰ τὴν παροιμιαζομένην Σιδηρῷ Θρασεῖαν ἐκείνην γνωστα, φοροῖεν τὸ οἰκεῖον
ὄνομα. In the second passage the latter part of this is repeated.

καὶ ὡς ἐν τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπαίνοις] “Fortasse intelligit iis nominibus vocari
eos tunc solitos quae vim et potestatem eorum declararent.” Victorius.
It may perhaps refer to the ‘significant names’ derived from their attributes or occupations, by which deities are designated, and which as special distinctions would naturally occur in the hymns addressed to them. These may sometimes be substituted for their proper names, and may furnish *arguments of praise*.

The Conon and Thrasybulus here mentioned are doubtless, as may be inferred from the absence of any special designation, *the Conon*, the victor of Cnidus (394 B.C.), and *the Thrasybulus*, the expeller of the Thirty and restorer of the demus in 403: though there are several others bearing both of these names in Sauppe's *Ind. Nom. ad Or. Att.* III. pp. 63, 4, 81, 2. Thrasybulus is named by Demosth., de Cor. § 219, as one of the most distinguished orators among his predecessors, together with Callistratus, Aristophon, and Cephalus; the two first of these we have had mentioned in the Rhetoric. In de F. L. § 320, he is called *τὸν δημοτικὸν* (the popular Thrasybulus, the people's friend, *καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ Φυλῆς καταγάγοντος τὸν δῆμον*. Conon and he were contemporaries. Conon died soon after 392 B.C., Clinton, *F. H. sub anno* 388. 3, Thrasybulus, “perhaps in the beginning of B.C. 389.” Ib. *sub anno* 390. His name, according to Conon, fitly represented the *rashness* of his counsels and character. Grote, *H. G.* IX 509 [chap. LXXV.], in describing the character of Thrasybulus, omits to notice this.

In like manner the name of Thrasymachus, the rhetorician, is significant of the *hardihood* and *pugnacity* which were combined in his character. The sketch given of him in the first book of Plato's Republic is in exact correspondence with this. “Always true to your name,” rash and combative, said Herodicus to him, doubtless provoked by some rudeness of the Sophist in the course of a dialectical disputation. There were two Herodicuses, both physicians; see note on I 5.10. Doubtless this again is the *better known* of the two, Herodicus of Selymbria in Thrace; of whose medical practice Plato gives an account, Rep. III 406 A seq. In a similar dispute with Polus, another Sophist and Rhetorician, (whose character, in perfect agreement with this, is likewise sketched by Plato in his Gorgias, where he is said to be *νέος καὶ ὁξύς*¹), Herodicus again reminds him of the significance of his name, “Colt by

¹ [p. 463 E.] A very brief summary of the leading points of Polus' character as he appears in the Gorgias, is given amongst the ‘dramatis personae’ of the Introd. to transl. of Gorg. p. Ixxvii.

χαλεποὶ γάρ. καὶ ὡς ή Εύριπίδου Ἐκάβη εἰς τὴν Ἀφροδίτην

καὶ τοῦνομ' ἀρθῶς ἀφροσύνης ἄρχει θεᾶς,
καὶ ὡς Χαιρήμων

Πενθεὺς ἐσομένης συμφορᾶς ἐπώνυμος.

30 εὐδοκιμεῖ δὲ μᾶλλον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τὰ ἐλεγκτικὰ τῶν ἀποδεικτικῶν διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν μὲν ἐνα-

name and colt by nature¹.” And lastly this inveterate punster applies the same process to ‘Dracon the legislator’, declaring ‘that his laws were not those of a man, but of a *dragon*; so cruel were they’. Aristotle, Pol. II 12 *sub finem*, says of Draco’s laws, that they had nothing peculiar, but ἡ χαλεπότης, διὰ τὸ τῆς ζημίας μέγεθος. Nearly every offence was made punishable with death. Hence Demades said of them that they “were written not in ink, but in blood.” Plut. Sol. 17. Tzetzes, Chil. 5, line 342 sqq. ap. Sauppe, Fragn. Demad. 17, *Orat. Att.* III 316; Grote, *H. G.* III 202 [chap. x.], whence our *Draconian* legislation.

The verse that follows is from Eur.’s Troades 990, where Hecuba is answering Helen, who had been arguing the invincible power of Love. “All follies are to mortals Aphrodite” (are attributed by men to this passion, ‘take the form of Aphrodite’ in their fancy), ‘and rightly does the goddess’ name begin the word ἀφροσύνη.’ ‘Ἀφροδίτη and Ἀφροσύνη have the first half of the word in common.

Πενθεύς, κ.τ.λ.] ‘Pentheus that bearest the name of thy future fortune’. Comp. Bacch. 367 and 508, and Theocr. Id. xxvi. 26, ἐξ ὅρεος πένθημα καὶ οὐ Πενθῆ φέρουσαι.

Probably from Chaeremon’s Dionysus, quoted three times in Atheneus (Elms. ad Eur. Bacch. 508), and also probably, like the Bacchae, on the story of Pentheus. Chaeremon’s fondness for flowers and the vegetable creation in general, noticed by Athen. XIII. 608 D, appears throughout the fragments preserved. See *infra* III 12. 2 where he is spoken of as ἀκριβῆς, ὥσπερ λογογράφος, on which see note in Introd. ad loc. p. 325.

On Chaeremon see Müller *Hist. Gr. Lit.* xxvi 6, and the Art. in Smith’s *Dict. Biogr.* s.v. He is a poet whose plays are more suited for reading than acting, ἀναγνωστικός, Rhet. III u.s. He is quoted again by Ar. Probl. III 16. In Poet. I 12, his Centaur is spoken of as a μικτὴ φαντασία, on the import of which see the two writers above referred to; and in Poet. 24. 11, this blending of heterogeneous elements is again alluded to. See also Meineke, *Hist. Crit. Com. Gr.* p. 517 seq. Chaeremon is one of those who have been erroneously included amongst the Comic poets. Wagner, *Fr. Trag. Gr.* III 127—147. Clint. *F. H.* Vol. II. Introd. p. xxxii.

¹ This most ingenious rendering was given by Dr Thompson, then Greek Professor, in a lecture delivered Feb. 6, 1854. [Introd. to ed. of Gorg. p. v.]

τίων εἶναι ἐν μικρῷ τὸ ἐλεγκτικὸν ἐνθύμημα, παρ' ἄλληλα δὲ φανερὰ εἶναι τῷ ἀκροατῇ μᾶλλον. πάντων δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐλεγκτικῶν καὶ τῶν δεικτικῶν συλλογισμῶν θορυβεῖται μάλιστα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὅσα ἀρχόμενα προορώσι μὴ τῷ ἐπιπολῆς εἶναι (ἄμα γὰρ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφ' αὐτοῖς χαίρουσι προαισθανόμενοι), καὶ ὅσων τοσοῦτον ὑστερίζουσιν ὥσθ' ἄμα εἰρημένων γνωρίζειν.

§ 30. The chapter concludes with two observations on enthymemes in general. First, ‘Enthymemes of refutation are more popular and applauded than those of demonstration, because the former is a *conclusion of opposites*’ (the def. of *Ἐλεγχός*; see Introd. p. 262, note 1) ‘in a small space (or narrow compass), and things are always made clearer to the listener by being placed side by side (close together, so as to admit of immediate comparison)’. This is repeated in nearly the same words, III 17. 13.

‘But of all syllogisms destructive or constructive, such are most applauded as those of which the results are at once (at the very beginning, of the argument) foreseen: not because they are superficial (*ἐπιπολῆς*, I 15. 22, note ad loc., II 16 1)—for they (the hearers ‘are pleased themselves also with themselves at the same time’) are pleased (not only with the speaker and his enthymeme, but) with themselves also (*ἄμα*) for their sagacity in anticipating the conclusion: (and therefore they *don't* think it superficial)—and those which they are only just so far behind—which they can so nearly keep pace with—as to understand them (step by step) as they are delivered’.

ἄμα εἰρημένων] On this genitive, see note on II 8 11. [For the sense, compare III 10. 4.]

CHAP. XXIV.

In the preceding chapter a selection has been given of the topics or special classes of enthymemes which are most appropriate and serviceable in the practice of Rhetoric: and these are *τὰ ὄντα ἐνθυμήματα*, c. 24. 11, ult., sound, genuine, logical inferences. But besides these there are, in Rhetoric as well as Dialectics, arguments apparent but not real, fallacious, illogical, which are often employed to mislead and deceive. Now, although we are to abstain from the use of these ourselves, *οὐ γάρ δέ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν*, I 1. 12, it is necessary for the rhetorician to be thoroughly acquainted with them, in order to detect them in others and to refute any unfair reasoning which may be employed against him, (*ibidem*): and so vindicate the superiority of truth and right to falsehood and wrong. And accordingly we have in the following chapter a selection of the most prominent rhetorical fallacies, and in c. 25 the solution of them; corresponding respectively to the two parts of the de Soph. El. (cc. 1—15; 16, to the end), which in like manner is appended as a sequel to the Topics in which is expounded and illustrated the genuine and artistic method of the employment of the dialectical syllogism. On Fallacies in

general, see Grote's *Plato, Euthydemus*, Vol. I. c. xix [Grote's *Aristotle c.x.*] and J. S. Mill, *System of Logic*, Vol. II. Bk. v. Whately, *Logic*, ch. v.

In the Topics, (de Soph. El.) c. 4, 165 b 23, fallacious arguments are classified under two heads, παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, fallacies of language, *verbal*, and ἔξω τῆς λέξεως, non-verbal, beyond the sphere of, not dependent upon mere words; *logical* fallacies. "Alterum vitium positum est in prava verborum interpretatione (*wort-verdrehung*), alterum in falsa argumentatione (*schluss-fehler*)."
Waitz ad loc. 165 b 23. ἔξω τῆς λέξεως, die "welche in den ausdruck ihren grund nicht haben." Brandis, u. s. [*Philologus*, IV i] p. 20. "Fallacies in the words, and fallacies in the matter." Whately, *Logic*, ch. v. On Fallacies, § I. Verbal fallacies are six in number: (1) ὁμωνυμία, equivocal, ambiguous, *terms*, τὸ πλεονάχως λεγόμενον; (2) ἀμφιβολία, general ambiguity in *language*, ambiguous *expressions*, "ambiguous propositions," Poste; (these two may be distinguished as here; or, as in Poet. xxv 21, identified, under the one general term ἀμφιβολία, 'ambiguity in expression': in the explanation of them, Top. u. s. 166 a 14 seq., we have ἦ ὁ λόγος the proposition, or combination of words, ἡ τοῦνομα, the single word, the ὁμώνυμον); (3) σύνθεσις and (4) διάρρεσις, explained and illustrated Top. ibid. 166 a 22—38, illicit combination and separation of words; (5) προσῳδία, accent, pronunciation—which is of more use in criticising written composition, especially poetry; in Dialectics, where there is no written text, ἀνεν γραφῆς, it is of little or none. Ibid. b 1; and (6th and last), παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, 'in figura dictionis,' Waitz, fallacies or ambiguities, arising from the confusion of (assuming the apparent for the real,) different categories—"categories, that is, in their grammatical acceptation, as predicates, or a classification of the parts of speech; when, owing to similarity of (grammatical) form, a thing is referred to the wrong category" (Waitz, note ad loc.). And as this difference of categorical predication is expressed in the *termination* of words, it may be otherwise represented as "a similarity (or identity) of termination," which leads to fallacy (Poste, Transl. of de Soph. El.). Thus the termination -ειν (which marks the infinitive of a verb) in νύαινειν implies 'some quality or disposition of a thing', (as we say, it is a *neuter* verb), i. e. belongs to the category of ποιότης ἔχειν: in τέμνειν or οἰκοδομεῖν, it implies action, ποιεῖν; i. e. it is an active verb; belongs to the category of ποιεῖν. Similarly from a masculine noun with a feminine termination, or the reverse, and a neuter with either one or the other; Ibid. b 10—19. "falsche grammatische form." Brandis, u. s. p. 22.

Of these, accent, division (probably including the opposite), and ἀμφιβολία, including ὁμωνυμία, are illustrated from the poets in Poet. xxv 18—20. There is a fourth, § 21, κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως, which may be brought under the more general topic of the dialectical treatise, παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως.

Of these dialectical topics four are transferred to Rhetoric: ὁμωνυμία, including ἀμφιβολία, § 2; and σύνθεσις and διάρρεσις, together, as one topic, § 3. σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως, § 2, stands for a *fallacy of language* quite different to that which bears its name in the Topics. The difference is explained in the note on § 2.

Fallacies ἔξω τῆς λέξεως, in the Topics are seven. (1) παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, from the confusion of subject and accident; (2) of absolute

I ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνδέχεται τὸν μὲν εἶναι συλλογισμὸν, τὸν δὲ μὴ εἶναι μὲν φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐνθύμημα τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἐνθύμημα, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι φαίνεσθαι δέ, ἐπεί-
2 περ τὸ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμὸς τις. τόποι δὲ εἰσὶ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνθυμημάτων εἰς μὲν ὁ παρὰ τὴν

(ἀπλῶς) and particular or qualified (κατά τι, or πᾶν ἢ ποῦ ἢ πρός τι) statements; (3) ἐλέγχον ἄγνοια, *ignoratio elenchi*, “an inadequate notion of confutation,” Poste, “inscitiae eorum quae ad redargendum pertinent,” Waitz; (4) τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν, *petitio principii*, begging the question, assuming the thing to be proved; (5) τὸ μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι, “in ratione non recte redditā,” Waitz, the assumption of not-cause for cause; (6) παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, the assumption that antecedent and consequent are always and reciprocally convertible: that if B follows A, A must follow B. (The order of these two last is inverted in the explanation; 167 b 1 and 21.) (7) τὸ τὰ δύο ἐρωτήματα ἐν ποιεῖν, to put two (or more) questions as one, ‘when it escapes observation that the question is not one but several, and one answer is returned, as though it were one’. De Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 20—27, where there is a summary enumeration of them; and to the end of the chapter, 168 a 16, where they are explained at length and exemplified.

Of these (1) § 6 (these two are the same only in *name*; see on § 6); (2) §§ 9, 10; (5) § 8; and (6) § 7, occur also in the Rhetoric. ἐκ σημείου, § 5, falls under the head of τὰ ἐπόμενα; de Soph. El. 167 b 8, ἐν τε τοῖς ρήτορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὰ σημείον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἐπόμενων εἰσίν. The remaining three (3) (4) (7), are found only in the dialectical treatise. Brandis, u. s. p. 22, expresses his surprise at the omission of these three, and thinks that it argues the later date of the de Soph. El.; though of the priority of the Topics there can be no doubt. Vahlen, *Trans. Acad. Vien.* Oct. 1861, p. 134, pronounces this to be very doubtful; and proceeds to argue in favour of the earlier date of composition for *both* treatises. Besides these we have the purely rhetorical topic of δείνωσις, aggravation, exaggeration, § 4. The paradox or fallacy, εἰκὼς καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὼς, or ξεσταὶ τὸ μὴ εἰκὼς εἰκὼς, and also τὸ τὸν ήττω λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν, both come under the head of παρὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλὰ τι, No. (2), § 10.

§ 1. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐνδέχεται] ‘But seeing that besides the (real, genuine) syllogism there may be another, which has only the semblance, not the reality of it; so in the case of the enthymeme, there must necessarily be two corresponding kinds, one real and the other not real, but only apparent, since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism’, conf. I 1. II. The enthymeme is a syllogism incomplete in form. See Introd. p. 103, note 1.

§ 2. ‘Topics of unreal enthymemes are, first, the fallacy that arises from the language’ (παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, as Victorius also notes, is *not* ‘against’, but ‘along of’, Arnold’s Thuc. I 141.9; like διά, ‘arising from’, ‘shewn in’, as παρὰ τὴν ὄμωνυμίαν, § 2, παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν, §§ 3, 9); ‘and of this one part (sort or kind),—as in dialectics, to omit or evade the syllogistic process (that is, to assume without proof) and then in the terms of a syllogistic conclusion to state the result, “therefore it is *not* so and so

λέξιν, καὶ τούτου ἐν μὲν μέρος, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς δια- P. 1401.
λεκτικοῖς, τὸ μὴ συλλογισάμενον συμπερασματικῶς
τὸ τελευταῖον εἰπεῖν, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, ἀνάγκη ἄρα
τὸ καὶ τό. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασι¹ τὸ συνεστραμ-

¹ τὸ καὶ τό, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐνθύμημασι (Vahlen).

(the conclusion of an *ἔλεγχος* or syllogism of refutation of an opponent's thesis) or, "therefore necessarily so and so follows" (conclusion of a demonstrative, constructive, syllogism);—so in enthymemes (Rhetic) the enunciation of a concise, condensed, well-rounded or turned, periodic' (*συνεστραμμένως*, Plat. Protag. 342 E : on *ἡ κατεστραμμένη λέξις*, Introd. p. 308 seq. on III 9. 3) 'and antithetical sentence passes for an enthymeme'. The completeness in the structure of the period, which "like a circle returns into itself", its carefully balanced members, and its antithetical epigrammatic character, have the effect of an argument and supply to the deluded listener the lacking proof. The force of the antithesis and epigram in conversation and discussion is too well known to need further illustration. I have followed Vahlen, who has discussed this sentence at length in his paper, already referred to, *zur kritik Arist. Schrift.* (*Trans. Acad. Vien.* Oct. 1861, pp. 136—8), in removing the full-stop at *τὸ καὶ τό* and reading *καὶ ἐν* for *καὶ τό*: or perhaps the simple omission of *τό* would be sufficient. He apologises for the anacolouthon, and the repetition of *ἐνθύμημα* at the end of the sentence, and proposes two expedients for getting rid of them; unnecessarily as it seems to me: accepting the two alterations, as I have done, the sense is perfect, and the expression of it quite in character with the author's hasty and careless style. I pass over the attempted explanations of Vater and others. Victorius has given the sense correctly, though his interpretation does not adhere closely to his text. Bekker and Spengel leave the passage unaltered.

The words of de Sopha. El. 15, 174 b 8 (comp. 18, 176 b 32), *τὸ μάλιστα σοφιστικὸν συκοφάντημα τῶν ἐρωτώντων, τὸ μηδὲν συλλογισαμένους μὴ ἐρώτημα ποιέν τὸ τελευταῖον, ἀλλὰ συμπεραντικῶς εἰπεῖν, ὡς συλλελογισμένους*, οὐκ ἄρα τὸ καὶ τό, present an unusually close correspondence in word as well as sense with this parallel passage of the Rhetic: few I think will agree with Brandis in supposing the dialectical treatise to be the later of the two compositions.

'For such a style'—this condensed and antithetical, *periodic*, style, the style of Demosthenes and Isocrates,—'is the proper seat of enthymeme'. *χώρα* the region or district, *sedes*, where enthymemes are to be found; their haunt or habitat: precisely like *τόπος*, *locus*, on which see Introd. pp. 124, 5, and the quotations from Cic. and Quint. So Victorius, "sedes et tanquam regio enth." It cannot possibly be 'form', as Vahlen renders it, (if I do not misunderstand him,) u. s., p. 137, *die dem Enth. eigenthümliche Form*.

With the statement compare III 9. 8, of antithesis, *ἡδεῖα δ' ἔστιν ἡ τοιαῦτη λέξις,...καὶ ὅτι ἔοικε συλλογισμῷ*. ὁ γὰρ *ἔλεγχος συναγωγῆ τῶν ἀντικειμένων* ἔστιν. III 18. 4, *τὰ ἐνθυμήματα ὅτι μᾶλιστα συστρέφειν δεῖ*.

'A fallacy of this kind seems to arise from the fashion of' (the style

μένως καὶ ἀντικειμένως εἰπεῖν φαίνεται ἐνθύμημα· ἡ γάρ τοιαύτη λέξις χώρᾳ ἔστιν ἐνθυμήματος. καὶ ὡσικε τὸ τοιοῦτόν εἶναι παρὰ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως. ἔστι δὲ εἰς τὸ τῇ λέξει συλλογιστικῶς λέγειν χρήσιμον τὸ συλλογισμῶν πολλῶν κεφάλαια λέγειν, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ἔσωσε, τοῖς δὲ ἑτέροις ἐτιμώρησε, τοὺς δὲ Ἐλληνας ἡλευθέρωσεν· ἔκαστον μὲν γὰρ τούτων ἔξ ἄλλων ἀπεδείχθη, συντεθέντων δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐκ τούτων τι γίγνεσθαι. ἐν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν, ὡς τὸ p.¹⁰⁵ φάναι σπουδαῖον εἶναι μῦν, ἀφ' οὗ γ' ἔστιν ἡ τιμω-

of) ‘language used’, (i. e. the periodical and antithetical construction of the sentences). Such I think *must* be the interpretation of *σχῆμα τῆς λέξεως*, though it differs *in toto* from the signification of the phrase in Top. (de Soph. El.) 4, 166 δ 10, the 6th of the verbal fallacies (see above). Vahlen, u. s., points out this difference, which is sufficiently obvious. Nevertheless Victorius identifies them. Both of them may no doubt be referred to the head of fallacies of language—in its most general sense; but the dialectical topic is a mistake or misuse of the termination of single words, involving a confusion of categories; the rhetorical is *an abuse of language* in a totally different application.

‘For the purpose of conveying by the language the appearance of syllogistic reasoning it is serviceable to recite (enumerate) the heads (of the results) of many syllogisms (previous trains of reasoning); “some he saved, and on the others he took vengeance, and the Greeks he set at liberty”: (this is from Isocr. Evag. §§ 65—9, as Spengel has pointed out, *Tract. on Rhet.* in *Trans. Bav. Acad.* 1851, p. 22 note. Aristotle has gathered into these three *heads* of the contents of Isocr.’s five sections. The person of whom this is said is of course Evagoras, the hero of the declamation. The same speech has been already referred to, II 23. 12): ‘for each of these points was already proved from something else, but when they are put together, it seems as if some additional (*καὶ*) conclusion might be drawn from them’.

[*κεφάλαια*] heads of arguments, in a summary or recapitulation. Plat. Tim. 26 C. Dem. Olynth. Γ § 23 and the foll., de Symmor. § 11, *κεφάλαια τῆς δυνάμεως*, followed by the enumeration of them. De falsa leg. § 315, ἐπελθεῖν ἐπὶ *κεφαλαῖων*.

ἐν δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν] The second topic of verbal fallacies: probably including the dialectical ἀμφιβολία, ‘ambiguous propositions’, fallacies of language which are not *confined to single terms*. ‘One (fallacious argument) arising from verbal ambiguity; as to say that a mouse is a thing of worth (a worthy and estimable creature)—from it at least the most valued (esteemed) of all religious rites is derived; for the mysteries are of all religious rites most esteemed’. This is taken beyond all doubt from Polycrates’ panegyrical declamation, ‘the Encomium of

τάτη πασῶν τελετή· τὰ γάρ μυστήρια πασῶν τιμιωτάτη τελετή. ἡ εἴ τις κύνα ἐγκωμιάζων τὸν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ συμπαραλαμβάνει ἡ τὸν Πάνα, ὅτι Πίνδαρος ἔφησεν

ὦ μάκαρ, ὃν τε μεγάλας θεοῦ κύνα παντοδαπόν
καλέουσιν Ὀλύμπιοι.

ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα εἶναι κύνα ἀτιμότατόν ἐστιν, ὥστε

mice', referred to in § 6: see the note there. The ambiguity from which the fallacious inference is drawn is of course the assumed derivation from *μῦς* instead of *μύειν*. If mysteries are *derived from* mice, how great must be the honour due to the little animal. See Whately, *Logic*, ch. v. § 8, on ambiguous middle.

τελετὴ is a religious rite, and specially rites into which initiation enters as a preparation—mysteries; sometimes initiation alone. Athen. B. 12, p. 40 D, *τελετὰς καλοῦμεν τὰς ἔτι μείζους καὶ μετά τυνος μυστικῆς παραδόσεως ἑορτάς*. Suidas, s. v., Θυσία μυστηριώδης ἡ μεγίστη καὶ τιμιωτέρα. Hesychius, *τελεταῖς ἑορταῖ, θυσίαι, μυστήρια*. Photius, Θυσία μυστηριώδης. Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, Lib. II § 8, Vol. I p. 304. *Mystic* rites, (Arist. Ran. 1032, Dem. c. Aristog. § 11,) ascribed to Orpheus. Comp. Plat. Rep. II. 635 A, ὡς ἄρα λύσεις καὶ καθαρμὸς ἀδικημάτων διὰ θυσιῶν καὶ παιδιᾶς ἡδονῶν εἰσὶ μὲν ἔτι ζῶσιν, εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ τελευτήσασιν, ἂς δὴ τελετὰς καλοῦσιν, αἱ τῶν ἑκεὶ κακῶν ἀπολύνοντιν ἡμᾶς· μή θύσαντας δὲ δεινὰ περιμένειν. This is said of the Orphic and Musaeian rites and mysteries and initiation into them, but will apply equally to the Eleusinian, and all others which had the same object and character. Comp. Protag. 316 D [and Isocr. Paneg. § 28].

'Or if one in the encomium of a dog takes into the account the dog in heaven (the *dog-star*)'. *κύων*, as the star Sirius, the herald of the dog-days in summer, Hom. Il. XXII 27—29, ἀστέρ̄... ὃν τε κύν' Ὁρίωνος ἐπίκλησιν καλέουσιν. Dem. c. Lacrit. § 13, Arist. Hist. An. VIII 15. 9, ἐπὶ κυνί, et alibi, as a mark of the season, like the Pleiads; also ὑπὸ κύνα, μετὰ κύνα, περὶ κύνα, Arist. Theophr. al. *Canis, canicula*, Hor. Od. III 13. 9; Ep. I 10. 16. Virg. Georg. I 218, Ovid, &c.

'Or Pan, because Pindar called him "the mighty mother (Cybele)'s manifold dog"'. Pindar, Parthenia, Fragn. 6. "Pan optime in illo carmine audiebat, quo ante Magnae Matris, ubi eius statua, celebrabatur." Böckh, ad Fragn. Pind., *Op.* II. 594. By 'Cybele's dog' Pindar meant her *faithful* and *constant* attendant. This *metaphor* is converted by some panegyrist of the animal into an *argument* in his favour, as if the god Pan were *really* a distinguished member of that fraternity¹.

ἢ ὅτι τὸ μηδένα κ.τ.λ.] The meaning of this is obscure. Victorius, merely observing that this is another fallacious inference as to the value of a dog, candidly admits that he cannot explain it. Schrader under-

¹ Can the term 'dog' be applied to Pan, in reference to his character of *ovium custos*, (Virg. Georg. I 17,) as a shepherd's dog? I suppose not.

τὸ κύνα δῆλον ὅτι τίμιον. καὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν φάναι τὸν Ἐρμῆν εἶναι μάλιστα τῶν θεῶν μόνος γὰρ καλεῖται κοινὸς Ἐρμῆς. καὶ τὸ τὸν λόγον εἶναι σπουδαιότατον, ὅτι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἀνδρες οὐ χρημάτων ἀλλὰ

stands it thus: “ne canem quidem in domo ali sordidum est. Ergo canem esse honorificum est.” He goes on to say that the equivocation lies in the double meaning of *κύνον*, dog and *Cynic*¹. “Cynici enim philosophi Canes appellabantur, qui hac fallacia cognomen istud suum ornare poterant.” The argument is, ‘To have no dog at all is the highest disgrace’ (would this be accepted as *probable*?); ‘therefore to be a dog (in another sense, a Cynic,) is plainly a mark of distinction.’

‘And to say that Hermes is the most liberal’ (communicative of good things to others (so Schrader); or ‘sociable’, communicative of himself, *superis deorum gratus et imis*), ‘of all the gods; for he alone goes by the name of Common Hermes’. The latter of the two interpretations of *κοινωνικόν* seems to be right, from the comparison of Polit. III 13, 1283 a 38, where justice is said to be a *κοινωνικὴ ἀρετή*, ὡς πάσας ἀναγκαῖον ἀκολουθεῖν τὰς ἀλλας. *Eine der bürgerlichen gesellschaft wesentliche tugend*, i. e. social, (Stahr). The fallacy lies in transferring the *special* signification of *κοινός* in the proverb, and applying it in a *general* sense to the character of the god.

[*κοινὸς Ἐρμῆς*] Hermes is the god of ‘luck’, to whom all *ἔρματα*, windfalls, lucky finds, pieces of good fortune, are due. When a man finds anything, as a coin which has been dropped in the street, his companion immediately puts in a claim to ‘go halves’, with the proverbial “Common Hermes”, i. e. luck is common, I am entitled to share with you. Theophr. Char. XXX, καὶ εὐρισκομένων χαλκῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν οἰκείων δευτὸς (ὅ αἰσχροκερδῆς) ἀπαυγῆσαι τὸ μέρος, κοινὸν εἶναι φήσας τὸν Ἐρμῆν. Hesychius, κοινὸς Ἐρμῆς ἐπὶ τῶν κοινῆς τε εὐρισκόντων. Plutarch, Phil. esse cum princ. c. 2, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμονοτιὰ καὶ ἀπειροκαλιὰ τὸν κοινὸν Ἐρμῆν ἐμπόλαιον καὶ ἔμμισθον γενέσθαι (apud Erasm. *Adag.* Liberalitas, ‘Communis Mercurius’, p. 1144, ed. 1599), the god of gain, profit, luck, has ceased to be as of old *common* and *liberal*, and has taken to commerce and mercenary habits. Lucian, Navig. § 12; Adimantus had spoken of some golden visions, to which Lycinus replies, οὐκοῦν τὸ προχειρότατον τοῦτο, κοινὸς Ἐρμῆς, φασί, καὶ ἐσ μέσον κατατίθει φέρων τὸν πλοῦτον (let me, as the proverb *κοινὸς Ἐρμῆς* has it, share your wealth), ἄξιον γὰρ ἀπολαῦσαι τὸ μέρος φίλους ὅντας. To be *κοινός* in this latter sense does not entitle a man or god to the epithet *κοινωνικός*.

‘And, to prove that words’ (speech, rhetoric; this is probably taken from an encomium on the art) ‘are a most excellent, valuable thing; for the reason that the proper reward of good men is, not money, but λόγος (in the double sense of ‘words’, and ‘consideration, estimation’; λόγον ποιεῖσθαι (ἔχειν) τινός, ἐν οὐδενὶ λόγῳ εἶναι, et similia passim); ‘for λόγον

¹ On this name as applied to Antisthenes, compare the epigram in Diog. Laert. VI 1. 10, which interprets it thus, τὸν βίον ἥσθα κύνων, Ἀντισθένες, ὃδε πεφυκὼς ὥστε δακεῖν κραδίην ρήμασιν οὐ στόμασιν, and to Diogenes, VI 2. 60, 61.

λόγου εἰσὶν ἄξιοι· τὸ γὰρ λόγου ἄξιον οὐχ ἀπλῶς
ζ λέγεται. ἄλλος τὸ διηρημένον συντιθέντα λέγειν ή
τὸ συγκείμενον διαιροῦντα· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ταύτὸν δοκεῖ
εἶναι οὐκ ὃν ταύτὸν πολλάκις, ὅπότερον χρησιμώτε-
ρον, τοῦτο δεῖ ποιεῖν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο Εὐθυδήμου λό-
γος. οἷον τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι τριήρης ἐν Πειραιεῖ ἔστιν·

ἄξιον is an ambiguous, equivocal expression' (is used in more than one sense).

§ 3. *σύνθεσις* and *διαίρεσις*, 'wrong (fallacious) combination, composition, and disjunction, separation, in reading or speaking', which are here taken together as one form of fallacy, are two in de Soph. El. c. 4, 165 b 26, Ib. 166 a 22, and 33. The solution of them is given in c. 20, where "Euthydemus' argument" is also referred to, and thence no doubt transferred hither.

'Another is, to pronounce in combination what is (properly, or is intended to be) separated, or the reverse, the combined as separate: for since it seems to be the same either way (when combined or separated, and it is in this appearance, and the advantage taken of it, that the fallacy lies), whichever of the two happens to be more serviceable, *that* must be done'. *δεῖ* does not here imply a moral obligation; it is not intended to recommend the practice; the only obligation is that which is imposed by the art; *if* you want to avail yourself of this unfair mode of reasoning (which I don't say I approve, I am only stating what the art requires), this is the way to proceed.

'This is Euthydemus' argument. For instance to know that a trireme is in the Piraeus, because he knows each (of two things which are here omitted). This example, which is unintelligible as it stands here, has some further light (or obscurity) thrown on it by the form in which it occurs in de Soph. El. c. 20, 177 b 12, καὶ ὁ Εὐθυδήμου δὲ λόγος, ἀρ' οὖτας σὺ νῦν οὕτως ἐν Πειραιῇ τριήρεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ ἔν; but in both much is left to be supplied, the argument alluded to being supposed to be well known, and in every one's recollection. Schrader thus fills up the argument:—What you know, you know in the Piraeus—where the two disputants were standing—this is admitted: but you know also that there are triremes: this also is conceded, because the respondent knows that the Athenians have triremes somewhere; out at sea, or in Sicily, (referring to the expedition of 415 B.C.); whence the conclusion, you know that there are triremes in the Piraeus. The illicit combination (*σύνθεσις*) in this interpretation—though Schrader does not explain it further—must lie in the conjunction of the Piraeus with the knowledge of triremes, to which it does not belong in the respondent's interpretation of the question: and *ἔκαστον* will be 'each of these two pieces of knowledge, the knowledge of what is known in the Piraeus, and of the triremes'. They are both known separately, Euthydemus illicitly combines them.

This seems to be a reasonable explanation of the example *sofar as it is given in the Rhetoric*. But it seems quite certain that Aristotle is

έκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν. καὶ τὸν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐπιστά-
μενον ὅτι τὸ ἔπος οἶδεν τὸ γὰρ ἔπος τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν.
καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ δὶς τοσοῦτον νοσῶδες, μηδὲ τὸ ἐν φάναι
ὑγιεινὸν εἶναι ἀτοπον γὰρ εἰ τὰ δύο ἀγαθὰ ἐν κακόν

quoting identically the same argument in de Soph. El. The triremes and the Piraeus appear in both, and both are styled Εὐθυδήμου λόγος, the well-known argument of Euthydemus. Schrader, though he refers to the passage, takes no account of the words *ἐν Σικελίᾳ* ὦ, which it seems must have formed part of it. Victorius has endeavoured to combine both in his explanation of the fallacy—I am not at all sure that I understand it: I will therefore transcribe it in his own words *verbatim et litteratim*. “Tu scis te esse in Piraeo: quod concedebatur ipsi (the respondent), ac verum erat. Scis triremes Atheniensium esse in Sicilia (miserant enim eo classem ut eam insulam occuparent); id quoque non inficiabatur qui interrogatus erat. Tu scis igitur (aiebat ille) in Piraeo triremes esse, in Sicilia existens. Qua captione ipsum in Sicilia, scire triremes esse in Piraeo cogebatur; cum eo namque, scire in Piraeo, coniungebatur triremes esse: a quo remotum primo pronunciatum fuerat: ab illo vero, in Sicilia, cum quo copulatum editum primo fuerat, disiungebatur: atque ita efficiebatur ipsum, in Sicilia cum esset, scire in Piraeo triremes esse. Quod vero hic adiungit έκαστον γὰρ οἶδεν: separatim scilicet utrumque nosse intelligit, se in portu Atheniensium tunc esse: triremesque item in Sicilia. E quorum conglutinatione fallax ratio conflata, quae inde vocata est παρὰ σύνθεσιν.” By this must be meant, that the two statements, existence or knowledge in the Piraeus, and knowledge of triremes in Sicily, which ought to be kept separate, are combined in one statement, and hence the fallacy: true separately, they are not true together. Whether this is a satisfactory version of Euthydemus' fallacy I fear I must leave it to others to decide. My principal difficulty is as to the mode of transition from the Piraeus to Sicily in the two first propositions, which as far as I can see is not satisfactorily accounted for. What is there to connect the ‘knowing that you are in the Piraeus’, or ‘knowing in the Piraeus’, with knowing or being in Sicily? And yet there must be some connexion, apparent at least if not real, to make the fallacy plausible. This is nevertheless Alexander's solution of it. Comm. ad Top. 177 b 12, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἡρώτα ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐν Πειραιεῖ τυγχάνων, ὅτε αἱ τῶν Ἀθηναίων τριήρεις εἰς Σικελίαν ἥλθον. ἔστι δὲ ἡ τοῦ σοφίσματος ἀγωγὴ τουαύτη. “Δρά γε σὺ νῦν ἐν Πειραιεῖ εἶ; ναί. ἀρ' οἶδας ἐν Σικελίᾳ τριήρεις οὖσας; ναί. Δρά οἶδας σὺ νῦν οὖσας ἐν Πειραιεῖ τριήρεις ἐν Σικελίᾳ ὡν;” παρὰ τὴν σύνθεσιν τὸ σοφίσμα. However this may be, at any rate, if Plato's dialogue is to be trusted, there is no kind of fallacy however silly, transparent, and contemptible, of which Euthydemus and his partner were incapable; and the weight of authority, notwithstanding the utter want of sense, must decide us to accept this explanation.

Of Euthydemus, and his brother and fellow-sophist Dionysodorus, contemporaries of Socrates, nearly all that we know is derived from Plato's Euthydemus. They had studied and taught the art military,

ἐστιν. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐλεγκτικόν· ὥδε δὲ δεικτικόν· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐν ἀγαθὸν δύο κακά. ὅλος δὲ ὁ τόπος παραλογιστικός. πάλιν τὸ Πολυκράτους εἰς Θρασύβουλον, ὅτι τριάκοντα τυράννους κατέλυσεν· συν-

and the forensic branch of Rhetoric, *Euthyd.* 273, C. D, before entering at an advanced age upon their present profession, viz. that of ἐριστική, the art of sophistical disputation, and of universal confutation, by which they undertook to reduce any opponent whatsoever to silence. Many examples of their mode of arguing are given in the Platonic dialogue, but Aristotle's instance does not appear among them. See also Grote's *Plato*, on *Euthydemus*, Vol. I., ch. xix. The fallacies are exemplified from the dialogue, p. 545 seq. And on *Euthydemus* and his brother, also Stallbaum's *Disp. de Euth.* Plat. prefixed to his edition of the dialogues, p. 10 seq. (Ed. 1).

An example of illicit combination is given in the περὶ Ἐρμηνείας, the treatise on the proposition or elementary combination of words, c. II, p. 20 δ 35, ἀλλ' οὐχί, εἰ σκυτεύς καὶ ἀγαθός, καὶ σκυτεύς ἀγαθός. εἰ γάρ, ὅτι ἔκάτερον ἀληθές, εἶναι δεῖ καὶ τὸ συνάμφω, πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ἔσται.

'Another example is that one that knows the letters, knows the whole verse; for the verse is the same thing (as the letters, or elements, of which it is composed)'. The reason given, τὸ ἔπος τὸ αὐτό ἔστιν, contains the fallacy. It assumes that the things combined are the same as they are separate; which is not true.

'And (thirdly) to argue, that since twice a certain amount (of food or a drug) is unwholesome, so must also the single portion be: for it is absurd to suppose that if two things separately are good, they can when combined unite into one bad'. If the two parts together are unwholesome, neither of them can be wholesome separately, because the combination of two good things can never make one bad. This is a fallacious *confutation*; of a physician, may be, who is recommending the use of a drug. You say that your drug is wholesome: now you only administer a certain quantity. Suppose you were to double it, you would not say that it was wholesome *then*: but if the two parts together are unwholesome, how can either of them, the component elements being precisely the same in each, be wholesome? two wholesomes could never make an unwholesome. Here the undue combination of the double with the single part produces the fallacy (so *Victorius*).

'Used thus, it serves for refutation, but in the following way for proof (this is, by inverting the preceding): because one good thing cannot be (made up of) two bad'. If the whole is good, then the two parts, which is not always true. 'But the entire topic is fallacious': in whichever way it is applied (*Victorius*).

'And again, what Polycrates said in his encomium of Thrasybulus, that he put down thirty tyrants: for he puts them all together'. This again, which without further elucidation would not be altogether intelligible, is explained by two notices in Quintilian, III 6. 26, VII 4. 44.

As an illustration of the argument from number, he gives this, *An Thrasybulo triginta praemia debeantur, qui tot tyrannos sustulerit?*

τίθησι γάρ. ἢ τὸ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ τῷ Θεοδέκτου· ἐκ διαιρέσεως γάρ ἔστιν.

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δίκαιον ἔστιν, ἢ τις ἀν κτείνη πόσιν,
ἀποθυήσκειν ταύτην, καὶ τῷ πατρί γε τιμωρεῖν τὸν
νιόν· οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα πέπρακται· συντεθέντα γὰρ 4
ἴσως οὐκέτι δίκαιον. εἴη δ' ἀν καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν·
ἀφαιρεῖται γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τίνος. ἄλλος δὲ τόπος τὸ δει-
νώσει κατασκευάζειν ἢ ἀνασκευάζειν. τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν
ὅταν, μὴ δείξας ὅτι ἐποίησεν, αὐξήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα.

Whence it appears that Polycrates had argued that he deserved thirty rewards for his services, one for each tyrant that he had expelled; an illicit combination. Spalding ad loc. III. 6, "Hoc videtur postulasse Polycrates, qui dixit." quoting this passage. On Polycrates see § 6, *infra*.

"Or that in Theodectes' Orestes, for it is a fallacy of division: 'It is just for her that slays her husband' to die, and for the son to avenge his father: and accordingly this is what has actually¹ been done: (but this is a fallacy) for it may be that when the two are combined, (the sum-total) is no longer just'. Orestes, being the son of her that had slain her husband, was no longer the right person to take vengeance on his murderer. On the use of οὐκέτι, the opposite of ηδη, 'not now as before, in former cases', see note on I 1. 7, ηδη, οὐτω, οὐκέτι.

On Theodectes of Phaselis, see note on II 23. 3, and the reff. Also compare the topic of that section with this-example from his Orestes, which in all probability is there also referred to. This passage of Aristotle is cited by Wagner, *Fragm. Trag. Graec.* III 122, without comment, as the sole remaining specimen of Theodectes' Orestes.

'This may also be explained as the fallacy of omission; for the (person) by whom (the deed was done) is withdrawn'. Had it been stated 'by whom' the vengeance was inflicted, the *injustice* of it would have been apparent. It is stated generally, the particular circumstances which falsify the statement in this case being omitted. παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν is explained in § 9, τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, the omission of time and circumstances, which falls under the more general head of τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς, § 10, an unqualified, instead of qualified statement. It occurs also in § 7.

§ 4. 'Another topic (of fallacious reasoning) is exaggeration, δεινωσίς—especially the excitement of indignation contrasted with ἔλεος, II 21. 10, III 19. 3—in construction or destruction (of a thesis or argument). *Haec est illa quae δεινωσίς vocatur: rebus indignis asperis, invidiosis, addens vim oratio.* Quint. vi 2. 24. Ernesti, *Lex. Technologiae Graecae*, s. v. ἀνασκευάζειν and κατασκευάζειν, are technical terms distinguishing the

¹ A^c and three other MSS have οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα καὶ πέπρακται. Spengel, ed. 1867, rightly puts the first in brackets and retains the second, which I have followed in the translation.

ποιεῖ γὰρ φαίνεσθαι ἢ ὡς οὐ πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ τὴν αἰτίαν ἔχων αὐξῇ, ἢ ὡς πεποίηκεν, ὅταν ὁ κατηγορῶν ὄργιζηται. οὐκονν ἐστὶν ἐνθύμημα· παραλο-^{ρ. 106.}

γίζεται γὰρ ὁ ἀκροατὴς ὅτι ἐποίησεν ἢ οὐκ ἐποίησεν, 5 οὐ δεδειγμένου. ἄλλος τὸ ἐκ σημείου ἀσυλλόγιστον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. οἶν εἴ τις λέγοι “ταῖς πόλεσι συμφέρουσιν οἱ ἐρῶντες· ὁ γὰρ Ἀριστο-

two kinds of syllogisms and enthymemes, the destructive or refutative ἐλεγκτικοί, and the constructive or demonstrative δεικτικοί, ἀποδεικτικοί: as κατασκευάζειν is to establish something which you undertake to prove, and leads to a positive conclusion, so ἀνασκευάζειν or ἀναιρεῖν (a term of the same import) is to break down or destroy, upset, subvert, an adversary's thesis or conclusion, by refuting it, and so leads to a negative conclusion. κατασκευαστικά of enthymeme, II 26. 3.

'This means to amplify, heighten, intensify, exaggerate (a species of the general topic αὔξειν καὶ μειών, amplification and depreciation, the fourth of the κοινοὶ τόποι. Introd. p. 129, comp. II 26. 1), the fact or act alleged (usually a crime), without any proof of its having been committed: for it makes it appear, either that it has not been done' (read *οὐ* for *οὐτε*, with Bekker and Spengel), 'when the party accused (or inculpated) employs it; or that the accused is guilty when the accuser grows angry (works himself into a fit of virtuous indignation)'. This might seem to confine the topic to accusation and defence in the forensic branch, and no doubt it is in this that it is most useful and most usual; and also this is its most appropriate sphere as a fallacious *argument*: still as a species of one of the κοινοὶ τόποι it must needs be applicable to the other two branches, and in fact in all invectives, and in *epideictic* oratory, it is essential. Its appropriate place in the speech is the *ἐπίλογος* or *peroration*, III 19. 1, 3.

'Accordingly it is *no* (true) *enthymeme*, for the listener falsely concludes (assumes) the guilt or innocence (alleged) though neither of them has been proved'. This is of course a purely rhetorical topic.

§ 5. 'Another fallacy is derived from the use of the 'sign': for this also leads to no real conclusion (*proves, demonstrates, nothing*). On the *sign* and its logical character and value, see Introd. pp. 161—3, and the paraphrases of Rhet. I 2. 15—18, Ibid. pp. 163—5.

In the Topics, fallacies from the sign are noticed as the form which fallacies of consequence assume in Rhetoric. *ἐν τε τοῖς ρήτορικοῖς αἱ κατὰ τὸ σημεῖον ἀποδείξεις ἐκ τῶν ἐπομένων εἰσίν.* De Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 8.

'As for instance if one were to say, "Lovers are of service to states; for it was the love of Harmodius and Aristogeiton that put down (put an end to) the tyranny of Hipparchus". This is a mere *apparent sign* or possible indication of a connexion between love and the putting down of tyranny: there is no *necessary consequence*; it is not a *τεκμήριον*, a conclusive sign, or indication: no general rule of connexion can be established between them, from which we might infer—without fallacy—

γείτονος ἔρως κατέλυστε τὸν τύραννον "Ιππαρχον." ἢ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι κλέπτης Διονύσιος πονηρὸς γάρ· ἀσυλλόγιστον γάρ καὶ τοῦτο· οὐ γὰρ πᾶς πονηρὸς κλέπτης, ἀλλ' ὁ κλέπτης πᾶς πονηρός. 6 ἄλλος διὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ὁ λέγει Πολυκρά-

that the one would always, or for the most part, follow the other. Herein lies the difference between the dialectical *consequence* and the rhetorical *sign*. The converse of this—from the governor's point of view—is argued by Pausanias in Plato's Symp. 182 C. Θύ γάρ, οἵμαι, συμφέρει τοῖς ἀρχοντοῖς... φίλιας ἰσχυρὰς καὶ κουκωνίας (ἐγγίνεσθαι)· ὁ δὴ μάλιστα φίλει τά τε ἄλλα πάντα καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐμποιεῖν. ἔργῳ δὲ τοῦτο ἔμαθον καὶ οἱ ἐνθάδε τύραννοι· ὁ γάρ Ἀριστογείτονος ἔρως καὶ Ἀριστοδίου φίλια βέβαιος γενομένη κατέλυσεν αὐτῶν τὴν δρχήν. Victorius.

'Or again, if one were to say, (it is a sign) that Dionysius (Dionysius, like Socrates and Coriscus, usually, in Aristotle, here represents anybody, men in general) is a thief, because he is a bad man: for this again is incapable of demonstration; because every bad man is not a thief, though every thief is a bad man'. The consequence is not *convertible*. 'Ο δὲ παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλεγχος διὰ τὸ οὔτισθαι ἀντιστρέψει τὴν ἀκολούθησιν, (the fallacy in this topic arises from the assumed convertibility of the consequence), de Soph. El. 5, 167 b 1. In the uncertain *sign*, antecedent and consequent are never reciprocally convertible, the converse does not follow reciprocally, and therefore the sign is always liable to be fallacious. On the different kinds of consequences, see Anal. Pr. I c. 27, 43 b 6, seq.

§ 6. 'Another, the fallacy of *accident*'. This is not the same fallacy as that which has the same name in the Topics, the first of the fallacies ἔξω τῆς λέξεως, de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 28; "Fallacies of accident are those that arise from the assumption that the same things are predicate alike of the thing itself (*τὸ πρᾶγμα*, i.e. the logical subject, *τὸ ὑποκείμενον*). For whereas the same subject has many accidents, it is by no means necessary that all that is predicate of the former should also be predicate of the latter." White is an accident, or predicate, of the subject, man: it is by no means true that all that can be predicated of man can also be predicated of white. The confusion of these, the substitution of one for the other, gives rise to the fallacy. The example is the following:—A Sophist argues that because Socrates is not Coriscus, and Coriscus is a man, Socrates is not a man. Man is the subject, and Socrates and Coriscus are both predicates, attributes, or accidents of man. And if we substitute 'name' for 'man' in the proposition 'Coriscus is a man', the argument vanishes. But both the examples here are instances of accident for *cause*, and not for subject, which is no doubt a more suitable application of it for rhetorical purposes.

The first example is taken from Polycrates' encomium on mice, quoted above without the name, § 2. One of his topics in praise of them was "the aid they lent by gnawing through the bow-strings." Something similar to this is narrated by Herodotus, II 141 (Schrader), but the circumstances do not quite tally. Sennacherib king of the Arabians and

της εἰς τοὺς μῦς, ὅτι ἐβοήθησαν διατραγόντες τὰς νευράς. ἢ εἴ τις φαίη τὸ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον κληθῆναι τιμώτατον· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ κληθῆναι ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐμήνυσε

Assyria invaded Egypt with a great host, when Sethos the priest was king. The god appeared to him in a dream with promises of succour against the invaders. "A flood of field-mice poured over the enemy by night, which devoured their quivers and bows, and besides, the handles of their shields, so that on the following day, flying without arms, many of them fell," &c. At all events, wherever the incident was taken from, Polycrates meant to praise the mice for some *service* they had rendered by gnawing the bow-strings: now this service was a mere accident: their intention was, not to do service, but only to satisfy their appetite (Victorius). Polycrates' fallacy therefore consists in assigning as a *vera causa* what was only accidental. I do not see how this can be construed as a confusion of *subject* and accident. And so Victorius in his explanation; "quia quod casu evenit tamquam propter se fuisse sumitur¹."

Of the declamations of Polycrates, who has been already twice mentioned or referred to, the most celebrated were the ἀπολογία Βουσίριδος, a paradoxical defence of Busiris a mythical king of Egypt, proverbial for inhumanity, *illaudatus Busiris*, Virg. Georg. III 4; and an equally paradoxical *κατηγορία Σωκράτους*, Isocr. Busir. § 4 (this speech is addressed to Polycrates). He was also famous for his declamations—paradoxical again—on mean and contemptible subjects, as mice, pots (*χύτρας*), counters, (Menander ap. Spengel, *Artium Scriptores*, p. 75,) which he employed his art in investing with credit and dignity. The *paradoxical*, παράδοξον, is one of the four kinds of *ἐγκώμια*, Menander περὶ ἐπιδεικτικῶν II 1. He may possibly have been the author of the similar declamations on 'salt' and 'humble bees'², referred to, without the author's name, by Plat. Symp. 177 B, Isocr. Helen. § 12, Menand. περὶ ἐπιδεικτικῶν (*Rhet. Gr.* III 332. 26, ed. Spengel). Similar *paradoxical* declamations of Alcidamas, τὸ τοῦ Θανάτου ἐγκώμιον, ἡ τὸ τῆς Πενίας, ἡ τοῦ Πρωτέως τοῦ κυνός. Menand. περὶ ἐπιδεικτικῶν II 1 (*Rhet. Gr.* III p. 346). Quint. III 7. 28, *somni et mortis scriptae laudes, et quorundam a medicis ciborum*. It might have been supposed that these ingenious exercises were intended for burlesques, were it not that Aristotle by quoting arguments from them shews that they had a serious purpose. Further on Polycrates, see Spengel, *Artium Scriptores*, pp. 75, 6; Westermann, *Geschichte der Gr. u. R. Beredtsamkeit*, § 50, 22; Cambr. *Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX, Vol. III. p. 281 seq.

¹ This seems to be the true interpretation; Aristotle has here left it open by not defining the topic. But if this absence of defin. be understood as a tacit reference to the de Soph. El., and we desire to bring the examples here into conformity with the explanation of the topic there, we may understand τὸ πρᾶγμα in that passage, not as the logical subject, but as 'thing' in general, and say that the fallacy of the examples in the Rhetoric lies in the substitution of a mere accident for the *thing* in question, i.e. the real thing, the reality; as in that of the mice, the accidental *service*, for the real *appetite*: and in Achilles' case, the accidental neglect to invite, for the real disrespect that it implied.

² [Comp. Lucian's *μύλας ἐγκώμιον*. Blass, however, explains βομβύλαι, as *Art Trinkgefäße* (see Bekker's *Anecd.*, s. v. and comp. *χύτρας, supra*)].

*τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐν Τενέδῳ· ὁ δὲ ὡς ἀτιμαζόμενος ἐμήνι-
τσεν, συνέβη δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ κληθῆναι. ἄλλος τὸ
παρὰ τὸ ἐπόμενον, οἶον ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ, ὅτι μεγα-*

Comp. Ib. No. v, Vol. II. p. 158, note. Sauppe, *Fragm. Orat. Gr.*, Polycrates, *Or. Att.* III 220. [Also Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit*, II pp. 341, 342.]

‘Or if one were to say that an invitation to dinner is the highest possible honour; because it was the want of an invitation which excited Achilles’ wrath against the Achaeans at Tenedos: his anger was really excited by the disrespect, the non-invitation (the form or mode of its manifestation) was a mere accident of it’. *ἐπὶ τοῦ ‘on the occasion, in the case of’*. This is a fallacious inference (drawn either by Arist. himself, or, more likely, by some disclaimer) from an incident in a play of Sophocles, the subject of which was this (Wagner, *Fr. Trag. Gr.*, Soph., *Ἀχαιῶν Σύλλογος*, Vol. II. p. 230, from Welcker):—The Greeks on their way to Troy had put in at the island of Tenedos to hold a council as to the best way of attacking the city. Achilles would not attend at the meeting, having taken offence at the neglect, and presumed slight or contempt, of Agamemnon in not inviting him, either not at all, or after the rest, to an entertainment. There are two extant titles of plays by Sophocles, the *Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος*, and *Ἀχαιῶν σύνδειπνον*, or *σύνδειπνοι*, Plutarch, *de discr. adul. et amici.*, 74 A, Vol. I. p. 280, ed. Wytt. *ὡς ὁ παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα παροξύνων Οδυσσεὺς οὐ φησιν ἐργίζεσθαι διὰ τὸ δεῖπνον κ.τ.λ.*, citing three verses from the play (Ulysses had been sent with Ajax and Phoenix to Achilles to make up the quarrel). Comp. Athen. I. p. 17 D, Σοφ. ἐν *Ἀχαιῶν συνδείπνῳ*, where four lines are quoted; and VIII 365 B, τὸ Σοφ. *δράμα...ἐπιγράφειν ἀξιούσι Σύνδειπνον*. Cic. ad Quint. Fr. II 16, *Συνδείπνους Σοφ.* Dindorf, *Fragm. Soph.* (Poet. Sc.) p. 35, following Toupin, Brunck, and Böckh, supposes these two titles to belong to the same play, a satyric drama (Dind.). Wagner after Welcker (*Trag. Graec.* pp. 112 and 233) shews that they were distinct, the *Ἀχαιῶν σύλλογος* founded on the story above mentioned, the other *Ἀχαιῶν σύνδειπνον*, or simply *σύνδειπνον* or *σύνδειπνοι*, derived from the *Odyssey*, and descriptive of the riot and revelry of the suitors in Penelope’s house. See Wagner, *Fr. Trag. Gr.*, Soph., Vol. II. pp. 230 and 380. The case of two distinct dramas is, I think, made out.

§ 7. ‘Another from consequence’, i. e. from the unduly assumed reciprocal convertibility of antecedent and consequent: just as in the ‘sign’ (q. v.), between which and this there is no real difference. As we saw in § 5, in the de Soph. El. the sign is spoken of as the rhetorical variety of the general topic of *consequence*: and they ought not to be divided here.

‘As in the Alexander’, i. e. Paris; a declamation of some unknown author, already referred to, c. 23 §§ 5, 8, 12; (it is argued) ‘that he is high-minded, because he scorned the society of many’ (*quaere τῶν πολλῶν ‘of the vulgar’*) ‘and dwelt alone in Ida’: (the inference being that) ‘because such is the disposition of the high-minded, therefore he might be supposed to be high-minded.’ This is a fallacy, or logical flaw, as Schrader puts it, “quia universalem affirmantem convertit simpliciter, et

λόψυχος· ύπεριδῶν γάρ τὴν πολλῶν ὄμιλίαν ἐν τῇ
 "Ιδη διέτριβε καθ' αὐτόν ὅτι γάρ οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι
 τοιοῦτοι, καὶ οὗτος μεγαλόψυχος δόξειεν ἄν. καὶ
 ἐπεὶ καλλωπιστῆς καὶ νύκτωρ πλανᾶται, μοιχός· τοι-
 οῦτοι γάρ. ὅμοιον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ιεροῖς οἱ πτωχοὶ^{οἱ πτωχοὶ}
 καὶ ἄδουσι καὶ ὥρχοῦνται, καὶ ὅτι τοῖς φυγάσιν ἔξ-
 εστιν οἰκεῖν ὅπου ἀν θέλωσιν· ὅτι γάρ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν
 εὐδαιμονεῖν ύπάρχει ταῦτα, καὶ οἵς ταῦτα ύπάρχει,
 δόξαιεν ἀν εὐδαιμονεῖν. διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς· διὸ καὶ
 quia in secunda figura concludit affirmative." Or rather, as this is an
 illicit consequence, because here antecedent and consequent are not
 reciprocally convertible: it does not follow, even supposing that all high-
 minded men dwell apart from others, that all lonely-dwellers are high-
 minded men: and to say that so and so, anybody whatsoever, is high-
 minded for that reason and that alone, is as much as to say that the rule
 is universal.

'And again (to argue) that so and so is a dandy and roams at night,
 and therefore a rake, because such are the habits of rakes'. This, as
 before, is to say that because (supposing it to be so) all adulterers are
 smartly dressed and walk at night, therefore all smart dressers and
 night-walkers are adulterers. This appears also as an example of the
 sign, the rhetorical form of the topic τὸ ἐπόμενον, de Soph. El. c. 5, 167 b 9,
 βούλόμενοι γάρ δεῖξαι ὅτι μοιχός, τὸ ἐπόμενον ἔλαβον, ὅτι καλλωπιστῆς ἡ ὅτι
 νύκτωρ ὥραται πλανώμενος. [See *infra* III 15. 5.]

καλλωπιστῆς] Plato Sympos. 174 A. Socrates (going out to dinner)
 ταῦτα δὴ ἐκαλλωπισάμην, ἵνα καλὸς παρὰ καλὸν ἦω.

'And another (argument), similar to these (for exalting the condition
 of poverty and exile), is that beggars sing and dance in the temples,
 and that exiles are allowed to live where they please': because, these
 things (enjoyments) being the ordinary accidents or concomitants of
 apparent happiness, those who have them may also be supposed to be
 happy'. Here again there is an illicit conversion of antecedent and
 consequent: if singing and dancing, or living where one pleased, were
 coextensive with happiness, the inference would be true and the two
 convertible. As it is, it does not follow that, because these are *indica-
 tions* of happiness, or often accompany (follow) it, all men that sing
 and dance, or can live where they please, are necessarily happy. This
 is taken from one of those paradoxical encomiums of poverty and exile
 to which Isocrates refers, Helen. § 8, ἥδη τινές..τολμῶσι γράφειν, ὡς
 ἔστιν ὁ τῶν πτωχευόντων καὶ φευγόντων βίος ζηλωτότερος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἀν-
 θρώπων; such as Alcidamas' πενίας ἐγκώμιον cited above from Menander
 on § 6. [For an ἀπολογία Πενίας see Arist. Plutus, 467—597, in the course
 of which a distinction is drawn between πενία and πτωχεία, 552—4.]

διαφέρει δὲ τῷ πῶς· διό κ.τ.λ.] 'But there is a difference in their manner
 of doing these; and therefore this topic falls under the head of *omission*,

8 εἰς τὴν ἔλλειψιν ἐμπίπτει. ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ ἀνάτιον
ὡς αἴτιον, οἷον τῷ ἅμα ἢ μετὰ τοῦτο γεγονέναι· τὸ
γὰρ μετὰ τοῦτο ὡς διὰ τοῦτο λαμβάνουσι, καὶ μά-
λιστα οἱ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις, οἷον ὡς ὁ Δημάδης τὴν
as well as (*καὶ*) that of *τὸ ἐπόμενον*. Beggars and exiles do what appear
to be the same things as the wealthy and prosperous, they dance and
sing in the temples and sacred precincts, and change their place of
residence at their pleasure : but there is a difference in the mode and
motive of doing these things, *which is omitted*; and the omission when
supplied explains the fallacy. The beggars dance and sing in the
temples to amuse the visitors and obtain an alms ; the wealthy and pros-
perous out of wantonness or exultation, to shew that they have the
liberty of doing what is forbidden to humbler people (so Victorius, and
Schrader who borrows his note : these may however be mere *signs of
happiness* in the *εὐδαιμονες*). And again, the exiles *are obliged* to live
abroad, and would gladly be at home again ; the wealthy and prosperous
travel for change of scene, to satisfy their curiosity, or (like Herodotus
and Plato) their desire of knowledge. The *ἔλλειψις* is here of *τὸ πῶς*,
as in § 3, ult. of *ἵπὸ τίνος*, and in § 9, of *πότε* and *πῶς*, which in each case
may be applied to explain the fallacy.

§ 8. This section, *ἄλλος παρὰ τὸ ἀνάτιον—συνέβη ὁ πόλεμος*, is quoted
by Dionys. Ep. ad Amm. c. 12 with no other variation from our text than
the omission of *οἷον* before *ὡς*.

The fallacy here illustrated is the familiar *post hoc ergo propter hoc* ;
the assumption of a mere chronological sequence as a true cause : to
mistake a mere accidental connexion of the order of time, for one of
cause and effect. It is the rhetorical application, and only one variety,
of the wider and more general topic of the dialectical treatise (de Soph.
El. c. 5, 167 b 21) *non-causa pro causa*, in dialectical argumentation.

'Another from the substitution of what is no cause for (the true)
cause ; for instance (this substitution takes place) by reason of the
occurrence of something contemporaneously or subsequently (to that
which is presumed to account for it) : for it is assumed that what merely
follows (in time) is the effect of a cause, and especially by politicians ;
as Demades, for instance, pronounced Demosthenes' policy to be the
cause of all their calamities ; because it was *after* it that the war (with
Philip, and the defeat of Chaeronea) occurred'. Victorius refers to a
similar charge of Aeschines, c. Ctes. § 134, *καὶ ταῦθ' ἡμῖν συμβέβηκεν
ἔξ οὗ Δημοσθένης πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν προσελήνθεν*, compare § 136, army
and navy and cities, *ἄρδην εἰσὶν ἀνηρπασμέναι ἐκ τῆς τούτου πολιτείας*.
Dinarch. c. Dem. §§ 12, 13.

This is the only place in which the *name* of Demosthenes appears
in Aristotle's Rhetoric. See on this subject Introd. pp. 45, 6, and note 2.
In II 23. 18, a few words of his are quoted, but without the author's
name. The Demosthenes mentioned in III 4. 3 is probably not the
great Orator.

On Demades and his remains, see Sauppe, *Fragm. Orat. LII*, Demades,
Or. Att. III 312 seq.

Δημοσθένους πολιτείαν πάντων τῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν·
9 μετ' ἐκείνην γὰρ συνέβη ὁ πόλεμος. ἄλλος παρὰ τὴν
ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, οἷον ὅτι δικαίως Ἀλέξ-
ανδρος ἔλαβε τὴν Ἐλένην· αἴρεσις γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐδόθη
παρὰ τοῦ πατρός. οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἵστως, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶ-
τον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ μέχρι τούτου κύριος. ἦ εἴ τις P. 1402.
φαίη τὸ τύπτειν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ὑβριν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ

§ 9. ‘Another from the omission of *when* and *how*; a particular case, like those of § 3, and § 7, of the following topic παρὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς; a *dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*; the omission of particulars in the way of exceptions to a general statement, as time, place, manner, circumstances. ‘For example, that Paris had a right to take Helen; for the choice was given her by her father (Tyndareus, the *choice* viz. of one of the suitors, whichever she preferred). Eur. Iph. Aul. 66, ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐπιστάθησαν, εὐ δέ πως γέρων ὑπῆλθεν αὐτοὺς Τυνδάρεως πυκῆ φρενί, δίδωστ θέσθαι θυγατρὶ μνηστήρων ἔνα (Victorius). The whole story of ‘Helen’s choice’, and the sequel, is told by Agamemnon, Iph. Aul. 49 seq., in his speech at the opening of the play, which serves for the prologue.

But this is a fallacy; ‘for (the choice was granted) not it may be supposed (*ἵστως*) for ever, but only for the first time: for in fact the father’s authority only extends so far’. Helen, acting upon her father’s permission, chose Menelaus; η δὲ εἰλεθ’ ὡς γε μῆποτ’ ὕφελεν λαβεῖν Μενέλαον, Iph. A. 70; and here, at this *first* choice, her father’s authority and her own right to choose ended. The fallacy therefore consists in the ‘omission’ of the particular time, *τοῦ πότε*; she *generalized* the time of choice from the particular time to all time; and therefore Paris was *not* ‘justified’ in taking her.

‘Or again, if one were to say, that to strike a free man is an act of *ὑβρις* (wanton outrage, liable to a *γραφή*, a public prosecution): for it is not so in every case (*πάντως = ἀπλῶς*), but only (*κατά τι*) when the striker is the aggressor’. This of course makes all the difference in the nature and legal construction of the offence. If the blow is *returned*, it may be regarded as an act of self-defence; the insulting wantonness, the injury to the sufferer’s honour and personal self-respect, is shewn in the wanton aggression. ἀν τις τύπτῃ τινά φησιν (ὅ νόμος), ἄρχων χειρῶν ἀδίκων, ὃς, εἴ γε ημύνατο, οὐκ ἀδίκει. Demosth. c. Aristocr. § 50.

ἄρχειν χειρῶν ἀδίκων is to strike the first blow, to give the offence. The phrase assumes various forms. Rhet. ad. Alex. 36 (37) 39, συνέ-
 κοψάς μου τὸν νιόν; ἔγωγε ἀδίκων χειρῶν ἄρχοντα. Isocr. κατὰ Δοχίτου § 1,
 ἔτυπτε με Δοχίτης ἄρχων χειρῶν ἀδίκων. Xen. Cyrop. I 5. 13, Antiph.
 τετραλογία Γ. Or. 4, β § 1, and § 6, ἄρξας τῆς πληγῆς. χειρῶν is sometimes
 omitted, Bos, Ellips. p. 301, (527, ed. Schäfer); sometimes ἀδίκων, Plat.
 Legg. IX. 869 D, ἄρχ. χειρῶν πρότερον. Herodotus has ὑπάρχειν ἀδίκων ἔργων,
 I 5; and various similar phrases, IV 1. VII 8. 2, and 9 a, IX 78; also
 ἄρχειν ἀδικῆς et sim. III 130, &c. ὑπάρχειν alone, Plat. Gorg. 456 E,

ιο πάντως, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄρχῃ χειρῶν ἀδίκων. ἔτι ὥσπερ p. 107
ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς,
ἀλλὰ τί, γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, οὗν ἐν

ἀμνομένους μὴ ὑπάρχοντας. Stallbaum et Ast, ad Legg. l. c. Also ἄρχεσθαι alone; Arist. Hist. Anim. IX. 12. 3, καὶ τὸν δετόν, ἐὰν ἄρξηται, ἀμνομένοι νικῶσιν (οἱ κύκνοι).

§ 10. ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς]. See note on I 11. 15, where the meaning of this as a technical term is illustrated from the de Soph. El. *τὰ ἐριστικά* here designates a book or treatise; the fallacious, sophistical reasoning exposed in the ninth book of the Topics; just as *τὰ διαλεκτικά* stands for the dialectical treatise, including (as below), or not including, the appendix on Fallacies. The subject of the de Soph. El. is described as *περὶ τῶν ἀγωνιστικῶν καὶ ἐριστικῶν*, 165 b 10. *Ἐριστική* there, c. 2, is first distinguished from the three other kinds of ‘discussion’, *διδασκαλική* (science), *διαλεκτική*, and *πειραστική*, a branch of the latter; and the *ἐριστικοὶ* are defined, *οἱ ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ἐνδόξων μὴ ὄντων δὲ συλλογιστικοὶ η̄ φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοὶ*, which would include the *σοφιστικοὶ*. Elsewhere the two are distinguished; both are *οἱ πάντως νικᾶν* (victory at any price) *προαιρομένοι*, 171 b 24; but *οἱ τῆς νίκης αὐτῆς χάριν τοιοῦτοι ἐριστικοὶ καὶ φιλέριδες δοκούσιν εἰναι, οἱ δὲ δόξης χάριν τῆς εἰς χρηματισμὸν σοφιστικοὶ*: the one dispute out of mere pugnacity and contentious habit, the others add to this a desire of gaining a reputation which may be turned to profitable account.

Further, as in the eristic branch of dialectics, from the substitution of something as universally or absolutely for that which is so not universally, but only partially, or in *particular* cases, an apparent (fallacious) syllogism (i. e. enthymeme, see on I 1. 11) is elicited. As in dialectics for instance, the argument “that the non-existent *is* (has existence), because non-being *is* non-being”. (*Is, ἔστι*, has two different senses, absolute and relative, or absolute and particular: the Sophist, in the second case, *intends* it to be understood in its most general signification *ἀπλῶς*, of actual existence: it is in fact a mere copula connecting the one *μὴ ὄν* with the other, and merely states the identity of those two *expressions*, which is no doubt a very *partial statement* indeed: it is true, but nothing to the purpose of the argument. Comp. de Soph. El. c. 25, 180 a 33, 4.) ‘Or again that the unknown is an object of knowledge, because the unknown may be known—that it is unknown’. (Here of course the particular that is left out of the account is the *ὅτι ἄγνωστον*; whereby the absolute or universal, ‘the unknown is knowable’, is substituted for the partial or particular statement, that what is knowable is only that it cannot be known.) ‘So also in Rhetoric a seeming inference may be drawn from the absolute to merely partial probability’. This topic is illustrated in Plat. Euthyd. 293 c seq. See Grote’s *Plato*, I 546, 7, and 549; [also Grote’s *Aristotle* I 182, note].

The construction of this last sentence which had been obscured by wrong punctuation in Bekker’s 4to and first 8vo ed., has in the second been made intelligible and consecutive by removing the full stops at *μὴ ὄν* and *ὅτι ἄγνωστον*, and changing all the colons into commas. The

μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν ὅν, ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὴ ὄν μὴ ὄν, καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἀγνωστον, ἔστι γὰρ ἐπιστητὸν τὸ ἀγνωστον ὅτι ἀγνωστον, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ρήτορικοῖς ἔστι φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα παρὰ τὸ μὴ ἀπλῶς εἰκός ἀλλὰ τὸ εἰκός. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο οὐ καθόλου, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἀγάθων λέγει

τάχ' ἄν τις εἰκός αὐτὸ τοῦτ' εἶναι λέγοι

βροτοῖσι πολλὰ τυγχάνειν οὐκ εἰκότα.

γίγνεται γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός, ὥστε εἰκός καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἔσται τὸ μὴ εἰκός εἰκός.

correlative of *ώσπερ* *ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς* is of course οὕτω καὶ *ἐν τοῖς ρήτορικοῖς*: and in the intervening sentence *οἷον* *ἐν μὲν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς*, the *μὲν* has also reference to an intended δέ, to be inserted when Rhetoric comes to be contrasted with Dialectics, which however is never expressed and the *μέν* left *pendens*.

The topic is first defined in general terms, as it appears in the dialectical treatise, and illustrated by two examples of its *dialectical* use: and then exhibited in its *special* application to Rhetoric, the paralogism of absolute and particular probability. The first, as in the dialectical examples, is confounded with, or substituted for, the second.

'This (particular probability, *τὸ εἰκός*,) is not universally (true or applicable), as indeed Agathon says: Perchance just this may be called likely, that many unlikely things befall mortals', Agathon, Fragm. Inc. 5. Wagner, *Fragm. Trag.* III 78. Of Agathon, see Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* ch. xxvi. § 3. *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. IX, Vol. III. p. 257. Spengel, *Artium Scriptores*, p. 91, merely quotes four fragments from Aristotle. The extant fragments are collected by Wagner, u. s., on p. 73 seq. His style is criticized in Aristoph. Thesm. 55 seq. and imitated or caricatured 101 seq. A specimen of his Rhetoric is given by Plato, Symp. 194 E seq.

This 'probable improbable' is illustrated in Poet. XVIII 17, 18, from tragedy, by the cunning man cheated, and by the defeat of the brave. *ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο εἰκός, ὥσπερ Ἀγάθων λέγει* εἰκός γὰρ γίνεσθαι πολλὰ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκός. Comp. XXV 29. On this fallacy the 'solution' in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37) § 29, is based. Dion. Ep. I ad Amm. c. 8, τὸ κακονρύότατον τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων...ὅτι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἰκός γίνεται ποτε εἰκός.

'For what is contrary to the probable does come to pass, and therefore what is *contrary* to probability is also probable (*καὶ*, besides what is *directly* probable). And if so, the improbable will be probable. Yes, but not absolutely (the answer); but as indeed in the case of Dialectics (in the dialectical form of the fallacy), it is the omission of the circumstances (*κατὰ τὶ*, in what respect,) and relation and mode that causes the cheat, so here also (in Rhetoric) (the fallacy arises) from the probability assumed not being absolute probability (or probability in general) but

ἀλλ' οὐχ ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐριστικῶν τὸ κατὰ τί καὶ πρὸς τί καὶ πῇ οὐ προστιθέμενα ποιεῖ τὴν συκοφαντίαν, καὶ ἐνταῦθα παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς εἶναι μὴ ΙΙ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ τὶ εἰκός. ἔστι δὲ ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τόπου η Κόρακος τέχνη συγκειμένη· ἀν τε γὰρ μὴ ἔνοχος ἡ τῇ αἰτίᾳ, οἷον ἀσθενῆς ὡν αἰκίας φεύγη· οὐ γὰρ εἰκός· καν ἔνοχος ὡν, οἷον ἀν ἴσχυρὸς ὡν· οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ὅτι

some particular, special probability'. That which is only probable in particular cases, as in particular times, places, relations, and circumstances in general, is fraudulently represented as probable absolutely, without any such conditions or qualifications.

συκοφαντία, in this sense of a logical cheat or deception, transferred from its ordinary meaning, of a false, calumnious information or charge, is not to be found in any of the Lexicons.

§ II. 'Of (the application of) this topic the (whole) "art" of Corax is composed.' 'This topic', as Ar. afterwards implies, is the topic of *τὸ εἰκός* in general, and not confined to the fallacious use of it. In the former of the two alternatives of the example from Corax's Art the argument is fair enough; the feeble man may fairly plead that it was not likely that he should be guilty of an assault upon one much stronger than himself. Of course this does not prove the point, but it would have a considerable effect in persuading the judges of the accused's innocence, 'For whether he (the accused) be not liable to the charge, as for instance if (repeat *ἄν* from the preceding) a weak man were to be tried for an assault, (he defends himself upon the ground that, *h̄t.* 'it is because,') it is improbable: or if he be liable (under the same circumstances), as for instance if he be a strong man (he argues—the omission explained as before) that it is improbable because it was likely to seem probable' (and therefore knowing that he would be exposed to the suspicion he was less likely to bring upon himself an almost certain punishment). And in like manner in all other cases: for the accused must be either liable or not liable to the charge: now it is true that both seem probable, but the one is really so, the other not probable in the abstract (*ἀπλῶς simpliciter*), but in the way that has been already stated', i. e. under the conditions and circumstances before mentioned.

Of Corax, with Tisias his pupil the founder of Rhetoric, see Cic. Brut. c. 12, Spengel's *Artium Scriptores* p. 22 seq., Cambr. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil. No. VII, Vol. III. p. 40 seq., Westerm. *Gesch. der Beredt.* § 27, pp. 35—7, Müller, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* XXXII 3 [and Blass, *die Attische Beredsamkeit* I. pp. 19, 20].

The assault case and its alternatives was evidently one of the stock instances of the rhetorical books. It has been already referred to in I 12. 5, and re-appears in Plat. Phaedr. 223 B, as an extract from Tisias' art. Again in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37) § 6.

The topic *τὸ εἰκός* which formed the staple of the art of Corax, and was treated in that of Tisias, Plato, l. c., continued in fashion with the

εἰκός ἔμελλε δόξειν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· οὐ γάρ ἔνοχον ἀνάγκη ἢ μὴ ἔνοχον εἶναι τῇ αἰτίᾳ· φαίνεται μὲν οὖν ἀμφότερα εἰκότα, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν εἰκός, τὸ δὲ οὐχ ἀπλῶς ἀλλ' ὕσπερ εἴρηται. καὶ τὸ τὸν ἥπτω δὲ λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν τοῦτ' ἔστιν. καὶ ἐντεῦθεν δικαίως ἐδυσχέραινον οἱ ἀνθρωποι τὸ Πρωταγόρου ἐπάγγελμα· ψεύδος τε γάρ ἔστι, καὶ οὐκ

early rhetoricians of the Sophistical school, as we may see by the constant notices of it in Plato. Somewhat later it was taken up by Antiphon, a disciple of this school, and appears in his three surviving school exercises, or *μελέται*, the Tetralogies. See also de caed. Herod. § 63. On the *tόπος* of the first of these, see Müller, *Hist. Gr. L.* xxxiii § 2. It is to be found also in the Rhet. ad Alex.; and of course in the Orators: and it crept into the Tragedies of Agathon. An amusing instance of the alternative application of the argument is the story of the encounter between Corax and his pupil Tisias in the attempt of the former to recover the fees due for his instruction, which Tisias had withheld. Related at length in *Camb. Journ. of Cl. and Sacred Phil.* No. vii, Vol. III p. 34. It is likewise told of Protagoras and his wealthy pupil Euathlus.

'And this is (the meaning of) "making the worse appear the better argument":' (that is, giving the superior to the inferior, the less *probable*) argument, making it prevail over that which is *really* superior, and more probable: which is identical with the second, the fallacious alternative of Corax's *tόπος*. Cic., Brut. VIII 30, extends this profession to all the Sophists. *Tum Leontinus Gorgias... Protagoras Abderites... aliique multi temporibus eisdem docere se profitebantur, arrogantibus sane verbis, quemadmodum causa inferior (ita enim loquebantur) dicendo fieri superior posset.* See the dialogue between the *δίκαιος* and *ἄδικος λόγος*, Arist. Nub. 889—1104. τῷ λόγῳ—τὸν κρείττον', ὅστις ἔστι, καὶ τὸν ἥπτον, 882. τίς ᾧ; λόγος. ἥπτων γ' ᾧ. ἀλλά σε νικῶ, τὸν ἐροῦ κρείττα φάσκοντ' εἶναι, 893: and he keeps his word. The fair argument is at last forced to own his defeat, and acknowledge the superiority of his unfair competitor. This was one of the articles of charge of Meletus and his coadjutors against Socrates, Plat. Apol. 19 B. Socrates is there made to refer to Aristophanes as its original author.

'And hence it was that men were justified in taking offence (in the displeasure, indignation, they felt) at Protagoras' *profession*: for it (the mode of arguing that it implies) is false, and not real (true, sound, genuine) but only apparent; and no true art (proceeding by, lit. 'included in,' no rule of genuine art), but mere rhetoric and quibbling. And so much for enthymemes, real and apparent'. *αὐτὸ μὲν οὖν τοῦτο ἔστιν, ἔφη (ὁ Πρωταγόρας), ὡς Σώκρates, τὸ ἐπάγγελμα δὲ ἐπαγγέλλομαι.* Plat. Protag. 319 A.

This distinction of *ἀληθής* and *φαινόμενος*, *εἶναι* and *φαίνεσθαι*, reality and appearance, the true, genuine, substantial, and the sham, false

ἀληθὲς ἀλλὰ φαινόμενον εἰκός, καὶ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ τέχνῃ
ἀλλ’ ἐν ρήτορικῇ καὶ ἐριστικῇ.

I καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν CHAP.X
φαινομένων εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ λύσεως ἔχόμενόν ἔστι

semblance, is traced in its various applications at the opening of the de Soph. El. The latter is the especial characteristic of the Sophists and their professions and practice, 165 a 21, c. 11, 171 b 27–34, and elsewhere. It constantly reappears in Aristotle's writings.

The imputation here cast on Protagoras' profession is rather that of logical than of moral obliquity and error, though no doubt the latter may also be implied.

I have already referred to the strong expression of Diogenes, Ep. ad Amm. c. 8, on the use of this topic, above, note on § 10.

CHAP. XXV.

The account of the genuine and spurious enthymemes or rhetorical inferences in cc. XXIII, XXIV, is followed by a chapter upon *λύσις*, the various modes of refuting an adversary's argument; the same order being observed as in the corresponding Dialectics (*ἀντίστροφος ή ρήτορικὴ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς*), where we have first (in the eight books of the Topics) the art of logical, systematic, argumentation, laid down and analysed; which is supplemented in an Appendix, Top. IX, or de Soph. El., by an account, (in the first fifteen chapters) of sophistical fallacies and paradoxes, and (from c. 16 to 33) the various modes of 'solving' or refuting them [Grote's Aristotle, chap. x]. The principal difference between them is that the dialectical *λύσις* deals only with the refutation of *fallacious* arguments, the rhetorical with that of rhetorical inferences or enthymemes in general. The same subject is treated again, more briefly, in III 17, under the head of *πίστεις*, the third 'division of the speech', including the establishment of your own case and the refutation of your opponent's: and in the Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), under that of accusation and defence.

On *λύσις*, solution, or refutation in general, and its divisions, according to Aristotle, see Poste, *Transl. of Posterior Analytics*, Introd. pp. 28–30. Thomson, *Laws of Thought*, § 127. Trendelenburg, *El. Log. Arist.* § 41. Cic. de Inv. XLII 79, seq. On *refutatio*, Quint. v c. 13. On *ἐνστασίς*, one of its two divisions, Anal. Pr. II c. 26, which is there treated logically and syllogistically, see Poste, u. s., and Appendix C (note) p. 198, *Transl. of de Soph. El.*, Introd. to Rhet. on c. 25, p. 267, seq. In the Topics there is no direct and detailed explanation of *λύσις* or *ἐνστασίς*—*λύσις* is exemplified in de Soph. El.—though that book is twice referred to, II 25. 3, 26. 4, as containing an account of the latter of the two. This apparent contradiction will be considered in the note on the former of the two passages.

§ 1. 'The next thing we have to treat of, after what has already been said (c. XXIII. XXIV), is *λύσις*, the modes of refuting an opponent's arguments'. On the meaning and derivation of *λύσις*, see Introd. p. 267, note.

τῶν εἰρημένων εἰπεῖν. ἔστι δὲ λύειν ἢ ἀντισυλλογι-
2 σάμενον ἢ ἔνστασιν ἐνεγκόντα. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀντισυλ-
λογίζεσθαι δῆλον ὅτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων ἐνδέχεται
ποιεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων, δο-
3 κοῦντα δὲ πολλὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν. αἱ δὲ

'This solution or refutation may be effected either by a counter-syllogism (which concludes the negative of the opponent's thesis or conclusion, the regular *ἔλεγχος*) or by advancing a (contradictory) *instance*, or objection (to one of the premisses proving or indicating a false statement). The *conclusion* must be refuted by a counter-syllogism. Comp. on these two, c. 26. 3, 4.'

§ 2. 'Now these counter-syllogisms may plainly be constructed out of the same topics: for syllogisms' (i. e. not all syllogisms, not the scientific and demonstrative, but dialectical syllogisms, and rhetorical enthymemes: note on I 1. II) 'are derived from probable materials, and mere (variable) *opinions*' (what is generally *thought*, probabilities;—truth, the conclusions of science, is constant: and scientific demonstration, the object of which is *ἀλήθεια*, does *not* admit, like Dialectics and Rhetoric, of opposite conclusions, of arguments on *either* side of a question), 'are often contrary to one another, (and therefore can be converted into *opposite* enthymemes)'.

§ 3. 'Objections (contradictory instances) are brought (against opposing enthymemes) in four ways, as also in the Topics'. Schrader had long ago observed that the words *ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς* are not a reference to the special treatise of that name, but express the art, or the practice of it, in general; and this explanation he had already applied to other passages, as II 23. 9, *ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς* and 24. 10, *ἐν τοῖς ἐριστικοῖς*; unnecessarily in those two, as we have seen.

Brandis will not allow that 'the Topics' can ever be applied to Dialectics in general, but thinks that it must be confined to the particular book in which Dialectics are treated as *Topics* (wherein Vahlen agrees with him). He admits that although the fourfold division of *ἐντάσεις*, as *here given*, is not found in the Topics, as we now have them, (there is a *different* division into four,) yet the proper place for them is indicated in Bk. Θ c. 10; also, that there are plenty of *examples* of these four *ἐντάσεις* in the Topics; and also that they are found (substantially, not by name and description,) in the Analytics. Nevertheless, he hesitates to suppose that there can be a direct reference to the Topics here and suggests the possibility of an alteration of Bk. Θ subsequent to the composition of the Rhetoric, or of an omission of something in our present text. Tract in Schneidewin's *Philologus* IV. i, p. 23.

To this Vahlen very fairly replies, *zur krit. der Ar. Schrift*. II 25, 1402 a 30, (*Trans. Vien. Acad.* Oct. 1861, p. 140), that Aristotle "has so often exemplified the application of these four kinds of *ἐντάσεις* in the eighth book of the Topics—see especially c. 2, 157 a 34, and b 1, ff.—and elsewhere throughout the treatise—as in the Topics of *πρός τι* (Z 8, 9), *γένος* (Δ), *ἴδιον* (Ε)—that he might very well refer to that work

ἐνστάσεις φέρονται καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς,
τετραχῶς· ἢ γὰρ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ὄμοίου ἢ ἐκ p. 108.
4 τοῦ ἑναντίου ἢ ἐκ τῶν κεκριμένων. λέγω δὲ ἀφ' ἑαυ-
τοῦ μέν, οἷον εἰ περὶ ἔρωτος εἴη τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὡς σπου- P. 1402
δαῖος, ἢ ἐνστασίς διχῶς· ἢ γὰρ καθόλου εἰπόντα ὅτι
πᾶσα ἔνδεια πονηρόν, ἢ κατὰ μέρος ὅτι οὐκ ἀν ἐλέγετο

here in the Rhetoric for the application of them to the use of that art." "The words *καθάπερ* καὶ *ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς* need not be referred to more than the *φέρονται* *ἐνστάσεις* (the bringing or *application* of objections), and the expression here is no less correct than in 1403 a 31." (26. 4): and consequently (he says) Brandis' two suggestions are superfluous. The reference to the Topics in Rhet. I 2.9 is a case exactly parallel to this. It is not made to any particular passage, but what is stated may be gathered or inferred from the contents of that work. Compare note ad loc., and see Introd. p. 154, note 1.

On *ἐνστάσεις* and its four kinds, Introd. pp. 269—271; where the examples that follow, §§ 4—7, are also explained. We learn from the chapter of the Analytics that 'objections', directed against the premisses of a syllogism (or enthymeme), may be either universal or particular: and that the syllogisms into which they are thrown are either in the first or third figure.

ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ] which in the next sentence becomes *ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ*, is, as Schrader puts it, "Cum ex eo quod antecedenti enthymematis nobis oppositi, eiusdemque vel subiecto vel praedicato inest, contrarium argumentum exsculpitur, eoque id quod obiectum est confutatur." An argument derived 'from itself' must mean 'from the opponent's enthymeme itself', and so retorted on him.

§ 4. 'Supposing for instance your adversary's major premisses were, "all love is good", the objection may be opposed in two ways: either (universally) by saying that all want or defect' (one of Plato's notions of love, Philebus, comp. Rhet. I 11. 11, 12) 'is bad: or particularly, that, if that were the case, the 'Caunian love' would never have passed into a proverb (this is a *particular* instance; *some* love), if there had been no form of love bad at all.'

Καύνιος ἔρως] The reading of all MSS but Ac is *κάλλιστος* ἢ *κάκιστος* *ἔρως*. Who could have divined from this, without the aid of that MS, that *Καύνιος* was what the author had written? asks Spengel, *Trans. Bav. Acad. u. s. 1851*, p. 50. What Ac really does read is *Κάνυκος* according to Bekker, *Καύνικος* according to Spengel.

The saying is proverbial for 'an illicit, or unfortunate (fatally ending) passion'—in either case *πονηρός*—such as that of Byblis for her brother Caunus; which was *πονηρός* in both its senses. Suidas, s. v. ἐπὶ τῶν μῆ κατορθουμένων ἐπιθυμιῶν' *Καύνος γὰρ καὶ Βυβλίς ἀδελφοὶ ἐνστάχησαν*, Hesychius ἐν *Καύνῳ τυμάται*' (under the next word we have *Καύνος...καὶ πόλις Ρόδου*) *καὶ ὁ σφοδρός*. Erasm. *Adag. Amor.* No. 1. "De foedo amore dicebatur; aut si quis ea desideraret quae neque fas esset concupiscere neque liceret

5 Καύνιος ἔρως, εἰ μὴ ἦσαν καὶ πονηροὶ ἔρωτες. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐναντίου ἔνστασις φέρεται, οἷον εἰ τὸ ἐνθύμημα ἦν ὅτι ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ πάντας τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖ, 6 ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ὁ μοχθηρὸς κακῶς. ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὄμοίου, εἰ ἦν τὸ ἐνθύμημα ὅτι οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες ἀεὶ μισοῦσιν,

assequi. Biblis Caunum fratrem impotenter adamavit; a quo cum esset repulsa, sibimet necem consivit." Ovid, Met. IX 452—664, who says (662) that she wept herself to death, and was changed into a fountain. *Byblis in exemplo est ut ament concessa puellae; Byblis Apollinei correpta cupidine fratris, Non soror ut fratrem, nec qua debebat amavit.*

§ 5. "The case of a *contrary* instance or objection is exemplified by the following, suppose the opponent's enthymeme is this' (i. e. has for its major premiss, is constructed upon the principle that, derives its conclusion from this), 'that all good men' (ὁ ἀγαθὸς, the definite article marks the class: note on I 7.13, comp. II 4.31), 'or good men invariably, do good to all their friends, the objection may be taken, that the *opposite* is not true; that bad men don't do harm to all theirs'. "The allegation of contraries," Poste, *Transl. of de Soph. El.* Appendix C, p. 197. If it be true that all good men do good to all their friends, the *contrary* of this, that all bad men do harm to all theirs, must be true likewise. But the latter is known not to be universally true; to some of their friends bad men do harm, to others not: it is *not* necessary therefore that good men should always help all their friends; they may be good without that. So Victorius. Comp. Top. B 9, 114 b 6 seq. where two other examples are given: σκοπεῖν δὲ...καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου τὸ ἐναντίον, οἷον ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἔξ ἀνάγκης ἥδυ· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ κακὸν λυπηρόν· ἡ εἰ τοῦτο, κάκεινο. καὶ εἰ ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἡ ἀδίκια ἀγνοια. καὶ εἰ τὸ δικαίως ἐπιστημονικῶς καὶ ἐμπείρως, τὸ ἀδίκιως ἀγνοούντως καὶ ἀπειρως. And again B 7, 113 a 1 seq. αἱ μὲν οὖν πρώται δύο κ.τ.λ....line 8, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πάντα τέτταρα ποιεῖ ἐναντίων. τὸ γὰρ τοὺς φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν τῷ τοὺς φίλους κακῶς ἐναντίον ἀπὸ τε γὰρ ἐναντίου ἥθους ἔστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴρετὸν τὸ δὲ φευκτόν. "But the other four combinations, benefiting a friend, hurting a friend: benefiting an enemy, hurting an enemy: benefiting a friend, benefiting an enemy: hurting a friend, hurting an enemy: are all respectively *contraries*." Poste, u. s. p. 201.

§ 6. "An example of an objection from *similaris* (is the following), suppose the enthymeme (i. e. the premiss, as before,) to be, that those who have been injured always hate, (it may be met by the objection,) "nay but, neither (no more than in the other case) do those who have been well treated always love". This, as Victorius observes, may plainly be taken as an example of the preceding kind of *ἔνστασις* ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου. It may also exemplify that of 'similaris', to which Arist. has here applied it. Ill treatment is no necessary proof of hatred, any more than kindness and benefits are necessarily accompanied by love. The premiss, 'those who are injured always hate', we encounter with the objection, of a *similar*, *parallel*, case, that 'those who are well treated don't always love'.

ἢ ὅτι ἀλλ' οὐδὲ οἱ εὖ πεπονθότες ἀεὶ φιλοῦσιν. αἱ δὲ κρίσεις αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων ἀνδρῶν, οἶνον εἴ τις ἐνθύμημα εἰπεν ὅτι τοῖς μεθύοντι δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἀγνοοῦντες γὰρ ἀμαρτάνουσιν, ἔνστασις ὅτι οὔκουν ὁ Πιττακὸς αἰνετός οὐ γὰρ ἀν μείζους ζημίας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἑάν τις μεθύων ἀμαρτάνῃ.

Parallel cases are also illustrated in Top. B 10, 114 & 25, but not as objections, though objections might be derived from them.

§ 7. A fourth kind is that of, ‘judgments, or decisions proceeding from distinguished men: as for instance, if the enthymeme be, that drunkards should have allowance made for them (and be punished less severely than if they had been in their sober senses), because they sin in ignorance, an objection may be taken, that then Pittacus is no longer commendable (i. e. loses his due credit; is no longer an *authority*, as he is entitled to be); for (if he had been—on the supposition that the enthymeme objected to is true,) he would not have enacted (as he did) a heavier penalty for an offence committed under the influence of intoxication’. The *authority* of Pittacus, which is of course maintained by the objector, is urged in opposition to the general principle laid down by the opponent, that indulgence should be granted to those who committed a crime in a fit of intoxication, because they were then out of their senses and had lost all self-control.

If this were true, replies the objector, Pittacus, one of the seven “wise men,” would be no authority—which cannot be supposed—for he ruled the direct contrary, that drunkenness aggravated, not extenuated, the offence. The text, with the supplements usually required in translating Aristotle, seems to give a clear and consistent sense. Vahlen however, *Trans. Vien. Acad.* Oct. 1861, p. 141, objects to *alverós* on two grounds; first, the word itself, as belonging only to *poetry*; and secondly as inapplicable here; the meaning required being, that Pittacus is no *wise* man, for otherwise he would not have made such an enactment: that we must therefore read *συνέρος* for *alverós*. On the second ground I can see no necessity for alteration; for the first objection, there is more to be said. *alverós* is a *very* rare word: only two examples of it are given in Steph. *Thes.* (this place of Aristotle is strangely overlooked) and both from *poets*, Antimachus and Alcaeus. Whether this is a sufficient reason for condemning the word in Aristotle I will not take upon me to decide. It is retained by all editors; and Aristotle’s writings are not altogether free from irregularities of grammar and expression not sanctioned by the usage of the best Attic writers. For instance, *κυντότατον* is quoted in Bekker’s *Anecdota*, I 101, as occurring in the *περὶ ποιητικῆς*—doubtless in the lost part of that work.

On this example, see Poste, *Trans. of de Soph. El.* Appendix C. p. 199.

On Pittacus, Diogenes Laertius I 4. In § 76, νόμους δὲ ἔθηκε τῷ μεθύοντι, ἔαν ἀμάρτη, διπλῆν εἴναι τὴν ζημίαν ἵνα μὴ μεθύωσι, πολλοῦ κατὰ τὴν νήσου οἶνον γενομένου, Lesbos to wit, famous for its wine. He was born at

8 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται ἐκ τεττάρων, τὰ δὲ τέτταρα ταῦτ' ἔστιν εἰκὸς παράδειγμα τεκμήριον σημεῖον, ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἡ ὄντων ἢ δοκούντων συνηγμένα ἐνθυμήματα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, τὰ δὲ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς διὰ τοῦ ὅμοίου, ἢ ἐνὸς ἢ

Mytilene in 651 B.C., and died in 569 B.C. Mure, *Hist. Gr. Lit.* III 377. Clinton, *F. H. sub anno*. Aristotle also refers to this law of Pittacus, Pol. II 12, 1274 b 19 seq., where the reason for enacting it is given. νόμος δὲ ἴδιας αὐτῷ, τὸ τούς μεθύοντας ἀν τυπήσωσι, πλειά ξημίαν ἀποτίνει τῶν νηφόντων διὰ γάρ τὸ πλείους ύβριζεν μεθύοντας ἢ νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώμην ἀπέβλεψεν, ὅτι δεῖ μεθύοντας ἔχει μᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. Comp. Eth. N. III 7, 1113 b 30 sq. καὶ ἐπὶ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἴναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς μεθύονται διπλά τὰ ἐπιτίμα...κύριος γάρ τοῦ μὴ μεθυσθῆναι. III 2, 1110 b 26.

On the appeal to authorities, as *mártires*, comp. I 15. 13, 14, 15; and note on II 23. 12.

§§ 8, 9. The following two sections, 8 and 9, are a summary repetition of what has been already stated more at length, I 2. 14—19, inclusive: on the materials of enthymemes and their varieties.

'Enthymemes being derived from four sources, or kinds of materials, probabilities, example, and signs certain and uncertain; in the first enthymemes being *gathered* (*conclusions collected*) from things which usually happen or seem to do so, that is, from probabilities; in the next (examples) from induction (by an incomplete *inductive process*), by means of similar (analogous, parallel) cases, one or more, when you first obtain your universal (the universal major, premiss or proposition, from which the conclusion is drawn) and then conclude (infer) the particular by an example' (on this process and its logical validity, see the account of *παράδειγμα*, Introd. pp. 105—107); 'and (thirdly) by means of' (through the channel, medium, instrumentality, διὰ with genit.) 'the necessary and invariable' (reading καὶ δὲ δύνατος, 'that which ever exists', unchanging, permanent, enduring for ever), 'by *τεκμήριον* that is; and (fourthly) by signs, universal or particular' (see on this, I 2. 16, the two kinds of signs: and the paraphrase of §§ 15—18, Introd. pp. 163—5), 'whether (the conclusion be) positive or negative (so Vict.); and the probable, (of which all these materials of enthymemes consist—with the solitary exception of the *τεκμήριον*, which is very rarely used—not being what is constant and invariable (always occurring in the same way, uniform) but what is only true *for the most part*; it is plain that (the conclusion is that) all such enthymemes as these can be always disproved by bringing an objection: the refutation however is (very often) apparent and not always real; for the objector does not disprove the probability, but only the necessity, (of the opponent's statement)'. As *none* of a rhetorician's arguments is more than probable, this can always be done, but in a great many cases it is not fair.'

The words δι' ἐπαγωγῆς are put in brackets by Spengel as an interpolation. With the limitation which I have expressed in the translation,

πλειόνων, ὅταν λαβὼν τὸ καθόλου εἴτα συλλογίσηται τὰ κατὰ μέρος, διὰ παραδείγματος, τὰ δὲ δι’ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ὄντος¹ διὰ τεκμηρίου, τὰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ τοῦ ἐν μέρει ὄντος, ἔάν τε ὃν ἔάν τε μή, διὰ σημείων, τὸ δὲ εἰκὸς οὐ τὸ ἀεὶ ἀλλὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα μὲν τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἀεὶ 9 ἔστι λύειν φέροντα ἐνστασιν, η δὲ λύσις φαινομένη ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀληθὴς ἀεὶ· οὐ γὰρ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός, λύει 10 ὁ ἐνιστάμενος, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον. διὸ καὶ ἀεὶ ἔστι πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπολογούμενον μᾶλλον ἢ κατηγοροῦντα διὰ τοῦτον τὸν παραλογισμόν· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ο μὲν κατηγορῶν δι’ εἰκότων ἀποδείκνυσιν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ ταύτῳ λύσαι ἢ ὅτι οὐκ εἰκὸς ἢ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀεὶ

¹ καὶ δὲ ὄντος

it seems to me that ἐπαγωγῆς is quite justifiable, and may be retained: διά is at all events superfluous, and would be better away; Victorius and Buhle had already rejected it.

I have followed Vahlen (and Spengel in his recent Ed.) in supposing ἀεὶ to have been omitted between καὶ and ὄντος in the explanation of τεκμήριον. Vahlen truly observes, Op. cit. p. 141, "that the τεκμήριον rests not upon the necessary *and being*, but upon the necessary and *ever-being*," (the permanent and invariable): referring to ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον in § 10; Phys. B 196 b 13, οὔτε τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεὶ, οὔτε τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ: Metaph. E 1026 b 27, ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ὠσαύτως ἔχοντα καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης... τὰ δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ ἀεὶ, ὡς δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ: Ib. 1064 b 32, πᾶν δή φαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης: 1065 a 2 ff.—which seem quite sufficient to warrant the alteration.

ἔάν τε ὃν ἔάν τε μή (ὅν) *subaudi* ἥ, a rare ellipse of the *subjunctive mood* of εἶναι: Eur. Hippol. 659, ἔς τ’ ἀν ἔκδημος χθονὸς Θησεύς. Aesch. Agam. 1318, κοινωσώμεθα ἀν πως δοφαλὴ βουλήματα (γ). Paley, note ad loc., supplies other examples; and refers to Buttmann (on Mid. § 14, n. 143, p. 529 δ, ἀφ’ ής ἀν ἡ γραφή), who gives two more, Antiphon de caed. Herod. § 32, ἐφ’ οἷς ἀν τὸ πλείστον μέρος τῆς βασάνου; Plat. Rep. II 370 E, ἀν ἀν αὐτοῖς χρεῖα.

Victorius offers an alternative translation of the above words, 'the real or apparent' sign: but I think his first rendering, which I have followed, is the best.

The contents of §§ 8—11 inclusive are paraphrased at length, with an explanation, in Introd. on this chapter, pp. 271—4; to which the reader is referred. § 10 (misprinted § 8) is translated on p. 272.

§ 10. ἐπεὶ γὰρ...δὲ κριτής] On this irregularity, ἐπεὶ with the apodosis δέ,—a case of Aristotelian carelessness, his attention having been diverted from ἐπεὶ to δέ μὲν κατηγορῶν—see the parallel examples quoted on I 1. 11.

δ' ἔχει ἔνστασιν τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· οὐ γὰρ ἀν ἦν
εἰκὸς ἀλλ' ἀεὶ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον· ὁ δὲ κριτὴς οἴεται, εἰ p. 109.
οὔτως ἐλύθη, ἢ οὐκ εἰκὸς εἶναι ἢ οὐχ αὐτῷ κριτέον,
παραλογιζόμενος, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν
ἀναγκαίων δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον κρίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τῶν
εἰκότων· τοῦτο γάρ ἔστι τὸ γνώμη τῇ ἀρίστῃ κρίνειν.
οὐκον ἵκανὸν ἀν λύσῃ ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀλλὰ δεῖ
λύειν ὅτι οὐκ εἰκός. τοῦτο δὲ συμβήσεται, ἐὰν ἡ
11 ἡ ἔνστασις μᾶλλον ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἐνδέχεται δὲ
εἶναι τοιαύτην διχῶς, ἢ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τοῖς πράγμασιν,
κυριώτατα δέ, εἰ ἀμφοῖν· εἰ γὰρ τὰ πλεονάκις οὔτω, P. 1403.
12 τοῦτ' ἔστιν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον. λύεται δὲ καὶ τὰ σημεῖα
καὶ τὰ διὰ σημείου ἐνθυμήματα εἰρημένα, καν ἡ ὑπάρ-
χοντα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις· δτι γὰρ ἀσυλ-
λόγιστόν ἔστι πᾶν σημεῖον, δῆλον ήμιν ἐκ τῶν ἀνα-
13 λυτικῶν. πρὸς δὲ τὰ παραδειγματώδη ἡ αὐτὴ λύσις

ἀν οὔτως ἐλύθη of course cannot stand, though Spengel retains it in his recent text. It must be either ἀν οὔτωσι λυθῆ, which seems the simplest and most natural alteration; or, as Bekker, εἰ οὔτως ἐλύθη.

On the dicast's oath, *γνώμη τῇ δριστῇ*, or more usually *τῇ δικαιοτάτῃ, κρίνειν*, see Introd. note 1, p. 273.

§ 11. The *enstasis* may be made more probable in two ways, either by the consideration of the time, (as an *alibi* for instance, shewing that at the time alleged the accused was elsewhere, see II 23. 6, the topic of *time*: this use of the topic may be added to that which is illustrated there,) or the circumstances of the case; or most conclusively (authoritatively, cogently, weightily), by both: for in proportion to the multiplication of events or circumstances similar to your own case as you represent it, is the degree of its probability'. If I am right in the interpretation of *τῷ χρόνῳ*—see Introd. p. 274—τὰ πλεονάκις refers to *τοῖς πράγμασιν*, 'facts and circumstances', alone. If 'the time' meant 'the number of recurring times', it would surely be *τοῖς χρόνοις*, not *τῷ χρόνῳ*.

§ 12. 'Signs (except *τεκμήρια*), and enthymemes stated or expressed by (i. e. derived from, founded on) signs, are always liable to refutation, even though they be true and genuine, *bona fide*, (*ὑπάρχοντα*, really there, in existence; not imaginary or fictitious,) as was stated at the commencement of this work (I 2.18, *λυτὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο*, this as well as the first, *καν δληθὲς ἦ*): for that no sign can be thrown into the regular syllogistic form is clear to us from the Analytics'. Anal. Pr. II 27. Introd. pp. 162, 3. It wants the universal major premiss, except in the single case of the *τεκμήριον*.

καὶ τὰ εἰκότα· ἔάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμέν τι, οὐχ οὕτω λέ-
λυται¹, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ τὰ² πλείω ἢ πλεον-

1-1 ἔχωμέν τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέλυται,

* οτι. τὰ

§ 13. In this section the clause, *ἔάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν...* ἄλλως, should (it seems) be read thus: *ἔάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμέν τι οὐχ οὕτω, λέλυται, ὅτι οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ πλείω ἢ πλεονάκις ἄλλως* and the succeeding, *ἔάν τε καὶ...* *οὕτω, μαχετέον ἢ ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* The first alteration of the punctuation, and *εἰ καὶ πλείω* for *ἢ καὶ τὰ πλείω*, appear first in Spengel's reprint of the Rhetoric, in his *Rhetores Graeci*; the corresponding alteration of punctuation in the second clause occurs in his recent edition. Bekker, who had adopted the altered punctuation in his 2nd ed., has returned to the original one in his 3rd, whether by mere oversight, or intentionally, who can determine? At all events with the punctuation found in all the editions prior to Bekker's 2nd, the sentences appear to be unintelligible. Vahlen, u. s., pp. 142, 3, has adopted the same alterations with the addition of the not improbable but unnecessary one of *ἔάν τε γὰρ ἔχωμεν ἐν τι*. The connexion of the passage thus altered is this: There are two ways of meeting and refuting an opponent's example, the rhetorical substitute for a complete induction: first, if we have an adverse or contradictory instance (*οὐχ οὔτω*) to bring against his general rule—a case exceptional to the example or examples that he has collected in support of it—this is refuted, at all events so far as to shew that it is not *necessary*, even though the majority of cases (*πλείω καὶ πλέονάκις*, ‘more of them and ostener’) of the same kind, or examples, are ‘otherwise’ (*ἄλλως*, are in another direction, or go to prove the contrary): or, secondly, if the great majority of instances are in conformity with his rule (*οὔτως*), and (which must be supplied) we have no instance to the contrary to adduce, we must then contend that the present instance (any one of his examples) is not analogous, not a case in point, that there is some difference either of kind and quality, or of mode, or some other, whatever it may be, between the example and that with which he compares it, which prevents its applicability here. The objection to this connexion and interpretation is of course the combination of *οὐχ οὔτω* with *ἔάν*; which may perhaps have been Bekker's reason for returning to the original punctuation. But as the sense seems to require the alteration of this, we may perhaps apply to this case Hermann's explanation¹ of the conjunction of *οὐ*, the direct negative with the hypothetical *εἰ*, which may occur in cases where the negative is immediately connected, so as to form a single negative notion with the thing denied, and does not belong to the hypothesis: so that *οὐχ οὔτως* being equivalent to *ἄλλο* or *ἔτερον* may stand in its place with the hypothetical particle: though no other example of this combination with *ἔάν* has been produced. In the choice between the two difficulties, the grammar, I suppose, must give place to the requirements of the sense. Neither Vahlen nor Spengel takes any notice of the grammatical irregularity.

With *καὶ τὰ εἰκότα* in the first clause *πρὸς* is to be carried on from *πρὸς τὰ παραδειγματῶδη*.

¹ Review of Elmsley's Medea, vv. 87, 348. [Comp. *supra* Vol. I. Appendix C, p. 301.]

άκις ἄλλως· ἔάν τε καὶ τὰ πλείω καὶ τὰ *πλεονάκις,
οὐτῷ μαχετέον, ἢ ὅτι¹ τὸ παρὸν οὐχ ὅμοιον ἢ οὐχ
14 ὁμοίως ἢ διαφοράν γέ τινα ἔχει. τὰ δὲ τεκμήρια καὶ
τεκμηριώδη ἐνθυμήματα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον
οὐκ ἔσται λῦσαι (δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῦθ' ἡμῖν ἐκ τῶν ἀν-
λυτικῶν), λείπεται δ' ὡς οὐχ ὑπάρχει τὸ λεγόμενον
δεικνύναι. εἰ δὲ φανερὸν καὶ ὅτι ὑπάρχει καὶ ὅτι
τεκμήριον, ἀλυτον ἥδη γίγνεται τοῦτο· πάντα γὰρ
γίγνεται ἀποδείξει ἥδη φανερά.

I τὸ δ' αὐξεῖν καὶ μειοῦν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθυμήματος CHAP. XXVI.
στοιχεῖον· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸν λέγω στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπον·
ἔστι γὰρ στοιχεῖον καὶ τόπος, εἰς ὃ πολλὰ ἐνθυμή-

¹⁻¹ πλεονάκις οὐτῷ, μαχετέον ἢ ὅτι

οὐχ ὅμοιον ἢ οὐχ ὁμοίως] represent similarity of quality, *τὸ ποιόν*, the third category; and similarity of mode, conveyed by the adverbial termination -ως. “Non esse par, aut non eodem modo geri posse.” Victorius.

§ 14. τεκμήρια] ‘Certain, necessary, signs, and enthymemes of that sort (founded upon them), will not be found capable of refutation in respect of their not being reducible to the syllogistic form—which is plain to us from the Analytics (An. Pr. II 27), and it only remains to shew that the fact alleged is false (or non-existent). But if it be clear both that the fact stated is true, and that it is a necessary sign, *then* indeed it *does* become absolutely insoluble. For by demonstration (the τεκμήριον converted into a syllogism) everything is made quite clear’; when once a thing is demonstrated, the truth of it becomes clear and indisputable. On the τεκμήριον, I 2. 16, 17, 18, μόνον γὰρ ἣν ἀληθὲς γίγνεται τοῦτον ἔστιν.

CHAP. XXVI.

On the object and meaning of this short chapter, Victorius thus writes: “Omnibus iam quae posuerat explicatis, nonnulla quae rudes imperitosque fallere potuissent pertractat: ut bonus enim magister non solum quomodo se res habeat ostendit, sed ne facile aliquis a vero abduci possit, quae adversari videantur refellit.” He not only states what is true, but also guards his disciples against possible error.

§ 1. ‘Amplification and depreciation is not an *element* of enthymeme: by *element* I mean the same things as *topic*: for elements or topics are so many heads under which many enthymemes fall. But amplification and depreciation are enthymemes or inferences to prove that anything is great or little (to exaggerate and exalt, or disparage, depreciate, lower it), just as there are enthymemes to prove that anything is good or bad, or just or unjust, and anything else of the same kind’. Comp. xxii 13. On στοιχεῖον, and how it comes to be convertible with τόπος, see Introd. pp. 127, 8. αὔξειν and μειοῦν are in fact (one or two, under different divisions) of the κοινοὶ τόποι, the *loci*

ματα ἐμπίπτει. τὸ δ' αὐξεῖν καὶ μειοῦν ἔστιν ἐνθυμήματα πρὸς τὸ δεῖξαι ὅτι μέγα ἢ μικρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτιοῦν.
 2 ταῦτα δ' ἔστιν πάντα περὶ ἃ οἱ συλλογισμοὶ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα· ὥστ' εἰ μηδὲ τούτων ἔκαστον ἐνθυμήματος
 3 τόπος, οὐδὲ τὸ αὐξεῖν καὶ μειοῦν. οὐδὲ τὰ λυτικὰ ἐνθυμήματα εἰδός τι ἔστιν ἄλλο τῶν κατασκευαστικῶν· δῆλον γάρ ὅτι λύει μὲν ἢ δεῖξας ἢ ἔνστασιν

communissimi, which can be applied to all the three branches of Rhetoric : and they furnish (*are*, Aristotle says,) enthymemes applicable to all the *εἴδη* in the three branches, as the good and bad treated in I 6, the greater and lesser good in I 7, fair and foul, right and wrong, in I 9, just and unjust in I 13. Comp. II 18. 4, II 19, on the four *κοινοὶ τόποι*; § 26, *περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος*, where he refers to the *προειρημένα*, the chapters of Bk. I already quoted, for exemplifications of it : and II 22. 16. It therefore (it is here spoken of as *one*) differs from the *τόποι ἐνθυμητάτων* of II 23. 24, which are *special* topics of particular classes of enthymemes.

§ 2. ‘And all these are the subjects (or materials) of our syllogisms and enthymemes ; and therefore if none of these (good and bad, just and unjust, &c.) is a topic of enthymeme, neither is amplification and depreciation’. This is the first of the two possible mistakes that require correction.

§ 3. The second is as follows. ‘Neither are refutative enthymemes a distinct kind other than the demonstrative (those that prove the affirmative, *construct*, establish) ; for it is plain that refutation is effected either by direct proof, or by advancing an objection ; and the *proof* is the demonstration of the opposite (the negative of the opponent’s conclusion)—to prove, for instance, if the object was to shew that a crime had been committed, that it has not; or the reverse. And therefore *this* cannot be the difference, because they both employ the same kind of arguments (steps of proof) ; for both bring enthymemes to prove one the fact, the other the negation of it (§ 4). And the objection is no enthymeme at all, but, as in the Topics, to state an opinion (a probable proposition) from which it will clearly appear either that the syllogism is defective (the *reasoning*, logic, is defective) or that something false has been assumed (in the premisses)’. See II 22. 14, 15. II 25. 1, 2, where *ἀντισυλλογίεσθαι* stands for *ἀνταποδεικνύειν* here. It was stated, c. 22. 14, that “*there are two kinds* of enthymemes,” the *δεικτικά* and *ἔλεγκτικά*, founded on the distinction of constructive and destructive, affirmative and negative: in this passage that statement is so far corrected as to deny that this is not a sufficient foundation for a distinction of kinds; the mode of reasoning is the same in both, and therefore as enthymemes they are the same.

§ 4. On *ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς*, see note on II 22. 10, and 25. 3.

ἐνεγκών, ἀνταποδεικνύουσι δὲ τὸ ἀντικείμενον, οἷον εἰ p. 110.
 ἔδειξεν ὅτι γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι οὐ γέγονεν, εἰ δὲ ὅτι
 οὐ γέγονεν, οὗτος ὅτι γέγονεν. ὥστε αὕτη μὲν
 οὐκ ἀν εἴη ή διαφορά· τοῖς αὐτοῖς γὰρ χρῶνται
 ἀμφότεροι ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ή ἔστιν, ἐνθυμήματα
 4 φέρουσιν· ή δὲ ἔνστασις οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνθύμημα, ἀλλὰ
 καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς τὸ εἰπεῖν δόξαν τινὰ ἐξ ής
 ἔσται δῆλον ὅτι οὐ συλλελόγισται ή ὅτι ψεῦδος τι
 εἴληφεν.

5 ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ τρία ἔστιν ἀ δεῖ πραγματευθῆναι περὶ

§ 5. ‘Now of the three departments of Rhetoric that require to be treated, of examples, and maxims, and enthymemes, and the intellectual (logical) part in general¹, whence we are to obtain a supply of them, and how refute them, let us be satisfied with what has been already said: style and order (of the parts of the speech) remain for discussion’.

Dionys., de Comp. Verb. c. I., divides the art of composition into two branches, *διτῆς οὖσης ἀσκήσεως περὶ πάντας τὸν λόγον*, viz. (1) *δ πραγματικὸς τόπος*, the facts, or matter—Ar.’s *πίστεις* (in Rhetoric)—and (2) *λεκτικός*, the style or manner. The latter is again subdivided into *σύνθεσις*, ‘composition’, combination, construction of words in *sentences*, and *ἐκλογὴ τῶν διοράτων*, selection of single words.

This (with the *possible* exception of *τὰ λοιπά* in II 18. 5) is the first notice we have in this work that there *is* anything to consider in Rhetoric beyond the proofs or *πίστεις* that are to be employed in persuasion; and the omission of any distinct mention of it up to this point is certainly remarkable. Of course those who regard the third book as not belonging to the system of Rhetoric embodied in the two first—(no one, except Rose, I think, goes so far as to deny the genuineness of the book as a work of Aristotle)—but as a separate treatise, founded on a different conception of the art, improperly attached to the foregoing, assume that the last words, *λοιπὸν δὲ...τάξεως*, are a subsequent interpolation added to connect the second book with the third. Vahlen, *Trans. Vien. Acad. Oct. 1861*, pp. 131, 2, has again shewn that arbitrary and somewhat dogmatical positiveness which characterises his criticism of Aristotle’s text. He pronounces, that of the last section, only the words which he alters into *περὶ μὲν οὖν παραδειγμάτων—εἰρήσθω ήμūν τοσαῦτα* (omitting *καὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν*)—that is to say, only those which

¹ With *τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν*, comp. Poet. xix 2, *τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ρητορικῆς κείσθω. τοῦτο γάρ ίδιον μᾶλλον ἐκεῖνης τῆς μελέδου. έστι δὲ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν ταῦτα, ὅσα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ παρασκευασθῆναι*: which is followed in § 4 by a brief summary of the principal subjects of Rhetoric. Instead of inferring from this correspondence—as seems most natural—the indisputable genuineness of the words in the Rhetoric, Vahlen (see below in text) uses this passage—to which I suppose he refers—as an argument *against* it; that the (assumed) interpolator borrowed his phrase from Rhet. III 1. 7, and ‘the Poetics’.

τὸν λόγον, ὑπὲρ μὲν παραδειγμάτων καὶ γνωμῶν καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων καὶ ὅλως τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅθεν τε

happen to agree with his theory, that the third book did not form part of the original plan of the work, “are to be regarded as genuine Aristotelian.” The promised proof of this theory, is, I believe, not yet forthcoming.

Brandis is much more reasonable, *Tract on Rhet.* [*Philologus* IV i.] p. 7, 8. He thinks that the second and third parts (the contents of Bk. III., *λέξις* and *τάξις*) are already presupposed in the conception of the art expressed in the preface to the work. (This is certainly nowhere distinctly stated, and the *προσθῆκαι* and *τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος* of I I. 3 seem rather to refer to the exaggerations and appeals to the feelings and such like topics, of which the ‘arts’ of the earlier professors were mainly composed. Still, the *tricks of style*, introduced by Gorgias and his followers into their arts, may be included with the others, E. M. C.). One of the hypotheses suggested by Brandis on the relation of this third book to the two others seems to me highly probable. It is that the third book—which is in fact complete in itself (E. M. C.)—was written earlier than the rest, and before the author had arrived at his final conception of Rhetoric in its connexion with Logic; and was afterwards appended to the two others, instead of a new treatise written specially with a view to them; and this would account for the repetitions, such as that of III 17, which certainly are difficult to explain, if the third book be supposed to have been written after, and in connexion with, the first and second. With regard to the references, as in cc. 1 and 10, to one of the preceding books, Brandis thinks they might easily have been introduced *after the addition* of the third to the two others. He altogether rejects the notion that any one but Aristotle could have been the author of it. (It has in fact all the characteristics of Aristotle’s style, mode of thought and expression, and nothing whatever which is out of character with him: on the other hand let any two sentences in this book and the *Rhet. ad Alex.* be compared, and it is seen at once that the style, manner, and mode of treatment are all totally different. E. M. C.) Lastly he notes that it is characteristic of Aristotle’s writings (this, I think, deserves attention) *not* to give a full account of the contents of the work at the beginning of it; and such omission of style and arrangement was all the more likely in the Rhetoric in so far as it was part of Aristotle’s theory of the art that everything but proof direct or indirect was non-essential and completely subordinate. He concludes, “I think therefore that I need not retract the expression I ventured on above (*Sie ist ein werk aus einem gusse*) that the Rhetoric is, more than most of Aristotle’s writings, a work made at one cast.”

Spengel, in his tract on the Rhetoric, Mun. 1851, (*Trans. Bav. Acad.* p. 40), though he thinks the phraseology of the passage requires alteration in one or two points to bring it into conformity with Aristotle’s ordinary manner, yet as the MSS all agree in giving the words as they stand in our text, says there is no ground for suspecting their genuineness. On the connexion of the third book with the others he gives no opinion. In the note to his recent edition, p. 354, he thinks

εὐπορήσομεν καὶ ὡς αὐτὰ λύσομεν, εἰρήσθω ἡμῖν το- P. 1403 b.
σαῦτα, λοιπὸν δὲ διελθεῖν περὶ λέξεως καὶ τάξεως.

that it may have been added *after* the two first were composed. He pronounces strongly in favour of its genuineness, and against Rose, *Pseudepigraphus*, p. 3 and p. 137 note; adding, for the benefit of that critic, *haec est nostrae aetatis ars critica.*

APPENDIX (D)

ON

B 20 § 5.

εἰ δύναται ἀν.

On ἀν with optative after certain particles.

The attempt to control the free expansion of the Greek language by rigorous rules which forbade the deviation from set forms of speech, and allowed for no irregularities of expression by which nice shades and varieties of thought and feeling might be conveyed; rules derived mostly from a somewhat limited observation, often from the usages of the tragic and comic writers alone, the least departure from which was to be summarily and peremptorily emended; this attempt, which was involved in the practice of scholars like Dawes, Porson, Elmsley and Monk and their followers, has been happily frustrated, and we have learned, chiefly under the guidance of Godfrey Hermann, to deal more liberally and logically with Greek grammar. That Hermann was infallible; that he did not sometimes overreach himself by his own ingenuity; that his nice and subtle distinctions in the interpretation of grammatical variations are always well founded; or that he is always consistent in his explanations, I will not take upon me to assert: but it may at least be said that in this branch of scholarship, the application of logic to Greek grammar, he has done more than any other scholar, past or present.

On this principle, that of leaving the Greeks to express themselves as they please, let us not in the passage before us omit ἀν, though MSS Q, Y^b, Z^b do so, but rather endeavour to explain it.

The facts of the case are these. There are numerous instances in the Greek poets and prose writers of ἀν joined with the opt. mood and various particles, in which ordinary usage would seem to require either the subj. with ἀν or the opt. without it. ἀν and the opt. are found (1) with relatives, as Thuc. VIII 68, *ἀν γνοί εἰπεῖν*, Plat. Phaed. 89 D, *οὐδὲ ἀν ἤγγισατο*. Xen. Memor. IV 1. 2, *μημονέειν ἀ δύ μάθουειν*, (this is immediately preceded by the ordinary grammar,

μανθάνειν οἷς προσέχουεν, ‘to learn whatever they gave their attention to’, which must imply a change of meaning corresponding to the change of expression). Ib. de rep. Lac. II 10, ἐπιτάσσειν ὅτι ἀν ἀγαθὸν δοκοίη εἶναι. (2) with ὡς, δπως, δπῃ, with which the subj. and not the opt. is usually joined, Thuc. VIII 54, δπη ἀν δοκοίη. Aesch. Agam. 355, δπως ἀν—βέλος ἥλιθιον σκήψειν. Arist. Av. 1337, γενοίμαν ἀετός, ως ἀν ποταθείνην. Plat. Protag. 318 E, δπως ἀν, cum optativo bis: and numerous examples in Herm. *de Particula ἀν*, III 4, p. 151: four in Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 810. 4. (3) after δταν (Aesch. Pers. 450, δταν ἐκσωζόιατο), δπόταν, ἐπειδάν, Dem. adv. Onet. p. 865, § 6, ἐπειδὰν δοκιμασθείην, ἔως, ἔωσπερ, Andoc. περὶ μυστηρίων § 81, ἔως ἀν οἱ νόμοι τεθέλεν, Soph. Trach. 687, ἔως ἀν ἀρμόσαιμι, Dem. c. Aphob. p. 814, ἔως ἀν δοκιμασθείην, Pl. Phaedo 101 D, ἔως ἀν σκέψαιο; μέχρι περ, Pl. Tim. 56 D, μέχρι περ ἀν...γῇ γένοιτο; πρὶν, Soph. Trach. 2, πρὶν ἀν θάνοι τις, Antiph. de caede Herodis, § 34, πρὶν ἀν ἐγὼ ἔλθοιμι. (4) After δέδοικα μή, Soph. Trach. 630, δέδοικα γὰρ μὴ πρῷ λέγοις ἀν, and Philoct. 493, ὃν δὴ παλαῖ’ ἀν ἐξ ὅτου δέδοικ’ ἐγὼ μή μοι βεβήκοι. Thuc. II 93, προσδοκία...μὴ ἀν ποτε.. ἐπιπλεύσειαν. Xen. Anab. VI I. I, ἐκεῖνο ἐννοῶ μὴ λίαν ἀν ταχὺ σωφρονισθείην. (5) After εἰ, εἰπερ, Rhet. II 20. 5, II 23. 7, εἰ προδοίη ἀν, Ib. § 20, εἰ δοίη ἀν. Plat. Theaet. 170 C, σκόπει εἰ ἐθέλοι ἀν, Men. 98 B, εἰπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην ἀν εἰδέναι, Phileb. 21 D, εἴ τις δέξαιτ’ ἀν, Protag. 329 B, εἰπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ... πειθούμην ἀν, Legg. VII 807 B, εἰ ἔγροιμεν ὅν. Ib. x 905 C. Rep. VIII 553 E, σκοπῶμεν εἰ ὅμοιος ἀν εἴη. Eur. Hel. 825, εἴ πως ἀν ἀναπείσαιμεν. All, I conceive, or most of these well-established usages would have been condemned as solecisms by Dawes or Elmsley.

In the first class of cases, where ἀν with the opt. follows a relative, the simple explanation seems to be this. Take, for instance, the passage of Xen. Mem. IV I. 2, above quoted. *μανθάνειν οἷς προσέχουεν* is “to learn whatever they gave their attention to”, the opt. indicating *indefinite possibility*, and the *indefiniteness* implying a liability to *recurrence*; an uncertainty as to when the thing will occur; a possible frequency, which we express by the addition of *ever* to the relative; whatever, whenever. The addition of the *conditional* ἀν suggests some condition attached to the act, and the “whatever they attended to” becomes “whatever they would, could, or might, attend to”, under certain circumstances which may be imagined but are not expressed.

In class (2) ως ἀν, δπως ἀν with the opt. are usually explained by *quomodo* (Hermann), ‘how’, ‘in what way’, which is equivalent to ‘that’. Thus in the passage of Aristophanes, quoted, under this head, “Oh that I were changed into an eagle that so I might fly”, ως ‘how’, ‘in what way’, may be resolved into δπως οὗτως (see Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 480, obs. 3) ‘that in that way’, ‘that so’; and the opt. with ἀν is exactly what it is in an independent sentence, a modified future

or imperative, as the grammars sometimes call it (Matth. *Gr. Gr.* § 515, β , γ), or rather a *potential mood* or *conditional tense* like that of the French and Italian verb. This is well illustrated by a passage of the Pseudo-Plat. Eryxias, p. 392 C, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν συμκρῶν τούτων ἀν μᾶλλον ὄργιζουντο, οὐτως ως ἀν μάλιστα χαλεπώτατοι εἴησαν, where the addition of οὐτως shews how ως is to be interpreted. Herm. *de Part.* ἀν, IV 11. 12, and III 4, p. 151 seq. divides these cases into two heads, the first, in which ως ἀν, &c. signify *quomodo*; the second, in which the conjunction retains its proper signification ‘that’, indicating the *end* or *purpose*, and the opt. with ἀν is used only “ubi finis is est, ut possit aliquid fieri”—where it indicates *possibility under certain conditions*. In all the examples that he gives, III 11, the other explanation is equally applicable.

(3) Conjunctions of *time*, with *āv* and opt. Hermann in his treatise does not separate these cases from the rest, and deal with them as a separate class, as he does in the case of *ōs āv*, &c., and the conditional sentence: the object of his first chapter on this subject, III 4, is summed up (p. 151) "apparet ex his reprehensione vacuum esse usum optativi pro coniunctivo, adiuncta particula *āv*:" from which it would appear that his object was rather the establishment of the *fact* than the explanation of it. But the *ut quid possit fieri* may be intended to extend to all cases of opt. with *āv*, though it is confined in expression to that of the *particulae finales*, *ōs*, *ōtwos*, &c., p. 154. In his note on Trach. 2, he attributes the opt. *θávōi* to the *obliqua oratio* in which it occurs: which however leaves the *āv* unaccounted for. The *time* or tense of the preceding verb has at all events nothing to do with the explanation; the preceding verb is not always a past tense. Perhaps it may be sufficient to say, that it appears from numerous examples, that the optative with or without *āv* may be used in the same constructions with conjunctions expressing time, as the subjunctive with or without *āv* (*āv* being often omitted, especially in verse, with *τρίτη*, *ἔως*, &c.) with a slight difference of sense; the subjunctive expressing as usual a future expectation, the optative the bare possibility, or the *indefinite* issue of an event, the *āv*, as usual, adding the notion of certain conditions to which it is subject.

These differences are so nice and subtle, that they are often hardly capable of being expressed in translation: unless it happen, as is not often the case, that there are words in the one language corresponding to those which we wish to render in the other, so far as to suggest exactly similar associations. Perhaps the differences between $\pi\acute{r}iv\theta\acute{a}ry$ or $\pi\acute{r}iv\grave{\alpha}v\theta\acute{a}ry$, and $\pi\acute{r}iv\theta\acute{a}voi$ may be partially represented by 'ere he shall or may be dead', and 'ere he might be dead', implying uncertainty or mere possibility of the event; but when we come to $\pi\acute{r}iv\grave{\alpha}v\theta\acute{a}voi$, where the condition, or circumstances under

which it may occur, is added, it seems impossible to convey the whole by any tolerable English translation, since we have nothing corresponding to *ἄν*, a word of two letters, suggestive of associations which would require in English certainly more than one word to express.

(4) The same explanation may be applied to the rare cases in which *μή* preceded by *δέδοικα* or something equivalent is followed by the optative with *ἄν*.

On these cases Jelf, *Gr. Gr.* § 814 c, expresses a similar opinion. “The opt. is also used in its secondary meaning to express more decidedly a doubt as to the realization of the object, a possibility only of its being so (this is Hermann’s explanation of the signification of the mood): *ἄν* is added when the suspicion is supposed to depend upon a condition: Xen. Anab. VI 1. 29” (quoted above).

The reason why the subjunctive after particles of purpose (*ὡς*, *ὅπως*, &c.), time, and fear (*μή*) is most usual, and the opt. comparatively rare, so as to appear even irregular, is that the former of the two moods, which conveys merely the future expectation, is the expression of the direct and immediate tendency of the impulse or emotion; of that which the subject would naturally and usually feel: whereas the notion of possibility and condition would be, in comparison with the other, very rarely suggested.

(5) The fifth class of cases of opt. with *ἄν*, with *εἰ* or other conditional particles, is treated by Hermann in a special chapter, u.s., c. 11, and abundantly illustrated. He distinguishes two varieties of these, one peculiar to the Epic poets, “particulam (sc. *ἄν*) sic adiectam habens, ut magis ad voculam conditionalem, quam ad optativum pertineat: quare cultior sermo ut non necessariam omittit,” p. 171. In the second, “nihil nisi particula conditionalis vel finalis ad optativum rectae orationis cum *ἄν* coniunctum accedit,” p. 173. That is to say, if the optative with *ἄν* can be used in an independent proposition, as the conditional tense (see above), it may equally well be so used with a conditional particle attached, which is the mere addition, and nothing more, to the independent proposition, and does not affect the construction: and this is the view I had myself taken. And this is especially true when *εἰ*, as often happens, has lost its conditional force, and become the mere equivalent of ‘that.’ It also is frequently used interrogatively, as *πότερον* (some of my instances exemplify this); and as *πότερον* can of course be joined with *ἄν* and opt. in their ordinary sense, so likewise can *εἰ*, when it stands for the other. There is an actual example of this in Pseudo-Plat. Eryx. 393 B, *ἢρόμην πότερον ἄν φαίη*, ‘whether he would or should say’.

Mr Paley, Appendix C to Aesch. Suppl. Ed. 2 with Latin Commentary, has a note on “*ὡς* *ἄν* with opt.”, which is withdrawn

in the complete edition of Aeschylus, 1861. He there distinguishes two usages of ὡς, or διπλῶς, ἀν with the opt., in one of which, the more usual, (where the particle is to be interpreted *quomodo*,) he says “ἀν semper pertinet ad verbum”. This means, as I understand it, that when ὡς or διπλῶς signifies ‘how’, ‘in what way’, ἀν is to be construed with the verb, and the two are to be understood in precisely the same sense and construction as they have in an independent proposition: as I have myself also explained it. But in the other, in which ὡς, διπλῶς, are ‘in order that’, ἀν adheres closely to, and is to be construed with, the conjunction, ὡς—ἀν; so that the two combined may retain the ordinary sense of purpose, as in the case of ὡς ἀν with the subjunctive. It seems to me better not to make a difference in the explanation of idioms to all appearance identical, provided they *can* be explained in the same way; as I have endeavoured to shew. And also, I see no reason for supposing that the conditional particle can ever be separated from the verb that it conditions, and associated with anything else, either in conception or grammatical construction: the condition must accompany and modify the *action*, which is expressed by the verb.



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